Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed her sentence imposed after she pleaded guilty to unlawful importation of methamphetamine and heroin, principally contending that the district court erred by failing to give her advance notice before imposing a special condition of supervised release that requires her to submit to suspicionless searches by any law enforcement officer.The Ninth Circuit concluded that United States v. Wise, 391 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2004), which held that, where a condition of supervised release is not on the list of mandatory or discretionary conditions in the sentencing guidelines, notice is required before it is imposed, remains good law after Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708 (2008), which held that, before imposing a custodial sentence, a district court is not required to give advance notice that it is considering varying upwards from the applicable sentencing range under the Sentencing Guidelines. Therefore, Wise is controlling here and the district court erred by failing to give notice that it was contemplating imposing its broad search condition prior to imposing that condition in its oral pronouncement of sentence. The panel vacated at least that portion of defendant's sentence. The court affirmed the custodial portion of defendant's sentence, finding no plain error. View "United States v. Reyes" on Justia Law

Defendant Franklin pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting the possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(i)–(ii) and 2, and robbery affecting interstate commerce (Hobbs Act robbery) in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1951(a).The Ninth Circuit concluded that binding precedent forecloses Franklin's contention that Hobbs Act robbery is not categorically a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)(A). The panel concluded that there are two distinct questions that this court answers in examining a hearsay statement at sentencing: (1) whether the statement is "procedurally reliable" and (2) whether the statement is "substantively reliable." If the court answers either question in the affirmative, then the statement may be considered at sentencing. The panel explained that this is a disjunctive test: If the court answered either question in the affirmative, then the statement may be considered at sentencing. In this case, the government provided enough specifics so that Franklin was not put to the burden of proving that the enhancement did not apply, and that there were adequate procedural opportunities for Franklin to challenge the extrinsic, nonhearsay evidence corroborating Coconspirator Hiler's hearsay statements. The panel concluded that there was no error in the district court's conclusion that the evidence sufficiently corroborated Hiler's statements and that the admission of those statements at sentencing did not deprive Franklin of due process. Furthermore, the district court did not clearly err in implicitly finding the two coconspirators' statements to corroborate each other enough to be substantively reliable, and that their admission at sentencing thus did not violate due process. View "United States v. Franklin" on Justia Law

In 2004-2005, the government filed forfeiture actions against a Credit Suisse account, owned by a corporation organized by Kim’s sister . The government alleged the $15 million account included proceeds of fraudulent activities involving Kim’s control of Optional. The district court ordered the seizure of the Account. The putative owners (Kim Claimants) contested the forfeiture. Optional, no longer under Kim's control, and DAS, an alleged victim of Kim's fraud, filed competing claims.In 2011, after years of parallel litigation, the Swiss Attorney General’s Office unfroze the Account and ordered the bank to wire $12.6 million to DAS, which filed a “Notice of Withdrawal of Claims” in the forfeiture proceeding. The court ordered that no party disturb money remaining in the Credit Suisse accounts and requested that the government investigate how the transfer to DAS was accomplished. The court declined to hold DAS in contempt, concluded that it “cannot compel DAS to surrender the funds,” then granted DAS’s opposed motion to be dismissed from the forfeiture proceedings.Optional, the sole remaining claimant, submitted a 2013 proposed final judgment, which the district court adopted. Five years later, Optional sought to hold DAS in contempt for allegedly violating that judgment because DAS failed to surrender the money transferred in 2011; the 2013 judgment had awarded Optional all funds in the Account as of August 2005. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of the contempt motion. The 2013 judgment did not require DAS to turn over $12.6 million to Optional. At the 2013 trial, the court did not have before it, and did not undertake to decide, the competing claims to the transferred money. In awarding Optional “all funds” the district court unmistakably was referring only to the remaining funds. View "Optional Capital, Inc. v. DAS Corp." on Justia Law

