Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, 134 men and women registered as sex offenders in Idaho, filed suit claiming that the retroactive application of Idaho's Sexual Offender Registration Notification and Community Right-to-Know Act (SORA) is unconstitutional. The district court granted defendants' motions to dismiss.The Ninth Circuit reversed in part, holding that the district court erred in dismissing the ex post facto claim on the basis that SORA was civil in intent and not punitive in effect. The panel explained that the district court erred by applying plaintiffs' ex post facto claim as an as-applied challenge; erred by applying the "clearest proof" standard at the motion to dismiss stage; and erred in finding the outcome of the Smith factors analysis controlled by precedent. Because the district court predicated its dismissal of the Eighth Amendment and double jeopardy claims on its dismissal of the ex post facto claim, the panel held that those judgments were also in error. The panel also held that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' free exercise claim because the district court erred in finding that plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts to plead a plausible claim under Idaho's Free Exercise of Religion Protected Act (FERPA). In this case, plaintiffs have alleged facts showing that the challenged policy substantially burdens the exercise of their religious beliefs. The panel found no error in the district court's analysis of plaintiffs' vagueness, Free Association, Equal Protection, Contracts Clause, Takings, Separation of Powers, and state Police Power challenges. Therefore, the panel affirmed the dismissal of those claims. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Does v. Wasden" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit vacated defendants' sentences imposed after they pleaded guilty to multiple offenses, including conspiracy to possess unauthorized access devices, access device fraud, and aggravated identity theft. Defendants' convictions arose from their installation of cameras and skimmers at ATM machines to film fingers as PINS were entered and to record the information of inserted cards.The panel held that the record does not support the conclusion that defendants obtained 852 and 754 account numbers respectively. The panel explained that, while there is evidence that defendant hoped to obtain account information for each ATM customer, there is insufficient evidence that they succeeded in doing so. Therefore, the district court clearly erred by applying a twelve-level increase to defendants' base level under USSG 2B1.1(b)(1) based on its conclusion that defendants obtained account information for each person who visited the ATMs while the cameras and skimmers were installed. In this case, while the government showed how many people used the ATMs while the skimmers were installed, it did not provide any evidence of the skimmer success rate, either for these transactions or even for hypothetical transactions. View "United States v. Ruiz Gainza" on Justia Law

On remand from the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions on two counts of encouraging and inducing an alien to remain in the United States for the purposes of financial gain in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) and 1324(a)(1)(B)(i)). Defendant, who operated an immigration consulting business, continued to sign retainer agreements and inform clients that they could obtain green cards via a labor certification program under Section 245i of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which defendant knew had expired.The panel rejected defendant's contention that the conduct charged is beyond the scope of Subsection (A)(iv) and held that the fact that engaging in the underlying section 245i process may have yielded some legitimate benefit to defendant's clients does not detract from her culpability under Subsection (A)(iv). The panel also held that defendant did not lack fair notice that her conduct violated the law and her prosecution did not violate due process; the Subsection (A)(iv) charges against defendant were not impermissibly vague, and the district court did not err by refusing to dismiss them; and, because defendant's conduct was not protected by the First Amendment, the district court did not err by denying her motion to dismiss the charges on First Amendment grounds. Finally, the panel held that the evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant encouraged or induced her clients to remain in the United States. View "United States v. Sineneng-Smith" on Justia Law

The en banc court affirmed defendant's conviction for misdemeanor assault within the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States. Defendant was traveling on a commercial flight from Minneapolis to Los Angeles when she argued with another passenger and slapped him in the face.The en banc court held that venue for in-flight federal offenses is proper in the district where a plane lands. The en banc court explained that, for crimes committed on planes in flight, the Constitution does not limit venue to the district directly below the airspace where the crime was committed, and thus venue "shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed." The en banc court joined the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits and concluded that the second paragraph of 18 U.S.C. 3237(a) applies to federal crimes committed on commercial aircraft within the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States. Such in-flight crimes are covered by section 3237(a) and may be prosecuted in the flight's landing district. View "United States v. Lozoya" on Justia Law

