Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit vacated defendant's sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The panel held that defendant's prior conviction for assault with a deadly weapon under Nevada Revised Statutes 200.471 categorically qualified as a crime of violence under the elements clause of USSG 4B1.2(a) because the statute required proof that the defendant placed the victim in fear of bodily harm and thus necessarily entailed the use or threatened use of violent physical force against the person of another. However, defendant's prior convictions for robbery and coercion did not constitute a "crime of violence" because, under the categorical approach, they were not covered by the Guidelines' definition of the term. Accordingly, the panel remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Edling" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief where petitioner contended that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney held deeply racist beliefs about African Americans in general and him in particular. The panel rejected petitioner's claim in light of Mayfield v. Woodford, 270 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), where petitioner conceded that he was unaware of his attorney's racism until years after his conviction was final and failed to identify any acts or omissions by his attorney that fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. View "Ellis v. Harrison" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit certified three questions of criminal law to the Nevada Supreme Court: 1. Is Nev. Rev. Stat 453.337 divisible as to the controlled substance requirement? 2. Does the decision in Sheriff v. Luqman, 697 P.2d 107 (Nev. 1985), conclude that the existence of a controlled substance is a "fact" rather than an "element" of section 453.337, rendering the statute indivisible? If so, can this conclusion be reconciled with Muller v. Sheriff, 572 P.2d 1245 (Nev. 1977)? 3. Does the decision in Muller conclude that offenses under section 453.337 comprise "distinct offenses requiring separate and different proof," rendering the statute divisible as to the controlled substance requirement? If so, can this be reconciled with Luqman? View "United States v. Figueroa-Beltran" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit dismissed as moot defendant's appeal from a revocation of supervised release. In this case, the Bureau of Prisons had unconditionally released defendant from custody, and his sentence was complete. The panel held that defendant has fully completed the sentence imposed for his revocation of supervised release and has identified only speculative and hypothetical collateral consequences flowing from the charge underlying his revocation. The panel rejected defendant's claim that he faced collateral consequences because he could be required to register as a sex offender and this could affect his ability to visit his children. View "United States v. King" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment for plaintiffs in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action brought by five prisoners who were severely injured during cell extractions in two high security units. The panel held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to proceed to trial during the pendency of an interlocutory appeal from a prior qualified immunity ruling, but the error was harmless; in regard to the exhaustion of administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the district court did not clearly err in finding that a reasonable fear of retaliation made the grievance system effectively unavailable for plaintiffs because they reasonably believed that they would suffer additional physical force if they complained; the district court did not err by denying defendants' Rule 50(b) motion based on qualified immunity where there was abundant evidence presented to the jury that defendants inflicted severe injuries on plaintiffs while they were not resisting, and even while they were unconscious; and the panel rejected claims under state law as well as claims of Monell liability, juror bias, punitive damages, and trial errors. Finally, the panel affirmed the district court's attorney's fee award of $5,378,174.66. View "Rodriguez v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed a juvenile defendant's life sentence without parole where the juvenile was convicted of felony murder and other crimes. The panel held that the district court did not err in resentencing defendant by first calculating and using the sentencing guideline range of life imprisonment; under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016), the district court was required to consider the hallmark features of youth before imposing a sentence of life without parole on a juvenile offender; and the district court took into account evidence of defendant's rehabilitation as part of its inquiry into whether defendant was a member of a class of permanently incorrigible juvenile offenders. View "United States v. Briones, Jr." on Justia Law

18 U.S.C. 2113(e) does not contain a separate requirement that the defendant intend the killing which results from his bank robbery. Congress mandated an enhanced punishment for an individual who kills a person in the course of committing a bank robbery in section 2113(e) and the enhancement applies even when the bank robber accidentally kills someone. The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for bank robbery resulting in death, in violation of section 2113(e), holding that the means rea required was the mens rea necessary to commit the underlying bank robbery. View "United States v. McDuffy" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence found on his person and in the car he was driving. The panel held that defendant failed to show that the officers' decision to pull him over and to impound his car would have occurred in the absence of an impermissible reason. However, the panel held, in light of United States v. Orozco, 858 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2017), that the officers' search and seizure of items from defendant's car could not be justified under the inventory-search doctrine where officers explicitly admitted that they seized items from the car to search for evidence of criminal activity. In this case, the government did not offer any justification for the seizure of the property other than the inventory-search doctrine, and thus the district court erred in denying the motion to suppress. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The Hostage Taking Act does not require proof of a nexus to international terrorism. The Ninth Circuit affirmed Defendant Mikhel and Kadamovas's convictions and death sentences for several federal crimes, including multiple counts of hostage taking resulting in death under the Hostage Taking Act. Defendants raised numerous issues on appeal. The panel held that the Act was a valid exercise of Congress's power under the Necessary and Proper Clause together with the Treaty Power, and rejected defendants' Tenth Amendment challenge; defendants' motion for recusal of the district judge was untimely and failed on the merits; defendants' Batson challenge failed because defendants did not meet their burden of demonstrating race was a substantial motivating factor; the district court did not err by empaneling an anonymous jury; defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was not violated; there was no error in the jury instruction; and the panel rejected defendants' remaining guilt phase claims. Furthermore, the panel rejected defendant's penalty phase claims and held that the district court either did not err or any error was harmless. View "United States v. Mikhel" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied petitioner's application for leave to file a second or successive habeas petition with the district court. The panel held that petitioner's Brady v. Maryland claim was subject to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's (AEDPA) second or successive gatekeeping requirements because the factual predicate supporting a Brady claim existed at the time of the first habeas petition. The panel applied AEDPA's second or successive bar to petitioner's Brady claim and held that he has failed to make the requisite prima facie showing of actual innocence. View "Brown v. Muniz" on Justia Law