Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea filed after he was sentenced to a mandatory 30 year prison term and before the district court entered an amended judgment ordering restitution. Defendant filed his notice of appeal the day after the district court entered the amended judgment.The Ninth Circuit held that defendant's appeal was timely because it was filed within fourteen days of entry of the amended judgment. The panel explained that, because the district court had delayed a final sentence by deferring restitution, it had jurisdiction to allow defendant to withdraw his guilty plea until the final restitution order if he presented a "fair and just reason" to do so. The panel affirmed the district court's refusal to allow defendant to withdraw his guilty plea because it was knowing and voluntary. Finally, the panel held that defendant's remaining claims are waived and did not consider his ineffective assistance of counsel claim for the first time on appeal. View "United States v. Shehadeh" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a habeas corpus petition challenging petitioner's conviction and capital sentence for murdering his parents. Petitioner alleged that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because his lawyer failed to present additional evidence of third-party culpability. Petitioner also alleged that a contract for indigent defense services between Los Angeles County and the Pomona Contract Lawyers Association (PCLA) violated his constitutional rights because it interfered with his ability to obtain second trial counsel.The panel held that trial counsel rendered deficient performance by failing to present testimony that gang members appeared to claim credit for the murders, but that counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to find and call a gang expert to counter the testimony of the prosecution's gang expert. In this case, fairminded jurists could disagree as to whether the testimony of five witnesses regarding the gang members' boasting was reasonably likely to have changed the outcome of petitioner's trial. Therefore, there were reasonable grounds for the California Supreme Court to conclude that the omitted testimony would not have altered the outcome. The panel also held that the California Supreme Court's summary denial on the merits of the PCLA contract claims (claims 1, 2, 3, and 11) was not unreasonable, because there is no evidence in the record that trial counsel was appointed to represent petitioner under the contract, was a member of the PCLA at the time the initial contract was signed, or was a signatory to the original contract. View "Staten v. Davis" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to receipt of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2). The panel held that defendant's prior conviction under California Penal Code section 261.5(c) is not a categorical match to the generic federal definition of sexual abuse of a minor. The panel explained that because the minimum conduct required for a conviction includes consensual sexual intercourse between an individual a day shy of eighteen and an individual who is 21 years of age, section 261.5(c) is not a categorical match to the general federal definition of sexual abuse of a minor. Although the "relating to" language in section 2252(b)(1) has a broadening effect and will allow certain flexibility at the margins, the panel cannot say that the minimum conduct criminalized under section 261.5(c) relates to abusive sexual conduct involving a minor.Finally, because the district court determined defendant's sentence in view of the incorrect statutory and Guidelines ranges, the district court's weighing of the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors was potentially affected and must be redone. Accordingly, the panel remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Jaycox" on Justia Law

The First Step Act of 2018 does not permit a plenary resentencing proceeding in which a defendant's career offender status can be reconsidered. The Act permits the court to sentence "as if" parts of the Act had been in place at the time the offense occurred, not "as if" every subsequent judicial opinion had been rendered or every subsequent statute had been enacted.The Ninth Circuit held that the district court properly exercised its discretion when it acknowledged that the Act did not authorize it to conduct a plenary resentencing and instead recalculated defendant's Guidelines range to be 188-235. The panel held that the district court correctly applied the applicable laws existing when defendant's covered offense was committed, "as if" the Act was also in existence. The district court then proceeded to the second step of the resentencing and exercised its discretion to impose a reduced term of imprisonment of 180 months. The panel found no error in the district court's approach. View "United States v. Kelley" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions of Defendants Eduardo Hernandez, Leonidas Iraheta, and Vladimir Iraheta; affirmed in part and reversed in part the convictions of Javier Perez; vacated Perez's sentence; and remanded for resentencing. Defendants' convictions and sentences stemmed from their involvement in the Columbia Lil Cycos clique of the 18th Street gang.The panel held that the post-verdict filing made in camera by a third party did not contain Brady material and there was no abuse of discretion in not allowing Leonidas and Hernandez's attorneys to view it; in the few instances in which admission of the witnesses' testimony was error, Leonidas and Hernandez suffered no prejudice; the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering (VICAR) statute may reach a crime committed abroad with sufficient nexus to the conduct of an enterprise's