Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence for assault by strangling a spouse in Indian country. The panel held that the district court did not impermissibly double count when it applied a three-level sentencing enhancement for strangling a spouse under USSG 2A2.2(b)(4). The panel explained that it is possible to be sentenced under section 2A2.2(a) without having strangled one's spouse, and thus the base offense level does not necessarily "capture the full extent of the wrongfulness" of defendant's behavior. View "United States v. Harrington" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed defendant's sentences imposed in two cases that the district court sentenced in the same hearing. In the first case, defendant pleaded guilty to mail fraud, visa fraud, money laundering, and willful failure to pay over tax. In the second case, defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit visa fraud.The panel held that the district court erred by applying USSG 2B1.1 to calculate the offense level for defendant's mail fraud count of conviction. The panel explained that the allegations underlying this count established an immigration visa fraud offense expressly covered by USSG 2L2.1, and thus the district court should have followed the USSG 2B1.1(c)(3) cross-reference and applied section 2L2.1. The panel further held that the error was plain and substantially affected the sentencing guidelines range the district court used to sentence defendant. Therefore, the panel remanded for resentencing in accordance with USSG 5G1.2. View "United States v. Wang" on Justia Law

The en banc court affirmed the district court's grant of sentencing relief based on petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, holding that the California Supreme Court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law when it concluded that petitioner received constitutionally adequate representation at the penalty phase of his trial.The en banc court held that the only reasonable interpretation of Supreme Court precedent and the facts of this case lead to the following conclusions: (1) that counsel failed in their duty to undertake a reasonable investigation at the penalty phase of petitioner's trial; (2) that counsel's choices cannot be rationalized as "strategic" or "tactical;" and (3) that any reasonably competent attorney would have discovered and introduced the substantial and compelling mitigating evidence that existed. The en banc court held that no fair-minded jurist would conclude otherwise. The en banc court also held that the California Supreme Court's conclusion that petitioner suffered no prejudice was objectively unreasonable. Without having heard the substantial and compelling mitigating evidence, the en banc court held that the jury could not fairly gauge petitioner's moral culpability at sentencing. View "Andrews v. Davis" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for bribery of a public official under 18 U.S.C. 201(b)(2)(A) where defendant, while working as a field representative for a congresswoman, took money from an undercover agent in exchange for a promise that he made as a federal public official. In this case, defendant promised to make a marijuana dispensary's permitting problems "go away" in exchange for $5,000.The panel held that defendant's conviction was supported by sufficient evidence where a rational jury could have reasonably concluded that defendant in fact had the ability to exert the promised influence. The panel rejected defendant's contention that because marijuana dispensaries were categorically unlawful in Compton, and it would have been impossible for him to help secure an operating permit, there was no "official act." Rather, the panel stated that a bribe tied to a contingency was no less a bribe. The panel explained that the evidence supported the jury's conclusion that defendant could have exerted influence to help obtain the promised permit at a later date. The panel wrote that it was true the contingency never came to be, and the dispensary got shot down, but section 201 liability did not depend on an outcome; the offense was complete at the moment of agreement, and that agreement need not even be accompanied by the bribe recipient's genuine intentions to follow through. Regardless, the panel held that the prosecution was not required to prove that defendant could achieve the outcome promised. View "United States v. Kimbrew" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion challenging the validity of a conviction for use of a firearm during a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). In this case, defendant walked into a pharmacy, pointed a gun at an employee, and demanded all of the pharmacy's OxyContin.The panel held that armed robbery involving controlled substances described in 18 U.S.C. 2118(c)(1) is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)(A). The panel explained that, because robbery involving controlled substances by force or violence or intimidation is a crime of violence, so too is armed robbery involving controlled substances, which requires proof of all the elements of unarmed robbery involving controlled substances. View "United States v. Burke" on Justia Law

The State appealed the district court's grant of federal habeas relief to petitioner, a state prisoner sentenced to death for the sexual assault, abuse, and felony murder of a four year old girl.The Ninth Circuit held that 28 U.S.C. 2254(e)(2), which precludes evidentiary hearings on claims that were not developed in state court proceedings, did not prohibit the district court from considering the evidence adduced at the Martinez v. Ryan hearing to determine the merits of petitioner's underlying ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claim. The panel explained that when a district court holds an evidentiary hearing to determine whether a petitioner's claim is excused from procedural default under Martinez, it may consider that same evidence to grant habeas relief on the underlying claim.The panel also held that the district court did not err in determining that the assistance provided by petitioner's counsel was constitutionally deficient where he failed to perform an adequate pretrial investigation into whether the victim's injuries were sustained during the time she was with petitioner, and petitioner has demonstrated prejudice due to counsel's failures. In regard to Count Four, this failure only affected the jury's determination that petitioner had acted intentionally or knowingly, but not his underlying guilt on the lesser included offense of reckless misconduct. Therefore, the panel affirmed the grant of habeas relief, but vacated the district court's remedy, remanding for further proceedings. View "Jones v. Shinn" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion challenging the validity of a conviction for discharging a firearm during a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A).The panel held that assault with a dangerous weapon described in 18 U.S.C. 113(a)(3) is a crime of violence under section 924(c)(3)(A). The panel explained that the least violent form of each offense is the threat to use violent physical force through the use of a dangerous weapon that reasonably caused a victim to fear immediate bodily injury, which under precedent, necessarily entails at least the threatened use of violent physical force to qualify the offenses as crimes of violence under section 924(c)(3)(A)'s elements clause. View "United States v. Gobert" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted a petition for review of an ICE order reinstating petitioner's prior removal order. Determining that it had jurisdiction, the panel held that petitioner timely challenged the order reinstating his prior removal order.Based on In Matter of Farinas, 12 I. & N. Dec. 467 (BIA 1967), the panel held that petitioner has shown a gross miscarriage of justice. In this case, there was no valid legal basis for petitioner's removal order at the time of its execution in 2008 because the conviction on which it had been based had been expunged in 1999. Therefore, the panel held that a collateral attack on petitioner's prior removal order was appropriate in this case. The panel also held that there was no diligence requirement that limits the time during which a collateral attack on that deportation or removal order may be made based on a showing of gross miscarriage of justice. The panel did not reach petitioner's due process and regulatory arguments. View "Vega-Anguiano v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's determination that petitioner was removeable. The panel held that petitioner's prior conviction for first degree unlawful imprisonment under Hawaii Revised Statutes 707-721(1) is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) that made him removable. Applying the categorical approach, the panel explained that the Hawaii statute requires proof that the defendant knew that his actions would expose another person to a risk of serious bodily injury, and the panel's decision accords with the decisions of its sister circuits. View "Fugow v. Barr" on Justia Law

After defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, he appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence, as well as conditions of his supervised release. The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction, holding that the search of defendant's home was lawful.However, the panel held that three conditions of supervised release -- requiring defendant to support his dependents and meet other family responsibilities, that he work regularly at a lawful occupation, and that he notify third parties of risks that may be occasioned by his criminal record or personal history or characteristics -- were unconstitutionally vague under United States v. Evans, 883 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2018). The panel vacated the supervised release conditions and remanded with instructions to impose whatever alternative conditions the district court deemed appropriate. The panel explained that rewriting a provision of a sentence would exceed its authority under 18 U.S.C. 3742(f)(1), and thus it did not need to consider how section 3742(f)(1) affected its authority to modify a sentence without remanding. View "United States v. Ped" on Justia Law