Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves the Hawai‘i Disability Rights Center (HDRC), which represents individuals with developmental disabilities, including children with autism. HDRC alleges that the Hawai‘i Departments of Education (DOE) and Human Services (DHS) unlawfully deny students with autism access to Applied Behavioral Analysis (ABA) therapy during school hours, even when medically necessary. DOE provides ABA services only if deemed educationally relevant, and DHS does not provide ABA services during school hours, even if medically necessary and covered by Medicaid or private insurance.The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii granted summary judgment in favor of DOE and DHS, holding that HDRC's failure to exhaust administrative procedures under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) was fatal to all its claims, including those under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the Medicaid Act. The court concluded that HDRC, as a protection and advocacy organization, must ensure that parents of its constituents exhaust the IDEA’s administrative process.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that HDRC, as Hawai‘i’s designated protection and advocacy system, can pursue administrative remedies under the IDEA and is therefore bound by the IDEA’s administrative exhaustion requirement for its own claim. However, HDRC need not ensure that parents of individual children with autism exhaust their individual IDEA claims. The court found that HDRC did not exhaust its administrative remedies, and no exceptions to IDEA exhaustion applied.The Ninth Circuit also held that HDRC was not required to exhaust the IDEA’s administrative procedures before bringing its claims under the ADA, Section 504, and the Medicaid Act. The court concluded that HDRC’s non-IDEA claims do not allege the denial of a free appropriate public education (FAPE) and therefore do not require exhaustion under the IDEA. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case. View "HAWAI'I DISABILITY RIGHTS CRT. V. KISHIMOTO" on Justia Law

A class of over 500,000 federal student loan borrowers sued the U.S. Department of Education for failing to process their borrower defense (BD) applications. The Department and the plaintiffs reached a settlement, which included automatic debt forgiveness for certain borrowers and streamlined adjudication for others. Three for-profit universities (the Schools) listed in the settlement as having substantial misconduct intervened, claiming reputational harm.The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California approved the settlement and denied the Schools' motion to intervene as of right but allowed them to object to the settlement. The Schools appealed, arguing that the settlement caused them reputational and financial harm and interfered with their procedural rights.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the Schools had Article III standing due to alleged reputational harm but lacked prudential standing to challenge the settlement because they did not demonstrate formal legal prejudice. The court found that the dispute between the plaintiffs and the Department was not moot, as the Department's voluntary cessation of issuing pro forma denials did not render the case moot. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of the Schools' motion to intervene as of right, concluding that the Schools did not have a significantly protectable interest and failed to show prejudice from the denial of intervention as of right.The Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal in part and affirmed the district court's denial of intervention as of right. View "Sweet v. Everglades College, Inc." on Justia Law

Orthodox Jewish families and schools challenged California's requirement that private schools be nonsectarian to provide special education under the IDEA. The families argued this requirement violated their Free Exercise and Equal Protection rights by preventing them from advocating for religious school placements for their children with disabilities. The schools claimed the requirement barred them from certification solely due to their religious affiliation.The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California dismissed the case, ruling the schools and one family lacked standing and denying the families' motion for a preliminary injunction. The court found the schools did not demonstrate they were "able and ready" to apply for certification and that the nonsectarian requirement did not affect the educational placement of one family's child. However, it held that another family had standing to challenge the requirement.The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the schools' and one family's claims for lack of standing but reversed the dismissal of the other families' claims. The court held that the nonsectarian requirement burdened the families' free exercise rights by preventing them from advocating for religious school placements. It found the requirement was not neutral to religion and applied strict scrutiny, concluding the State failed to show the requirement was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest. The court vacated the denial of the preliminary injunction and remanded for further consideration of the injunction factors. View "LOFFMAN V. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION" on Justia Law

