Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Honolulu police obtained a warrant to open a suspicious package, intercepted at the UPS facility; it contained 500 packets labeled “bath salts” and “Spike Max.” Initial testing indicated but did not confirm that they contained methylenedioxypyrovalerone (MDPV), which was illegal in Hawaii. Six days later, the police made a controlled delivery to Smith’s home. After taking the delivery, Smith was arrested without a warrant. Hours later, the police effected controlled buys of MDPV at stores Smith owned. They seized evidence from the house and the stores. Later that day, an officer completed a sworn application; a state judicial determination of probable cause for extended restraint was signed on the second day following the arrest. The police received a lab report that confirmed that the substances were MDPV and informed Smith of his rights. Smith did not provide a statement and was released. Smith was never prosecuted. Smith filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. During jury deliberations, the court received an emergency phone call indicating that the foreperson had physically threatened another juror. After individual interviews, both attorneys stipulated to the dismissal of one juror. The jury then deliberated for four hours with six, instead of seven, jurors, returning a verdict that rejected Smith's claim of unreasonable detention. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Smith’s arguments that the verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence and that misconduct by defense counsel and witnesses painted Smith as a “bad guy.” View "Smith v. City & County of Honolulu" on Justia Law

Jose Maria Garcia-Martinez was a lawful permanent resident at the time of his convictions, and the BIA found him removable, under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), for having been convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMT), not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct. He was granted review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision, arguing the BIA erred in concluding that Garcia’s Oregon theft convictions were CIMTs. The Ninth Circuit noted that the Oregon theft offenses for which Garcia was convicted did not require a permanent taking of property. Therefore, the panel concluded that, at the time Garcia committed the offenses, they were not crimes involving moral turpitude because for many decades the BIA had required a permanent intent to deprive in order for a theft offense to be a crime involving moral turpitude. "In short, Garcia’s thefts were not CIMTs, and his removal order must be set aside. ... the BIA has changed or updated or revised its rule for the future. Nevertheless, that rule should not be applied to Garcia, who pled and was convicted while the old rule was extant." View "Garcia-Martinez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a motion to enjoin the government's prosecution of Defendants Gilmore and Hemsley for conspiracy to manufacture marijuana plants and manufacture of marijuana plants. In the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act (hereafter Section 538), Congress barred the Department of Justice from using appropriated funds to prevent certain States, including California, from implementing their own State laws that authorize the use, distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana. The panel held that Section 538 did not limit the government's ability to enforce federal drug laws on federal land. View "United States v. Gilmore" on Justia Law

On remand from the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for bank fraud. In this case, defendant contended that the disjunctive form of the district court's jury instruction that a "scheme to defraud" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 1344(1) means a defendant must intend to "deceive, cheat or deprive" the bank of something of value. The panel held that this argument the Supreme Court identified for consideration on remand was not fairly presented to the panel or to the district court. The panel held that, even if defendant had preserved the objection, any error was harmless. View "United States v. Shaw" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for sexually abusing a developmentally delayed 11 year old girl. The panel held that the district court properly exercised its discretion in admitting the testimony of a nurse practitioner and a law enforcement officer about statements the victim made to them during interviews conducted shortly after the abuse occurred. The panel also held that defendant's remaining challenge to the propriety of the prosecutor's closing argument did not merit reversal. View "United States v. Kootswatewa" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendants' convictions for charges related to their misuse of funds belonging to the Wounded Marine Careers Foundation (WMCF). Defendants were convicted, among other things, of violating 18 U.S.C. 666, a statute prohibiting the wrongful taking of property from an organization that receives more than $10,000 in federal "benefits" during a one-year period. The panel held that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably conclude that WMCF did receive "benefits" within the meaning of the statute. The panel reasoned that an entity need not be the primary beneficiary of a federal program to qualify as having received "benefits," and that the Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment Program aimed to aid veterans and to ensure the viability and quality of the organizations that served those veterans. View "United States v. Paixao" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging that a police officer used excessive force. Plaintiff alleged that excessive force was used when the officer pointed a gun at plaintiff's head in the context of a felony arrest after plaintiff had already been searched, was calm and compliant, and was being watched over by a second armed deputy. The panel held that pointing a loaded gun at the suspect's head in these circumstances constituted excessive force under the Fourth Amendment, but that the officers here were entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established at the time of the traffic stop. View "Thompson v. Copeland" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction in the United States District Court for the District of Guam based on his guilty plea for attempted possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction and rejected defendant's argument that his constitutional right under Article III, Section 2, clause 3 and the Sixth Amendment to be tried in a state or district where the crime was committed was violated because Guam is neither a state nor a district. The panel held that Congress never extended Article III, Section 2, clause 3 to Guam. The panel explained that the Sixth Amendment, which provides for the right to a jury trial in "the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed," did apply to Guam. Congress deemed Guam a "district," defendant's crime occurred in part in the district of Guam, and therefore venue in Guam was proper. View "United States v. Obak" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit circuit vacated defendant's sentence after the district court denied defendant a minor role reduction under USSG 3B1.2(b). The panel rejected defendant's contention that the district court erred because it did not consider or mention the five factors listed in section 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(C), and failed to mention other factors it did consider when it concluded that defendant did not qualify for a minor-role adjustment. The panel explained that the district court was not obligated to tick off the factors on the record to show that it considered them, and the panel had no trouble determining from the sentencing memoranda and the transcript of the sentencing hearing that the district court was well aware of the factors added by Amendment 794. The panel held, however, that the decision to deny the adjustment rested on incorrect interpretations of section 3B1.2 and Amendment 794. In this case, there was no evidence that defendant had a proprietary interest in the outcome of the operation or otherwise stood to benefit more than minimally, and the government did not account for defendant's limited understanding of the overall scope and structure of the criminal operation. View "United States v. Aguilar Diaz" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for attempting to reenter the United States after a prior removal. Defendant was previously removed for committing an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B) because he was convicted of felony possession of methamphetamine in violation of California Health & Safety Code section 11378. The panel held that because section 11378 had a trafficking element and required a sufficiently culpable state of mind, section 11378 was a drug trafficking aggravated felony under section 1101(a)(43)(B) where the record of conviction established that the substance involved was federally controlled. Therefore, removal under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) based on such a conviction under section 11378 was not fundamentally unfair. View "United States v. Verduzco-Rangel" on Justia Law