affairs; but VICAR does not reach all crimes committed in other countries; because California requires the formulation of criminal intent—and a non-de-minimis act in furtherance of the crime’s commission—in California, the district court's instruction on Perez's count one, sixteen, seventeen, and eighteen was in error; the error as to count eighteen was not harmless and required reversal; and the evidence was sufficient to support defendants' underlying convictions.The panel also held that, although the district court improperly applied the firearm enhancement to Hernandez, the error was harmless, and all of Hernandez and Leonidas's other sentencing-related challenges failed; there was no error in the district court's decision to give both Hernandez and Leonidas life sentences; and remand of Perez's sentence was necessary in light of the error on his count eighteen conviction. View "United States v. Perez" on Justia Law

A conviction for being under the influence of a controlled substance, in violation of California Health and Safety Code 11550(a), is divisible with respect to controlled substance such that the modified categorical approach applies to determining whether a conviction under the statute is a controlled-substance offense as defined by federal law.The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's dismissal of petitioner's appeal from the IJ's decision finding him removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) for having been convicted of a controlled-substance offense as defined by federal law. The panel explained that, where, as here, the controlled-substance requirement of a state statute is divisible and where, as here, the relevant substance is shown by application of the modified categorical approach to be federally controlled, then there is "a direct link between an alien's crime of conviction and a particular federally controlled drug" such that section 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) is satisfied. Furthermore, the divisibility of the actus reus element of Section 11550(a) is irrelevant, because under the modified categorical approach a conviction for using or being under the influence of amphetamine relates to a federally controlled substance. View "Tejeda v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's determination that petitioner's conviction for felony vehicular flight from a pursuing police car while driving against traffic, in violation of California Vehicle Code section 2800.4, is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude that made him removable.The panel applied the two-step process in determining whether California Vehicle Code section 2800.4 is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude by first reviewing the elements of the statute de novo and then by deferring, to some extent, to the BIA's conclusion that a crime involves moral turpitude. The panel concluded that it need not decide the appropriate level of deference because, even affording only minimal deference, the BIA's interpretation was correct. View "Lepe Moran v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order granting defendant's motion to suppress evidence. The panel held that where, as here, law enforcement officers are asked to assist in the execution of an administrative warrant authorizing the inspection of a private residence, they violate the Fourth Amendment when their "primary purpose" in executing the warrant is to gather evidence in support of a criminal investigation rather than to assist the inspectors.The panel need not address defendant's argument that the warrant itself was invalid under state law nor whether LASD exceeded the scope of the warrant. The panel only held that the LASD's execution was unreasonable and thus the district court properly granted defendant's motion to suppress. View "United States v. Grey" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of petitioner's habeas corpus petition challenging his Nevada convictions for three murders and an attempted murder, as well as his death sentence for one of the murders. The district court issued a certificate of appealability (COA) for petitioner's argument that the procedural default of his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim should be excused in light of Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012).The panel affirmed the denial of habeas relief and held that, although counsel's performance was deficient at the second penalty-phase hearing, petitioner failed to show that he was prejudiced by counsel's performance. In this case, petitioner failed to show that he was prejudiced by the lack of an evidentiary hearing, and his claim remains procedurally defaulted. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the Martinez claim without holding an evidentiary hearing.The panel certified petitioner's claim alleging violation of the rule set out in Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), but ultimately concluded that this claim does not entitle petitioner to habeas relief because the Stromberg error was harmless. The panel declined to certify the remaining claims because they do not raise substantial questions of law and the panel was not persuaded that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. View "Smith v. Baker" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for writ of mandamus filed under the Crime Victims' Rights Act. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining the amount of restitution to which petitioner is entitled. Furthermore, the panel held that the district court's finding that the prior civil settlement reduced the amount of petitioner's loss was supported by the evidence and was neither an abuse of discretion nor legally erroneous. View "Barber v. USDC, San Francisco" on Justia Law