Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging that his constitutional rights were violated when, as a condition of his supervised release and while his appeal of his conviction was pending, he was required to complete a sex offender treatment program, and then was discharged from the program and given a limited jail sanction for refusing to admit to the conduct underlying his conviction, a required part of his treatment.The panel held that it was bound by the rule adopted by six justices in Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 770 (2003) (plurality opinion), as enunciated in this court's precedent, and consistent with the rule adopted by sister circuits—that the Fifth Amendment is not violated unless and until allegedly coerced statements are used against a suspect in a criminal case. The panel concluded that because plaintiff did not make a statement that was used in a criminal proceeding, he may not bring a civil action against the government under section 1983 for a violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Accordingly, the panel affirmed the district court's dismissal of this claim. The panel also affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's claims alleging that the government officials involved in this incident violated plaintiff's Sixth Amendment right to counsel and his First Amendment right to bring a civil lawsuit against the government. View "Chavez v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Juliano pled guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm and of possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of actual methamphetamine. Juliano had a 262-327-month guideline imprisonment range. The government agreed to recommend 240 months of imprisonment, then the minimum for Count 2, for a defendant who had one prior felony drug offense conviction. He was sentenced to 240 months. About 10 weeks after Juliano’s sentencing, the First Step Act reduced the mandatory minimum penalty for certain drug crimes, including those for which Juliano was convicted, from 20 to 15 years, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A).Juliano moved under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel, claiming that his attorneys failed to investigate or inform him about the pending First Step Act, or to seek a continuance of his sentencing. The district court reasoned that courts “have uniformly concluded that a defense attorney is not deficient in failing to anticipate a change in the law” and that “it is doubtful the Court would have been receptive to a request to delay sentencing.” The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Given the general uncertainty surrounding pending legislation, counsel’s alleged failure to advise Juliano about the First Step Act or to seek a continuance fails to meet the highly deferential Strickland test for deficient performance. View "United States v. Juliano" on Justia Law

Porretti, a 62-year-old prisoner, has suffered from serious mental illnesses—Tourette’s syndrome, depression, obsessive-compulsive disorder, personality disorder, and paranoid schizophrenia— throughout his life. Porretti’s mental illnesses have caused him to attempt suicide and to suffer psychotic symptoms, including compulsive ingestion of metal objects like razor blades, paranoid delusions, hallucinations, and verbal tics. Porretti received Wellbutrin and Seroquel for his mental illnesses before he was incarcerated in Nevada and after he entered into the custody of the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC). In 2017, without the recommendation of a healthcare provider, NDOC stopped providing his medication because of a new administrative policy.The Ninth Circuit upheld a preliminary injunction requiring prison officials to provide Porretti’s Wellbutrin and Seroquel. The district court carefully applied the preliminary-injunction factors and rendered highly detailed factual findings that rejected opinions from NDOC’s experts for reasons grounded in the record evidence; Porrettif’s Eighth Amendment claim was likely to succeed on the merits and he would suffer irreparable harm in the form of “very serious or extreme damage to his mental health” if injunctive relief were not granted. Porretti’s severe and persistent psychotic symptoms overwhelmingly outweighed NDOC’s financial or logistical burdens in providing Wellbutrin and Seroquel. An injunction was in the public’s interest because prisons must comply with the standard of care mandated by the Eighth Amendment. View "Porretti v. Dzurenda" on Justia Law

In 2017, Pollard was indicted for possessing a gun as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Over the previous 20 years, he had been convicted of several felonies and served over five years in prison, including for a 2004 violation of California’s felon-in-possession statute. Pollard pled guilty. He was sentenced to 57 months and did not appeal.A year later, the Supreme Court decided “Rehaif,” holding that section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove that the defendant knew he was a felon at the time of possession. Pollard moved to vacate his conviction and sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255(a), contending that his guilty plea was not intelligent, knowing, or voluntary without having been informed of section 922(g)(1)’s knowledge-of-status element. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of Pollard’s motion because he had not shown actual prejudice and failed to overcome the procedurally defaulted nature of his claim. View "United States v. Pollard" on Justia Law