The case involves two transgender girls, Jane Doe and Megan Roe, who wish to participate in girls' sports at their respective schools in Arizona. Both girls have not undergone male puberty due to puberty-blocking medication and hormone therapy. Arizona enacted the Save Women’s Sports Act, which prohibits "students of the male sex," including transgender women and girls, from participating in women’s and girls’ sports. The plaintiffs argue that this Act violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona reviewed the case and granted a preliminary injunction, preventing the enforcement of the Act against the plaintiffs. The court found that the Act was adopted with the purpose of excluding transgender girls from girls' sports teams and concluded that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their equal protection and Title IX claims. The court determined that before puberty, there are no significant differences in athletic performance between boys and girls and that transgender girls who receive puberty-blocking medication do not have an athletic advantage over other girls.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order, agreeing that the Act discriminates based on transgender status and is subject to heightened scrutiny. The court held that the Act’s categorical ban on transgender girls from participating in girls' sports is not substantially related to the state’s objectives of ensuring competitive fairness and equal athletic opportunities for female student-athletes. The court also found that the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm without the injunction and that the balance of equities and public interest favored granting the preliminary injunction. View "DOE V. HORNE" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, parents of Idaho school children, sought reimbursement for fees associated with educational and extracurricular activities within Idaho public school districts. They argued that these fees were improperly assessed because the Idaho Constitution mandates "free common schools," and that the payment of such fees constituted a taking of property without due process, violating the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho initially denied the school districts' motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiffs had a property interest in a free education under the Idaho Constitution. However, the case was later reassigned to a different district judge, who revisited the issue. The second district judge granted summary judgment in favor of the school districts, concluding that the plaintiffs did not possess a property right protected by the Takings Clause because the right to a free public education in Idaho does not constitute a vested private property interest.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment. The court held that the Idaho Constitution does not create a vested private property interest in specific educational benefits. It determined that public education in Idaho lacks the essential characteristics of private property, such as the right to possess, use, dispose of, or sell. Therefore, money paid to satisfy fees related to supplemental educational services is not subject to a Takings Clause claim. The court also clarified that a second district judge should not reconsider a prior judge's ruling unless specific conditions are met, but found any procedural error in this case to be harmless. View "Zeyen v. Bonneville Joint District" on Justia Law

