Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A person who is prohibited from entering a residence by a court's no-contact order lacks a legitimate expectation of privacy in that residence and may not challenge its search on Fourth Amendment grounds. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress, holding that defendant could not challenge the search of a residence that a no-contact court order barred him from entering. The panel reversed defendant's conviction in a concurrently filed memorandum disposition. View "United States v. Schram" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for conspiracy to commit mail fraud. The panel held that the district court's references to Eastern District of California local codes sufficiently explained the district court's reasons for its finding that the ends of justice were served by granting continuances. Therefore, the panel rejected defendant's Speedy Trial Act claim. The panel noted that, because any error was harmless, it need not reach the issue of whether the district court erred by increasing defendant's sentence for being a manager or supervisor under USSG 3B1.1(b). The panel addressed remaining issues in an unpublished memorandum opinion. View "United States v. McCarns" on Justia Law

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58's requirement that a separate document be filed upon entry of judgment applies in proceedings under 28 U.S.C. 2255. In this case, after petitioner pleaded guilty to fraud-related charges and was sentenced, he filed a motion under section 2255 seeking to vacate his plea and sentence. The district court denied the motion but did not enter judgment in a separate document. Petitioner then filed a notice of appeal just over two months after the district court's denial of his section 2255 motion. The Ninth Circuit held that petitioner's notice of appeal was timely and that the court had jurisdiction over his appeal. View "Kingsbury v. United States" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendant based on qualified immunity grounds in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging that defendant failed to disclose evidence that would have cast serious doubt on the star prosecution witness in plaintiff's trial. The panel held that the record demonstrated as a matter of law that defendant withheld material impeachment evidence under Brady v. Maryland and Giglio v. United States, and raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendant acted with deliberate indifference or reckless disregard for plaintiff's due process rights. The panel also held that the law at the time of the 1997–98 investigation clearly established that police officers investigating a criminal case were required to disclose material, impeachment evidence to the defense. Finally, the panel held that the district court abused its discretion by striking the declaration of plaintiff's police practices expert. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Mellen v. Winn" on Justia Law

Battery committed with the use of a deadly weapon under Nevada Revised Statute 200.481(2)(e)(1) is a crime of violence as defined in 18 U.S.C. 16(a). The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for illegal reentry into the United States. The panel held that defendant's prior battery conviction under Nevada law qualified as a crime of violence and thus his initial deportation was not unlawful. View "United States v. Guizar-Rodriguez" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a petition for habeas relief challenging a sentencing enhancement for a prior nonjury juvenile conviction and for a gang-related crime. Petitioner argued that the evidence supporting the gang enhancement was constitutionally insufficient under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), and that the enhancement for his nonjury juvenile conviction violated Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).The panel held that it was objectively unreasonable to conclude that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find the robbery was committed "in association with" a gang; but it was not objectively unreasonable to conclude that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find the robbery was committed "for the benefit of" a gang. The panel also held that the juvenile conviction claim was procedurally barred, and the sentencing enhancements based on nonjury juvenile convictions did not violate any clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court. View "Johnson v. Montgomery" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the parties disputed the maximum term of official detention that can be imposed upon revocation of juvenile delinquent supervision when the juvenile is more than 21 years old at the time of the revocation proceeding. Defendant argued that the duration of previously ordered terms of official detention is always subtracted from the maximum term prescribed by 18 U.S.C. 5037(c)(2).The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's imposition of the 34 month term of official detention following revocation of defendant's juvenile delinquent supervision. The panel held that the text and structure of section 5037(d)(5), its legislative history, and the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act's motivating purpose supported defendant's construction of section 5037(d)(5). In this case, defendant was entitled to credit for "any term of official detention previously ordered," and thus the maximum term of official detention that could have been imposed upon revocation of his juvenile delinquent supervision was 14 months. View "United States v. Juvenile Male" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision finding petitioner ineligible for cancellation of removal. The panel held that the BIA's determination that witness tampering under Oregon Revised Statutes 162.285 was a crime involving moral turpitude did not warrant deference under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), because the agency's analysis directly conflicted with circuit precedent, and was inconsistent both internally and with prior BIA decisions.The panel held that Oregon Revised Statutes 162.285 was not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude because the statute captures conduct that was neither fraudulent nor base, vile, or depraved. Although the statute was divisible, the subsection that formed the basis for petitioner's conviction was likewise not a categorical match for a crime involving moral turpitude. Accordingly, the panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Vasquez-Valle v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit held that the BIA erred in finding that petitioner's conviction for child abuse and neglect under Nevada law was categorically a "crime of child abuse" under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). The panel held that it was bound by this circuit's opinion in Martinez-Cedillo v. Sessions, No. 14-71742, 2018 WL 3520402 (9th Cir. July 23, 2018), which deferred to the BIA's interpretation, in Matter of Soram, 25 I. & N. Dec. 378 (BIA 2010), that the generic crime of child abuse includes acts and omissions that create at least a "reasonable probability" that a child will be harmed. In this case, the Nevada statute was broader than the federal generic crime and there was a realistic probability that Nevada could prosecute conduct under its statute that fell outside the scope of the federal generic crime. Therefore, the panel granted the petition for review of the BIA's determination that petitioner was removable. View "Alvarez-Cerriteno v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress in a case where he was convicted of four counts of making false statements on immigration documents. Defendant sought to suppress recordings of conversations with his wife and his wife's testimony describing the conversation.The panel held that the district court erred by extending the sham marriage exception to the marital communications privilege. The district court did not make a finding about whether the marriage was irreconcilable when the IRS recorded defendant's statements, which would render the marital communications privilege inapplicable. Therefore, the panel remanded for the district court to rule on the issue of irreconcilability. Finally, the panel held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding that defendant understood the documents he signed, and the panel declined to reach defendant's remaining arguments. View "United States v. Fomichev" on Justia Law