Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Years ago, Bachmeier was convicted of state crimes. During one telephonic hearing, Bachmeier yelled a graphic, specific threat to gravely harm Judge Moran’s family. Bachmeier remains in state custody. Years later, Bachmeier filed a name change petition in Kenai, Alaska, which was randomly assigned to Judge Moran. The reassignment deadline passed before Bachmeier learned of the assignment. Bachmeier mailed a message to the Kenai Courthouse: Am requesting to cancel ... I would of struck Moran from this case as I have told her in the past Im going to kill her family which I still entend to do.” The clerk’s office forwarded it to Judge Moran’s chambers without reviewing its substance.Bachmeier was charged under 18 U.S.C. 876(c) for mailing a threatening communication. Bachmeier unsuccessfully argued that his request was addressed to the courthouse, not a natural person as 876(c) requires. The court rejected Bachmeier's request that the jury be instructed that it was required to find that “Bachmeier subjectively intended to threaten” Judge Moran, instructing the jury to find either that Bachmeier “intended to communicate a threat... or acted with knowledge that the document would be viewed as a threat.” The Ninth Circuit affirmed his conviction. A rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the judge, a natural person, was the addressee. The jury instruction was erroneous but the evidence overwhelmingly supported a finding that Bachmeier subjectively intended to threaten, so the error was harmless. View "United States v. Bachmeier" on Justia Law

In 1995, Jones was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of his girlfriend’s mother. After the California Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence and denied his state habeas petition, Jones filed a federal habeas petition, raising multiple challenges to both the guilt and penalty phases of his trial. The district court granted relief on Jones’s claim that the state trial court violated his right to present a complete defense; Jones should have been permitted to testify during the guilt phase about events from his childhood and his mental health history, and the trial court erred by conditioning such testimony on the presentation of a psychiatric expert who would explain the testimony’s relevance to Jones’s mental state during the murder.The Ninth Circuit reversed. The condition the trial court imposed on Jones’s testimony was neither arbitrary nor disproportionate to the valid purposes served by its ruling. The court remanded for the district court to consider Jones’s remaining claims. View "Jones v. Davis" on Justia Law

In 2006, Wilson was sentenced to 352 months’ imprisonment for 11 counts of importation and sale of a controlled substance, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. In 2015, pursuant to a stipulation under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), the court reduced Wilson’s sentence to 347 months, citing Sentencing Guidelines Amendment 782, which retroactively reduced the offense levels assigned to specified quantities of drugs. Wilson unsuccessfully sought reconsideration, arguing that to accomplish Amendment 782’s “full 2-point deduction,” he should have received the low end of the new Guidelines range--295 months.Wilson again sought sentence modification under section 3582(c)(2), arguing that to effectuate the original sentencing judge’s intent to sentence Wilson to a low-end guideline sentence, the court should modify his current term of imprisonment.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. It is unclear whether Wilson is currently serving a term of imprisonment that is based, even in part, on a sentencing range that was lowered by Amendment 782. Assuming that Wilson is eligible to seek relief under 3582(c)(2), the judge considered the applicable section 3553(a) factors. Any error concerning the effect of Amendment 782 on the firearm offense was harmless. The decision was not substantively unreasonable; the judge was not required to give more weight to Wilson’s rehabilitative efforts than to the nature of Wilson’s conduct. View "United States v. Wilson" on Justia Law

