Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Education Law
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This case was brought under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) by the parents of A.O., a child with severe hearing loss who uses cochlear implants. The parents had rejected the Los Angeles Unified School District's proposed individualized education program (IEP) for their daughter, which they felt didn't specify the frequency and duration of proposed speech therapy and audiology services, offer a meaningful educational benefit, or place A.O. in the least restrictive environment appropriate for her. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision largely supporting the parents' objections. The court found that the school district's proposed IEP violated the IDEA by not clearly specifying the frequency and duration of proposed speech therapy and audiology services. The court also concluded that the proposed IEP wouldn't offer A.O. a meaningful educational benefit and failed to place her in the least restrictive environment appropriate for her. The court reversed the district court's conclusion that the school district's proposed IEP did not need to provide individual speech therapy. The court remanded the case to the district court to modify its judgment. View "LAUSD V. A. O." on Justia Law

Posted in: Education Law
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=O.B. who was attending the University on a football scholarship, repeatedly and violently assaulted Plaintiff, his fellow student, in an off-campus house where O.B. was living with other university football players. At the time of the assault, university officials knew that O.B. had repeatedly and violently assaulted two other female undergraduates the previous year. Plaintiff sued the University under Title IX. The district court granted summary judgment to the University.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment. The en banc court held that to obtain damages under Title IX for student-on-student harassment, a plaintiff must show (1) that the educational institution had substantial control over both the harasser and the context in which the known harassment occurs; (2) that the harassment was so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it denied its victims the equal access to education that Title IX is designed to protect; (3) that a school official with authority to address the alleged discrimination and to institute corrective measures has actual knowledge of the discrimination; (4) that the school acted with deliberate indifference to the harassment; and (5) that the school’s deliberate indifference must cause students to undergo harassment. The en banc court held that evidence in the record would support a conclusion by a reasonable factfinder that University officials had actual knowledge or notice of O.B.’s violent assaults and that Erika Barnes, the University’s Title IX liaison within the Athletics Department, was an official who had authority to address O.B.’s assaults and to institute corrective measures. View "MACKENZIE BROWN, ET AL V. STATE OF ARIZONA, ET AL" on Justia Law

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The Fellowship of Christian Athletes (FCA), is a ministry group formed for student-athletes to engage in various activities through their shared Christian faith. FCA holds certain core religious beliefs, including a belief that sexual intimacy is designed only to be expressed within the confines of a marriage between one man and one woman. The San Jose Unified School District (District) revoked FCA’s status as an official student club on multiple campuses for violation of the District’s nondiscrimination policies. FCA filed a motion for a preliminary injunction for violation of FCA’s First Amendment rights to free exercise of religion and free speech and directed the district court to enter an order reinstating FCA’s recognition as an official Associated Student Body (ASB) approved student club. The district court denied the motion.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial. The en banc court held that the District’s Pioneer High School FCA had representational organizational standing and its claims for prospective injunctive relief were not moot. FCA National had organizational standing, and its claims were not moot because the District’s actions frustrated FCA National’s mission and required it to divert organizational resources, which it would continue to do in order to challenge the District’s policies. The en banc court next held that the district court erred in applying a heightened standard applicable to mandatory injunctions. The en banc court held that FCA and the other plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their Free Exercise claims. View "FELLOWSHIP OF CHRISTIAN ATHLETES, ET AL V. SAN JOSE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATIO, ET AL" on Justia Law

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Idaho enacted the Fairness in Women’s Sports Act, Idaho Code §§ 33-6201–06 (2020) (the “Act”), a first-of-its-kind categorical ban on the participation of transgender women and girls in women’s student athletics. Elite athletic regulatory bodies also had policies allowing transgender women athletes to compete if they met certain criteria. The Act, however, bars all transgender girls and women from participating in, or even trying out for, public school female sports teams at every age. At issue is whether the federal district court for the District of Idaho abused its discretion in August 2020 when it preliminarily enjoined the Act, holding that it likely violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it found that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the Act violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because the Act subjects only women and girls who wish to participate in public school athletic competitions to an intrusive sex verification process and categorically bans transgender women and girls at all levels, regardless of whether they have gone through puberty or hormone therapy, from competing on female, women, or girls teams, and because the State of Idaho failed to adduce any evidence demonstrating that the Act is substantially related to its asserted interests in sex equality and opportunity for women athletes, the panel held that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their equal protection claim. View "LINDSAY HECOX, ET AL V. BRADLEY LITTLE, ET AL" on Justia Law

