Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit reversed defendant's convictions for two counts of First Degree Murder, two counts of Murder of a Federal Employee, and two counts of Use of a Firearm in Relation to a Crime of Violence Resulting in Death. The panel held that the government overstepped in moving to excuse second defense counsel; the district court erred in allowing the government to use criminal profile testimony as substantive evidence of guilt; the district court erred in admitting other act evidence; the district court was not required to declare a mistrial upon elicitation of prejudicial testimony; the district court properly excluded evidence of third party culpability; and the panel reassigned the case to preserve the appearance of justice. Accordingly, the panel remanded for a new trial after being reassigned. View "United States v. Wells" on Justia Law

Arizona armed robbery does not qualify as a violent felony under either the force clause or the enumerated felonies clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). In this case, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct defendant's sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255. In the panel's recent decision in United States v. Molinar, No. 15-10430, 2017 WL 5760565 (9th Cir. Nov. 29, 2017), the panel applied the categorical approach to determine that Arizona armed robbery did not qualify as a crime of violence under the force clause of USSG 4B1.2(a). The panel held that Molinar's holding applied equally to the question of whether Arizona armed robbery was a violent felony under the ACCA's force clause. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

In 2014, defendant-appellant Justin Werle was indicted in Washington State for the unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition, and possession of an unregistered firearm. Werle pled guilty to both counts. The district court found that Werle had seven prior qualifying convictions under the Armed Career Criminal Act and was therefore subject to a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence. This finding was based in part on the district court’s determination that the Washington riot statute was categorically a violent felony for the purposes of the ACCA. A different panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Washington riot statute was not categorically a violent felony, and the case was remanded for resentencing in light of the opinion. On remand, the district court imposed a sentence enhancement under U.S.S.G. section 2K2.1(a) due to Werle’s prior convictions for felony harassment via a threat to kill under Washington Revised Code section 9A.46.020(2)(b)(ii), finding that those convictions were crimes of violence. The district court then calculated Werle’s sentencing guideline range to be between 130 and 162 months, and concluded that a total sentence of 140 months was appropriate. Werle appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Werle" on Justia Law

Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016), which clarified application of the categorical analysis to the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), did not establish a new rule of constitutional law. Rather, Mathis clarifies application of the categorical analysis to the ACCA. In this case, the Ninth Circuit denied petitioner's application for authorization to file a second or successive motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate a sentence. View "Arazola-Galea v. United States" on Justia Law

The federal offense of carjacking is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 924(c). In this case, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion challenging his conviction for brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence. Therefore, the predicate offense for defendant's conviction, carjacking, qualified as a crime of violence. View "United States v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's conviction of attempted reentry of a removed alien. Defendant argued that his 2009 removal was invalid because his 1997 drug trafficking conviction under Wash. Rev. Code 69.50.401 was incorrectly determined to be an aggravated felony. The panel held that defendant's waiver of the right to seek judicial review was not considered and intelligent, and thus he was deprived of due process. Furthermore, defendant's prior drug trafficiking conviction did not qualify as an aggravated felony under the categorical approach and could not be the basis for defendant's 2009 removal. Therefore, defendant satisfied all three elements of 8 U.S.C. 1326(d), and his collateral attack on the underlying deportation order should have been successful. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Valdivia-Flores" on Justia Law

If the terms used by an expert witness do not have a specialized meaning in law and do not represent an attempt to instruct the jury on the law, or how to apply the law to the facts of the case, the testimony is not an impermissible legal conclusion. The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for distributing controlled prescription drugs in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). In this case, the panel held that an expert's testimony passed muster under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and 704 where he did not substitute his judgment for the jury's. Rather, he provided a professional opinion about whether a course of conduct comported with the standard of care prevalent in the medical community. View "United States v. Diaz" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition challenging petitioner's conviction for first degree murder and rape and his capital sentence. The panel held that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) applied to petitioner's federal habeas petition and rejected his claim that AEDPA was inapplicable because he had filed a request for appointment of counsel and a stay of execution before AEDPA's effective date; although trial counsel was deficient for retaining a psychiatrist for the penalty phase only a few days before its start and by failing to prepare him adequately, the California Supreme Court could reasonably conclude that he was not prejudiced; the California Supreme Court reasonably decided that petitioner's counsel's performance was not deficient because his counsel could have made a strategic decision to omit a witness' testimony at the penalty phase and he had not shown prejudice; the prosecutor's statements at penalty phase closing argument did not violate petitioner's constitutional rights; the panel rejected petitioner's conflict claim; and the court declined to expand the certificate of appealability to include an unexhausted claim that systemic delay in the administration of California’s death penalty rendered executions arbitrary in violation of the Eighth Amendment. View "Rowland v. Chappell" on Justia Law

Section 11351 of the California Health and Safety Code (possession or purchase for sale of designated controlled substance) is divisible –as discussed in Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) –as to its controlled substance requirement, such that a conviction under that statute may, applying the modified categorical approach, be held to be a drug trafficking offense under the Sentencing Guidelines. In this case, the Ninth Circuit applied the modified categorical approach and held that the government established that defendant was previously convicted of possessing cocaine for sale, which qualifies as a drug trafficking offense under the Sentencing Guidelines. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Murillo-Alvarado" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's imposition of a sentencing enhancement based on defendant's prior Arizona conviction for attempted armed robbery, which the court treated as a "crime of violence" under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual. The panel reexamined its previous decision in United States v. Taylor, 529 F.3d 1232 (9th Cir. 2008), that Arizona attempted armed robbery should be considered a crime of violence under the relevant Guidelines provision, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010), which construed a similarly worded crime-of-violence provision in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The panel held that, although Johnson did not require the panel to depart from some of its analysis in Taylor, Arizona attempted armed robbery nonetheless qualifies as a crime of violence for reasons other than those relied upon in Taylor. The panel held that Arizona robbery (and thus armed robbery) was a categorical match to generic robbery, and that Arizona attempt was equivalent to generic attempt, so defendant's conviction did constitute a crime of violence for purposes of USSG 4B1.2. View "United States v. Sanchez Molinar" on Justia Law