Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case under review is an appeal regarding the resentencing of Vivian Tat, who was involved in a money-laundering scheme. At her initial sentencing, Tat was convicted on several counts and sentenced to 24 months imprisonment. However, she appealed and the higher court vacated her conviction on one count and her sentence, remanding for de novo resentencing. At the resentencing hearing, Tat received an 18-month sentence.Her appeal to this court is her second one, and she argues that the lower court erred in applying sentencing enhancements related to her role as an organizer/leader and her abuse of trust, improperly considered "cost" in dismissing her community-service proposal at sentencing, and violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 by failing to make factual findings about certain parts of her presentence report.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a criminal defendant’s failure to challenge specific aspects of her initial sentence on a prior appeal does not waive her right to challenge comparable aspects of a newly imposed sentence following de novo resentencing. The court found that the lower court had erred in applying an organizer/leader enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, as Tat’s status as a mere member of the criminal enterprise did not bear on whether she was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of the criminal activity, and the criminal conduct was not “otherwise extensive.” However, the district court did not err in applying an enhancement for abuse of trust under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, where Tat’s position as a manager at the bank gave her the discretion to carry out transactions like the one at issue here without oversight, and where her position of trust facilitated her role in the underlying offense. The court also found that the lower court did not improperly consider “cost” in dismissing Tat’s community-service proposal. The court vacated Tat’s sentence and remanded to the district court for resentencing consistent with this opinion. View "United States v. Tat" on Justia Law

In this case, Markanthony Sapalasan was arrested and his backpack was searched. After the arrest, his backpack was taken into police custody, and Sapalasan was taken to the police station for questioning regarding a potential murder. After questioning, Sapalasan was released, but his backpack remained in police custody. Approximately six hours later, Officer Tae Yoon conducted an inventory search of the backpack and discovered methamphetamine. Sapalasan was subsequently convicted of two drug felonies and appealed the conviction, claiming that the search of his backpack violated his Fourth Amendment rights.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the police may constitutionally conduct an inventory search of belongings when the property is lawfully retained and the search is done in compliance with police regulations, even after the individual has been released. The court found that the lawfulness of the initial separation of Sapalasan from his backpack was unchallenged, so the justification of an inventory search did not depend on whether he was headed to jail. The court also determined that Officer Yoon's inventory search substantially complied with the police department's policy. Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court's denial of Sapalasan's motion to suppress the methamphetamine found during the search. View "USA V. SAPALASAN" on Justia Law

A petitioner, Joseph William Hart, appealed the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The case emerged from a 1988 trial in which Hart was convicted of the murder of Diana H., and of the rape, sodomy, and forced oral copulation of Amy R. Hart was sentenced to death.Hart argued that the State suppressed evidence that could have impeached one of the prosecution’s expert witnesses, Dr. Dewitt Hunter, in violation of Brady v. Maryland. He also argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge Dr. Hunter’s qualifications and testimony.The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of Hart's petition. It held that the Supreme Court of California could have reasonably concluded that the impeachment evidence Hart referred to was not material. The court also found that Hart's trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge Dr. Hunter's qualifications and testimony. The court determined that Hart's counsel's decisions were entitled to deference and that Hart provided no substantial evidence that another expert would have contradicted Dr. Hunter's findings. View "JOSEPH HART V. RON BROOMFIELD" on Justia Law

In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the petitioner, Terry Eugene Iversen, appealed the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Iversen had been sentenced to life without parole (LWOP) for the crime of public indecency under Oregon’s sex offender recidivism statute due to his extensive criminal history, which included prior convictions for public indecency, rape, and sodomy. Iversen argued that the LWOP sentence was grossly disproportionate to his offense, in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.The court, applying the demanding standard required by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, upheld the district court’s decision. The court found that the Oregon state court’s decision concerning Iversen’s sentence was not contrary to Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. The court considered Iversen’s extensive history of adult felony recidivism, his mental health record, his failed opportunities to reform, and the fact that he remained dangerous to others. The court also noted Oregon’s public-safety interest in incapacitating and deterring recidivist felons like Iversen.The court concluded that Iversen’s sentence did not raise an inference of gross disproportionality given the gravity of his offense and criminal history. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of Iversen’s habeas petition. View "Iversen v. Pedro" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed Jose Jimenez-Chaidez's conviction for knowingly importing cocaine and methamphetamine, vacated his sentence, and remanded the case for resentencing.The court's decision had several key components. First, it approved the lower court's decision to admit evidence of Jimenez's prior drug smuggling activities, as it demonstrated his knowledge and intent, and was not unduly prejudicial. Second, the court found no abuse of discretion by the district court in allowing an FBI agent to testify as a lay witness about extracting data from a cellphone, holding that specialized knowledge was not required for this testimony.The court did, however, find error in the district court's failure to make an explicit reliability finding regarding an expert's testimony about the value of the drugs found in Jimenez's vehicle. Nevertheless, it determined this error was harmless.Lastly, the court vacated Jimenez's sentence and remanded for resentencing, in line with recent authority guiding the process for conducting a mitigating role inquiry under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. The court clarified that the relevant comparison for this inquiry is to other participants in the defendant's crime, not to typical defendants who commit similar crimes. View "USA V. JIMENEZ-CHAIDEZ" on Justia Law