J.B., a student with multiple disabilities, was enrolled in the Kyrene Elementary School District. Due to concerns about the school's handling of J.B.'s behavioral issues, J.B.'s parent, L.B., withdrew J.B. from the District and placed J.B. in a private school, Brightmont Academy. The District attempted to conduct evaluations to update J.B.'s Individualized Education Program (IEP), but L.B. refused to consent to these evaluations, proposing instead that the District use video recordings for assessments.The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that the District did not violate the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and ruled in favor of the District. L.B. appealed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona, which affirmed the ALJ's decision. The District Court found that L.B. refused to consent to the District's evaluations and made it clear that she did not intend to re-enroll J.B. in the District.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that the District did not deny a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) to J.B. because L.B.'s refusal to consent to evaluations relieved the District of further obligations under IDEA. Additionally, the court found that the District's procedural error in stating that no further IEP meetings would occur because J.B. was not enrolled in the District was harmless, as it did not result in a deprivation of educational opportunity for J.B. Consequently, L.B. was not entitled to reimbursement for private school tuition and related expenses. View "J.B. V. KYRENE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 28" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of plaintiffs, including the Health Freedom Defense Fund, Inc. and California Educators for Medical Freedom, who challenged the COVID-19 vaccination policy of the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD). The policy, which was in effect for over two years, required employees to get the COVID-19 vaccination or lose their jobs. The plaintiffs argued that the policy interfered with their fundamental right to refuse medical treatment.The case was initially dismissed by the United States District Court for the Central District of California, which applied a rational basis review under Jacobson v. Massachusetts, concluding that the policy served a legitimate government purpose. The court held that even if the vaccine did not prevent transmission or contraction of COVID-19, it furthered the purpose of protecting LAUSD students and employees from COVID-19.The plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. During the appeal, LAUSD rescinded its vaccination policy. LAUSD then asked the court to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the case was now moot. The plaintiffs objected, arguing that LAUSD withdrew the policy because they feared an adverse ruling.The Ninth Circuit held that the case was not moot, applying the voluntary cessation exception to mootness. The court found that LAUSD's pattern of withdrawing and then reinstating its vaccination policies, particularly in response to litigation risk, was enough to keep the case alive.On the merits, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court misapplied the Supreme Court’s decision in Jacobson v. Massachusetts. The court found that Jacobson did not apply because the plaintiffs had plausibly alleged that the COVID-19 vaccine does not effectively prevent the spread of COVID-19. The court vacated the district court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings under the correct legal standard. View "HEALTH FREEDOM DEFENSE FUND, INC. V. ALBERTO CARVALHO" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of disabled students who sued the Superintendent of Public Instruction and the Office of the Superintendent of Public Instruction in Washington State. The students claimed that the state's practice of discontinuing special education services at the end of the school year in which a student turns 21 violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The IDEA generally requires states to provide special education to disabled students until their 22nd birthday, but allows states to discontinue services as early as age 18 if providing special education to older students would be inconsistent with state law or practice. The students argued that because Washington offers certain adult-education programs to 21-year-olds, it should also be required to provide special education to disabled 21-year-olds.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington denied the students' motion for a preliminary injunction, holding that the students had not shown that they would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction was not granted. The court also concluded that the students were not likely to succeed on the merits of their claim because the adult-education programs in Washington charged a tuition fee, and therefore did not constitute "free public education."The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court held that the students had a high likelihood of success on the merits of their claim because the availability of the adult-education programs in Washington triggered an obligation under the IDEA to provide special education to disabled 21-year-olds. The court also found that the students would suffer irreparable harm from the denial of access to special education. The court concluded that the balance of hardships tipped in the students' favor and that an injunction would be in the public interest. View "N. D. V. REYKDAL" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a law student, Douglas Pell, who was studying at an unaccredited law school and was required to pass the First Year Law Students Exam (FYLSX) as a prerequisite to bar admission. Due to personal circumstances, Pell was unable to take the exam until his sixth opportunity. Despite passing on his first attempt, he was denied credit for 39 hours of courses he had completed after his first year of law school because he did not pass the FYLSX within the first three opportunities. Pell petitioned the State Bar of California for a hearing to excuse his delay and waive the forfeiture of his credits, but his petition was denied without explanation. Instead of petitioning the California Supreme Court to review the State Bar's decision, Pell filed a complaint in federal court.The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed Pell's case, agreeing with the State Bar that Pell had not suffered a cognizable deprivation under federal law. The court held that the California Supreme Court has exclusive original jurisdiction over matters of admission, and challenges regarding the FYLSX or its authorizing statute must be brought by original petition to the California Supreme Court. The State Bar's denial of Pell's petition for a hearing and a waiver of his credit forfeiture was taken in the Bar's advisory role and did not result in a cognizable deprivation of a protected right or property interest.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that Pell's federal claims must be dismissed for failure to state a claim, as the State Bar's actions did not cause Pell to suffer a cognizable deprivation under federal law. However, the court held that the district court erred in dismissing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court also reversed the dismissal of Pell's state law claim under California's Unruh Act and remanded the case to the district court to exercise its discretion over whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction or dismiss the claim without prejudice so that it may be pursued in state court. View "Pell v. Nunez" on Justia Law

This case was brought under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) by the parents of A.O., a child with severe hearing loss who uses cochlear implants. The parents had rejected the Los Angeles Unified School District's proposed individualized education program (IEP) for their daughter, which they felt didn't specify the frequency and duration of proposed speech therapy and audiology services, offer a meaningful educational benefit, or place A.O. in the least restrictive environment appropriate for her. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision largely supporting the parents' objections. The court found that the school district's proposed IEP violated the IDEA by not clearly specifying the frequency and duration of proposed speech therapy and audiology services. The court also concluded that the proposed IEP wouldn't offer A.O. a meaningful educational benefit and failed to place her in the least restrictive environment appropriate for her. The court reversed the district court's conclusion that the school district's proposed IEP did not need to provide individual speech therapy. The court remanded the case to the district court to modify its judgment. View "LAUSD V. A. O." on Justia Law