Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit granted in part and denied in part a petition for review of the BIA's determinations that petitioner does not qualify for derivative citizenship and that his burglary conviction renders him removable. The panel held that petitioner is not a derivative citizen of the United States and did not become a citizen of the United States under 8 U.S.C. 1431(a). In this case, petitioner concedes that he never resided in the United States pursuant to a lawful admission for permanent residence while he was under the age of eighteen. Therefore, petitioner was subject to removal proceedings.The IJ and the BIA found that petitioner was removable because his California burglary conviction was a crime-of-violence aggravated felony. While this appeal was pending, the Supreme Court held that the "crime of violence" statute, as incorporated into the Immigration and Nationality Act's definition of aggravated felony, is unconstitutionally vague. Therefore, the panel held that petitioner's burglary conviction can no longer support removal as a crime-of-violence aggravated felony. The panel remanded to the BIA for the agency to determine whether petitioner is removable on another ground, including based on his California conviction for receipt of stolen property. View "Cheneau v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a petition for habeas corpus relief challenging petitioners' conviction and death sentence for first-degree murder, forcible rape, and robbery.The panel held that any constitutional error in admitting petitioner's reference to "Satan" was harmless at both the guilt and penalty phases, and thus rejected petitioner's First Amendment argument under Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S 159 (1992). The panel also held that because the admission of the Satan references could not have had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict, petitioner cannot meet the higher Strickland standard of prejudice on his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. Furthermore, the district court properly denied petitioner's claim that trial counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase by failing to adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence regarding his life. Finally, weighing the overwhelming weight of the aggravating evidence against the purported juror misconduct, the panel held that any misconduct was harmless. View "Kipp v. Davis" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of petitioner's federal habeas petition and his Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion to set aside the judgment and amend his habeas petition to add a new claim. Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder, attempted murder, and street terrorism.In regard to the habeas petition, the panel applied the deferential standard in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and held that the state court's conclusion that petitioner's statements were voluntary was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. Under the totality of the circumstances, petitioner was advised of his Miranda rights; the state court did not unreasonably conclude that petitioner was sixteen years old and considered his age, experience, and maturity as part of the totality of the circumstances of his confession; and the state court did not unreasonably conclude that the circumstances of the interview were not coercive. Furthermore, the video recording of the interview refutes petitioner's argument that those tactics overbore his will and rendered his confession involuntary. In regard to the Rule 60(b) motion, the panel held that the district court properly denied that motion as an unauthorized second or successive petition under 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(3)(A). View "Balbuena v. Sullivan" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of petitioner's request for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).The panel held that the federal generic definition of murder is "the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought" under 18 U.S.C. 1111(a); because federal law defines the term "human being" to exclude an unborn fetus, California Penal Code section 187(a), which criminalizes the unlawful killing of an unborn fetus, is broader than the federal generic definition; section 187(a) is divisible because it creates distinct crimes for the unlawful killing of a human being and the unlawful killing of a fetus; and, under the modified categorical approach, petitioner's section 187(a) second degree murder conviction under section 187(a) for the unlawful killing of a human being is an aggravated felony under the INA. Accordingly, substantial evidence supported the denial of deferral and petitioner is removable as charged. View "Gomez Fernandez v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision and held that petitioner's conviction under California Penal Code 288.3(a), for attempting to communicate with a child with the intent to commit lewd or lascivious acts upon that child, was categorically a crime involving moral turpitude that made him removable.The panel explained that not all of section 288.3(a)'s enumerated offenses involve moral turpitude, and thus the statute is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. However, the panel held that the statute is divisible; petitioner pleaded guilty to section 288.3(a) with the specific intent of violating section 288; and thus he was properly deemed removable as an alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). The panel also distinguished Menendez v. Whitaker, 908 F.3d 467 (9th Cir. 2018), from petitioner's circumstances in this case. View "Syed v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed defendant's conviction for illegal reentry into the United States. Defendant argued that the district court committed plain error by failing to comply with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(2)'s requirements of establishing that the plea was voluntary. In light of the magistrate judge's egregious failure to comply with Rule 11(b)(2), which the panel has previously noted is part of a disturbing "pattern," the panel agreed.In this case, the magistrate judge did not engage in direct inquiries regarding force, threats, or promises, nor did he address competence to enter the plea. Furthermore, the government's bare bones justifications are not enough to establish voluntariness in light of defendant's significant mental challenges and the magistrate judge's complete lack of inquiry into whether the plea was coerced by any threats or promises. The panel explained that defendant showed that there was a reasonable probability that the error may have affected his decision to plead, and that the district court's plain error was sufficiently serious to impinge on the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. View "United States v. Fuentes-Galvez" on Justia Law

