Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of plaintiff's action challenging DHS's denial of I-130 visa petitions. Plaintiff filed petitions seeking Legal Permanent Residence (LPR) status for his non-citizen wife and her three non-citizen children. DHS denied the petitions pursuant to the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 because defendant had been convicted of committing a lewd and lascivious act with a child under the age of fourteen. Because the Adam Walsh Act clearly delineates who may have a petition granted—rather than who may literally file a petition—the panel held that the amended statute applied to petitions that were filed before, but were still pending on, its effective date. Therefore, USCIS correctly applied the Adam Walsh Act in plaintiff's case. The panel also held that applying the Adam Walsh Act to pending petitions did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause; the panel lacked jurisdiction to review plaintiff's statutory claims concerning the "no risk" determination; and plaintiff's constitutional claims were not colorable. View "Gebhardt v. Nielsen" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendants' misdemeanor convictions under 8 U.S.C. 1325(a)(1) for attempting to enter the United States "at any time or place other than as designated by immigration officers." The panel held that a place "designated by immigration officers" refers to a specific immigration facility, not an entire geographic area. In this case, there was no dispute that defendants did not enter the United States through a facility where immigration officials could accept applications for entry. Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendants attempted to enter the United States in a place other than as designated by immigration officers. View "United States v. Aldana" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of habeas relief as to petitioner's guilt phase claims and vacated his convictions. In this case, a jury convicted defendant of two counts of first degree murder, two counts of rape, and two counts of forcible sodomy. The panel held that had counsel performed effectively and investigated and presented a diminished mental capacity defense based on mental impairment, there was a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have had a reasonable doubt as to whether petitioner could have formed the requisite mental state for first degree murder. View "Hernandez v. Chappell" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's grant of a writ of habeas corpus based on petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) at sentencing and affirmed the district court's denial of relief on petitioner's other claims. The panel held that federal court review was not procedurally barred; vacated the district court's grant of relief because it could not find the Arizona Supreme Court's determination that petitioner's counsel's deficient performance at sentencing was not prejudicial to be clearly unreasonable; affirmed the denial of relief on petitioner's claims of inadequate funding to investigate mitigating evidence and mental disability; granted a certificate of appealability for petitioner's claims of an application of an unconstitutional causal nexus standard by the Arizona Supreme Court and for ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to challenge petitioner's competency to stand trial; and denied the claims on the merits. View "Apelt v. Ryan" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed defendant's convictions for two counts of First Degree Murder, two counts of Murder of a Federal Employee, and two counts of Use of a Firearm in Relation to a Crime of Violence Resulting in Death. The panel held that the government overstepped in moving to excuse second defense counsel; the district court erred in allowing the government to use criminal profile testimony as substantive evidence of guilt; the district court erred in admitting other act evidence; the district court was not required to declare a mistrial upon elicitation of prejudicial testimony; the district court properly excluded evidence of third party culpability; and the panel reassigned the case to preserve the appearance of justice. Accordingly, the panel remanded for a new trial after being reassigned. View "United States v. Wells" on Justia Law

Arizona armed robbery does not qualify as a violent felony under either the force clause or the enumerated felonies clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). In this case, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct defendant's sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255. In the panel's recent decision in United States v. Molinar, No. 15-10430, 2017 WL 5760565 (9th Cir. Nov. 29, 2017), the panel applied the categorical approach to determine that Arizona armed robbery did not qualify as a crime of violence under the force clause of USSG 4B1.2(a). The panel held that Molinar's holding applied equally to the question of whether Arizona armed robbery was a violent felony under the ACCA's force clause. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

In 2014, defendant-appellant Justin Werle was indicted in Washington State for the unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition, and possession of an unregistered firearm. Werle pled guilty to both counts. The district court found that Werle had seven prior qualifying convictions under the Armed Career Criminal Act and was therefore subject to a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence. This finding was based in part on the district court’s determination that the Washington riot statute was categorically a violent felony for the purposes of the ACCA. A different panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Washington riot statute was not categorically a violent felony, and the case was remanded for resentencing in light of the opinion. On remand, the district court imposed a sentence enhancement under U.S.S.G. section 2K2.1(a) due to Werle’s prior convictions for felony harassment via a threat to kill under Washington Revised Code section 9A.46.020(2)(b)(ii), finding that those convictions were crimes of violence. The district court then calculated Werle’s sentencing guideline range to be between 130 and 162 months, and concluded that a total sentence of 140 months was appropriate. Werle appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Werle" on Justia Law

Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016), which clarified application of the categorical analysis to the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), did not establish a new rule of constitutional law. Rather, Mathis clarifies application of the categorical analysis to the ACCA. In this case, the Ninth Circuit denied petitioner's application for authorization to file a second or successive motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate a sentence. View "Arazola-Galea v. United States" on Justia Law

The federal offense of carjacking is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 924(c). In this case, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion challenging his conviction for brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence. Therefore, the predicate offense for defendant's conviction, carjacking, qualified as a crime of violence. View "United States v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's conviction of attempted reentry of a removed alien. Defendant argued that his 2009 removal was invalid because his 1997 drug trafficking conviction under Wash. Rev. Code 69.50.401 was incorrectly determined to be an aggravated felony. The panel held that defendant's waiver of the right to seek judicial review was not considered and intelligent, and thus he was deprived of due process. Furthermore, defendant's prior drug trafficiking conviction did not qualify as an aggravated felony under the categorical approach and could not be the basis for defendant's 2009 removal. Therefore, defendant satisfied all three elements of 8 U.S.C. 1326(d), and his collateral attack on the underlying deportation order should have been successful. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Valdivia-Flores" on Justia Law