Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In the Central District of California, defendant-appellant Christopher Esqueda was convicted for possession of a firearm as a felon, following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence collected during an undercover operation. Undercover agents, with Esqueda's consent, entered his motel room to conduct a controlled purchase of a firearm. The agents secretly recorded the encounter using audio-video equipment concealed on their persons. Esqueda argued that the secret recording of the encounter exceeded the scope of the "implied license" he granted when he consented to the officers' physical entry, hence infringing upon his Fourth Amendment rights.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that no Fourth Amendment search occurred. It relied on longstanding Supreme Court precedents asserting that an undercover officer who physically enters a premises with express consent and secretly records only what he can see and hear by virtue of his consented entry does not trespass, physically intrude, or otherwise engage in a search violative of the Fourth Amendment. The court noted that the Supreme Court's decisions in Florida v. Jardines and United States v. Jones, which outline a property-based, trespassory test for Fourth Amendment violations, do not disturb this principle. View "USA V. ESQUEDA" on Justia Law

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the defendant, William Klensch, appealed his sentence after pleading guilty to one count of transportation of an illegal alien. Klensch argued that he was entitled to a minor-role reduction in his sentencing, contending that he had no knowledge of the full smuggling operation and was paid only a small sum for his part. The district court denied this reduction because Klensch was the one physically transporting the individuals. However, the appellate court ruled that the district court did not apply the correct legal standard in denying a minor-role reduction, as the court did not conduct a proper comparative analysis of Klensch’s conduct. The court noted that the district court's explanation did not indicate it considered the factors required for a minor-role reduction. As such, the appellate court vacated Klensch’s sentence and remanded for resentencing in regard to the minor-role reduction.Additionally, Klensch argued that the district court erred by imposing a dangerous-weapons enhancement because he did not possess the stun gun in his car in connection with his illegal smuggling activity. The appellate court rejected this argument, as Klensch acknowledged having the stun gun within his reach while transporting the two men. The court ruled that even if the district court applied an incorrect standard of proof by not requiring the Government to prove a nexus to the stun gun, this error was harmless. As such, the district court's imposition of the dangerous-weapons enhancement was affirmed. View "USA V. KLENSCH" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences of four defendants who were involved in the January 2016 occupation of the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge in eastern Oregon. The defendants were charged with various offenses including conspiracy to impede officers of the United States, possession of firearms in a federal facility, and depredation of government property. The court rejected the defendants' contentions that the district court erred in the jury selection process and that they were entitled to a jury trial for the misdemeanor offenses charged. The court also held that the evidence was sufficient to support the defendants' misdemeanor and felony convictions. Furthermore, the court rejected the defendants' arguments that their Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was violated. The court remanded the case back to the district court to resolve certain issues related to the sealing and discovery of materials. The court's ruling is significant as it addressed the rights of the accused in the context of jury selection and the conduct of the trial. View "USA V. EHMER" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the second federal habeas corpus petition by Jaime Dean Charboneau, who sought to overturn his conviction for the 1984 shooting death of his ex-wife in Idaho. Charboneau alleged that Idaho officials violated their obligations under Brady v. Maryland by encouraging his ex-wife's daughter, Tira, to provide false statements and testimony regarding her mother’s death and to dispose of potentially exculpatory evidence. In support of these allegations, Charboneau relied on a letter written by Tira in 1989. However, the court held that Charboneau failed to meet the threshold requirement of showing actual innocence as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) for consideration of second or successive federal habeas petitions. The court held that, even if the letter was genuine, the statements in the letter, viewed in light of all the evidence, were not sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have convicted Charboneau of first-degree murder. The court concluded that Charboneau’s new materials did not suffice to make the requisite showing of actual innocence. Therefore, the district court properly dismissed his petition without reaching the merits of his Brady claim. View "CHARBONEAU V. DAVIS" on Justia Law

Defendant participated in a drug distribution operation in Hawaii and charged with possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and heroin. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court should not have applied the leader-or-organizer enhancement under Section 3B1.1(c) of the Sentencing Guidelines because no evidence suggests that he “exercised control over others” in the organization.The Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that the level of control required to be an organizer is only “the ability and influence necessary to coordinate the activities of others to achieve the desired result.” United States v. Doe, 778 F.3d 814, 824 (9th Cir. 2015). View "USA V. DANIEL VINGE" on Justia Law