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Columbia Basin College officials terminated R.W. from the nursing program after learning that he had sought medical treatment for homicidal thoughts about three instructors. R.W. filed suit seeking damages, reinstatement in the nursing program, and expungement of his failing grades.   On interlocutory appeal, the Ninth Circuit  (1) affirmed the district court’s order determining that Plaintiff’s suit for injunctive relief against Columbia Basin College officials in their official capacity could proceed under the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity; and (2) dismissed in part defendants’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction in plaintiff R.W.’s action alleging First Amendment violations and other claims arising from his termination from a nursing program at Columbia Basin College.   The panel held that R.W.’s complaint alleged an ongoing violation of his constitutional rights given the uncertainty as to whether he could reenroll in the nursing program or qualify for financial aid; his claim for prospective relief was not moot; and the Dean of Student Conduct was a proper defendant because he was directly involved with the alleged constitutional violations and there was a question of fact as to whether he had authority to implement injunctive relief if so ordered.   the panel held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the district court’s order declining to reconsider its prior partial summary judgment for R.W. on his 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 claim for violation of the First Amendment. The merits of R.W.’s First Amendment claim were severable from, and neither necessary to nor necessarily resolved by, the district court’s ruling on the Ex parte Young issue and were reviewable upon entry of final judgment. View "R. W. V. COLUMBIA BASIN COLLEGE, ET AL" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff alleged that when he was a first-year student-athlete at the University of Arizona, his teammates subjected him to frequent “sexual and homophobic bullying” because they perceived him to be gay. He claims that the Arizona Board of Regents and the University of Arizona (“University Defendants”) were deliberately indifferent to his claims of sexual harassment and that they retaliated against him in violation of Title IX. He also brings claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against two of his coaches (collectively, “Defendant Coaches”). Finally, he sought punitive damages against the Defendant Coaches. The district court dismissed the action.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and reversed in part the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s action. The panel held that Title IX bars sexual harassment on the basis of perceived sexual orientation. The panel held that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a form of sex-based discrimination under Title IX. The panel held that Plaintiff sufficiently alleged the first, third, and fourth elements of his Title IX harassment claim, but the operative complaint failed to allege a deprivation of educational opportunity. The panel affirmed the dismissal of the harassment claim, vacated the portion of the district court’s order denying leave to amend, and remanded for the district court to consider Plaintiff’s request to amend the complaint again, should he renew that request before the district court. The panel held that the operative complaint sufficiently alleged that Plaintiff suffered harassment on the basis of perceived sexual orientation and that Defendants retaliated against him when they failed to investigate his accusations adequately. View "MICHAEL GRABOWSKI V. ARIZONA BOARD OF REGENTS, ET AL" on Justia Law

