Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After the Party failed to meet the deadline for recognition as an official political party on the 2014 Arizona ballot, it challenges the constitutionality of Arizona’s filing deadline for new party petitions, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The Party claims that by requiring "new" parties to file recognition petitions 180 days before the primary, Arizona unconstitutionally burdens those parties’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court concluded that, without evidence of the specific obstacles to ballot access that the deadline imposes, the Party did not establish that its rights are severely burdened. Moreover, the court concluded that, at best, any burden is de minimus. Finally, after the court balanced the impact of the 180-day filing deadline on the Party's rights against Arizona's interests - administering orderly elections - in maintaining that deadline, the court concluded that the Party has not demonstrated an unconstitutional interference with ballot access. View "Arizona Green Party v. Reagan" on Justia Law

The Party brought a facial First Amendment challenge to Hawaii’s open primary system, seeking to limit the participants in its primary elections to its formal members or to voters who are otherwise willing publicly to declare their support for the Party. The Party claims that Hawaii’s open primary system, which allows registered voters to participate in any party’s primary without formally joining or declaring support for that party, severely burdens the Party’s associational rights. Under Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent, the court concluded that the extent of the burden that a primary system imposes on associational rights is a factual question on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof. In this case, the court concluded that the Party's preference for limiting primary participants to registered Party members, coupled with the fact that more people vote in Democratic primaries than are formally registered with the Party, is not sufficient to show that Hawaii’s open primary system severely burdens the Party’s associational rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Democratic Party of Hawaii v. Nago" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, five Tucson voters and a non-profit corporation called PIA, filed suit challenging the constitutionality of Tucson’s hybrid system for electing members of its city council. The Supreme Court has held that the primary and general elections are a “single instrumentality for choice of officers.” Because the primary and general elections are two parts of a “unitary” process, a citizen’s right to vote in the general election may be meaningless unless he is also permitted to vote in the primary. Because the constituency of the representative to be elected remains static throughout the election process, the geographical unit must also remain static throughout that process. In this case, such mismatches between voters at different stages of a single election cycle are not constitutionally permissible. The court concluded that the practical effect of the Tucson system is to give some of a representative’s constituents - those in his home ward - a vote of disproportionate weight. The court held that every otherwise eligible voter who will be a constituent of the winner of the general election must have an equal opportunity to participate in each election cycle through which that candidate is selected. Because all Tucsonans have an equal interest in determining who the nominees will be, the city may not exclude out-of-ward voters from the primaries. Thus, the court rejected the city's final argument that the hybrid system is a reasonable “residency restriction” on the right to vote. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment in favor of the city. View "Public Integrity Alliance v. City of Tucson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, three civil rights organizations, filed suit alleging that Nevada violated, and continues to violate, Section 7 of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), 52 U.S.C. 20506(a)(2)(A). Section 7 requires states to distribute voter registration materials and to make assistance available to people who visit, and make certain requests of, public assistance offices. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The court concluded, however, that plaintiffs have Article III standing by plausibly alleging they have suffered injury in fact fairly traceable to the State’s noncompliance with Section 7 of the NVRA. The court also concluded that plaintiffs have also satisfied the statute’s notice requirement in two ways. First, they notified the State that violations were occurring 120 days before an election, thus authorizing them to file suit after waiting 20 days from the date of their notification. Second, they plausibly alleged that the State was violating Section 7 within 30 days of a federal election, thus permitting them to file suit without first notifying the State (even though plaintiffs in fact had done so). Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. The court denied as moot plaintiffs' motion for judicial notice and instructed the district court to assign the case to a different district judge. View "Nat'l Council of La Raza v. Cegavske" on Justia Law