In 2017, Langley pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography and was sentenced to time served and 10 years of supervised release. As required by 18 U.S.C. 3583(d), the conditions of Langley’s supervised release included that he “not commit [a] federal, state or local crime,” “not illegally possess a controlled substance,” and “refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance.” In 2017, Langley unsuccessfully sought amendment of the conditions of supervised release to permit him to use medical marijuana as allowed by California state law, to alleviate pain stemming from the amputation of his lower leg. Langley renewed the motion in 2020. Langley, who submitted a physician's opinion that marijuana was the best medical solution for his pain issues, argued that he has a fundamental Due Process Clause right to use medical marijuana.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of Langley’s renewed motion. The court held that it is bound by precedent that rejected the identical substantive due process claim. Even if state laws decriminalizing marijuana could constitute additional evidence under the test for determining whether a right is protected by the Due Process Clause, the court concluded that it is bound by its 2007 decision until it is overturned by a higher authority. View "United States v. Langley." on Justia Law

Officers stopped a Cadillac with an expired registration. Jenkins, a passenger, showed no signs of distress. When the officers discovered that Jenkins was subject to an arrest warrant, they handcuffed her and put her in a cruiser, where Jenkins vomited. Officers called for paramedics and asked Jenkins if she was detoxing. Jenkins responded: “No … I’m pregnant.” The call for paramedics was then canceled. During transport, Jenkins groaned and screamed for help. After fingerprinting Jenkins at the police station, officers returned her to the cruiser. Several minutes later they found her unconscious, called for paramedics, and began CPR. Jenkins fell into a coma and died nine days later.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a 42 U.S.C. 1983 lawsuit. The district court validly exercised its discretion in choosing to review a bodycam video that was incorporated by reference into the amended complaint and did not assign the video too much weight. The complaint did not plausibly allege that any city policy or custom “was the moving force” behind the alleged constitutional violations but suggested that that the moving force was the officers’ failure to heed their training. The complaint failed to establish either objective unreasonableness or objective deliberate indifference by individual officers. The alleged violative nature of their conduct, in failing to recognize and respond to Jenkins’ serious medical need, was not clearly established in the specific context of this case, so the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. View "J. J. v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

In 2002, Munoz digitally penetrated his daughter. He later pleaded guilty to attempted lewdness with a child under the age of 14, acknowledging that “the Court will include as part of [his] sentence . . . lifetime supervision.” A Nevada state court sentenced Munoz to 48–144 months’ imprisonment, required him to register as a sex offender, and imposed a special sentence of lifetime supervision. Munoz filed a federal habeas corpus petition challenging the lifetime supervision under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The lifetime supervision consists of a $30 monthly fee to defray the costs of his supervision; electronic monitoring; and a requirement that Munoz may reside only at a residence approved by his parole officer, and that he keep his parole officer informed of his current address.The Ninth Circuit vacated the denial of the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The conditions, individually and collectively, do not severely and immediately restrain Munoz’s physical liberty, so Munoz is not challenging his “custody,” and his claims are not cognizable in federal habeas. On remand, the district court may determine whether to allow Munoz to file an amended habeas petition that could secure jurisdiction or consider whether it would be appropriate to construe Munoz’s habeas petition to plead a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. View "Mounoz v. Smith" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate at Mule Creek State Prison, asserted that he was physically and sexually assaulted in March 2016 and filed a grievance in March 2016, which prison officials failed to process. He submitted a second grievance in May 2016 concerning subsequent events, but referring to the March assaults. The district court reasoned that because the March assaults were mentioned in the May grievance which was pending when the plaintiff filed his 42 U.S.C. 1983 action, an avenue of administrative relief remained open and the plaintiff could not be excused from exhausting the March grievance.The Ninth Circuit reversed, in part, the dismissal of the suit. The prison’s failure to respond to the March grievance rendered the administrative appeals process “unavailable” under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997e. Where inmates take reasonably appropriate steps to exhaust but are precluded from doing so by a prison’s erroneous failure to process the grievance, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied. A later-filed grievance that alleges new complaints but refers to a previous, already exhausted grievance for context does not render the first grievance unexhausted. Because the May grievance was still pending when the complaint was filed, the district court properly deemed that grievance unexhausted. View "Fordley v. Lizarraga" on Justia Law