In this appeal before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the appellant, Michael McLaughlin, challenged his state court convictions for attempted murder, battery, and burglary arising from a stabbing attack on multiple employees at a social services office in Nevada. He argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for not pursuing a defense of voluntary intoxication to negate specific intent, a required element for the charges.The district court denied McLaughlin's habeas corpus petition, but the Ninth Circuit initially vacated and remanded the decision. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court again denied relief, concluding that despite new evidence, the appellant's trial counsel had not provided ineffective assistance and that McLaughlin had not demonstrated prejudice.On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Shinn v. Martinez Ramirez, which clarified standards for considering new evidence in federal habeas proceedings, meant that the lower court was barred from considering any new evidence offered by McLaughlin. The Ninth Circuit found that McLaughlin's failure to present that evidence to the state courts "in compliance with state procedural rules" constituted a failure to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) as construed by Shinn. The court also noted that under Shinn, it made no difference that McLaughlin's first post-conviction counsel's negligence led to that failure.As McLaughlin conceded that he could not succeed on his ineffective assistance claim unless the new evidence was considered, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of McLaughlin's habeas petition. View "MCLAUGHLIN V. OLIVER" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the constitutionality of a pretrial release condition that temporarily barred two defendants from possessing firearms pending trial. The defendants, Jesus Perez-Garcia and John Thomas Fencl, were charged with various felony offenses. The district courts imposed a condition barring them from possessing firearms as part of their pretrial release, arguing that the restriction was necessary for public safety. The defendants appealed, arguing that this condition infringed on their Second Amendment rights.The Ninth Circuit disagreed, finding that the firearm condition was constitutional. The court reasoned that the Bail Reform Act of 1984's firearm condition on pretrial release is consistent with how courts have historically balanced the constitutional rights of pretrial detainees with public safety considerations. The court also pointed out that the nation has a long history of temporarily disarming criminal defendants facing serious charges and those deemed dangerous or unwilling to follow the law. Therefore, the court held that the temporary disarmament of the defendants was justified by this historical tradition. View "United States v. Garcia" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the defendant, Melchor Orozco-Orozco, was appealing his conviction for being a previously removed alien found in the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Orozco had previously been removed from the U.S. following a conviction for carjacking under California Penal Code § 215, which had been classified as an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).The appellate court examined whether this classification was correct. It found that the California Supreme Court had determined that a person could commit carjacking under § 215 without the intent to steal required by a generic theft offense. This court held that Orozco's carjacking conviction did not qualify as an aggravated felony under the INA because § 215 was not a categorical match for a “theft offense.”The appellate court reversed the district court's order denying Orozco's motion to dismiss his indictment in accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) and sent the case back to the lower court for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court's order denying Orozco's motion to dismiss his indictment on equal protection grounds. View "USA V. OROZCO-OROZCO" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a federal habeas corpus petition by Raymond Anthony Lewis, who was sentenced to death in 1991 after a California jury convicted him of the first-degree murder of Sandra Simms. Lewis argued that the state trial court's admission of his juvenile confession to a prior murder was unconstitutional and that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present evidence of his innocence of the prior murder. The court concluded that the California Supreme Court's affirmance of the trial court's admission of Lewis's juvenile confession was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law and that Lewis's trial counsel’s litigation of the evidence of the prior murder did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.Lewis also contended that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective by failing to investigate, develop, and present certain mitigating evidence during the penalty phase of the trial. The court found that Lewis failed to show that his trial counsel’s performance fell below an objectively reasonable standard. His counsel made reasonable strategic decisions to ask for the jury’s mercy and to appeal to any lingering doubt the jurors may have had about Lewis’s guilt. The court also concluded that much of the evidence Lewis argued his trial counsel was ineffective in not introducing would have been cumulative of evidence his counsel did introduce.Lewis also raised uncertified claims on appeal, but the court denied a certificate of appealability on these claims. View "LEWIS V. ANDES" on Justia Law

The case involved an appeal by Philip James Layfield against his convictions for wire fraud, mail fraud, and various tax offenses. Layfield argued that the 21-day period it took the U.S. Marshals Service to transport him from the District of New Jersey, where he was arrested, to the Central District of California (CDCA), where he was indicted, violated the Speedy Trial Act and required the court to overturn his convictions. The argument centered on a provision of the Speedy Trial Act that mandates trial commencement within seventy days from the date a defendant appears before a judicial officer of the court where the charge is pending.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected Layfield's argument, affirming his convictions. The court ruled that the 21-day delay between Layfield's detention in New Jersey and his first appearance before a judge in the CDCA was immaterial to the Speedy Trial Act analysis. The court held that a plain reading of the relevant section of the Speedy Trial Act dictates that the 21-day delay did not trigger a Speedy Trial Act violation. The court also rejected Layfield's argument that a different provision became relevant because he was detained. The court held that this provision applies to prisoners traveling between jurisdictions for court proceedings once the seventy-day clock has started, not to a pre-indictment or pre-appearance transfer. View "USA V. LAYFIELD" on Justia Law