Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2011, the Arizona Legislature enacted a new law requiring voter registration forms to list the two largest parties, as well as provide a blank line for “other party preferences.” See Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-152(A)(5). The Arizona Green Party, the Arizona Libertarian Party, and three of their members (together, Plaintiffs) brought this action alleging that the new voter registration form violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments because the form failed to “treat equally the four parties with Statewide continuing ballot access.” The district court granted summary judgment for the State. A panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of establishing that section 16-152(A)(5) is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest. View "Ariz. Libertarian Party v. Bennett" on Justia Law

Two associations and two individuals brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 challenging two requirements that the State of California and the City of Chula Vista, California, place on persons who wish to sponsor a local ballot measure: (1) the requirement that official proponents of local ballot initiatives be electors, thereby excluding non-natural persons such as corporations and associations; and (2) the requirement that official initiative proponents identify themselves on the face of the initiative petitions. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The en banc court of the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the requirement that the official proponent of an initiative be an elector does not violate Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association; but (2) the requirement that the name on the official proponent of an initiative be disclosed on the face of the initiative petitions satisfies exacting scrutiny under the First Amendment. View "Chula Vista Citizens for Jobs v. Norris" on Justia Law

This case arose from a political battle concerning labor unions. Chula Vista Citizens and the Associations sought to place an initiative on the Chula Vista municipal ballot. The City of Chula Vista requires that initiative proponents be electors (the elector requirement). Because Cal. Elec. Code 9202(a) requires proponents to sign a notice of intent, the effect of Cal. Elec. Code 9207 is that the identities of official proponents are disclosed to would-be signatories of the petition (the petition-proponent disclosure requirement). Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the elector and petition-proponent disclosure requirements, both facially and as applied, violated the First Amendment. Determining that the elector requirement was properly before the court because it implicated the chilling of expression and because the parties had not indicated that there were many pending actions in the California courts, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants as to the elector requirement where the Associations did not have a First Amendment right to serve as official proponents of local ballot initiatives. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants as to the petition-proponent disclosure requirement where the requirement was unconstitutional because they require official initiative proponents to identify themselves on the face of initiative petitions. View "Chula Vista Citizens v. Norris" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an unsuccessful candidate for judicial office in Mohave County, Arizona, filed suit challenging the facial and as-applied constitutionality of certain provisions of the Arizona Code of Judicial Conduct. The court held that Rule 4.1(A)(6) (the solicitation clause) is unconstitutional as applied to non-judge judicial candidates because it restricts speech that presents little to no risk of corruption or bias towards future litigants and is not narrowly tailored to serve those state interests. The court held that Rules 4.1(A)(2)-(5) - prohibiting speechifying, endorsements, and fundraising - are not sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve the state's interest in an impartial judiciary, and are therefore unconstitutional restrictions on political speech of non-judge candidates for judicial office. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. View "Wolfson v. Concannon, et al." on Justia Law

After plaintiff, who was twenty-seven years old at the time, was excluded from the presidential primary ballot under California law, she filed suit under the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Twentieth Amendment. The district court dismissed the case with prejudice. The court concluded that the case was not moot because it was "capable of repetition, yet evading review." The court concluded that age requirements, like residency requirements and term limits, are neutral candidacy qualifications which the State had the right to impose; any burden on plaintiff's speech and association rights were minimal; and the burden was justified by California's asserted interest in protecting the integrity of the election process and avoiding voter confusion. The court rejected plaintiff's Equal Protection claim; because including ineligible candidates on the ballot could easily cause voter confusion, treating ineligible candidates differently from eligible ones was rationally related to the state's interest in maintaining the integrity of the election process; and the Secretary did not violate the Equal Protection Clause by excluding from the ballot candidates who are indisputably ineligible to serve, while listing those with a colorable claim of eligibility. Even if the Twentieth Amendment gave rise to a private right of action, nothing in the Twentieth Amendment states or implies that Congress has the exclusive authority to exclude a candidate with a known ineligibility from the presidential ballot. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Lindsay v. Bowen" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of certain sections of California Senate Bill 6 (SB 6). SB 6, implementing California's Proposition 14 (Prop. 14), fundamentally changes the California election system by eliminating party primaries and general elections with party-nominated candidates, and substituting a nonpartisan primary and a two-candidate runoff. The court concluded that it had jurisdiction over the appeal; Plaintiff Chamness' case was not moot where his claim was capable of repetition because future election administrators would deny him the ability to use the designation "Independent" on the primary ballot; Plaintiffs Frederick's and Wilson's appeal were moot because they only sought declaratory relief affecting future elections; and Intervenor Galacki's claims regarding his write-in candidacy and the vote he cast for himself in the general election were moot. In Case No. 11-56449, the court held that Chamness failed to establish that SB 6 severely burdened his rights, and upheld the constitutionality of the statute as reasonably related to furthering the state's important interest in efficiently regulating elections. In Case No. 56303, the court held that the trial court acted well within its discretion in concluding that allowing Galacki to intervene would entail substantial delays and inefficiencies resolving the case, and in therefore denying Galacki's motion as untimely. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's order granting defendants summary judgment and denying Galacki's motion to intervene. View "Chamness v. Maldonado" on Justia Law

