Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Rashdan, an Egyptian dentist, enrolled in a program to credential her for practice in the U.S. Three months before graduation, Rashdan followed her clinical supervisor’s instructions to seat a crown, but the procedure was unsuccessful. The head of the restorative dentistry program, Geissberger, heard about the failed procedure, and told Rashdan, within earshot of others, that her “clinical work ... was ‘Third World Dentistry.’” Later, another supervisor greeted Rashdan saying, “What’s up, TW?” then stated: “Don’t you get it? ... Third World?” Days before graduation, Rashdan was informed that despite adequate academic work, she was not recommended for graduation and that she would have to remediate in restorative dentistry and removable prosthodontics. Rashdan entered an additional quarter of clinical work at no extra cost; her performance did not improve. Evaluators stated that she was actively harming patients. Faculty members exchanged emails about her poor performance, and recommended that Rashdan pursue an additional quarter of remedial work on models, after which she could return to work on patients. Rather than appeal the plan or begin remediation, Rashdan took a leave of absence and filed suit, claiming national origin discrimination in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000d. The district court rejected the claim on summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the McDonnell Douglas framework for disparate treatment claims under Title VII applied to the Title VI claim. Rashdan did not establish a prima facie case of national origin discrimination.View "Rashdan v. Geissberger" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who is disabled and uses a wheelchair for mobility, filed suit against the District, contending that he could not fully enjoy football games because of the unavailability of wheelchair accessible seating. The court concluded that Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12131-12165, does not a require a public entity to structurally alter public seating at a high school football field, where the seating was constructed prior to the ADA's enactment, and the school district provides program access to individuals who use wheelchairs. In this case, the District provided plaintiff with program access to the football games and plaintiff failed to establish that the District excluded him from a public program. Accordingly, plaintiff's claim failed under Title II of the ADA and the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the District. View "Daubert v. Lindsay USD" on Justia Law

E.M., who has an auditory processing disorder or a central auditory processing disorder, through his parents, filed suit against the district alleging that E.M. had been denied a free and appropriate public education (FAPE) pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004 (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. The court concluded that plaintiffs failed to show that the district acted unreasonably in determining in 2005 that E.M. did not qualify for special education services under the "specific learning disability" category; the Department of Education's position that a central auditory processing disorder is eligible for consideration for benefits under the "other health impairment" category merits deference; but plaintiffs failed to show that the district acted unreasonably in not considering E.M. for benefits under the "other health impairment" category in 2005. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of relief to plaintiffs. View "E.M. v. Pajaro Valley U.S.D." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a minor, challenged the district court's orders upholding the OAH's partial denial of reimbursement for educational costs under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) in No. 12-55715 and granting in part and denying in part a related motion for attorney's fees in No. 12-56796. The district court affirmed the OAH's finding that the school districts denied the student a free appropriate public education for the 2007/2008 school year when they failed to comply with a previous settlement agreement's assessment requirements. The court concluded that the private placement was appropriate. As such, the child should be reimbursed for the cost of tuition. Because the court found that the private placement was an appropriate placement, the child was also entitled to transportation reimbursement; and the district court did not err in partially rejecting reimbursement for the cost of the private aides. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part No. 12-55715. The court dismissed No. 12-56796 for lack of jurisdiction to hear the untimely appeal of the district court's order on fees. View "S. L. v. Upland Unified Sch. Dist., et al." on Justia Law