San Francisco pretrial detainees filed a putative class action challenging conditions of confinement under 42 U.S.C. 1983, citing the denial of access to outdoor recreation and direct sunlight. The court enjoined some of the jail’s practices, finding the evidence inconclusive as to whether the lack of direct sunlight created a medical risk and that plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of success in seeking exercise time outdoors. The policy of permitting general population inmates to receive 4.5-8 hours of day room time and 30 minutes of gym time daily was constitutionally sufficient but forcing pretrial detainees to live without direct sunlight for years was simply punishment. The court ordered the jail to provide one hour per week of direct sunlight to inmates who had been incarcerated for more than four years. The court dismissed the Sheriff’s Department as a superfluous defendant and dismissed individual defendants based on qualified immunity.The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part. The government’s appeal was moot because the preliminary injunction order expired after 90 days, The district court did not err in denying greater preliminary injunctive relief; there is no bright-line test to determine if and when inmates are entitled to outdoor exercise. Plaintiffs did not show a likelihood of success on their “direct sunlight” claim given the district court’s extensive factual findings. The court held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ cross-appeal of the dismissal of the Sheriff’s Department and the individual defendants. View "Norbert v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Bartley was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(4), based on his 2011 commitment to an Idaho state hospital after he was found incompetent to stand trial. Section 922(g)(4) prohibits the possession of a firearm by any person “who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution.” The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of Bartley’s motion to dismiss.The court rejected Bartley’s contentions that the 2011 state proceedings to determine his competency to face criminal charges lacked due process and that because the state court did not find that he was both mentally ill and dangerous, the 2011 proceedings did not constitute an adjudication or commitment within the meaning of section 922(g)(4). Neither section 922(g)(4) nor 27 C.F.R. 478.11 requires a finding that the committed person was both mentally ill and dangerous nor a separate finding under Idaho law that Bartley was a person to whom section 922(g)(4) applies. Assuming without deciding that the application of section 922(g)(4) to Bartley burdened Second Amendment rights, the court applied intermediate scrutiny and found the government’s statutory objective to be “significant, substantial, or important,” and a “reasonable fit” between the challenged law and that objective. View "United States v. Bartley" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted in part and denied in part a petition challenging the BIA's finding that petitioner's conviction for theft of a vehicle under California Vehicle Code 10851(a) is an aggravated felony, which renders him ineligible for certain forms of relief. The panel has held, and the parties do not dispute, that section 10851(a) is overbroad because it criminalizes a broader swath of conduct than the generic theft offense.Applying the framework described in Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248–49 (2016), the panel held that section 10851(a) is indivisible in its treatment of accessories after the fact. Because section 10851(a) does not categorically match the generic theft offense, a conviction under section 10851(a) is not an aggravated felony. The panel overruled Duenas-Alvarez v. Holder, 733 F.3d 812 (9th Cir. 2013), on the ground that it was irreconcilable with Mathis. Therefore, in petitioner's case, he has not been convicted of an aggravated felony and the panel remanded for consideration of his requests for asylum and cancellation of removal. In a concurrently filed memorandum, the panel denied petitioner's requests for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture. View "Lopez-Marroquin v. Garland" on Justia Law

Ferguson and two others robbed Commerce Bank, wearing masks, then fled in a stolen car. Police quickly located the car and attempted a traffic stop. The car crashed. The men fled on foot. They were found nearby. Officers also located bags of cash (approximately $132,000) along their escape path. DNA evidence taken from recovered masks matched the co-conspirators. Charged with bank robbery and conspiracy to commit bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), 18 U.S.C. 371, they all pleaded guilty.The magistrate advised the defendants of their right to a jury trial, right to confront witnesses, and right against self-incrimination. Ferguson noted that he understood and still wished to plead guilty. The magistrate did not ask Ferguson whether he was entering the plea because of force, threats, or promises, nor inquire if Ferguson was pleading guilty voluntarily. He did not question Ferguson about recent drug or alcohol use, his level of education, his understanding of the proceedings, or if he had any mental impairments but determined that Ferguson’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary and not the result of force, threats, or promises. The Rule 11 plea colloquy for Ferguson and his co-defendants lasted about 10 minutes.The Ninth Circuit affirmed Ferguson’s 84-month sentence, 13 months below the low end of the Guidelines range. A defendant must show the Rule 11 violation’s impact on substantial rights before a court will undo a guilty plea. Ferguson cannot make such a showing. View "United States v. Ferguson" on Justia Law

In 2014, Prigan pleaded guilty to two counts of Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951. Prigan served three years in prison and was released on supervised release. Prigan’s supervised-release conditions and conviction for Hobbs Act robbery prohibited him from possessing any firearm or ammunition. In 2018, federal officers searched Prigan’s residence and vehicle. They found firearms, ammunition, and methamphetamine. He pleaded guilty as a felon and unlawful user of controlled substances who possessed firearms and ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 922(g)(3), and 924(a)(2), and with possessing an unregistered firearm , 26 U.S.C. 5841. The PSR stated that Prigan’s 2014 conviction for Hobbs Act robbery constituted a crime of violence under Guidelines section 4B1.2(a), which increased Prigan’s Guidelines range from 46-57 months of imprisonment to 57-71 months. The district court overruled Prigan’s objections.The Ninth Circuit vacated his 64-month sentence, joining six other circuits in holding that Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence under section 4B1.2(a). Examining the enumerated offenses in that section, the court concluded that Hobbs Act robbery sweeps more broadly than the “force clause,” “robbery,” and “extortion.” View "United States v. Prigan" on Justia Law

Matias, a native of El Salvador, unlawfully entered the U.S. in 2014. El Salvadoran authorities considered him a member of MS-13, a violent gang. In Maryland, Matias pleaded guilty to assault in the first degree after being involved in a shooting that authorities determined was retaliation for MS-13 gang activity, and identified Matias as an MS-13 “affiliate.” ICE detained Matias in 2018. Matias requested to be housed with a gang aligned with MS-13. An IJ denied him bond and later denied Matias relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and ordered him removed. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal. The Ninth Circuit denied his petition for review in 2021.Matias moved the BIA to reopen his case so that it could consider “new developments” regarding his request for CAT relief: claimed political changes in El Salvador and an alleged text from an MS-13 gang member labeling him a “snitch” and saying he will be killed if he returns to El Salvador. The BIA denied his request for an emergency stay. Matias filed a habeas petition, asking the court to enjoin the government from removing him until the BIA ruled on his motion to reopen. The district court denied his motion. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court, which denied Matias’s motion for a temporary restraining order, determining that 8 U.S.C. 1252(g)’s jurisdictional limits barred his claims. View "Rauda v. Jennings" on Justia Law