A-1 filed suit challenging the constitutionality of four provisions of Hawaii's campaign finance laws under Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. On appeal, A-1 challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Commission. The court concluded that Hawaii’s expenditure and noncandidate committee definitions in HRS 11-302 are not vague given the Commission’s narrowing construction; Hawaii's advertising definition in HRS 11-302 is not unconstitutionally vague; the noncandidate committee reporting and disclosure requirements survive exacting scrutiny as applied to A-1 where they were substantially related to Hawaii's important interest in informing the electorate, preventing corruption or its appearance, and avoiding the circumvention of valid campaign finance laws; the disclaimer requirement for advertisements is constitutional under Citizens United; A-1 lacks standing to challenge the electioneering communications reporting requirements; the contractor contribution ban is constitutional even as applied to contributions to legislators who neither award nor oversee contracts; and individual Plaintiffs Yamada and Stewart are entitled to attorney's fees. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment on the merits, but vacated the fee award, referring the matter to the Appellate Commissioner with instructions. View "A-1 A-Lectrician v. Snipes" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Arizona Legislature enacted a new law requiring voter registration forms to list the two largest parties, as well as provide a blank line for “other party preferences.” See Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-152(A)(5). The Arizona Green Party, the Arizona Libertarian Party, and three of their members (together, Plaintiffs) brought this action alleging that the new voter registration form violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments because the form failed to “treat equally the four parties with Statewide continuing ballot access.” The district court granted summary judgment for the State. A panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of establishing that section 16-152(A)(5) is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest. View "Ariz. Libertarian Party v. Bennett" on Justia Law

Two associations and two individuals brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 challenging two requirements that the State of California and the City of Chula Vista, California, place on persons who wish to sponsor a local ballot measure: (1) the requirement that official proponents of local ballot initiatives be electors, thereby excluding non-natural persons such as corporations and associations; and (2) the requirement that official initiative proponents identify themselves on the face of the initiative petitions. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The en banc court of the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the requirement that the official proponent of an initiative be an elector does not violate Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association; but (2) the requirement that the name on the official proponent of an initiative be disclosed on the face of the initiative petitions satisfies exacting scrutiny under the First Amendment. View "Chula Vista Citizens for Jobs v. Norris" on Justia Law

This case arose from a political battle concerning labor unions. Chula Vista Citizens and the Associations sought to place an initiative on the Chula Vista municipal ballot. The City of Chula Vista requires that initiative proponents be electors (the elector requirement). Because Cal. Elec. Code 9202(a) requires proponents to sign a notice of intent, the effect of Cal. Elec. Code 9207 is that the identities of official proponents are disclosed to would-be signatories of the petition (the petition-proponent disclosure requirement). Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the elector and petition-proponent disclosure requirements, both facially and as applied, violated the First Amendment. Determining that the elector requirement was properly before the court because it implicated the chilling of expression and because the parties had not indicated that there were many pending actions in the California courts, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants as to the elector requirement where the Associations did not have a First Amendment right to serve as official proponents of local ballot initiatives. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants as to the petition-proponent disclosure requirement where the requirement was unconstitutional because they require official initiative proponents to identify themselves on the face of initiative petitions. View "Chula Vista Citizens v. Norris" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an unsuccessful candidate for judicial office in Mohave County, Arizona, filed suit challenging the facial and as-applied constitutionality of certain provisions of the Arizona Code of Judicial Conduct. The court held that Rule 4.1(A)(6) (the solicitation clause) is unconstitutional as applied to non-judge judicial candidates because it restricts speech that presents little to no risk of corruption or bias towards future litigants and is not narrowly tailored to serve those state interests. The court held that Rules 4.1(A)(2)-(5) - prohibiting speechifying, endorsements, and fundraising - are not sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve the state's interest in an impartial judiciary, and are therefore unconstitutional restrictions on political speech of non-judge candidates for judicial office. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. View "Wolfson v. Concannon, et al." on Justia Law

After plaintiff, who was twenty-seven years old at the time, was excluded from the presidential primary ballot under California law, she filed suit under the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Twentieth Amendment. The district court dismissed the case with prejudice. The court concluded that the case was not moot because it was "capable of repetition, yet evading review." The court concluded that age requirements, like residency requirements and term limits, are neutral candidacy qualifications which the State had the right to impose; any burden on plaintiff's speech and association rights were minimal; and the burden was justified by California's asserted interest in protecting the integrity of the election process and avoiding voter confusion. The court rejected plaintiff's Equal Protection claim; because including ineligible candidates on the ballot could easily cause voter confusion, treating ineligible candidates differently from eligible ones was rationally related to the state's interest in maintaining the integrity of the election process; and the Secretary did not violate the Equal Protection Clause by excluding from the ballot candidates who are indisputably ineligible to serve, while listing those with a colorable claim of eligibility. Even if the Twentieth Amendment gave rise to a private right of action, nothing in the Twentieth Amendment states or implies that Congress has the exclusive authority to exclude a candidate with a known ineligibility from the presidential ballot. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Lindsay v. Bowen" on Justia Law