Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The panel held that defendant's concessions in the district court foreclosed his newly minted argument that his underlying conviction for violation of California Penal Code 245(a)(1) was not actually a felony under California law; defendant failed to establish, in the alternative, that he received a misdemeanor sentence for his section 245(a)(1) conviction; Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013), did not alter this court's longstanding precedents holding that a felony conviction under section 245(a)(1) is a crime of violence; a wobbler conviction is punishable as a felony, even if the court later exercises its discretion to reduce the offense to a misdemeanor; and the panel rejected defendant's challenges to the crime of violence enhancement to defendant's offense level. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

A conviction under North Carolina's breaking-or-entering statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-54, qualifies as a predicate felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The Ninth Circuit affirmed petitioner's sentence imposed after defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The panel held that United States v. Stitt, 139 S. Ct. 399 (2018), which addressed a relevant question about the scope of generic burglary, foreclosed petitioner's argument that North Carolina's definition of "building" must be overbroad merely because it has been interpreted to encompass mobile homes. Because petitioner failed to demonstrate a "realistic probability" that North Carolina would apply section 14-54 to conduct outside the scope of generic burglary, the panel held that his conviction under that statute qualified as a predicate felony under the ACCA. View "Mutee v. United States" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the BIA's decision dismissing his appeal of the IJ's denial of relief from removal. The BIA held that petitioner's conviction of robbery in the third degree in violation of Oregon Revised Statutes section 164.395 was a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) and petitioner failed to prove membership in a particular social group for the purpose of establishing refugee status.The Ninth Circuit held that section 164.395 is not categorically a CIMT, because the minimal force required for conviction was insufficient and the government waived the issue of divisibility. However, the panel held that petitioner failed to demonstrate membership in a particular social group, because "individuals returning to Mexico from the United States who are believed to be wealthy" was not a discrete class of persons recognized as a particular social group. Accordingly, the court granted the petition in part, denied it in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Barbosa v. Barr" on Justia Law

An otherwise properly issued search warrant is not rendered void for Fourth Amendment purposes merely because it was executed by law enforcement officers who lacked warrant-executing authority under state law. In this case, federal agents may have violated California law when they executed two search warrants issued by state court judges. Although California law authorizes "peace officers" to execute search warrants, it excludes federal law enforcement officers from the definition of that term.The Ninth Circuit held that this violation of state law did not render the warrants invalid under the Fourth Amendment. The panel rejected defendants' alternative argument that the warrants should be assessed under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41. Nonetheless, the panel held that one warrant was invalid under the Fourth Amendment because it was not supported by probable cause. Therefore, the evidence seized pursuant to that warrant must be suppressed. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "United States v. Artis" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order correcting defendant's sentence as to one of his four counts of conviction following his partially successful motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to conduct a full resentencing and instead corrected petitioner's sentence only as to the count of conviction affected by Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). Even if the panel were to conclude that the counts were grouped for sentencing—something the record did not reflect here—the decision to restructure a defendant's entire sentence when only one of the counts of conviction was found to be invalid was discretionary and not mandatory.The panel held that, in any event, it was evident from the record that petitioner's counts of conviction were not actually grouped for sentencing in any material way that might have led the district court, in its discretion, to unbundle them for resentencing. Finally, the panel held that petitioner was not entitled to a certificate of appealability on his two remaining issues. View "Troiano v. United States" on Justia Law

Consistent with the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee, defendant's sentence for conspiracy to import methamphetamine could not be sustained solely by his admission that he conspired to import marijuana but it was "reasonably foreseeable" that methamphetamine would be imported. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court plainly erred by imposing a sentence that exceeded the statutory maximum for conspiracy to import marijuana. Accordingly, the panel vacated defendant's sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Jauregui" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained when a tribal officer twice searched defendant's truck. The officer initially pulled up behind the truck, which was parked on the side of the highway, to see if defendant and his young child needed assistance.The panel could not agree that the officer appropriately determined that defendant was a non-Indian just by looking at him. The panel held that the officer acted outside of his jurisdiction as a tribal officer when he detained defendant, a non-Indian, and searched his vehicle without first making any attempt to determine whether defendant was in fact an Indian.The panel held that the exclusionary rule applies in federal court prosecutions to evidence obtained in violation of the Indian Civil Rights Act's (ICRA) Fourth Amendment counterpart. The panel also held that a tribal officer does not necessarily conduct an unreasonable search or seizure for ICRA purposes when he acts beyond his tribal jurisdiction. However, tribal authority consideration is highly pertinent to determining whether a search or seizure is unreasonable under the ICRA. In this case, the officer violated the ICRA Fourth Amendment analogue by seizing defendant, a non-Indian, while operating outside the Crow Tribe's jurisdiction. View "United States v. Cooley" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit certified the following question to the Washington Supreme Court: Is the denial of a personal restraint petition final when the Washington Supreme Court denies a motion to modify an order of its Commissioner denying discretionary review of the state appellate court's denial, or is the denial not final until the Clerk of the Washington Court of Appeals issues a certificate of finality as required by Rule 16.15(e)(1)(c) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure? View "Phonsavanh Phongmanivan v. Haynes" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions for bank robbery and denied his motions to suppress evidence. The panel held that the district court correctly held that the search of defendant's trunk was a lawful parole search where defendant's uncontested control over the car was sufficient to permit a warrantless search of its trunk and, in any event, his conduct also illustrated a sufficiently close nexus to the trunk itself where officers observed him putting things inside the trunk.The panel also held that the warrantless placement of a GPS tracker on the car of defendant, a parolee, did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, cell site location information (CSLI) acquired before Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018), was admissible under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule so long as the government satisfied the Stored Communications Act's then-lawful requirements. In this case, the government reasonably relied on the Act when it obtained defendant's CSLI information. Therefore, the panel affirmed the district court's application of the Fourth Amendment's good faith exception. View "United States v. Korte" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the school district in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging that the district violated a student and his parents' First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights when it expelled the student for one year. The student was expelled for creating a hit list of students that "must die."Under the circumstances of this case, including the nature of the hit list, the student's access to firearms, and the close proximity of the student's home to the high school, the decision to discipline the student for his off-campus speech did not violate his constitutional right to free speech. The panel clarified that courts considering whether a school district may constitutionally regulate off-campus speech must determine, based on the totality of the circumstances, whether the speech bears a sufficient nexus to the school. The panel stated that there is always a sufficient nexus between the speech and the school when the school district reasonably concludes that it faces a credible, identifiable threat of school violence. Furthermore, a student's lack of intent to convey his off-campus speech to any third party is relevant to an evaluation of whether the speech constitutes a credible threat, but is not dispositive. In this case, taken as a whole, the considerations that guide application of the nexus test supported the school district.Finally, the parents' claims alleging violations of their substantive due process failed because their fundamental right to choose the student's educational forum was not infringed by the school district's discipline of the student. View "McNeil v. Sherwood School District 88J" on Justia Law