Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a petition challenging the denial of petitioner's naturalization application. The panel held that petitioner's conviction for sodomy where the victim was unable to consent, in violation of California Penal Code 286(i), was an aggravated felony. The panel held that a conviction under CPC 286(i), was an aggravated felony as a rape offense under 8 U.S.C.1101(a)(43)(A). The conduct prohibited by CPC 286(i) fell entirely within the generic definition of "rape" as articulated in Castro-Baez v. Reno, 217 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2000). Therefore, petitioner failed to meet the good moral character requirement for naturalization. View "Elmakhzoumi v. Sessions" on Justia Law

18 U.S.C. 3583(i), which extends the power to revoke a term of supervised release even after the term has expired, does not empower a district court to base a revocation upon violations which (1) were not alleged prior to the expiration period and (2) are not otherwise factually related to a matter raised in a signed warrant or summons issued before expiration. In this case, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's order revoking supervised release and remanded for further proceedings. The panel held that the district court erred in adjudicating the perjury allegations because they were submitted by the probation officer after defendant's term of supervision had expired. View "United States v. Campbell" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the sentence imposed because of his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition and the sentence for violating the conditions of his supervised release in another case. The panel held that the district court did not err in applying an enhancement under USSG 2A2.2(a) and (b)(2)(A) for use of a firearm in the commission of an aggravated assault; the panel remanded for the district court to strike the final sentence in Special Condition 5, which explicitly removed the requirement that the government prove mens rea in a future revocation proceeding; three standard conditions of supervised release were unconstitutionally vague and the panel remanded with instructions; and the panel need not decide whether it should read into Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1 a requirement that a district court in a revocation proceeding resolve factual disputes or determine explicitly that such resolution was unnecessary. Therefore, the panel affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded in part. View "United States v. Evans" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief for petitioner, who was criminally convicted in both state and federal court. Petitioner argued that his federal sentence actually commenced on one of the instances when the state prematurely transferred him to the federal authorities, and thus he should receive credit against his federal sentence for the period starting on the date he was erroneously turned over to federal authorities and including all his time in state prison after he was returned to state custody. The panel explained that because the state credited the time the federal authorities erroneously held petitioner against his state sentence, he effectively sought double-credit against both his state and federal sentences for the period between August 2009 and June 2011. The panel held that because these erroneous transfers did not manifest the state's consent to terminate its primary jurisdiction over petitioner, he was not in federal custody for purposes of 18 U.S.C. 3585(a), and therefore the federal sentence did not commence. View "Johnson v. Gill" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief for petitioner, who was criminally convicted in both state and federal court. Petitioner argued that his federal sentence actually commenced on one of the instances when the state prematurely transferred him to the federal authorities, and thus he should receive credit against his federal sentence for the period starting on the date he was erroneously turned over to federal authorities and including all his time in state prison after he was returned to state custody. The panel explained that because the state credited the time the federal authorities erroneously held petitioner against his state sentence, he effectively sought double-credit against both his state and federal sentences for the period between August 2009 and June 2011. The panel held that because these erroneous transfers did not manifest the state's consent to terminate its primary jurisdiction over petitioner, he was not in federal custody for purposes of 18 U.S.C. 3585(a), and therefore the federal sentence did not commence. View "Johnson v. Gill" on Justia Law

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), did not require the district court to abstain from hearing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the conditions of pretrial detention in state court. The Ninth Circuit held that the State has acted in good faith throughout this litigation with respect to the substantive merits of petitioner's claim; petitioner's case fell within the irreparable harm exception to Younger where he has been incarcerated for over six months without a constitutionally adequate bail hearing; and petitioner has properly exhausted his state remedies as to his bail hearing. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded with instructions to grant a conditional writ of habeas corpus, providing that the writ issue unless the California Superior Court conducts a new constitutionally compliant bail hearing within fourteen days after the issuance of the district court's order conditionally granting the petition. View "Arevalo v. Hennessy" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of an action alleging violations of plaintiff's First and Fifth Amendment rights under the implied cause of action theory adopted by the Supreme Court in Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), as well as state law claims. Neither the Supreme Court nor this court have expanded Bivens in the context of a prisoner's First Amendment access to court or Fifth Amendment procedural due process claims arising out of a prison disciplinary process, and the circumstances of plaintiff's case against private defendants plainly presented a "new context" under Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1854 (2017). The panel also held that plaintiff had alternative means for relief against the alleged violations of his First and Fifth Amendment rights by the private defendants. In a memorandum opinion, the panel addressed plaintiff's remaining arguments. View "Vega v. United States" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of an action alleging violations of plaintiff's First and Fifth Amendment rights under the implied cause of action theory adopted by the Supreme Court in Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), as well as state law claims. Neither the Supreme Court nor this court have expanded Bivens in the context of a prisoner's First Amendment access to court or Fifth Amendment procedural due process claims arising out of a prison disciplinary process, and the circumstances of plaintiff's case against private defendants plainly presented a "new context" under Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1854 (2017). The panel also held that plaintiff had alternative means for relief against the alleged violations of his First and Fifth Amendment rights by the private defendants. In a memorandum opinion, the panel addressed plaintiff's remaining arguments. View "Vega v. United States" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order on remand denying petitioner's claims that the California state court improperly denied his motion for a new trial based on the State's prosecutorial misconduct. Petitioner was convicted of raping and killing an eighteen-month-old girl. The panel held that the district court properly denied further discovery in light of its finding that there was no good cause to permit additional discovery because petitioner received the adverse inference he desired and further discovery into the State's alleged spoliation of evidence would not affect the decision of the remaining witness intimidation claim of the habeas petition. The panel also held that the district court did not clearly err in weighing the credibility of the witnesses in light of the evidence adduced at the hearing. View "Earp v. Davis" on Justia Law

A presumption of validity did not attach to a stipulation by defense counsel that their clients waived their right to a jury trial on their criminal charges. The Ninth Circuit reversed based on the ineffective jury trial waivers in this case and held that the record was insufficient to show that the jury trial waivers were voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. The panel reasoned that the proper practice under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(a) was for the defendant to personally execute the written waiver. Therefore, the panel concluded that the convictions were supported by sufficient evidence, but remanded based on the ineffective jury trial waivers. View "United States v. Laney" on Justia Law