Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A defendant is eligible for attorneys' fees under the Hyde Amendment only where there is egregious prosecutorial misconduct that renders the litigating position of the United States as a whole "vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith."The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion for attorneys' fees under the Hyde Amendment. In this case, defendant was not eligible for attorneys' fees because she conceded that there was no prosecutorial misconduct in her case. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. The panel also affirmed the district court's denial of her motion for reconsideration. View "United States v. Mixon" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of defendant's speedy trial claim. Defendant argued that the federal government's delay in starting its criminal proceedings until the state's proceedings had concluded violated his speedy trial rights.The panel held that, because the Supreme Court directs courts to take an ad hoc, case-by-case approach to a defendant's claim that the right to a speedy trial has been violated, the panel declined to adopt a rule that delaying a trial in order to allow a concurrent judicial proceeding to conclude is a valid or neutral reason that does not weigh against the government. The panel remanded for further proceedings in this case, because it could not determine from the district court's orders whether the district court erroneously applied a bright-line rule. View "United States v. Myers" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the BIA's order denying his untimely motion to reopen his removal proceedings. Petitioner alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during his removal proceedings. The BIA agreed that petitioner's prior counsel performed deficiently, but denied the motion to reopen after concluding that he failed to show prejudice.The Ninth Circuit granted the petition for review with respect to petitioner's claims for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and relief under former 8 U.S.C. 212(c). The panel held that the BIA analyzed petitioner's new prejudice evidence under standards more stringent than were proper. Although the more-likely-than-not standard governs the merits of a CAT claim, in the context of a motion to reopen for ineffective assistance, the petitioner need not show that he would win or lose on any claims. Rather, the question with respect to prejudice is whether counsel's deficient performance may have affected the outcome of the proceedings, which means that the petitioner need only show plausible grounds for relief. The panel denied the petition for review with respect to all other claims and held that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in rejecting petitioner's claims. Accordingly, the panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Flores v. Barr" on Justia Law

The en banc court granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of cancellation of removal. The BIA held that petitioner failed to demonstrate that her prior conviction was not for a disqualifying federal offense and therefore had not met her burden of showing that she was eligible for cancellation of removal.The en banc court held that, in the context of eligibility for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b), a petitioner's state-law conviction does not bar relief where the record is ambiguous as to whether the conviction constitutes a disqualifying predicate offense. The en banc court held that the statute under which petitioner was convicted was overbroad at the time of her conviction. The en banc court overruled its decision in Young v. Holder, 697 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), that, under Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013), an ambiguous record of conviction does not demonstrate that a petitioner was convicted of a disqualifying federal offense. Accordingly, the panel reversed and remanded. View "Marinelarena v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of petitioners' joint petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioners contend that the recently enacted First Step Act's amendment to the good time provision requires the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to recalculate their sentences immediately.The panel held that the Act's good time credit amendment did not take immediate effect upon enactment but will become effective with the establishment of the "risk and needs assessment system" on July 19, 2019. The panel stated that Congress provided "clear direction" in paragraph 102(b)(2) to delay the implementation of the good time credit amendment until the Attorney General establishes the "risk and needs assessment system." Furthermore, the delay was not a drafting oversight and the delay did not violate the Constitution. View "Bottinelli v. Salazar" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for conspiracy to use interstate telephone calls in the commission of a murder-for-hire in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1958. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion that defendant's promise to forgive an uncollectable debt satisfies the pecuniary value requirement of section 1958.The panel held that the pecuniary value requirement does not require the murder-for-hire agreement to comport with contract rules, as Congress did not aim section 1958 only at murderous businessmen. In this case, defendant's promise of loan forgiveness satisfied section 1958's pecuniary value requirement. In so holding, the panel joined its sister circuits' understanding that section 1958 does not require that the promised economic advantage be enforceable. View "United States v. Phillips" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. The panel held that defendant's prior conviction for battery resulting in serious bodily injury, in violation of section 243(d) of the California Penal Code, qualifies as a "crime of violence" as defined in USSG 4B1.2(a)(1). Accordingly, the district court did not err in its sentencing determination. View "United States v. Perez" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for misdemeanor offenses stemming from his unlawful BASE jump in Yosemite National Park. The panel held that the permit exception in 36 C.F.R. 2.17(a)(3) -- which prohibits delivering a person or object by parachute, helicopter, or other airborne means -- is an affirmative defense for which defendant, not the government, bore the burden of proof. Therefore, the panel rejected defendant's contention that the government failed to establish all elements of section 2.17(a)(3), and held that defendant did not meet the burden of proof at trial. The court also held that the magistrate judge's reference to a news article about the trial, though perhaps imprudent, did not mandate recusal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 455(a). View "United States v. Carey" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment on remand denying a motion by two medical marijuana growers to enjoin their federal prosecutions for violations of the Controlled Substances Act.The panel held that section 538 of the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act authorized defendants to seek to enjoin prosecution, and thus they bear the burden of showing that it is more likely than not that the state's medical marijuana laws "completely authorized" their conduct. Therefore, the district court did not err by placing the burden of proof on defendants. The panel rejected defendants' contention that the government must procure a jury verdict of noncompliance in Washington State Court before it can prosecute them for their federal crimes, and held that Washington's procedural rules should not be imported into section 538. Furthermore, defendants may not resort to common law defenses to show that the Medical Use of Cannabis Act (MUCA) authorizes their conduct, and the district court correctly focused on their compliance with MUCA itself. Finally, the panel held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that defendants were not "qualified patients." View "United States v. Evans" on Justia Law

The en banc court vacated and remanded defendant's sentence of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for his role in a robbery that resulted in murder. Defendant was 17 years old at the time. The Supreme Court later held that mandatory LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012).The Ninth Circuit held that the district court's analysis during resentencing was inconsistent with the constitutional principles the Supreme Court delineated in Miller and subsequent case law. In this case, based on the district court's articulated reasoning at defendant's resentencing, the panel could not tell whether the district court appropriately considered the relevant evidence of defendant's youth or the evidence of his post-incarceration efforts at rehabilitation. Furthermore, defendant provided evidence related to a number of the Miller factors at the resentencing hearing, including his abusive upbringing, his extensive exposure to drugs and alcohol as a child, his difficulty in high school because of his Native American traditions, and his father's inexplicable insistence that he reject the government's favorable plea offer. Most significantly, defendant offered abundant evidence on the critical issue that he was not irreparably corrupt or irredeemable because he had done what he could to improve himself within the confines of incarceration. View "United States v. Briones" on Justia Law