Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Under Amendment 798 to the Sentencing Guidelines, California robbery is not a "crime of violence." The Ninth Circuit vacated defendant's sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm. In this case, defendant was sentenced six months before the effective date of Amendment 798 and the pre-amendment generic extortion definition applied. The panel held that the portion of the amendment that altered the definition of extortion in the Guidelines' "crime of violence" section was not retroactive and the fact that California robbery was no longer a "crime of violence" was not applicable to defendant. The panel rejected defendant's arguments to the contrary and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Bankston" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's order of deportation after petitioner was convicted of possession for sale of cocaine salt. The panel held that petitioner was deportable as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); petitioner's conviction remained a valid ground of deportation despite its expungement under California Penal Code 1203.4; petitioner was not eligible for waiver of deportation under section 212(c); and the BIA did not err in denying deferral of deportation under the Convention Against Torture. View "Lopez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

A conviction for assault with a deadly weapon or instrument other than a firearm or by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury under California Penal Code 245(a)(1), as it was written prior to its amendment in 2011, qualifies as a conviction for a crime of violence within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 16(a). The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for illegal reentry and rejected his collateral attacks on his removal. The panel held that defendant's prior California conviction under section 245(a)(1) required an intentional use of force and was thus a crime of violence. The panel also held that, although the failure to inform defendant that his eligibility for relief could serve as a basis to collaterally attack a removal order, it was not plausible that he would have been granted relief at the time of his removal in this case. View "United States v. Vasquez-Gonzalez" on Justia Law

A person who is prohibited from entering a residence by a court's no-contact order lacks a legitimate expectation of privacy in that residence and may not challenge its search on Fourth Amendment grounds. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress, holding that defendant could not challenge the search of a residence that a no-contact court order barred him from entering. The panel reversed defendant's conviction in a concurrently filed memorandum disposition. View "United States v. Schram" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for conspiracy to commit mail fraud. The panel held that the district court's references to Eastern District of California local codes sufficiently explained the district court's reasons for its finding that the ends of justice were served by granting continuances. Therefore, the panel rejected defendant's Speedy Trial Act claim. The panel noted that, because any error was harmless, it need not reach the issue of whether the district court erred by increasing defendant's sentence for being a manager or supervisor under USSG 3B1.1(b). The panel addressed remaining issues in an unpublished memorandum opinion. View "United States v. McCarns" on Justia Law

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58's requirement that a separate document be filed upon entry of judgment applies in proceedings under 28 U.S.C. 2255. In this case, after petitioner pleaded guilty to fraud-related charges and was sentenced, he filed a motion under section 2255 seeking to vacate his plea and sentence. The district court denied the motion but did not enter judgment in a separate document. Petitioner then filed a notice of appeal just over two months after the district court's denial of his section 2255 motion. The Ninth Circuit held that petitioner's notice of appeal was timely and that the court had jurisdiction over his appeal. View "Kingsbury v. United States" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendant based on qualified immunity grounds in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging that defendant failed to disclose evidence that would have cast serious doubt on the star prosecution witness in plaintiff's trial. The panel held that the record demonstrated as a matter of law that defendant withheld material impeachment evidence under Brady v. Maryland and Giglio v. United States, and raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendant acted with deliberate indifference or reckless disregard for plaintiff's due process rights. The panel also held that the law at the time of the 1997–98 investigation clearly established that police officers investigating a criminal case were required to disclose material, impeachment evidence to the defense. Finally, the panel held that the district court abused its discretion by striking the declaration of plaintiff's police practices expert. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Mellen v. Winn" on Justia Law

Battery committed with the use of a deadly weapon under Nevada Revised Statute 200.481(2)(e)(1) is a crime of violence as defined in 18 U.S.C. 16(a). The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for illegal reentry into the United States. The panel held that defendant's prior battery conviction under Nevada law qualified as a crime of violence and thus his initial deportation was not unlawful. View "United States v. Guizar-Rodriguez" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a petition for habeas relief challenging a sentencing enhancement for a prior nonjury juvenile conviction and for a gang-related crime. Petitioner argued that the evidence supporting the gang enhancement was constitutionally insufficient under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), and that the enhancement for his nonjury juvenile conviction violated Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).The panel held that it was objectively unreasonable to conclude that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find the robbery was committed "in association with" a gang; but it was not objectively unreasonable to conclude that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find the robbery was committed "for the benefit of" a gang. The panel also held that the juvenile conviction claim was procedurally barred, and the sentencing enhancements based on nonjury juvenile convictions did not violate any clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court. View "Johnson v. Montgomery" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the parties disputed the maximum term of official detention that can be imposed upon revocation of juvenile delinquent supervision when the juvenile is more than 21 years old at the time of the revocation proceeding. Defendant argued that the duration of previously ordered terms of official detention is always subtracted from the maximum term prescribed by 18 U.S.C. 5037(c)(2).The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's imposition of the 34 month term of official detention following revocation of defendant's juvenile delinquent supervision. The panel held that the text and structure of section 5037(d)(5), its legislative history, and the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act's motivating purpose supported defendant's construction of section 5037(d)(5). In this case, defendant was entitled to credit for "any term of official detention previously ordered," and thus the maximum term of official detention that could have been imposed upon revocation of his juvenile delinquent supervision was 14 months. View "United States v. Juvenile Male" on Justia Law