Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The defendants immigrated to the U.S. from Somalia years ago and lived in Southern California. They were convicted of sending or conspiring to send, $10,900 to Somalia to support a foreign terrorist organization, 18 U.S.C. 2339, and money laundering.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions. The government may have violated the Fourth Amendment and did violate the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. 1861, when it collected the telephony metadata of millions of Americans, including at least one of the defendants, but suppression was not warranted in this case because the metadata collection did not taint the evidence introduced at trial. The court’s review of the classified record confirmed that the metadata did not and was not necessary to support the probable cause showing for the FISA warrant application. The Fourth Amendment requires notice to a criminal defendant when the prosecution intends to enter into evidence or otherwise use or disclose information obtained or derived from surveillance of that defendant conducted pursuant to the government’s foreign intelligence authorities, but in this case, any lack of notice did not prejudice the defendants. Evidentiary rulings challenged by the defendants did not, individually or cumulatively, impermissibly prejudice the defense and sufficient evidence supported the convictions. View "United States v. Moalin" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit vacated defendant's convictions and sentence for conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance and eight counts of distribution of a controlled substance, remanding for a new trial. In light of the unique facts of this case, the panel held that the district court erred in dismissing a juror, a former criminal defense lawyer, hours into jury deliberations following a lengthy criminal trial. The panel explained that the district court's determination that the juror harbored "malice toward the judicial process" is not supported and cannot provide the basis for the juror's dismissal. While the district court also cited the juror's alleged refusal to deliberate, based on the record in this case the panel is firmly convinced there was a reasonable possibility that the juror's dismissal stemmed from her views on the strength of the government's prosecution.The panel based its decision on the specific circumstances of this case, which are uncommon. Here, the district court decided to strike the juror after receiving a complaint from other jurors and without clarifying the juror's alleged confusion about a jury instruction that applied to all charges. The district court also removed the juror without giving the original jury any further instructions or allowing it any further opportunity to deliberate. View "United States v. Litwin" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of an information charging defendant with illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326 where defendant was previously removed because of an "aggravated felony" conviction—possession for sale of methamphetamine in violation of California Health & Safety Code 11378. In this case, the district court held an evidentiary hearing, heard the testimony of expert witnesses, and concluded that geometric isomers of methamphetamine do not chemically exist.The panel held that the district court's factual finding that geometric isomers of methamphetamine do not exist, under clear error review, finds overwhelming support in the record. The panel rejected defendant's contention that the California statute is overbroad because of its facial inclusion of "geometrical" isomers of methamphetamine. In light of Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007), and based on the evidentiary record before it, the panel held that there is simply no "realistic probability"—nor even a theoretical one—of defendant facing criminal liability under California law for the possession of geometric isomers of methamphetamine. View "United States v. Rodriguez-Gamboa" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions and sentence for wire fraud, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and securities fraud. Defendant, who served as Chief Financial Officer of Autonomy Corporation, a U.K. technology company that Hewlett-Packard acquired in 2011, and others fraudulently inflated revenue through a series of elaborate accounting schemes.The Ninth Circuit held that defendant's wire fraud convictions did not involve an impermissible extraterritorial application of United States law to foreign conduct because the "focus" of the wire fraud statute is the use of the wires in furtherance of a scheme to defraud, and defendant used domestic wires to perpetrate his fraud. The panel also held that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for securities fraud because a reasonable jury could conclude that defendant's approval of false and misleading financial information in an HP press release distributed to the investing public reflected a fraudulent scheme "in connection with" U.S. securities. The panel concurrently filed a memorandum disposition holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in certain evidentiary rulings or err in ordering money forfeiture. View "United States v. Hussain" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order dismissing an indictment charging defendant with failing to register as a sex offender in violation of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 18 U.S.C. 2250(a). The panel rejected defendant's contention that the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes jurisdiction over this appeal, and held that jeopardy did not attach in this case because the district court never heard evidence for the purpose of deciding the issue of guilt or innocence that could subject the defendant to the risk that he would be found guilty.The panel held that, in light of the plain language and purpose behind the statute, a conviction under section 2250(a) does not require that a defendant's interstate travel not be legally compelled. Because the district court erred in holding to the contrary, the panel remanded with instructions to apply the elements of section 2250 as