Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's denial of qualified immunity to Pelican Bay State Prison officials in a civil rights action brought by plaintiff, an inmate at Pelican Bay, alleging claims over prison noise stemming from the orders of a federal district court adopting recommendations of its Special Master to implement round-the-clock welfare checks to prevent inmate suicides in California's prison system.The panel held that, on the specific facts presented here, no reasonable officer would have understood that these court-ordered actions were violating the constitutional rights of the inmates. The panel explained that, even if the Pelican Bay officials haphazardly implemented the Guard One system, no reasonable official in these circumstances would believe that creating additional noise while carrying out mandatory suicide checks for prisoner safety clearly violated plaintiff's constitutional rights. In this case, where defendants were following court-ordered procedures to enhance inmate safety that are inherently loud, all Pelican Bay officials are entitled to qualified immunity. View "Rico v. Ducart" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit filed an amended opinion, denied a petition for rehearing, and denied on behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc, in appeals arising from the district court's denial of petitioner's habeas corpus petition and his motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) for relief from judgment. Petitioner argues that the state court's admission of his confession violated his due process rights because it was the involuntary product of coercion, and that his Rule 60(b) motion was a proper motion to amend his habeas petition and not a disguised second or successive petition subject to 28 U.S.C. 2244.Considering the petition under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) framework and applying a highly deferential standard, the panel held that the state court's conclusion that petitioner's confession was voluntary was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. In this case, the state court did not unreasonably conclude that petitioner was sixteen years old and considered his age, experience, and maturity as part of the totality of the circumstances of his confession. Furthermore, the state did not unreasonably conclude that the circumstances of his interview were not coercive. The panel also held that, because petitioner asserted a new claim in his Rule 60(b) motion despite the district court's previously adjudicating his habeas petition on the merits, the district court properly denied that motion as an unauthorized second or successive petition. View "Balbuena v. Sullivan" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit considered whether vacating the indictment against a criminal defendant ab initio following his death during the pendency of a certiorari petition to the Supreme Court requires vacation of an order issued under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) to make payments to reimburse in part the costs of his defense.After determining that the district court had jurisdiction to determine whether its CJA reimbursement order was within the scope of the abatement doctrine, the panel affirmed the district court's order on remand to enforce continuing obligations under the CJA reimbursement order. The panel held that the CJA reimbursement order is a final order not dependent in any way on defendant's conviction and is beyond the application of the abatement ab initio rule. The panel rejected claims of waiver and availability of funds under the CJA. View "United States v. Robertson" on Justia Law

On remand from the Supreme Court for further consideration in light of Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), the Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g). The panel applied United States v. Johnson, 2020 WL 6268027 (9th Cir. Oct. 26, 2020), and rejected defendant's Rehaif argument. In this case, as in Johnson, plain-error review applies when the defendant fails to challenge the district court's omission of the knowledge-of-status element now required under Rehaif. Furthermore, defendant's uncontroverted presentence report shows that he pleaded guilty to two felonies and served sentences of greater than one year for each. Therefore, defendant cannot prevail on plain error review. View "United States v. King" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit voted to rehear this case en banc to consider what the proper remedy is on appeal when it concludes that a district court has erred under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), by admitting or excluding expert testimony on one ground, but when it cannot tell from the record whether the admission or exclusion was nevertheless correct on other grounds.Recognizing that there are different circumstances involved in every case, the en banc court concluded that a bright-line rule requiring a specific remedy is inappropriate. Instead, each panel should fashion a remedy "as may be just under the circumstances." 28 U.S.C. 2106. The en banc court explained that the remedy may include remanding for a new trial or remanding for the district court to first determine admissibility, then requiring a new trial only if that admissibility determination differs from that in the first trial. In this case, the en banc court remanded to the three-judgment panel so that the panel may, in its discretion, determine the appropriate remedy. View "United States v. Bacon" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's determination that petitioner was removable for having committed an aggravated felony by violating California Health & Safety Code 11359. The panel held that petitioner's violation of section 11359 constitutes an aggravated felony for purposes of the INA, as decided by Roman-Suaste v. Holder, 766 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2014).The panel joined the Second, Third, and Eleventh Circuits in deciding that, when conducting a categorical analysis for removability based upon a state criminal conviction, it is proper to compare drug schedules at the time of the petitioner's underlying criminal offense, not at the time of the petitioner's removal. Because the California and federal definitions of marijuana were identical at the time of petitioner's guilty plea, the panel concluded that his conviction was a categorical match with the generic federal offense. Therefore, petitioner is removable. The panel also affirmed the BIA's decision to deny petitioner's claim for deferral of removal under the CAT. View "Medina-Rodriguez v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied separate petitions for review filed by Velasquez-Rios and Desai, holding that an amendment to section 18.5 