Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence for being a deported alien found unlawfully in the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326. Defendant contends that the district court erred in applying a sixteen-level enhancement pursuant to USSG 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i) based on his prior state conviction for possession of cocaine. Defendant asserts that his sentence was improperly enhanced because the statute of conviction, Nevada Revised Statutes (NRS) 453.337 did not categorically set forth a drug trafficking offense under Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013), maintaining that section 453.337 criminalizes possession of controlled substances not listed in the federal Controlled Substances Act.In light of the guidance provided by the Nevada Supreme Court, the panel held that section 453.337 is a divisible statute because possession of a specific controlled substance is an element of the crime, and not merely a means of committing the possession-for-sale offense. Therefore, under the modified categorical approach, the panel concluded that, based on the information and judgment, the district court correctly applied the enhancement under section 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) for defendant's Nevada conviction.The panel also held that the district court did not plainly err in its characterization of petitioner's criminal history based on its reasonable inference that prosecution of the controlled substance charge filed on May 13, 2013, was dismissed due to defendant's pending removal from the United States on June 4, 2013. Furthermore, the district court fully considered defendant's personal and criminal history, and the district court did not procedurally nor substantively err in imposing a three year term of supervised release. View "United States v. Figueroa-Beltran" on Justia Law

After defendants were charged with attempting to enter the United States illegally, the government prosecuted them on the normal criminal docket. Defendants moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that the government should have prosecuted them through the Central Violations Bureau (CVB) process, but the district court denied the motion.The Ninth Circuit held that the government did not violate defendants' right to equal protection by prosecuting illegal border crossings on the normal criminal docket. The panel explained that the policy does not discriminate against a protected class or infringe a fundamental right. Instead, it distinguishes between defendants based on their criminal conduct—in this case, illegally entering the United States. And since criminal defendants are not a protected class, at most the rational basis test applies. Applying the rational basis test, the panel concluded that the government's decision to prosecute first-time illegal entry separately from other petty offenses passes constitutional muster. In this case, defendants have not carried their burden to negate "every conceivable basis" which might support the government’s decision to prosecute them on the normal criminal docket. Therefore, the government's policy is supported by a rational basis and does not violate equal protection. View "United States v. Ayala-Bello" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of a stay and abeyance pending exhaustion of unexhausted claims under Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005). In this case, petitioner filed a 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition challenging the constitutionality of his conviction and capital sentence. The district court concluded that petitioner lacked good cause under Rhines for his failure to exhaust because his state postconviction counsel's ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) was not sufficiently egregious. However, the panel subsequently held in Blake v. Baker, 745 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 2014), that IAC by a petitioner's state-court counsel satisfies the good cause standard under Rhines. Therefore, the district court erred in applying the standard the panel later rejected in Blake and the panel remanded for the district court to apply the proper standard. View "Bolin v. Baker" on Justia Law

The United States appeals from the district court's dismissal with prejudice of an indictment against defendant, who was indicted in 2017 on drug-related charges and has since remained on pretrial release, obtaining eight continuances of his trial date. After the Central District of California suspended jury trials due to the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020, defendant invoked, for the first time, his right to a speedy trial. The government requested a continuance, which the district court denied.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the charges against defendant, concluding that the district court erred in its reading of the Speedy Trial Act's "ends of justice" provision under 18 U.S.C. 3161(h)(7)(A). The panel declined to adopt the district court's reading of section 3161(h)(7)(A)—that [c]ontinuances under the 'ends of justice' exception in the Speedy Trial Act are appropriate if without a continuance, holding the trial would be impossible." Rather, the panel concluded that nothing in the plain text of the Act or other precedents support this rigid interpretation.The panel also concluded that the district court's failure to grant the government's motion and subsequent dismissal of defendant's indictment, under the unique facts of defendant's case and the Central District's suspension of jury trials, resulted in a miscarriage of justice under section 3161(h)(7)(B)(i). Furthermore, the district court failed to consider other, non-statutory factors. The panel then listed relevant non-exhaustive factors in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. The panel noted that defendant's reliance on United States v. Clymer, 25 F.3d 824, 829 (9th Cir. 1994), is not helpful. Finally, the panel concluded that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the case with prejudice. Accordingly, the panel reversed and remanded with instructions to reinstate defendant's indictment, grant an appropriate ends of justice continuance, and set this case for trial. View "United States v. Olsen" on Justia Law