written. View "United States v. Lusby" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit held that the BIA reasonably interpreted "perjury," as used in 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(S), to mean an offense where "an offender make[s] a material false statement knowingly or willfully while under oath or affirmation [or penalty of perjury] where an oath is authorized or required by law." Given this definition, the panel held that perjury under section 118(a) of the California Penal Code is an "aggravated felony" because it is "an offense relating to . . . perjury."Petitioners, in three separate petitions for review, were convicted of perjury under section 118(a) and then suffered adverse immigration consequences on the ground that each had committed an "aggravated felony," namely, an "an offense relating to . . . perjury" under section 1101(a)(43)(S). The panel applied the categorical approach and held that section 118(a) is a categorical match with the BIA's generic definition of perjury, meaning that they cover the same amount of conduct. The panel rejected petitioners' claims to the contrary and held that section 118(a) is an "offense" relating to . . . perjury" under section 1101(a)(43)(S). The panel disposed of the petitions and any remaining arguments in concurrently filed memorandum dispositions. View "Ho Sang Yim v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability (COA) allowing petitioner to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Petitioner's motion asserted that a report issued on August 12, 2020, by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), which concluded that petitioner's trial and sentence violated his rights under the American Declaration, requires that his death sentence be vacated, that he must be released or given a new trial, and that he cannot be sentenced to death after a new trial.The panel held that reasonable jurists would not find debatable the district court's conclusion that the IACHR's decision is not binding in federal court. In this case, the district court concluded that IACHR rulings do not have binding power within the United States by virtue of the Organization of American States (OAS) Charter because the OAS Charter is not self-executing, and Congress has passed no statute to implement it. Furthermore, the district court rejected petitioner's argument that IACHR decisions are binding because they are derived, through the OAS Charter, from the American Declaration on the ground that the American Declaration is not a treaty and creates no binding set of obligations. View "Mitchell v. United States" on Justia Law

After defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, he was charged with violating the conditions of his supervised release. Defendant filed a motion to terminate his supervised release on the ground that a change in the law meant that the state offense underlying his felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm conviction was no longer a felony. The district court denied defendant's motion, found that defendant had violated his supervised release, and imposed a fifteen-month term of imprisonment.The Ninth Circuit affirmed and agreed with the district court that the validity of an underlying conviction cannot be challenged in a supervised release revocation proceeding. Rather, the underlying conviction can only be collaterally attacked in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The panel also held that the sentence imposed by the district court was reasonable where it adequately considered defendant's arguments and the requisite statutory factors. View "United States v. Cate" on Justia Law

Following the lead of at least two sister circuits and noting the deference owed to prison officials in light of the special duties that arise in the prison context, the Ninth Circuit held that intermediate scrutiny applies to equal protection challenges of prison regulations which facially discriminate on the basis of gender.In this case, plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that prison officials discriminated against him based on his male gender by not allowing him to purchase certain prison vendor products available only to female inmates. The panel held that plaintiff has sufficiently demonstrated that he has standing to bring his equal protection challenge of the Department's regulation governing inmates' personal property. The panel also held that imprisoned men and women of the same security classification subject to the challenged regulation are similarly situated for the purpose of this case, and that prison regulations such as this one, which facially discriminate on the basis of gender, must receive intermediate scrutiny. Accordingly, the panel vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the prison officials. Because the panel had not yet established intermediate scrutiny as the applicable standard at the time the district court reviewed the regulation at issue, the panel remanded for the district court to determine the issue in the first instance. View "Harrison v. Kernan" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions for assaulting his wife with a dangerous weapon and assault of a spouse by strangulation, both of which occurred on federal land. The panel held that the evidence from two other attacks on defendant's wife was proper non-propensity evidence admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a). The panel stated that other acts of domestic violence involving the same victim are textbook examples of evidence admissible under Rule 404(b). In this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the non-propensity evidence to show that defendant was not joking around or simply trying to frighten his wife, but rather intended to assault and strangle her.The panel also held that there was no error in admitting the evidence under Rule 403 where the evidence of the prior attacks were probative of his intent in this case. Furthermore, the district court on three separate occasions instructed the jury that such acts could only be used for the limited purpose of deciding whether the defendant had the state of mind, knowledge, or intent to commit the crimes charged in the indictment. View "United States v. Berckmann" on Justia Law