Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Jackson pleaded guilty to conspiracy to engage in sex trafficking in exchange for the government’s promise to recommend a sentencing range of 120–180 months’ imprisonment. Despite assuring the court during the plea colloquy that there was no “side agreement,” Jackson later argued that he relied on the government’s oral promise that it would not offer his codefendant (Young) a lesser sentence. Young was offered a 90-month sentence. Jackson also claimed ineffective assistance based on his attorney’s failure to ensure that the government’s oral promise was made a part of the record. The district court denied Jackson’s 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion. The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, first holding that Jackson’s notice of appeal was valid because his requests for a certificate of appealability, received before the FRAP 4(a)(1)(B) deadline, made clear his intention to appeal; his 2255 motion was not an improper “second or successive” motion because the underlying factual circumstances did not occur until after an earlier 2255 motion was resolved. The record was not sufficient to overcome the presumption that Jackson’s written plea agreement and his sworn plea colloquy statements described the complete agreement. Jackson’s claim was also barred by a collateral attack waiver. The district court abused its discretion by failing to consider Jackson’s pro se letter as a request to amend his section 2255 motion to add a claim of ineffective assistance. View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Based on his participation in a scheme to issue California commercial driver’s licenses to persons who had not passed the requisite tests, Turchin was convicted of fraud involving identification documents, 18 U.S.C. 1028(a)(1) and under 18 U.S.C. 371, for conspiracy to violate the prohibitions on bribery concerning a program receiving federal funds under 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(B) and (a)(2) and to commit fraud involving identification documents under section 1028(a).The Ninth Circuit reversed in part. Turchin’s actions fell within the scope of conduct covered by section 1028(a)(1) but the district court erred in instructing the jury. Section 1028(c)(1) provides that the requisite federal nexus exists if “the identification document . . . is or appears to be issued by or under the authority of the United States or a sponsoring entity of an event designated as a special event of national significance.” “United States” refers only to the national government, and does not refer broadly to the United States and all of its component parts. The district court erroneously instructed the jury that the federal nexus was automatically satisfied by showing that the identification document was issued by a state government. A reasonable jury could conclude that Turchin’s production of California driver’s licenses to the particular unqualified drivers at issue affected interstate commerce under 1028(c)(3)(A) and there was sufficient evidence supporting the federal nexus element of the alleged conspiracy to violate section 666. View "United States v. Turchin" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit filed (1) an order withdrawing the opinion and dissent filed on June 23, 2021, denying a petition for panel rehearing, and denying on behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc; and (2) an amended opinion denying the petition for review of a decision of the BIA.In the amended opinion, the panel held that, in determining whether a conviction satisfies the thirty-gram limit of the personal-use exception to the ground of removability based on drug convictions, the circumstance-specific approach applies to determining the amount of marijuana involved in the conviction. In this case, the circumstance specific to petitioner clearly established that the amount of marijuana in his possession exceeded thirty grams. View "Bogle v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted the petition for review of the BIA's decision agreeing with the IJ that petitioner's convictions were crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs) and that she was not entitled to cancellation of removal. The panel concluded that petitioner's convictions are not CIMTs and therefore she was not removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).In 2010, petitioner was convicted of solicitation to possess for sale less than two pounds of marijuana, in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-1002 (solicitation), 13-3405(A)(2) (possession for sale), and (B)(4) (less than two pounds). Shortly thereafter, petitioner was convicted of offering to transport less than two pounds of marijuana for sale, in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-3405(A)(4) (offer to transport) and (B)(10) (less than two pounds). The panel concluded that Arizona Revised Statutes 13-3405(A)(4), which prohibits certain conduct relating to marijuana, is overbroad and divisible; petitioner's section 13-3505(A) convictions, which involved categories in the statute involving the smallest quantity of marijuana, were not CIMTs; and petitioner was therefore not removable. View "Walcott v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision dismissing petitioner's appeal of the IJ's order pretermitting his application for cancellation. The BIA held that petitioner failed to establish that he had not been convicted of offenses with an aggregate sentence of at least 5 years.The panel concluded that the phrase "an offense" in 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(C) includes the multiple criminal convictions described in 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(B) that render an alien inadmissible. The panel rejected petitioner's contention that because the statutory disqualification is phrased in the singular, his multiple offenses do not trigger ineligibility. The panel also rejected petitioner's contention that the BIA erred in finding that his multiple convictions resulted in aggregated sentences of at least five years because the agency relied on the 2013 judgment, a record not clearly related to petitioner. Rather, substantial evidence supports the agency's determination that petitioner did not satisfy his burden to show that he had not been convicted of the qualifying offenses. View "Ramirez-Medina v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit withdrew its previous opinion; filed a replacement opinion affirming the prejudice portion of the district court's order denying a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion in which defendant challenged his felon-in-possession guilty plea on the ground that he was not informed of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1)'s knowledge-of-status element; and otherwise denied a petition for rehearing and, on behalf of the court, a petition for rehearing en banc. In this case, defendant fails to show actual prejudice from any error as nothing in the record objectively demonstrates that he would have not pled guilty had he known of section 922(g)(1)'s knowledge-of-status element. View "United States v. Pollard" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a habeas corpus petition challenging petitioner's Arizona conviction and death sentence for first-degree murder. Petitioner contends that his counsel did not investigate and present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase, including evidence of diffuse brain damage, childhood abuse, and substance abuse.The panel applied Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and concluded that petitioner has not shown either that his trial counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient or that the deficiencies were prejudicial. In this case, there is no showing that the education records nor the incarceration records contain meaningful mitigation evidence; petitioner has not met his burden of showing that counsel erred by not investigating and presenting evidence of his childhood abuse; petitioner's allegation that counsel erred by not investigating and presenting evidence of his substance abuse fails because counsel was not timely informed of his substance abuse; and petitioner has not shown that counsel erred by not seeking a psychological evaluation. View "Washington v. Shinn" on Justia Law