In 2007-2011, the Department of Justice and the FBI issued press releases disclosing Appellant’s role in the mortgage fraud crimes with which he and his co-conspirators were charged. The press releases included Appellant’s name, age, and the charges against him, and some limited employment history. The notices remain publicly available on the DOJ and FBI websitesThe Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Appellant’s action alleging that the continued online public availability of the government’s press releases relating to Appellant’s guilty plea and sentencing violated his statutory and constitutional rights. Appellant’s Privacy Act claim was barred by the Act’s two-year statute of limitations, which begins to run when a cause of action arises; while information may be repeatedly accessed after publication, the “single publication rule” provides that the limitations period runs only from the date of original dissemination. The court declined to apply equitable tolling. While individuals may have a constitutional privacy interest in certain, highly sensitive information, Appellant did not have such an interest in the information at issue. Rejecting an Eighth Amendment "cruel and unusual punishment" claim, the court held that the district court applied the correct test in determining whether the press releases were punitive in purpose or effect. View "Doe v. Garland" on Justia Law

Prasad owned and operated Maremarks, through which he filed petitions seeking H-1B status for nonimmigrant, foreign workers in specialty occupations to come to the U.S. as Maremarks’ employees performing work for Maremarks’ clients. Prasad falsely represented in the H-1B petitions that there were specific, bona fide positions available for the H-1B beneficiaries. Prasad was convicted of 21 counts of visa fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1546(a), and two counts of aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1). The district court ordered forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. 982(a)(6)(A)(ii): $1,193,440.87.The Ninth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Prasad’s argument that he did not “obtain” the entire $1,193,440.87 because he eventually paid portions of the money to the H1B beneficiaries. Prasad possessed the full $1,193,440.87 paid by the end-clients and had control over the money before he paid a percentage of it to employees. Considering the term “proceeds” in the context of the forfeiture statute, the statute’s punitive purpose, and its prior construction of virtually identical criminal forfeiture provisions, the court concluded that the term extends to receipts and is not limited to profit. Although the H-1B beneficiary employees performed legitimate work for end-clients, the portions of the money that Maremarks received for that work and subsequently paid to the beneficiary employees was, nonetheless, “obtained directly or indirectly from” Prasad’s unlawful conduct. View "United States v. Prasad" on Justia Law

Ochoa was convicted in a 1988 trial for violent crimes against three female victims, including murder, kidnapping, forcible rape, and assault with a deadly weapon. The California state court imposed the death penalty.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of his habeas petition, first rejecting Ochoa’s “Brady” claim the prosecutor failed to disclose that jailhouse informants told officers that Ramage had implicated himself in the murder. Ochoa argued ineffective assistance during the penalty phase for failure to further investigate the conditions in which Ochoa lived as a child and his family’s history of mental health issues and violence. The court rejected a separate Eighth Amendment argument based on that failure to present additional mitigation evidence.Rejecting “cruel and unusual punishment arguments,” the court stated that no clearly established federal law required the court to instruct the jury as to family sympathy; nothing precluded the jury from considering family sympathy evidence, and the court did not prohibit Ochoa from arguing family sympathy. Precedent barring the admission of a defendant’s suppression hearing testimony as evidence at trial on the issue of guilt does not dictate that suppression hearing statements cannot be considered in proceedings outside the guilt phase or for purposes other than establishing substantive guilt. The court declined to expand the certificate of appealability to include the fact that the penalty phase jury instructions failed to direct the jury that it was required to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that aggravating circumstances existed and outweighed the mitigating circumstances. View "Ochoa v. Davis" on Justia Law