Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of an indictment charging defendant of illegal reentry after removal in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326. The panel applied the majority's holding in its recently published opinion in United States v. Bastide-Hernandez, —F.3d —, 2021 WL 345581 (9th Cir. 2021), which held that the jurisdiction of the immigration court vests upon the filing of the Notice to Appear (NTA), even one that does not at the time inform the alien of the time, date, and location of the hearing, and held that the district court erred in dismissing the indictment. The panel also held that defendant failed to show that he can satisfy the section 1326(d) requirements for collaterally attacking the underlying removal order based simply on the NTA's lack of date and time information, standing alone. Therefore, he is foreclosed from making that argument on remand. The panel explained that defendant may collaterally attack the underlying order on remand on other grounds, but only if he can meet all the requirements of section1326(d). Accordingly, the panel remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Gonzalez-Valencia" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment finding Defendants Woodberry and Johnson guilty of Hobbs Act robbery under 18 U.S.C. 1951(a) and (b)(1); separately finding Johnson guilty of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence and a drug trafficking crime under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii); convicting Woodberry of aiding and abetting Johnson's firearm possession offense; and finding that Johnson used a short-barreled rifle during the robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(B)(i), which resulted in both defendants having their mandatory minimum sentences increased.The panel held that the district court did not err in instructing the jury that the "market for marijuana, including its intrastate aspects, is commerce over which the United States has jurisdiction," or that the "commerce" element of Hobbs Act robbery could be established if the robbery "could" affect commerce over which the United States has jurisdiction. The panel also held that the short-barreled element in section 924(c)(1)(B)(i) does not contain a separate mens rea requirement. View "United States v. Woodberry" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of an indictment charging defendant with illegal reentry after removal in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326. In this case, the district court held that a defective notice to appear (NTA) lacking time and date information did not provide the immigration court with jurisdiction to enter an order of removal.The panel explained that Karingithi v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2019), and Aguilar Fermin v. Barr, 958 F.3d 887 (9th Cir. 2020), created some confusion as to when jurisdiction actually vests. To clarify, the panel held that 8 C.F.R. 1003.14(a) means what it says and controls: the jurisdiction of the immigration court vests upon the filing of an NTA, even one that does not at that time inform the alien of the time, date, and location of the hearing. The panel further explained that while a defective NTA does not affect jurisdiction, it can create due-process violations. In defendant's brief, he chose not to address the requirements under section 1326(d) for a collateral attack on the validity of the underlying removal, and thus he failed to satisfy the section 1326(d) requirements based on the NTA's lack of date and time information. On remand, defendant may be able to collaterally attack the underlying removal order, if he can meet the requirements of section 1326(d). View "United States v. Bastide-Hernandez" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence for possession of child pornography where the district court applied a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence under 18 U.S.C. 2252(b)(2). Section 2252(b)(2) applies if a defendant has a prior conviction "under the laws of any State relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward." The district court applied section 2252(b)(2) based on defendant's prior conviction under California Penal Code 288(a), which criminalizes lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor under the age of fourteen. The panel held that the statutory provision "relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward" is not unconstitutionally vague, because the language neither fails to give ordinary people notice of its scope nor poses a risk of arbitrary enforcement. View "United States v. Hudson" on Justia Law

The United States sought an interlocutory appeal of the district court's order suppressing evidence in a criminal prosecution. Defendant was indicted for being an alien in possession of a firearm, and the evidence suppressed resulted from a confrontation between police officers and defendant while he was with his seven-year-old son at a shopping mall.As a preliminary matter, the Ninth Circuit held that United States v. Healy, 376 U.S. 75 (1964), foreclosed defendant's contention that the appeal is untimely. The panel affirmed the district court's suppression of the statements because they were the product of a custodial interrogation conducted without the required Miranda warnings and thus inadmissible. However, the panel explained that a Miranda violation does not alone warrant suppression of the physical fruits of defendant's inculpatory statements. Furthermore, both parties agree that the appropriate inquiry is whether, looking at the totality of the circumstances, defendant's consent to the search of the trunk was voluntary. Therefore, the panel remanded for the district court to resolve the voluntariness issue in the first instance. View "United States v. Mora-Alcaraz" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of a 28 U.S.C. 2241 habeas corpus petition where petitioner challenged an Oregon Circuit Court order under Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003), authorizing involuntary medication to restore petitioner's competency to stand trial for murder. The district court applied Younger abstention and concluded that intervention by a federal court would be inappropriate in light of the important state interests at stake in the pending criminal prosecution.The panel held that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction and the authority to rule on the petition. In this case, the state mischaracterized the cognizability issue as a subject matter jurisdiction issue. Furthermore, although the basic Younger criteria are satisfied in this case, the irreparable harm exception to Younger applies and the district court erred in abstaining. The panel remanded for the district court to consider the issue of the cognizability of petitioner's claim in habeas. View "Bean v. Matteucci" on Justia Law