Orange County jail inmates brought 42 U.S.C. 1983 and other federal claims based on alleged failure to combat COVID-19. The district court granted provisional class certification and issued a preliminary injunction under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which automatically expired 90 days after being issued.The Ninth Circuit dismissed an appeal as moot because the injunction and provisional class certification are no longer in effect. While the Supreme Court’s emergency stay of the preliminary injunction may have prevented the injunction from having any further effect, it did not toll the 90-day limit unambiguously detailed in the PLRA. The court rejected the County’s assertion that the appeal fell within an exception to mootness because the issue was capable of repetition but evading review, noting that circumstances had changed since the original injunction issued, Given the Supreme Court’s stay of the injunction, the chance that plaintiffs would successfully acquire another preliminary injunction, at least without significantly worse conditions than previously existed, is remote. The provisional class certification expired along with the preliminary injunction. View "Ahlman v. Barnes" on Justia Law

Briones was a leader of a violent gang that “terrorized the Salt River Reservation community.” Briones participated in multiple violent crimes, including a 1994 murder that was committed when Briones was 17 years, 11 months, and eight days old.The Ninth Circuit affirmed his life sentence in 1998. Following the Supreme Court’s decisions in "Miller," (2012), that the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) sentences for juvenile offenders, and Montgomery, (2016), that Miller’s rule applied retroactively on collateral review, Briones was resentenced to LWOP in 2016. A Ninth Circuit panel affirmed in 2018. The en banc court subsequently vacated the sentence. The Supreme Court remanded in light of Jones v. Mississippi, (2021), holding that in cases involving LWOP defendants, a discretionary system—where a sentencer can consider the defendant’s youth and has discretion to impose a lesser sentence—is constitutionally sufficient--and that permanent incorrigibility is not an eligibility criterion for the imposition of juvenile LWOP sentences; a sentencer need not provide an on-the-record explanation with an implicit finding of permanent incorrigibility.The Ninth Circuit again affirmed the LWOP sentence. The district court did consider Briones’s post-incarceration rehabilitation and there is no independent requirement that a court imposing juvenile LWOP “meaningfully engage” in a permanent-incorrigibility analysis. Briones waived his as-applied challenge to the substantive proportionality of his sentence. The court rejected “Briones’s wholly speculative arguments advocating for categorical bans on juvenile LWOP.” View "United States v. Briones" on Justia Law

Cobian first entered the U.S. in 1999. In 2004, he was returned to Mexico after being convicted of DUI. In 2016, Cobian, with his wife and children, presented himself to seek asylum. Cobian was separated from his family and given Notice of Expedited Removal. He sought asylum. Officers provided him with English and Spanish explanations of the credible fear interview process, detention protocols, his rights, and the consequences of removal. Cobian explained that he had been kidnapped for ransom in Mexico and was again being targeted; his captors, allegedly gang members, cut off his finger and sent it to his wife. The asylum officer ruled against Cobian and explained the right to appeal. Cobian declined because he did not want to remain in detention, unable to contact his family. Cobian was deported to Mexico but, in 2018, attempted reentry, and was deported.In 2019, Cobian was again found in the U.S. and was charged with illegal reentry, 8 U.S.C. 1326. Cobian argued that the predicate expedited removal order was entered in violation of his due process rights and even if he waived his right to appeal the asylum claim, his waiver was not considered and intelligent. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of his motion to dismiss. Administrative remedies must be exhausted before an order of removal can be collaterally challenged in a subsequent criminal prosecution for re-entry. Cobian made a considered and intelligent decision to waive his right to appeal the negative credible fear finding. View "United States v. De la Mora-Cobian" on Justia Law