After defendant was indicted on healthcare fraud and money laundering charges, he challenged a pre-trial repatriation order entered by the district court as a violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The order requires defendant to repatriate any proceeds of the fraudulent scheme that he may have transferred to any African bank during a three-year period, up to $7,287,000, despite the indictment alleging that he transferred only $760,000 to two specific banks in Uganda and Kenya.The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's order, holding that the challenged order compels defendant to incriminate himself by personally identifying, and demonstrating his control over, untold amounts of money located in places the government may not presently know about. The panel also held that the district court failed to apply the proper "foregone conclusion" exception test, relieving the government of its obligation to prove its prior knowledge of the incriminating information that may be implicitly communicated by repatriation. The panel explained that the order allows the government to shirk its responsibility to discover its own evidence, and the government's narrow promise of limited use immunity is insufficient to counterbalance these harms. Accordingly, the panel remanded with instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing. View "United States v. Oriho" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit vacated defendant's conviction for obstruction of justice and interstate travel in aid of extortion. Defendant's conviction stemmed from his involvement in an armed standoff between agents of the BLM and a group of private militia members that rallied behind Nevadan Cliven Bundy. On appeal, defendant argued that the district court violated the Sixth Amendment during his trial when it terminated his right to represent himself and appointed standby counsel to represent him instead.The panel held that defendant's conduct was not sufficiently disruptive to justify termination of his right to self-representation. In this case, defendant was not defiant and did not engage in blatantly outrageous conduct, such as threatening a juror or taunting the district judge. To the contrary, defendant merely asked a question prejudicial to the government. Furthermore, he remained calm and ultimately acquiesced in the district court's decision to revoke his right to self-representation. The panel also held that a violation of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to self-representation is structural error. Therefore, the panel must vacate the conviction and remand for a new trial. View "United States v. Engel" on Justia Law

Defendant, two of his sons, and sixteen other persons were charged in an indictment with obstructing federal law enforcement officials carrying out lawful court orders. In this case, defendant and hundreds of armed supporters forced federal officials to abandon the BLM's impoundment plan of defendant's cattle for a failure to pay federal grazing fees.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal with prejudice of the indictment based on violations of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The panel held that a district court is imbued with discretion in the supervision of proceedings before it and may dismiss an action when, in its judgment, "the defendant suffers substantial prejudice and where no lesser remedial action is available." The panel held that the withheld evidence -- the surveillance-camera evidence, the FBI 302s Regarding Snipers, the TOC Log, and the Threat Assessments -- substantially prejudiced the defense; the district court's findings of substantial prejudice and flagrant misconduct in relevant part were not clear error; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing with prejudice. View "United States v. Bundy" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's determination that petitioner's California conviction was "categorically one for an aggravated felony offense relating to obstruction of justice," and dismissal of his appeal. Because the panel in Valenzuela Gallardo I applied the Chevron framework to the BIA's construction of the aggravated felony of an offense relating to obstruction of justice, and the panel does not believe any exceptions to the law of the case doctrine apply here, the panel must proceed to Chevron Step One. The panel explained that both a de novo interpretation of the obstruction of justice provision utilizing traditional tools of statutory interpretation and a Chevron Step One analysis lead to the same conclusion.The panel held that "obstruction of justice" under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(S) is unambiguous in requiring an ongoing or pending criminal proceeding, and the Board's most recent interpretation is at odds with that unambiguous meaning. Furthermore, because "obstruction of justice" under section 1101(a)(43)(S) unambiguously requires a nexus to ongoing or pending proceedings, and California Penal Code section 32 does not, petitioner's state criminal conviction is not a categorical match with the aggravated felony offense charged in his Notice to Appear. Therefore, the panel vacated the removal order. View "Valenzuela Gallardo v. Barr" on Justia Law