Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case concerned Hawaii's "Act 163," Haw. Rev. Stat. 302A-1134(c), which barred students from attending public school after the last day of the school year in which they turned 20. At issue was whether state-funded high school diploma programs for adults who never graduated from high school were a form of "public education" under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1412(a)(1)(B)(I). The Community Schools for Adults offers "free public education" to students who did not require IDEA services. The Department offers, at taxpayer expense, the opportunity for nondisabled 20- and 21-year-olds to complete their secondary educations and earn high school diplomas. Providing IDEA services to disabled children of those ages would therefore be consistent with "State law or practice... respecting the provision of public education," so the state must do so. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment for the State on the IDEA claim, holding that Act 163 violated federal law. The court affirmed the district court's judgment on plaintiffs' remaining claims. View "E.R.K. v. State of Hawaii Dep't of Educ." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a severely disabled student, filed suit arguing that he was entitled to remain at a private school he had been attending since the age of seven. The Department issued a formal notice that plaintiff's special education placement at the school would end when he turned 20 years old. Plaintiff argued that he was entitled to remain at the school until he was 22 years old. At issue on appeal was whether the "stay put" provision in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1415j, applied to a student who has exceeded a state-imposed age limit on eligibility for public education. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that the district court correctly granted plaintiff's motion for stay put. Plaintiff was entitled to remain at the school as his stay-put placement from the date he filed his administrative complaint and he was entitled to remain there until his case was finally resolved. View "A.D. v. State of Hawaii Dep't of Educ." on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals, plaintiffs principally claimed that their school districts have an obligation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., to provide them with a word-for-word transcription service so that they can fully understand the teacher and fellow students without undue strain and consequent stress. The court held that courts evaluating claims under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400, and Title II must analyze each claim separately under the relevant statutory and regulatory framework. In these cases, the district courts legally erred in granting summary judgment by holding that plaintiff's Title II claim was foreclosed as a matter of law by the failure of her IDEA claim. Accordingly, the court reversed the grants of summary judgment on the ADA claims in both cases and on the Unruh Act, Cal. Civ. Code 51, 52, claim in K.M. v. Tustin, remanding for further proceedings in both cases. View "K. M. v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of his son, filed suit against the Hawaii Department of Education, alleging violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400(d). The district court found that the Department did not deny the son a free appropriate public education (FAPE) by holding an annual individualized education program (IEP) meeting without the participation of the parent. Plaintiff did not attend the meeting even though he actively sought to reschedule it in order to participate. The court concluded, however, that the Department denied the son a FAPE by denying plaintiff the opportunity to participate and plaintiff was entitled to reimbursement if he could establish that the private school placement was proper under the Act. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Doug C., et al. v. State of Hawaii Dep't of Educ." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's denial of his mandamus petition, where he sought to compel the DOE to issue him a Stafford Loan. While plaintiff's immigration status was still pending, he obtained valid employment authorization, graduated from college, and was accepted to law school. Plaintiff then filed a Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) and requested a Stafford Loan to pay his tuition. The law school declined to find him eligible for any form of federal student aid and plaintiff was unable to obtain a Stafford Loan. The court held that, in these circumstances, the jurisdictional question merged with the merits question. Plaintiff's mandamus petition fell within the scope of the sue-and-be-sued clause of 20 U.S.C. 1082(a)(2). Notwithstanding that clause, however, section 1082(a)(2)'s ani-injunction clause barred the suit for declaratory relief. The Larson-Dugan exception to sovereign immunity did not bar plaintiff's petition under 28 U.S.C. 1361. When plaintiff's Stafford Loan eligibility was reviewed, he did not provide any evidence from the INS or USCIS that he was in the United States for other than a temporary purpose. Therefore, the district court correctly dismissed plaintiff's petition on the merits. View "Mashiri v. Dept. of Education, et al" on Justia Law

M.P., a student with disabilities, appealed the district court's ruling that the Anchorage School District (ASD) did not deny him a free and appropriate public education (FAPE) because the failure to develop an updated Individualized Education Program (IEP) was mostly attributable to his "parents' litigious approach." The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) mandates that public educational agencies review and revise annually an eligible child's IEP. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding (1) the district court relied on an improper basis when it declined to consider whether the ASD complied with the IDEA's substantive requirements; (2) the ASD deprived M.P. of a substantively adequate FAPE by relying on an outdated IEP to measure M.P.'s academic and functional performance and provide educational benefits to M.P.; and (3) M.P.'s parents were entitled to reimbursement for private tutoring expenses incurred in 2008 and review of the propriety of private tutoring expenses incurred in 2009. Remanded. View "Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. M.P." on Justia Law

This case began as a dispute over the results of CM's special education evaluation under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. At issue on appeal was: (1) the ALJ's dismissal of several of CM's claims against Lafayette prior to holding a due process hearing; and (2) the district court's dismissal of MM's, CM's parents, separate claims against the California Department of Education (CDE). The court held that the district court correctly dismissed MM's claims against Lafayette challenging the ALJ's statute of limitations ruling as being premature. The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the fourth claim as duplicative and correctly held that the CDE had no authority to oversee the individual decisions of OAH's hearing officers. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiff, on behalf of her son, sued defendants, including the school district, alleging 20 procedural and substantive violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. The district court disposed of almost all of plaintiff's claims and plaintiff and defendants subsequently appealed. The court agreed with the school district that the district court erred by inferring from the IDEA a private right of action for nominal damages. The court also held that Congress has not expressed an intent to create a cause of action for monetary damages based on the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. The court reviewed plaintiff's other contentions in her cross-appeal and find them either waived or lacking merit.

Plaintiffs alleged that section 31 of article I of the California Constitution violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and caused the unfair exclusion of African American, Latino, and Native American students from higher education. They sought to enjoin the Governor and the President of the University of California, Mark Yudof, from enforcing section 31. Yudof asserted that he was immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment and that he was an improper defendant pursuant to Rule 21. Although the court held that plaintiffs' suit against Yudof was not barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity, the court held that plaintiffs' equal protection challenge to section 31 was precluded by Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, where the court previously upheld the constitutionality of section 31. Accordingly, the district court correctly dismissed the complaint against the Governor and Yudof for failure to state a claim.

Plaintiff sued the University of Oregon, alleging that it prevented her from completing a Ph.D. program in retaliation for having complained of gender-based institutional bias in the University's Ph.D. program, and gender discrimination by her faculty dissertation committee chair. The court held that the facts were sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title IX. Because a reasonable jury could conclude from the evidence presented at summary judgment that the faculty chair's resignation was gender-based retaliation, the district court erred in granting summary judgment. The court also reversed the district court's award of costs because the University was no longer the prevailing party under Rule 54(d).