In light of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Ninth Circuit is asked to determine the limits that federal law and the Constitution place on holding an accused person in detention solely for the purpose of awaiting trial. In this case, defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion for release from pretrial detention. His trial has been delayed and his detention prolonged as a result of the district court's findings that the "ends of justice" served by avoiding the serious public health risks presented by holding a trial during the COVID-19 pandemic outweighed his right to a speedy trial.The panel held that defendant's pretrial detention is consistent with the Speedy Trial Act. First, the panel concluded that because the plain text of the Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161(h)(7), requires consideration of the best interest of the defendant in a speedy trial, an ends-of-justice analysis will necessarily include consideration of whether the defendant is detained. Second, the panel concluded that section 3164(b) unambiguously provides that time properly excluded under section 3161(h) is properly excluded from section 3164. The panel explained that, because the record suggests that the district court considered defendant's detention in granting the ends-of-justice continuances here, his pretrial detention was properly tolled under the Speedy Trial Act. The panel further concluded that due process does not yet require defendant's release, but observed that the length of defendant's pretrial detention is likely approaching the outer bounds of due process. View "United States v. Torres" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's habeas corpus petition challenging his California state conviction and death sentence for two first-degree murders. The panel granted a certificate of appealability (COA) on the claims related to ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC). In this opinion, the panel addressed the certified claims as well as the previously uncertified claim (Claim 48), namely whether trial counsel failed to present evidence of mental impairments at the penalty phase.The panel applied the deferential standards imposed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and concluded that the California court's inferred conclusions were not an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The panel held that presenting the jailhouse informant's testimony would not have created a reasonable probability that petitioner would not have been convicted as an aider and abettor in two murders. Therefore, lead counsel at the guilt phase was not ineffective for failing to investigate and present evidence from the informant. Furthermore, counsel did not render deficient performance by failing to raise petitioner's mental impairments as mitigating evidence at the penalty phase; the panel did not review petitioner's argument that the state court made an unreasonable determination of the facts under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2) because this claim rests on an issue of state law; and the panel upheld the district court's denial of habeas relief on petitioner's proportionality claim. View "Sanchez v. Davis" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed defendant's conviction for two counts of unlawful use of a weapon (UUW) under Oregon law, Or. Rev. Stat. 166.220(1)(a), which federal prosecutors assimilated into federal law by the Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA), 18 U.S.C. 13(a). Defendant's conviction stemmed from a road rage incident where defendant, who was a passenger in a car driven by his girlfriend, fired six shots in the air after a passenger in the car in front of him threw a plastic soda bottle at his car.The panel concluded that assimilation is permitted only where necessary to fill gaps in federal criminal law on federal enclaves, and there was no such gap here. In this case, defendant's conduct of firing his gun six times while tailgating and subsequently passing the other car is undoubtedly punishable as simple assault under 18 U.S.C. 113(a)(5) and may also be punishable as assault with a dangerous weapon under 18 U.S.C. 113(a)(3) if he possessed the requisite intent to do bodily harm; the federal assault statute and Oregon's UUW statute seek to punish the same wrongful behavior; the federal assault statute occupies the field of assault to the exclusion of Oregon's UUW statute; and assimilating Oregon's UUW statute would rewrite the federal assault statute's offense definitions. View "United States v. Dat Quoc Do" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for attempted extortion under the Hobbs Act for threatening to file against a well-known entertainer a suit asserting salacious and scandalous allegations if the entertainer did not settle for $1,000,000.The panel concluded that there is no statutory, constitutional, or policy basis to support defendant's argument that threats of sham litigation are categorically excluded from criminal liability under the Hobbs Act. In this case, defendant's threats of sham litigation—in which he produced falsified evidence and lied about the existence of evidence, initially targeted another victim with the same threats, and knew he had no lawful claim against his victim—sought "wrongful" ends and thus were within the scope of Hobbs Act. Therefore, the panel rejected defendant's argument and affirmed the denial of his motion for acquittal.The panel also concluded that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence was more than sufficient for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knew his claims against the entertainer were baseless and that he had no right to demand money from the entertainer. The panel rejected defendant's instructional and evidentiary error arguments. Finally, the panel concluded that the district court did not err by applying a fourteen-level increase under U.S.S.G. 2B3.3(b)(1) based on the amount defendant demanded from the entertainer. However, the panel concluded that the district court plainly erred by failing to apply U.S.S.G. 2X1.1 for attempt offenses not otherwise covered by a specific offense guideline. Accordingly, the panel vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Koziol" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit vacated defendant's conviction and sentence for conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. 2332g, which prohibits illicit dealings in guided surface-to-air missiles. Defendant, a Jordanian-born, naturalized United States citizen, and an international arms dealer, was captured by DHS in Greece in an undercover sting operation. Defendant was extradited from Athens to Los Angeles, by way of New York. The government subsequently asked for an erroneous jury instruction on venue, which the district court gave, over defendant's objection.The panel concluded that, although defendant waived his challenge to the indictment for improper venue by failing to bring it before the pretrial motions deadline, he was still entitled to a correct instruction on venue. The panel explained that when defendant landed at John F. Kennedy International Airport, in custody, venue was laid in the Eastern District of New York for the section 2332g charge even though the government had not yet brought it. The panel concluded that the error was harmful because a reasonable juror could have found it more likely than not that defendant's restraint in Greece really was in connection with the alleged section 2332g offense, and thus his conviction must be vacated. Finally, the panel applied plain error review and disposed of defendant's remaining claims regarding extraterritoriality, the doctrine of specialty, and due process. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Ghanem" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's order denying defendant's motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The panel held that the current version of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual 1B1.13 is not an "applicable policy statement[] issued by the Sentencing Commission" for motions filed by a defendant under the recently amended section 3582(c)(1)(A). The panel explained that the First Step Act of 2018 amended section 3582(c)(1)(A) to allow for defendants, in addition to the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) Director, to file a motion, but section 1B1.13 has not since been amended and only references motions filed by the BOP Director. The dangerousness finding is part of the Sentencing Commission's policy statement in U.S.S.G. 1B1.13(2), but is not statutorily required under section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Because the district court relied on section 1B1.13, the panel remanded so that the district court can reassess defendant's motion under the correct legal standard. View "United States v. Aruda" on Justia Law