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Escondido Union School District (“Escondido”) appealed the district court’s ruling that Escondido denied D.O. a Free Appropriate Public Education (“FAPE”) by failing to timely assess him for autism. An administrative law judge ruled that Escondido’s delay in assessing D.O. for autism was neither a procedural violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Act (“IDEA”) nor a denial of a free appropriate public education, or FAPE. The district court reversed the ALJ in part, holding that Escondido’s four-month delay in assessing D.O. constituted a procedural violation of IDEA and that this procedural violation denied D.O. a FAPE by depriving him of educational benefits.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment ruling. The panel concluded that Escondido’s duty to propose an assessment in an area of suspected disability was triggered on December 5, 2016, when Escondido was put on notice that D.O. might be autistic by Dr. M.D., who had completed an assessment and report. The panel concluded that Escondido’s subsequent four-month delay in proposing an autism assessment plan did not violate any California statutory deadlines or any federal statutory timeline. The panel held that Escondido’s delay did not constitute a procedural violation of IDEA because Escondido did not fail to assess D.O., and some delay in complying with IDEA’s procedural requirement is permissible. The panel held that the district court erred in determining that Escondido’s delay was due, at least in part, to the subjective skepticism of its staff. The panel also held that even if the delay were a procedural violation of FAPE, it did not deny D.O. a FAPE. View "D.O. V. ESCONDIDO UNION SCHOOL DIST." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff was a long-time teacher in the Evergreen School District #114 (District) in Vancouver, Washington. Before the 2019–2020 school year began, he attended two days of teacher training and brought with him a MAGA hat. The question, in this case, is whether the First Amendment was violated when a principal told Plaintiff he could not bring his Make America Great Again (MAGA) hat with him to teacher-only trainings on threat of disciplinary action and when the school board affirmed the denial of the teacher’s harassment complaint filed against the principal.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Defendants in Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action. The panel first concluded that Plaintiff was engaged in speech protected by the First Amendment because the undisputed facts demonstrated that his MAGA hat conveyed a message of public concern, and he was acting as a private citizen in expressing that message. The record failed to establish, however, that the school district’s Chief Human Resource Officer, took any adverse employment action against Plaintiff, and for this reason, Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim against that defendant failed as a matter of law.   Further, any violation of Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights by the principal was clearly established where longstanding precedent held that concern over the reaction to controversial or disfavored speech itself does not justify restricting such speech. For these reasons, the panel reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the principal. View "ERIC DODGE V. EVERGREEN SCHOOL DISTRICT #114, ET AL" on Justia Law

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This case concerns a public high school’s ability under the First Amendment to discipline students for assertedly “private” off-campus social media posts that, once they predictably made their way onto campus, amounted to “severe bullying or harassment targeting particular” classmates.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment rejecting First Amendment claims brought by students against Albany High School and school officials after the students were disciplined for assertedly “private” off-campus social media posts that amounted to severe bullying or harassment targeting particular classmates. The panel held that, under the circumstances of the case, the school properly disciplined two of the involved students for bullying. The court explained that some of the posts used violent imagery that, even if subjectively intended only as immature attempts at malign comedy, would reasonably be viewed as alarming, both to the students targeted in such violently-themed posts and to the school community more generally. Nothing in the First Amendment would even remotely require schools to tolerate such behavior or speech that occurred under its auspices.   The panel concluded, taking into account the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Mahoney Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L. ex rel. Levy, 141 S. Ct. 2038 (2021), that the speech bore a sufficient nexus to Albany High School and its students to be susceptible to regulation by the school. Finally, the panel concluded that the discipline did not independently violate the California Constitution or the California Education Code. Because California follows federal law for free expression claims arising in a school setting, Plaintiffs’ reliance on the California Constitution failed for the same reasons discussed above. View "KEVIN CHEN, ET AL V. ALBANY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL" on Justia Law

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The parents believe their son, D.R., should spend most of the school day being educated in a regular classroom with his non-disabled peers. School officials believed D.R. would be better served spending more of his school day in a special education classroom receiving instruction with other disabled students. As permitted under the IDEA, D.R.’s parents requested a due process hearing before the California Office of Administrative Hearings. The district agreed with the ALJ’s analysis and affirmed the decision denying relief.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s judgment affirming an administrative law judge’s decision denying relief. Reversing in part, the panel held that, given the IDEA’s strong preference for educating children with disabilities alongside their non-disabled peers, the law supported the parents’ position. The panel held that D.R.’s parents met their burden of proving that the school district’s proposed individualized education program (IEP) failed to comply with the IDEA’s requirement that children with disabilities be educated in the “least restrictive environment,” alongside their non-disabled peers to the maximum extent appropriate.   Affirming in part, the panel held that D.R.’s parents were not entitled to reimbursement for the expenses they incurred after unilaterally removing their son from school and hiring a private instructor to educate him in a one-on-one setting. The panel concluded that D.R.’s parents showed that the IEP offered by the school district violated the IDEA, but they did not show that the alternative private placement they chose was proper under the Act. View "D. R. V. RBUSD" on Justia Law