Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order dismissing as time-barred defendant's seven non-conspiracy criminal counts. Plaintiff's convictions stemmed from his engagement in a scheme seeking payments in exchange for steering the award of Department of Defense contracts for infrastructure, engineering, and construction projects in Korea.The panel concluded that the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act's (WSLA) restrictive relative clause—"which is connected with or related to the prosecution of the war or directly connected with or related to the authorized use of the Armed Forces"—does not modify the first offense category "involving fraud or attempted fraud" or the second offense category involving "any real or personal property of the United States." 18 U.S.C. 3287. Therefore, the panel concluded that the running of any statute of limitations applicable to the WSLA's fraud and property offense categories—offense categories under which defendant was charged—is suspended, whether or not a nexus exists between these offenses and either war or "authorized use of the Armed Forces." Accordingly, the panel remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Nishiie" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment dismissing as barred by the one-year statute of limitations a Montana state prisoner's habeas corpus petition brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254. The panel concluded that the one-year period begins to run upon "the conclusion of direct review" of the conviction, and it is suspended during the pendency of any "properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review." The panel held that a proceeding in the Sentence Review Division of the Montana Supreme Court constitutes collateral review, rather than direct review, making the petition here untimely. View "Branham v. Montana" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's orders denying defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea to receipt of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2), and his motions to suppress evidence of sexually explicit images of minors found on two cell phones.The panel rejected defendant's contention that he was not fully informed of the essential elements of the crime of receipt of child pornography where his indictment, his plea agreement, and the colloquy informed him of the elements required to be proven; he does not assert that his counsel failed to inform him of the knowledge requirement for each element of the offense; and there is no indication that the Government misunderstood the elements. The panel affirmed the denial of defendant's motion to suppress as to the parole searches because defendant, a California parolee, had the same diminished privacy interest, and the State of California had the same substantial interest in supervising parolees as discussed in United States v. Johnson, 875 F.3d 1265 (9th Cir. 2017). The panel also affirmed the denial of defendant's motion to suppress as to the forensic searches because any illegality in the initial seizure of forensic images from defendant's cell phones was cured by the subsequent issuance of a warrant to search the forensic images from cell phones that were legally seized from defendant as the result of valid parole searches. View "United States v. Peterson" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for conspiracy to launder money in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1956(h), conspiracy to operate an unlicensed money transmitting business in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371, and operating such a business in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1960. Defendant's conviction stemmed from his involvement in a hawala operation, a money transmitting network that he and his coconspirators used to move drug trafficking proceeds from Canada to the United States and eventually to Mexico.The panel concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions; the government's closing arguments did not constructively amend Counts II and III of the indictment; and there was no Confrontation Clause violation and no abuse of discretion in the district court's rulings regarding the cross-examination of a cooperating witness. The panel also concluded that it was not required to resolve the issue of whether a clear and convincing evidence standard or a preponderance of the evidence standard should apply, because the record supports the application of the six-level USSG 2S1.1(b)(1) enhancement, because defendant knew that the laundered funds were drug trafficiking proceeds, under either standard of proof. The panel noted that the district court ultimately imposed a sentence of 70 months, which is well below defendant's Guidelines range of 151–188 months. View "United States v. Singh" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order committing defendant, who was found incompetent to stand trial and was committed to the custody of the Attorney General pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 4241(d) for inpatient assessment of her potential for restoration to competency.The panel held that section 4241(d) mandates that district courts commit mentally incompetent defendants to the custody of the Attorney General for treatment, without discretion for the court to order a particular treatment setting. The panel rejected defendant's assertion that under Attorney General and Bureau of Prison (BOP) policies, defendants are automatically hospitalized and that this contravenes her construction of the statute in violation of the Take Care Clause of Article II and general separation of powers principles. The panel also concluded that mandatory commitment under section 4241(d) does not violate defendant's substantive and procedural due process rights. The panel also rejected defendant's three equal protection claims that section 4241(d) denies her equal protection because it imposes a less stringent standard for confinement than the Bail Reform Act; that mentally incompetent pretrial defendants are subject to less stringent standards for commitment than convicted persons who, having served their sentence, are going to be committed civilly; and that section 4241(d) violates her right to equal protection because federal pretrial defendants are subject to a less stringent commitment standard than Arizona state defendants.The panel rejected defendant's novel claim that mandatory commitment violates fundamental fairness and a hybrid due process/equal protection right recognized by the Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015), and Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983). Finally, the panel held that mandatory commitment under 4241(d) does not violate the Sixth and Eighth Amendments, and the panel declined to reach defendant's arguments under the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. View "United States v. Quintero" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm and a felon convicted of a crime of violence in possession of