In 1982, a court-martial convicted Hubbard of murder and sentenced him to life in prison. He previously filed unsuccessful federal habeas petitions and, in 2019, sought DNA testing under the Innocence Protection Act (IPA), 18 U.S.C. 3600(a), to prove his innocence.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court was not the court that entered the judgment of conviction; Hubbard’s conviction was entered by a general court-martial, which has since dissolved, not in federal court. The court rejected Hubbard’s contentions that the district court had the power to grant his petition for DNA testing under the IPA or that the IPA should nonetheless be construed to allow him to petition for DNA testing in the district court because he would otherwise have no forum in which to seek his relief. The IPA, unlike the federal habeas statutes, does not provide a procedural mechanism for prisoners convicted by courts-martial to seek collateral relief in federal court. View "Hubbard v. United States" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a 28 U.S.C. 2241 petition in which petitioner challenged two sentencing enhancements—one under 18 U.S.C. 2251(e), another under 18 U.S.C. 3559(e)(1)—applied after his conviction on multiple counts of federal sex offenses.The panel held that petitioner's claim is foreclosed because the legal basis for his claim arose before he had exhausted his section 2255 motion, so he cannot show that he did not have an unobstructed procedural shot at presenting his challenge to the section 3559(e)(1) sentencing enhancement. The panel rejected petitioner's request for an extension of Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), concluding that an extension of Martinez would make little sense. The panel explained that it would open the door for every unsuccessful pro se petitioner under section 2255 to argue that his lack of counsel in his original section 2255 petition meant that he did not have an unobstructed procedural shot at presenting his claim and is therefore entitled to bring an escape hatch petition under section 2241. The panel noted that other circuits have similarly held that prisoners may not utilize Martinez to bring a section 2241 petition. Because petitioner cannot show that he lacked an unobstructed procedural shot with respect to the section 3559(e)(1) mandatory life sentencing enhancement, the panel did not need to reach the actual innocence prong for that enhancement or either prong for the section 2251(e) enhancement. View "Pavulak v. von Blanckensee" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted the petition for review of the BIA's decision concluding that petitioner is removeable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) because his two prior convictions for violating Hawaii’s fourth degree theft statute, Haw. Rev. Stat. 708-833(1), constitute crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs).The panel applied the categorical approach and held that section 708-833(1), a petty misdemeanor involving property valued at less than $250, is overbroad with respect to the BIA's definition of a CIMT. The panel explained that Hawaii's definition of "theft" does not always require the government to prove the defendant acted with an intent to permanently deprive or substantially erode the owner’s property rights. Furthermore, section 708-833(1) is indivisible because it proscribes one crime that can be committed eight different ways, not eight distinct crimes. Accordingly, the BIA erred in concluding that petitioner's section 708-833(1) convictions were CIMTs rendering him removable. View "Maie v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions and sentence for online enticement of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2422(b), travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2423(b), and engaging in illicit conduct in foreign places in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2423(c).The panel affirmed the district court's denials of defendant's motion for a competency hearing. The panel explained that, at no point in the proceedings was there substantial evidence of defendant's incompetence. Rather, the evidence reveals a consistent pattern of intentionally disrupting the proceedings and feigning incompetence to avoid trial and later, sentencing. The panel concluded that the district court acted within its discretion by excluding the testimony of defendant's psychiatrist. Under either de novo or abuse of discretion review, the panel concluded that the district court correctly denied defendant's Faretta request, which was made for the purpose of delay. The panel also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony of a forensic-psychologist. Finally, the panel concluded that the district court did not err in applying USSG 4B1.5(b)(1), which requires that the defendant engaged in a "pattern of activity" involving prohibited sexual conduct. View "United States v. Telles" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions and sentence for conspiracy with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of methamphetamine, distribution of methamphetamine, and being a felon in possession of a firearm.The panel held that the district court did not err by allowing the government to rebut defendant's entrapment defense in its case in chief, or by allowing the government to introduce evidence of his affiliation with gangs to rebut that defense. Furthermore, any error in allowing defendant's parole officer to testify was harmless. Finally, the panel concluded that the district court did not err by applying a two-level sentence enhancement under USSG 2D1.1(b)(1) for possession of a firearm during a drug-trafficking offense. View "United States v. Gomez" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. Defendant challenges his convictions for interstate domestic violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2261(a)(1), and use of a firearm in relation to a violent crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c), arguing that the predicate offenses underlying these convictions no longer qualify as categorical "crimes of violence" in light of Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018). Dimaya held that the residual-clause definition of "crime of violence" in 18 U.S.C. 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague.The panel agreed with the government that defendant has not demonstrated that he was convicted and sentenced in violation of Dimaya and therefore fails to satisfy the gatekeeping provision set forth in 28 U.S.C. 2255(h)(2). The panel explained that the record and relevant background legal environment confirm that the district court's determination that Idaho assault and battery qualify as crimes of violence did not rest on section 16(b). Because defendant's section 2261 and section 924(c) convictions did not rely on section 16(b), the panel concluded that defendant's challenges to those convictions do not "rely on" Dimaya. Therefore, defendant's second section 2255 motion does not meet the gatekeeping requirements for a second or successive motion. View "United States v. Dade" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a motion brought by plaintiffs, four affiliated Chinese companies, seeking to dismiss an indictment charging violations of the criminal provisions of the Economic Espionage Act. The Pangang Companies moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that they are "instrumentalities" of the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and are therefore entitled to sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).After determining that it had appellate jurisdiction, the panel concluded that, in moving to dismiss the indictment, the Pangang Companies failed to carry their burden to make a prima facie showing that they are instrumentalities of a foreign sovereign within the meaning of the FSIA. In this case, the allegations of the indictment, standing alone, are insufficient to establish that the Pangang Companies were instrumentalities of the PRC on the date they were indicted. The panel explained that, because the Pangang Companies relied solely upon the indictment’s allegations, and presented no evidence to support their motion to dismiss, they necessarily failed to establish a prima facie case that they were foreign states entitled to immunity under section 1604 of the FSIA. Therefore, the motion to dismiss was properly denied. View "United States v. Pangang Group Co." on Justia Law