Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit certified the following question of criminal law to the California Supreme Court: Does a finding of probable cause at a preliminary hearing preclude a false arrest claim? The panel panel withdrew the case from submission and stayed further proceedings pending final action by the state court. View "Patterson v. City of Yuba" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit certified the following question of criminal law to the California Supreme Court: Does a finding of probable cause at a preliminary hearing preclude a false arrest claim? The panel panel withdrew the case from submission and stayed further proceedings pending final action by the state court. View "Patterson v. City of Yuba" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for committing a violent crime in aid of racketeering. The panel held that the district court committed harmless error by instructing the jury on the federal definition of "knowingly," which lacked a self-defense instruction, rather than on the Hawaii definition. The panel also held that defendant's prior burglary and false imprisonment convictions qualified as crimes of violence under USSG 4B1.2's residual clause. View "United States v. Adkins" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss a count charging him with possession of body armor by a violent felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. 931(a)(1) and 924(a)(7). The panel held that defendant's prior conviction for attempted first degree murder under Washington law was a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(a) because it required specific intent and had as an element an intentional, threatened, attempted, or actual use of force. Likewise, attempted first degree murder under Washington law is a crime of violence under USSG 4B1.2(a). Therefore, the panel also affirmed the district court's interpretation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines. View "United States v. Studhorse" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss a count charging him with possession of body armor by a violent felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. 931(a)(1) and 924(a)(7). The panel held that defendant's prior conviction for attempted first degree murder under Washington law was a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(a) because it required specific intent and had as an element an intentional, threatened, attempted, or actual use of force. Likewise, attempted first degree murder under Washington law is a crime of violence under USSG 4B1.2(a). Therefore, the panel also affirmed the district court's interpretation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines. View "United States v. Studhorse" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a petition challenging the denial of petitioner's naturalization application. The panel held that petitioner's conviction for sodomy where the victim was unable to consent, in violation of California Penal Code 286(i), was an aggravated felony. The panel held that a conviction under CPC 286(i), was an aggravated felony as a rape offense under 8 U.S.C.1101(a)(43)(A). The conduct prohibited by CPC 286(i) fell entirely within the generic definition of "rape" as articulated in Castro-Baez v. Reno, 217 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2000). Therefore, petitioner failed to meet the good moral character requirement for naturalization. View "Elmakhzoumi v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a petition challenging the denial of petitioner's naturalization application. The panel held that petitioner's conviction for sodomy where the victim was unable to consent, in violation of California Penal Code 286(i), was an aggravated felony. The panel held that a conviction under CPC 286(i), was an aggravated felony as a rape offense under 8 U.S.C.1101(a)(43)(A). The conduct prohibited by CPC 286(i) fell entirely within the generic definition of "rape" as articulated in Castro-Baez v. Reno, 217 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2000). Therefore, petitioner failed to meet the good moral character requirement for naturalization. View "Elmakhzoumi v. Sessions" on Justia Law

18 U.S.C. 3583(i), which extends the power to revoke a term of supervised release even after the term has expired, does not empower a district court to base a revocation upon violations which (1) were not alleged prior to the expiration period and (2) are not otherwise factually related to a matter raised in a signed warrant or summons issued before expiration. In this case, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's order revoking supervised release and remanded for further proceedings. The panel held that the district court erred in adjudicating the perjury allegations because they were submitted by the probation officer after defendant's term of supervision had expired. View "United States v. Campbell" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the sentence imposed because of his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition and the sentence for violating the conditions of his supervised release in another case. The panel held that the district court did not err in applying an enhancement under USSG 2A2.2(a) and (b)(2)(A) for use of a firearm in the commission of an aggravated assault; the panel remanded for the district court to strike the final sentence in Special Condition 5, which explicitly removed the requirement that the government prove mens rea in a future revocation proceeding; three standard conditions of supervised release were unconstitutionally vague and the panel remanded with instructions; and the panel need not decide whether it should read into Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1 a requirement that a district court in a revocation proceeding resolve factual disputes or determine explicitly that such resolution was unnecessary. Therefore, the panel affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded in part. View "United States v. Evans" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief for petitioner, who was criminally convicted in both state and federal court. Petitioner argued that his federal sentence actually commenced on one of the instances when the state prematurely transferred him to the federal authorities, and thus he should receive credit against his federal sentence for the period starting on the date he was erroneously turned over to federal authorities and including all his time in state prison after he was returned to state custody. The panel explained that because the state credited the time the federal authorities erroneously held petitioner against his state sentence, he effectively sought double-credit against both his state and federal sentences for the period between August 2009 and June 2011. The panel held that because these erroneous transfers did not manifest the state's consent to terminate its primary jurisdiction over petitioner, he was not in federal custody for purposes of 18 U.S.C. 3585(a), and therefore the federal sentence did not commence. View "Johnson v. Gill" on Justia Law