body armor. The panel concluded that, in light of the Supreme Court's intervening opinion in Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), the district court committed plain error by failing to require the government to prove defendant's knowledge of his prohibited status and omitting the knowledge element from the indictment and jury instructions. However, the panel concluded that defendant cannot show that these errors affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. The panel likewise rejected defendant's challenge to the indictment and the jury instructions.The panel also concluded that the district court did not clearly err in applying an obstruction of justice enhancement pursuant to USSG 3C1.1 where defendant's pre-trial threats could reasonably be construed as an attempt to obstruct justice on the theory that defendant wanted to prevent the agent from testifying at his trial. Finally, the court concluded that defendant's sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to 276 months' imprisonment. View "United States v. Door" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of petitioners' habeas corpus petitions challenging their California state-court murder convictions. In this case, the key prosecution witness was an informant who said that both men had confessed to the crime. At trial, the witness invoked the Fifth Amendment and refused to testify, so the trial court read to the jury a transcript of the witness's preliminary-hearing testimony. The California Court of Appeal affirmed petitioners' convictions, holding that they had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witness when he testified at the preliminary hearing, so the introduction of his testimony at trial did not violate their Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against them.The panel granted a certificate of appealability on the issue of whether the admission of the witness's preliminary hearing testimony violated petitioners' Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, and concluded that the state court's decision was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Applying a deferential standard of review under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDA), the panel concluded that it was not unreasonable for the California Court of Appeal to determine that the questions petitioners wanted to ask the witness would not have given the jury a significant different impression of the witness's credibility. Furthermore, even assuming that the timing of the prosecution's disclosures implicated the Confrontation Clause, the California Court of Appeal could reasonably conclude that questioning based on those disclosures would not have materially enhanced the effectiveness of the cross-examination. View "Gibbs v. Covello" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence for being a deported alien found unlawfully in the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326. Defendant contends that the district court erred in applying a sixteen-level enhancement pursuant to USSG 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i) based on his prior state conviction for possession of cocaine. Defendant asserts that his sentence was improperly enhanced because the statute of conviction, Nevada Revised Statutes (NRS) 453.337 did not categorically set forth a drug trafficking offense under Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013), maintaining that section 453.337 criminalizes possession of controlled substances not listed in the federal Controlled Substances Act.In light of the guidance provided by the Nevada Supreme Court, the panel held that section 453.337 is a divisible statute because possession of a specific controlled substance is an element of the crime, and not merely a means of committing the possession-for-sale offense. Therefore, under the modified categorical approach, the panel concluded that, based on the information and judgment, the district court correctly applied the enhancement under section 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) for defendant's Nevada conviction.The panel also held that the district court did not plainly err in its characterization of petitioner's criminal history based on its reasonable inference that prosecution of the controlled substance charge filed on May 13, 2013, was dismissed due to defendant's pending removal from the United States on June 4, 2013. Furthermore, the district court fully considered defendant's personal and criminal history, and the district court did not procedurally nor substantively err in imposing a three year term of supervised release. View "United States v. Figueroa-Beltran" on Justia Law

After defendants were charged with attempting to enter the United States illegally, the government prosecuted them on the normal criminal docket. Defendants moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that the government should have prosecuted them through the Central Violations Bureau (CVB) process, but the district court denied the motion.The Ninth Circuit held that the government did not violate defendants' right to equal protection by prosecuting illegal border crossings on the normal criminal docket. The panel explained that the policy does not discriminate against a protected class or infringe a fundamental right. Instead, it distinguishes between defendants based on their criminal conduct—in this case, illegally entering the United States. And since criminal defendants are not a protected class, at most the rational basis test applies. Applying the rational basis test, the panel concluded that the government's decision to prosecute first-time illegal entry separately from other petty offenses passes constitutional muster. In this case, defendants have not carried their burden to negate "every conceivable basis" which might support the government’s decision to prosecute them on the normal criminal docket. Therefore, the government's policy is supported by a rational basis and does not violate equal protection. View "United States v. Ayala-Bello" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of a stay and abeyance pending exhaustion of unexhausted claims under Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005). In this case, petitioner filed a 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition challenging the constitutionality of his conviction and capital sentence. The district court concluded that petitioner lacked good cause under Rhines for his failure to exhaust because his state postconviction counsel's ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) was not sufficiently egregious. However, the panel subsequently held in Blake v. Baker, 745 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 2014), that IAC by a petitioner's state-court counsel satisfies the good cause standard under Rhines. Therefore, the district court erred in applying the standard the panel later rejected in Blake and the panel remanded for the district court to apply the proper standard. View "Bolin v. Baker" on Justia Law