Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a habeas petition as untimely under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). The panel rejected petitioner's contention that he waited to file his second state habeas petition until the California Supreme Court decided People v. Elizalde, 351 P.3d 1010 (Cal. 2015). The court also rejected petitioner's alternative contention that his delay was reasonable because of the size of the state court record and complexity of the case. The panel held that the district court correctly concluded that petitioner was not entitled to statutory tolling for the period following the California Superior Court's denial of his first state habeas petition. Finally, the district court did not err by not ordering the state to respond and lodge the state-court record. View "Valdez v. Montgomery" on Justia Law

Under the facts of this case, McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018), requires that a criminal defendant have the Sixth Amendment right to demand that counsel not present an insanity defense. Defendant was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to bodily harm, and assault with a deadly weapon resulting in serious bodily injury.The panel rejected defendant's contention that the government did not sufficiently allege and prove the jurisdiction element of 18 U.S.C. 113(a) (assault with a deadly weapon resulting in serious bodily injury). In light of McCoy, defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were violated when the trial judge permitted counsel to present an insanity defense against his clear objection; considering defendant's mental illness and "bizarre" behavior, including his diagnosis of schizophrenia, the district court did not abuse its discretion by appointing counsel; and defendant waived his Speedy Trial Act claim. View "United States v. Read" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions for conspiracy to commit sex trafficking of a minor, sex trafficking of a minor, conspiracy to transport a minor to engage in prostitution, and transporting a minor to engage in prostitution. The panel held that the district court did not err by excluding testimony regarding one of the victim's prior prostitution activities. In this case, defendant cited no case holding that a defense such as the one he sought to present here triggers the exception in Federal Rule of Evidence 42. The panel saw no reason to depart from the persuasive authorities that held to the contrary.However, the panel held that the applicability of Rule 412 should not depend on the alleged victim's desire to testify. The panel held that, even if the district court misapplied Rule 412, any error would be harmless. Finally, the panel considered defendant's additional arguments that the government opened the door to testimony about the victim's activities and held that they lacked merit. View "United States v. Haines" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence and held that the strict liability enhancement of USSG 2K2.1(b)(4), for the commission of a crime with a stolen firearm, is constitutional. The panel joined its sister circuits and reaffirmed the holding of United States v. Goodell, 990 F.3d 497 (9th Cir. 1993), that the lack of a mens rea requirement in section 2K2.1(b)(4) does not violate due process. The panel also held that Application Note 8(B) simply serves as confirmation that Goodell's reading has always been the correct one.The panel held that subsequent Supreme Court opinions recasting the role the Guidelines play in a district court's sentencing decision did not affect Goodell. The panel failed to understand how the Supreme Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence requiring that all facts leading to a sentence enhancement beyond the statutory maximum be proven to a jury overrules the long-settled position that the Fifth Amendment permits a sentencing enhancement for possession of a stolen firearm to apply on a strict-liability basis. View "United States v. Prien-Pinto" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit held that defendant's prior conviction for felony harassment in violation of Washington law qualified as a crime of violence pursuant to the force clause. However, the panel held that the district court erred in concluding that defendant's prior conviction for second degree assault in violation of Washington law did not qualify as a crime of violence, because the offense, in the ordinary case, did not present a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. The assault statute encompassed assault with intent to commit a felony, which included the intent to commit any non-violent felony offense. Furthermore, the assault statute was not similar in kind to the crimes listed in the enumerated offenses clause. Because the assault statute was indivisible, the modified categorical approach was inapplicable. The panel remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Door" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision upholding the IJ's denial of withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The panel held that it was appropriate for the BIA to consider sentencing enhancements when it determined that a petitioner was convicted of a particularly serious crime on a case-by-case basis.The panel clarified that it was also appropriate for the BIA to consider sentencing enhancements when it determined that a petitioner was convicted of a per se particularly serious crime. In this case, petitioner was convicted of willful infliction of corporal injury upon the mother of his child with a prior conviction, and was sentenced with a one-year enhancement that made his aggregate term of imprisonment five years. The panel held that the BIA applied the correct legal standard when it determined that petitioner was convicted of a per se particularly serious crime and was therefore ineligible for withholding of removal. The panel also held that substantial evidence supported the denial of CAT relief. View "Mairena v. Barr" on Justia Law

After Antonio Gilton was charged with four counts related to the murder of Calvin Sneed, Gilton moved to suppress his historical cell-site location information. The district court granted the motion to suppress, concluding that the warrant was so deficient in indicia of probable cause that no officer could have relied on the warrant in good faith.The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that the warrant authorizing the seizure of Gilton's location data was not supported by probable cause, but held that the deficiencies were not so stark as to render the officers' reliance on the warrant "entirely unreasonable." In this case, although the warrant was not supported by probable cause, the officers relied on good faith on the warrant they obtained. In light of the prevailing belief in 2012 that CSLI data was not protected by the Fourth Amendment, the panel held that there was no "willful" or "grossly negligent" error here where the officers nevertheless took the precautionary step of seeking a warrant and provided ample factual background by which the magistrate could reach his own determination of the existence of probable cause. Accordingly, the panel reversed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Elmore" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of habeas corpus relief to petitioner, who was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. Petitioner argued that the Arizona Supreme Court unconstitutionally affirmed his death sentence by failing to consider mitigating evidence of his longstanding alcohol and substance abuse.The panel held that the Arizona Supreme Court's decision was contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent. The panel held that the Arizona Supreme Court violated Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), by impermissibly requiring that petitioner establish a causal connection between his longstanding substance abuse and the murder before considering and weighing the evidence as a nonstatutory mitigating factor. Because the error was not harmless, the panel reversed the district court's judgment with respect to petitioner's death sentence. View "Spreitz v. Ryan" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's denial of petitioner's pro se 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition based on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC). The panel held that petitioner need only show that his IAC claims were substantial in order to excuse the procedural default of the claims under Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012). Furthermore, because the district court failed to conduct a Martinez analysis, it did not make any findings on the issue. In this case, the panel could not conclude on the record that petitioner's IAC claims were meritless under the deficient performance prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.C. 668 (1984). Therefore, the panel remanded for the district court to conduct an analysis of the substantiality of the IAC claims. View "Rodney v. Filson" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision upholding a final order of removal. At issue was whether the BIA permissibly interpreted the phrase "single scheme of criminal misconduct" under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). In Matter of Adetiba, 20 I. & N. Dec. 506 (BIA 1992), the BIA affirmed its longstanding interpretation of "single scheme of criminal misconduct" under section 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii): "when an alien has performed an act, which, in and of itself, constitutes a complete, individual, and distinct crime, he is deportable when he again commits such an act, even though one may closely follow the other, be similar in character, and even be part of an overall plan of criminal misconduct."The panel upheld the BIA's interpretation under the principles of Chevron deference and held that the BIA properly applied this interpretation here, and that this application was not impermissibly retroactive. The panel explained that, because the phrase in question operates as an exception to a ground for deportation, the BIA's narrower definition of the exception serves to broaden the application of the removal provision, making petitioner subject to removal when he might not have been under the panel's previous definition. The panel also upheld the BIA's denial of discretionary relief, acknowledging the limitations on judicial review of discretionary decisions. View "Szonyi v. Whitaker" on Justia Law