The Committee filed suit seeking a declaration that certain portions of a Montana statute making it a criminal offense for any political party to "endorse, contribute to, or make an expenditure to support or oppose a judicial candidate" in a nonpartisan judicial election, Mont. Code Ann. 13-35-231, were unconstitutional and requesting an injunction against its enforcement. The court concluded that, to the extent appellants challenged the permanent injunction against enforcement of section 13-35-231's ban on endorsements and expenditures, the court was bound to follow its published decision finding those provisions unconstitutional. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's entry of a permanent injunction as it pertains to those portions of the statute. However, the district court mistakenly entered a permanent injunction against the enforcement of section 13-35-231 in its entirety. Accordingly, the court remanded to the district court with instructions to revise the permanent injunction so that it enjoined only the statute's ban on endorsements and expenditures, and not the statute's ban on contributions. View "Sanders Cnty. Republican Cent. Comm. v. Fox, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a pre-enforcement action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendant, the California Secretary of State. At issue were the California Elections Code sections 8066 and 8451, which mandated that circulators shall be voters in the district or political subdivision in which the candidate was to be voted on and shall serve only in that district or political subdivision. Plaintiffs alleged that the residency requirement violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments and sought to enjoin its enforcement. The court reversed and remanded the district court's dismissal of the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs lacked standing, holding that plaintiffs have alleged a sufficient injury-in-fact to meet constitutional standing requirements. In light of plaintiffs' concrete plan and defendant's specific threat of enforcement, the court concluded that plaintiffs have met the constitutional "case or controversy" requirement. View "Libertarian Party Los Angeles, et al v. Bowen" on Justia Law

The district court concluded that the State of Montana's contribution limits in Montana Code Annotated 13-37-216 were unconstitutional under the First Amendment and permanently enjoined the State from enforcing its campaign contribution limits. The State sought a stay of the district court's order, pending appeal. The court concluded that the state was likely to succeed on appeal. The court concluded that the State had made a strong showing that a merits panel of the court would likely conclude that, absent en banc proceedings or an intervening decision of the Supreme Court, the court remained bound by its decision in Mont. Right to Life Ass'n v. Eddleman. The court also concluded that a merits panel was likely to hold that the analytical framework of the Supreme Court's decision in Randall v. Sorrell did not alter the analysis of Buckley v. Valeo or Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC in a way that affected the court's decision in Eddleman. In light of the State's interest in regulating campaign contributions, the lack of evidence that other parties would be substantially injured, and the public's substantial interest in the stability of its electoral system in the final weeks leading to an election, the court will stay the order pending the state's appeal. View "Lair, et al v. Bullock, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that she broke an unwritten rule and suffered the consequences when she challenged a sitting superior court judge for his seat in a local election while she was serving as a temporary superior court commissioner. The court concluded that, while the timing and targeted effect of the superior court's policy were suspicious, the court did not reach the merits of plaintiff's federal or state law retaliation claims because the judges of the superior court's Executive Committee enjoyed legislative immunity for their decision to alter the minimum qualifications to serve as a temporary commissioner. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants. View "Schmidt v. Contra Costa County, et al" on Justia Law