Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of habeas relief as to the penalty phase, because petitioner's counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not investigating and presenting mitigating evidence at the penalty phase. Applying de novo review, the panel held that counsel did not properly investigate petitioner's background, and thus the trial court at the penalty phase was not presented with substantial mitigation evidence regarding petitioner's education and incarceration, his diffuse brain damage, and his history of substance abuse. The panel held that this raised a reasonable probability that, had the trial court been presented with the mitigation evidence in the first instance, the outcome would have been different. In this case, petitioner may have been spared the death penalty and been imprisoned for life instead. Accordingly, the panel remanded with instructions to grant relief against the death penalty. View "Washington v. Ryan" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for knowingly engaging in sexual contact with another person without that other person's permission on an international flight. The panel rejected defendant's contention that the government was also required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he subjectively knew that his victim did not consent. The panel explained that unwanted sexual contact of the type defendant engaged in -- touching first, and arguing later that he "thought" the victim consented -- was precisely what 18 U.S.C. 2244(b) criminalizes. The panel also concluded that defendant was properly Mirandized and that the district court acted within its discretion in refusing to read back to the jury portions of the victim's testimony. View "United States v. Price" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed defendant's conviction for assaulting a fellow passenger on a commercial flight from Minneapolis to Los Angeles, holding that venue was not proper in the Central District of California. The court held that any erroneous application of the Speedy Trial Act would not have changed the outcome and that defendant did not waive her venue argument by failing to raise it until after the government's case-in-chief.Because the parties did not dispute that the assault ended before the flight entered the airspace of the Central District of California, the panel held that venue in the district court was improper. In this case, there was no doubt that the assault occurred before the flight entered the Central District's airspace. The panel held that the first paragraph of 18 U.S.C. 3237(a) and the second paragraph of section 3237(a) did not confer venue. Furthermore, 18 U.S.C. 3238 did not confer venue. Accordingly, the panel remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Lozoya" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The panel held that defendant's concessions in the district court foreclosed his newly minted argument that his underlying conviction for violation of California Penal Code 245(a)(1) was not actually a felony under California law; defendant failed to establish, in the alternative, that he received a misdemeanor sentence for his section 245(a)(1) conviction; Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013), did not alter this court's longstanding precedents holding that a felony conviction under section 245(a)(1) is a crime of violence; a wobbler conviction is punishable as a felony, even if the court later exercises its discretion to reduce the offense to a misdemeanor; and the panel rejected defendant's challenges to the crime of violence enhancement to defendant's offense level. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

A conviction under North Carolina's breaking-or-entering statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-54, qualifies as a predicate felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The Ninth Circuit affirmed petitioner's sentence imposed after defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The panel held that United States v. Stitt, 139 S. Ct. 399 (2018), which addressed a relevant question about the scope of generic burglary, foreclosed petitioner's argument that North Carolina's definition of "building" must be overbroad merely because it has been interpreted to encompass mobile homes. Because petitioner failed to demonstrate a "realistic probability" that North Carolina would apply section 14-54 to conduct outside the scope of generic burglary, the panel held that his conviction under that statute qualified as a predicate felony under the ACCA. View "Mutee v. United States" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the BIA's decision dismissing his appeal of the IJ's denial of relief from removal. The BIA held that petitioner's conviction of robbery in the third degree in violation of Oregon Revised Statutes section 164.395 was a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) and petitioner failed to prove membership in a particular social group for the purpose of establishing refugee status.The Ninth Circuit held that section 164.395 is not categorically a CIMT, because the minimal force required for conviction was insufficient and the government waived the issue of divisibility. However, the panel held that petitioner failed to demonstrate membership in a particular social group, because "individuals returning to Mexico from the United States who are believed to be wealthy" was not a discrete class of persons recognized as a particular social group. Accordingly, the court granted the petition in part, denied it in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Barbosa v. Barr" on Justia Law

An otherwise properly issued search warrant is not rendered void for Fourth Amendment purposes merely because it was executed by law enforcement officers who lacked warrant-executing authority under state law. In this case, federal agents may have violated California law when they executed two search warrants issued by state court judges. Although California law authorizes "peace officers" to execute search warrants, it excludes federal law enforcement officers from the definition of that term.The Ninth Circuit held that this violation of state law did not render the warrants invalid under the Fourth Amendment. The panel rejected defendants' alternative argument that the warrants should be assessed under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41. Nonetheless, the panel held that one warrant was invalid under the Fourth Amendment because it was not supported by probable cause. Therefore, the evidence seized pursuant to that warrant must be suppressed. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "United States v. Artis" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order correcting defendant's sentence as to one of his four counts of conviction following his partially successful motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to conduct a full resentencing and instead corrected petitioner's sentence only as to the count of conviction affected by Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). Even if the panel were to conclude that the counts were grouped for sentencing—something the record did not reflect here—the decision to restructure a defendant's entire sentence when only one of the counts of conviction was found to be invalid was discretionary and not mandatory.The panel held that, in any event, it was evident from the record that petitioner's counts of conviction were not actually grouped for sentencing in any material way that might have led the district court, in its discretion, to unbundle them for resentencing. Finally, the panel held that petitioner was not entitled to a certificate of appealability on his two remaining issues. View "Troiano v. United States" on Justia Law

Consistent with the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee, defendant's sentence for conspiracy to import methamphetamine could not be sustained solely by his admission that he conspired to import marijuana but it was "reasonably foreseeable" that methamphetamine would be imported. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court plainly erred by imposing a sentence that exceeded the statutory maximum for conspiracy to import marijuana. Accordingly, the panel vacated defendant's sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Jauregui" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained when a tribal officer twice searched defendant's truck. The officer initially pulled up behind the truck, which was parked on the side of the highway, to see if defendant and his young child needed assistance.The panel could not agree that the officer appropriately determined that defendant was a non-Indian just by looking at him. The panel held that the officer acted outside of his jurisdiction as a tribal officer when he detained defendant, a non-Indian, and searched his vehicle without first making any attempt to determine whether defendant was in fact an Indian.The panel held that the exclusionary rule applies in federal court prosecutions to evidence obtained in violation of the Indian Civil Rights Act's (ICRA) Fourth Amendment counterpart. The panel also held that a tribal officer does not necessarily conduct an unreasonable search or seizure for ICRA purposes when he acts beyond his tribal jurisdiction. However, tribal authority consideration is highly pertinent to determining whether a search or seizure is unreasonable under the ICRA. In this case, the officer violated the ICRA Fourth Amendment analogue by seizing defendant, a non-Indian, while operating outside the Crow Tribe's jurisdiction. View "United States v. Cooley" on Justia Law