Petitioner was sentenced to death after a California jury found her guilty of attempted murder and first-degree murder, finding true the special circumstances of lying in wait and murder for financial gain. Petitioner appealed the district court’s denial of her 28 U.S.C. Section 2254(d) habeas petition. In the petition, Petitioner argued that the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct during penalty-phase closing arguments by referencing Biblical verses to persuade the jury to impose a death sentence. Applying the extremely deferential standard required by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial. The panel granted a Certificate of Appealability (COA) as to Petitioner’s claim that the prosecutor improperly used peremptory challenges in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). After conducting a comparative juror analysis, the panel concluded that, under AEDPA’s deferential standard of review, the California Supreme Court’s finding that the trial court did not err in determining there was no purposeful discrimination was an objectively reasonable determination of the facts. View "MAUREEN MCDERMOTT V. DEBORAH JOHNSON" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and using a firearm during a crime of violence. Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255. He argued that his Section 924(c) conviction and its mandatory 15-year consecutive sentence should be vacated because his predicate crime, voluntary manslaughter, does not qualify as a crime of violence.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion. The panel wrote that for purposes of Section 924(c), voluntary manslaughter has the same mental state as murder—intent to commit a violent act against another or recklessness with extreme indifference to human life. Like murder, voluntary manslaughter requires at least an “extreme and necessarily oppositional” state of mind. The panel held that the district court therefore properly denied Defendant’s Section 2255 motion. View "USA V. DANIEL DRAPER" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is an Idaho prisoner facing execution by lethal injection. He challenged Idaho’s execution practices. He alleged that these practices: 1) interfere with his ability to challenge the State’s method of execution as cruel and unusual punishment; 2) inhibit his ability to seek clemency; 3) inflict mental anguish; 4) increase the risk of an unconstitutionally painful execution; 5) treat similarly situated prisoners unequally; 6) violate the separation of powers under the Idaho Constitution; and 7) contravene Idaho Code Section 19-2716’s requirement that the director of the Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC) establish procedures governing executions. On remand, and in light of then-co-plaintiff’s scheduled execution, the district court sua sponte dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6).   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court rejected Plaintiff’s contention that the district court violated the rule of mandate by denying leave to amend in connection with the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of the complaint. The court explained that although its decision in Pizzuto I noted parenthetically that Plaintiff should be permitted to amend the complaint, the court did not foreclose the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of the complaint or address whether, in connection with such a dismissal, further amendment would be futile. The court agreed with the district court that amendment of several of Plaintiff’s claims would be futile. The court therefore affirmed the dismissal with prejudice of the First Amendment claims based on access to execution-related information. View "THOMAS CREECH, ET AL V. JOSH TEWALT, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs—five individuals and the California Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc.—filed this action in the Southern District of California challenging the constitutionality of Section 32310 under the Second Amendment. On September 22, 2023, the district court issued an order declaring Section 32310 “unconstitutional in its entirety” and enjoining California officials from enforcing the law. Defendant Rob Bonta, the Attorney General of California, filed an emergency motion for a partial stay pending appeal. The Attorney General seeks to stay “all portions of the order except those regarding Sections 32310(c) and (d), which relate to large-capacity magazines that were acquired and possessed lawfully prior to the district court’s order granting a permanent injunction.”   The Ninth Circuit granted the motion. First, the court concluded that the Attorney General is likely to succeed on the merits. The court explained that the Attorney General makes strong arguments that Section 32310 comports with the Second Amendment under Bruen. Second, the Attorney General has shown that California will be irreparably harmed absent a stay pending appeal by presenting evidence that large-capacity magazines pose significant threats to public safety. Third, it does not appear that staying portions of the district court’s order while the merits of this appeal are pending will substantially injure other parties interested in the proceedings. Finally, the court concluded that the public interest tips in favor of a stay. View "VIRGINIA DUNCAN, ET AL V. ROB BONTA" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted in 1982 of first-degree murders. He was also convicted of one count of mutilation of human remains and one count of attempted murder and mayhem. The jury found a multiple murder special circumstance allegation and sentenced Petitioner to death. The California Supreme Court reversed Petitioner’s conviction for attempted murder and mayhem and affirmed Petitioner’s murder convictions and death sentence.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Petitioner’s petition challenging his California conviction and capital sentence for six counts of first-degree murder. The panel held that Petitioner’s pre-AEDPA October 1992 pro se filing seeking appointment of counsel was not an “actual application” that sought “adjudication” on the merits and that AEDPA applied to the habeas petition filed by appointed counsel in April 1997. The panel held that the California Supreme Court’s decision that Petitioner’s July 1982 pre-trial Faretta request to represent himself was equivocal was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court. The panel held that the California Supreme Court’s decision that Clark’s August 1982 Faretta request was untimely was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court. The panel held that the district court properly concluded that the California Supreme Court’s opinion holding that Petitioner’s Marsden rights were not violated was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court View "DOUGLAS CLARK V. RON BROOMFIELD" on Justia Law