Gear, a native of Australia, moved to Hawaii to work. Gear’s employer applied for, and Gear received, an “H-1B” nonimmigrant visa. Gear later returned from visiting Australia with a rifle. Gear was fired and needed a new visa. Gear created a new company and obtained a new H-1B visa. A DHS agent learned Gear was present on an H-1B visa and bragged about owning firearms, and obtained a search warrant. Before the search, Gear stated, “he couldn’t possess a firearm … because he was not a U.S. citizen.” Gear stated his ex-wife had shipped a rifle and gun safe to Hawaii but he claimed they had been discarded because “he couldn’t have it.” Gear eventually admitted that the gun and safe were in the garage.He was charged under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5)(B) for possessing a firearm while being an alien who had been admitted under a nonimmigrant visa. The jury was instructed the government had to prove Gear “knowingly possessed” the rifle, that had been transported in foreign commerce, and that Gear had been admitted under a nonimmigrant visa. Before Gear was sentenced, the Supreme Court decided Rehaif, holding that under section 922(g), the government must prove the defendant “knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.”The Ninth Circuit affirmed Gear’s conviction. While the government must prove the defendant knew he had a nonimmigrant visa, the erroneous jury instructions did not affect Gear’s substantial rights because the record overwhelmingly indicates that he knew it was illegal for him to possess a firearm. View "United States v. Gear" on Justia Law

In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), which held that Miranda is a rule of constitutional law that could not be overruled by congressional action, the Ninth Circuit concluded that where the unMirandized statement has been used against the defendant in the prosecution's case in chief in a prior criminal proceeding, the defendant has been deprived of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and he may assert a claim against the state official who deprived him of that right under 42 U.S.C. 1983.In this case, plaintiff alleged that his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated when his un-Mirandized statement was used against him at his criminal trial. The panel concluded that plaintiff sufficiently demonstrated a Fifth Amendment violation caused by the officer under section 1983, such that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury on this claim. The panel explained that there is no question that plaintiff's statement was introduced into evidence in the failed state criminal prosecution of him. Furthermore, there is no question that the officer "caused" the introduction of the statements at plaintiff's criminal trial even though the officer himself was not the prosecutor. The panel also concluded that the error was not harmless. Accordingly, the panel vacated the district court's judgment on the jury's verdict; reversed the district court's judgment as to plaintiff's requested jury instruction; and remanded for a new trial. View "Tekoh v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress firearms and dismissal of the remainder of his appeal as waived. Defendant had entered a conditional guilty plea to being a felon in possession.The panel concluded that the search warrant did not violate the Fourth Amendment where the warrant sufficiently justified the search for and seizure of "any firearm" and the good faith exception also justifies denying the suppression motion. The panel also concluded that defendant's knowing and voluntary appellate waiver precludes defendant from appealing his career offender sentence enhancement. Finally, the panel rejected defendant's contention that he should be allowed to withdraw his plea and enter a new agreement preserving his right to appeal his sentence because the district court violated Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1) by participating in his plea negotiations. As a threshold matter, the panel disagreed with the government's contention that this claim is subsumed by defendant's appellate waiver and that the panel has no jurisdiction to consider it. The panel concluded that neither of the two instances defendant alleged demonstrated inappropriate judicial pressure on plea negotiations. View "United States v. King" on Justia Law

Sandoval died of a methamphetamine overdose at the San Diego Central Jail after medical staff left him unmonitored for eight hours, despite signs that he was under the influence of drugs, and then failed to promptly summon paramedics when they discovered him unresponsive and having a seizure. A suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 was rejected on summary judgment.The Ninth Circuit reversed. The district court abused its discretion by summarily sustaining the defendants’ “frivolous” evidentiary objections. An objective standard applies to constitutional claims of inadequate medical care brought by pretrial detainees; the district court erroneously applied the subjective deliberate indifference standard. A jury could conclude that Sandoval would not have died but for the defendants’ unreasonable response to his obvious signs of medical distress and that a reasonable nurse who was told that Sandoval was shaking, tired, and disoriented, and who was specifically directed by a deputy to evaluate Sandoval more thoroughly, would have understood that Sandoval faced a substantial risk of serious harm. Failure to check on Sandoval and to promptly call paramedics were objectively unreasonable. The available law was clearly established at the time. The nurses were not entitled to qualified immunity. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, there was a triable issue of fact as to the county’s liability. View "Sandoval v. County of San Diego" on Justia Law