of the California Penal Code, which retroactively reduces the maximum misdemeanor sentence to 364 days, cannot be applied retroactively for purposes of removability under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i).The panel rejected petitioners' contention that the BIA erred by relying on McNeill v. United States, 563 U.S. 816 (2011), and United States v. Diaz, 838 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 2016). In McNeil, the Supreme Court held that retroactive changes to North Carolina's state-law sentencing scheme did not change the historical fact that the defendant had been convicted of two felonies. In Diaz, this court concluded that California's reclassification of Diaz's two felony convictions as misdemeanors did not invalidate his enhanced sentence under 21 U.S.C. 841. Relying upon McNeill, the panel held that the statute called for a backward-looking inquiry to the initial date of conviction, rather than the current state of California law, and that the triggering event under section 841 was when the two felony drug offenses had "become final." The panel rejected petitioners' arguments and further explained that its approach aligns with the Supreme Court's admonishments that federal laws should be construed to achieve national uniformity, and explained that its decision avoids the "absurd" results described in McNeill that would follow from petitioners' approach, under which an alien's removability would depend on the timing of the immigration proceeding. Finally, the panel held that federal law standards cannot be altered or contradicted retroactively by state law actions, and cannot be manipulated after the fact by state laws modifying sentences that at the time of conviction permitted removal or that precluded cancellation. View "Velasquez-Rios v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit withdrew its opinion filed May 16, 2019, in Case Nos. 17-50337 and 17-50387; withdrew the mandate issued in Case No. 17-50337; and filed a new opinion, after the Supreme Court remanded Case No. 17-50387 for reconsideration in light of Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019).Defendant Azano and his co-conspirators sought to influence local politicians during the 2012 San Diego election cycle by providing campaign contributions. Defendants Azano and Singh were convicted of various crimes stemming from the campaign contributions. Azano was also convicted of violating federal firearms law.Although the panel agreed with the Government that there was Rehaif error, the panel held that Azano has not demonstrated that the error seriously affected his substantial rights or the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of his judicial proceedings such that it warrants correction as an exercise of the panel's discretion. In this case, the evidence on the omitted mens rea element—that Azano knew he was "admitted to the United States under a nonimmigrant visa"—was overwhelming and uncontested such that there is no reasonable probability "the jury's verdict would have been different had the jury been properly instructed." However, the panel reversed Azano's and Singh's convictions under count thirty-seven for falsification of campaign records, finding the evidence insufficient to support all material elements. The panel affirmed as to all other convictions, including Azano's conviction for unlawfully possessing a firearm. The panel vacated Azano's and Singh's sentences and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Singh" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against CoreCivil under the Wiretap Act, alleging that CoreCivic unlawfully recorded privileged telephone calls between herself and her clients who were detained in CoreCivic's detention facility in Nevada.The Ninth Circuit held that the only reasonable interpretation based on both the text and context of the Act is that "the violation" refers to each separate interception, whether the interception is a singular event or part of a larger pattern of conduct. Therefore, each interception of plaintiff's privileged telephone calls is a separate violation of the Act, and the statute of limitations is triggered anew for each call that CoreCivic recorded. The panel held that the district court correctly determined that the Act's two-year statute of limitations was first triggered when plaintiff received discovery in June 2016 that contained recordings of her privileged telephone calls. In this case, the undisputed facts establish that plaintiff had such notice of recordings made before June 27, 2016, when she received discovery from the government on that date that included recorded calls. Accordingly, the panel affirmed the district court's holding that plaintiff's claims are untimely to the extent they are based on interceptions that occurred before June 27, 2016. However, to the extent her claims are based on calls that were recorded after this date, the timeliness of such claims depends on when she first had a reasonable opportunity to discover that such calls were recorded. The panel remanded to the district court for further analysis. View "Bliss v. CoreCivic, Inc." on Justia Law

On remand from the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit filed an amended opinion affirming defendant's convictions for being a felon in possession of a firearm, and an order denying a petition for panel rehearing and denying on behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc.The panel reaffirmed its conclusion that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b)'s plain error standard governs here. The panel explained that defendant's argument is best understood not as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, but rather as a claim that the district court applied the wrong legal standard in assessing his guilt—specifically, by omitting the knowledge-of-status element now required under Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), which was issued after the panel issued its original opinion in this case. Here, the government conceded that the first two prongs of plain error are met: the district court erred by not requiring the government to prove defendant's knowledge of his status as a convicted felon, and the error is clear following Rehaif. The panel also assumed without deciding that the error affected defendant's substantial rights.The panel stated that it is appropriate in this case to review the entire record on appeal—not just the record adduced at trial—in assessing whether defendants have satisfied the fourth prong of plain error review. Given the overwhelming and uncontroverted nature of the evidence, defendant cannot show that refusing to correct the district court's error would result in a miscarriage of justice. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law