Students brought a civil rights suit against the school district and two school officials after the school asked a group of students to remove clothing bearing images of the American flag when school officials learned of threats of race-related violence during a school-sanctioned celebration of Cinco de Mayo. The court concluded that school officials did not violate the students' rights to freedom of expression, due process, or equal protection where the school officials anticipated violence or substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities and their response was tailored to the circumstances. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's holding that the policy was not unconstitutionally vague and did not violate the students' rights to due process. View "Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the mandatory uniform policy at their children's public elementary school (RGES) under the First Amendment. The court concluded that RGES's inclusion of the motto "Tomorrow's Leaders" on its uniform shirts compelled speech because it mandated the written motto on the uniform shirts. The court also concluded that the exemption for uniforms of "nationally recognized youth organizations such as Boy Scouts and Girls Scouts on a regular meeting days" was content-based. Accordingly, the court concluded that strict scrutiny review applied. Because the district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), RGES was not required to make any showing regarding its justifications for including the written motto or the exemption in the policy. Further, plaintiffs were not given the opportunity to produce any countervailing evidence. The court reversed and remanded for the district court to determine whether defendants' countervailing interest was sufficiently compelling to justify requiring the written motto and the exemption. View "Frudden v. Pilling" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action suit on behalf of current and former students, alleging that Corinthian engaged in a deceptive scheme to entice the enrollment of prospective students in violation of California law. Corinthian moved to compel arbitration pursuant to arbitration clauses in plaintiffs' enrollment agreements. The court concluded that the Broughton-Cruz rule, which exempted claims for "public injunctive relief" from arbitration, was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 2. In the alternative, the court concluded that plaintiffs' claims were within the scope of their arbitration agreements and plaintiffs were required to arbitrate their public injunction claims. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's order denying Corinthian's motion to compel arbitration and remanded. View "Ferguson, et al. v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

This case arose out of the handcuffing and removal from school of then eleven-year-old C.B. by Sonora Police officers. The district court rendered a verdict ostensibly in favor of defendants, but the district court concluded that the verdict was incomplete and inconsistent and directed them to re-deliberate. On appeal, the court concluded that the unscripted supplemental jury instructions, together with the problematic verdict form, gave the jury the misimpression that its initial answers to Questions 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8 were internally inconsistent and needed to be revised. The court also concluded that Officers McIntosh and Prock were entitled to qualified immunity with regard to plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 because the law was, and still is, not "clearly established" that handcuffing and driving a juvenile from school to a relative's place of business implicated Fourth Amendment rights. Accordingly, the court vacated the verdict and judgments, remanding for further proceedings. The district court was instructed to enter judgment as a matter of law in favor of individual defendants McIntosh and Prock as to the 1983 claims. The court did not address whether defendants were entitled to an offset of the amount paid in settlement by the school district and one of the school's teachers. View "C. B. v. City of Sonora, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a professor, filed suit alleging that university administrators retaliated against him in violation of the First Amendment for distributing a short pamphlet and drafts from an in-progress book. The court held that there was an exception to Garcetti v. Ceballos for teaching and academic writing. Pickering v. Board of Education governed such teaching and writing by publicly employed teachers. The court affirmed the district court's determination that plaintiff prepared and circulated his pamphlet pursuant to official duties; reversed its determination that the pamphlet did not address matters of public concern; concluded that there was insufficient evidence to show that the in-progress book triggered retaliation; and held that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity given the uncertain state of the law in the wake of Garcetti. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Demers v. Austin" on Justia Law

Landon Wynar, a sophomore high school student, was suspended from school after he made a string of increasingly violent and threatening instant messages sent from home to his friends. Landon and his father sued the school district and others (collectively, "Douglas County") for violations of Landon's constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983, as well as for negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The court held that, when faced with an identifiable threat of school violence, schools could take disciplinary action in response to off-campus speech that met the requirements of Tinker v. DesMoines. In this instance, the court concluded that it was reasonable for Douglas County to interpret the messages as a real risk and to forecast a substantial disruption. Further, Landon's messages threatening the student body as a whole, and targeted specific students by name, impinged on the rights of the students to be secure and to be let alone. Accordingly, the court held that Douglas County's actions did not violate the First Amendment. The court also held that Landon received adequate due process before both his 10-day suspension and his 90-day expulsion. The court rejected plaintiffs' remaining claims and affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the school district. View "Wynar v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law