Five defendants appealed their convictions for conspiracy to distribute controlled substances under 21 U.S.C. 846 and 841. The en banc court concluded that the jury instruction in this case was erroneous, clarifying the requirements for conspiracy under section 846 and the facts that trigger the penalties under section 841(b)(1)(A)–(B).The en banc court explained that to convict defendants of conspiracy under section 846 in this case, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that each defendant agreed with another person that some member of the conspiracy would commit a section 841(a) offense, and that each defendant had the requisite intent necessary for a section 841(a) conviction. The en banc court further explained that a defendant convicted of conspiracy under section 846 is subject to a penalty under section 841(b)(1)(A)–(B) if the government has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the underlying section 841(a)(1) offense involved the drug type and quantity set forth in section 841(b)(1)(A)–(B). The government does not have to prove that the defendant had any knowledge or intent with respect to those facts. The en banc court clarified that a conviction under section 846 does not require proof of a level of criminal intent greater than that required for the underlying offense merely because it is a conspiracy conviction. The en banc court overruled United States v. Becerra, 992 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1993), and its progeny to the extent they depart from this decision.In this case, the erroneous jury instructions could amount to harmless error if there was overwhelming evidence that each defendant entered into an agreement involving the requisite drug type and quantity. Given the numerous issues raised on appeal and the extensive record from the ten-day jury trial, the en banc court found it appropriate to return this case to the three-judge panel to reconsider both the harmless error issue and the balance of the issues raised by the parties in light of this opinion, and to enter an appropriate judgment. View "United States v. Collazo" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for panel rehearing, denied on behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc, and filed an Amended Opinion and Concurrence.The panel affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for knowingly engaging in sexual contact with another person without that other person's permission on an international flight, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2244(b). The panel rejected defendant's contention that the district court erred in giving the Ninth Circuit Model Instruction on the elements of section 2244(b), which does not require that the government prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant subjectively knew that his victim did not consent to his conduct. The panel rejected defendant's reading of the statute as contrary to its text, the structure of the statutory scheme and its very purpose in penalizing those who sexually prey upon victims on the seas or in the air within federal jurisdiction. Because unwanted sexual contact of the type defendant engaged in—touching first, and asserting later that he "thought" the victim consented—is precisely what section 2244(b) criminalizes, the panel rejected defendant's claim of instructional error. Furthermore, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), does not alter the panel's conclusion. The panel also concluded that the police had probable cause to arrest defendant, that he was properly Mirandized, and that the district court acted within its discretion in refusing to read back to the jury portions of the victim's testimony. View "United States v. Price" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for accessing, possessing, and distributing child pornography. The panel held that defendant arguably waived his Franks claim and that any error was not plain. The panel rejected defendant's claim under Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973), where defendant, not the Government, benefited more from the district court's enforcement of the parties' agreement to disclose the identity of testifying witnesses. The panel rejected defendant's remaining evidentiary challenges and held that the district court did not err in denying his motion for a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct.The panel also held that the district court did not err, let alone plainly err, in imposing a lifetime term of supervised release. As to the substance of the Special Conditions, the Government concedes that remand is required to conform the written judgment to the oral pronouncement of Special Conditions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8. So conformed, the Government also concedes Special Conditions 5 and 8 must be vacated and remanded for the district court to reconsider. Finally, the district court's imposition of Special Condition 7, requiring defendant to submit to searches of his property and person by his probation officer, was not an abuse of discretion. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Rusnak" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed defendant's sentence for possession of ammunition by a convicted felon. Defendant contends that the district court erred in applying a recidivist sentencing enhancement based on his prior state conviction for attempted transportation of marijuana under Arizona Revised Statutes 13-3405(A)(4).The panel held that the district court's application of the six-level recidivist enhancement was plain error. The Arizona statute under which defendant was convicted included hemp in its definition of marijuana. However, in 2018, before defendant's federal conviction, Congress amended the Controlled Substances Act to exclude hemp from its definition of a controlled substance. Therefore, in 2019, when defendant was sentenced, the Arizona statute under which he had been convicted was overbroad and that conviction no longer qualified as a "controlled substance offense" under the Guidelines. Furthermore, the error affected defendant's substantial rights and allowing the error to go uncorrected would seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Accordingly, the panel remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Bautista" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit certified to the Idaho Supreme Court the following question: Whether an Idaho state court order reducing the defendant's judgment of conviction for felony burglary to a judgment of conviction for misdemeanor petit theft under the authority of Idaho Code 19-2604(2) changes the operative conviction for the purposes of Idaho Code 18-310, which prohibits the restoration of firearm rights to those citizens convicted of specific felony offenses. See Idaho Code 18-310(2). View "United States v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress a firearm found in a search of his car, vacated his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm, and remanded for further proceedings.The panel held that police officers who have reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a traffic stop—but who lack probable cause or any other particularized justification, such as a reasonable belief that the driver poses a danger—may not open the door to a vehicle and lean inside. In this case, the officer conducted an unlawful search in violation of the Fourth Amendment when he opened the car door and leaned into it to ask defendant for his driver's license and vehicle registration. The panel concluded that nothing about this case calls for a remedy other than the typical remedy for Fourth Amendment violation, which is the exclusion of evidence discovered as a result of that violation from criminal proceedings against defendant. Therefore, the firearm must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule. View "United States v. Ngumezi" on Justia Law