Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The district court concluded that the State of Montana's contribution limits in Montana Code Annotated 13-37-216 were unconstitutional under the First Amendment and permanently enjoined the State from enforcing its campaign contribution limits. The State sought a stay of the district court's order, pending appeal. The court concluded that the state was likely to succeed on appeal. The court concluded that the State had made a strong showing that a merits panel of the court would likely conclude that, absent en banc proceedings or an intervening decision of the Supreme Court, the court remained bound by its decision in Mont. Right to Life Ass'n v. Eddleman. The court also concluded that a merits panel was likely to hold that the analytical framework of the Supreme Court's decision in Randall v. Sorrell did not alter the analysis of Buckley v. Valeo or Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC in a way that affected the court's decision in Eddleman. In light of the State's interest in regulating campaign contributions, the lack of evidence that other parties would be substantially injured, and the public's substantial interest in the stability of its electoral system in the final weeks leading to an election, the court will stay the order pending the state's appeal. View "Lair, et al v. Bullock, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that she broke an unwritten rule and suffered the consequences when she challenged a sitting superior court judge for his seat in a local election while she was serving as a temporary superior court commissioner. The court concluded that, while the timing and targeted effect of the superior court's policy were suspicious, the court did not reach the merits of plaintiff's federal or state law retaliation claims because the judges of the superior court's Executive Committee enjoyed legislative immunity for their decision to alter the minimum qualifications to serve as a temporary commissioner. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants. View "Schmidt v. Contra Costa County, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. Plaintiff alleged that defendants violated the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), 42 U.S.C. 15301-15545, by failing to conduct a general election recount, in which plaintiff lost, in accordance with HAVA provisions. Because HAVA section 301 was not intended to benefit voters and candidates in local elections with respect to recounts, such individuals did not have a private right of action under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims for failure to state a claim.

Proposition 200, Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-166(F)(the registration provision), required prospective voters in Arizona to provide proof of U.S. citizenship in order to register to vote and required registered voters to show identification to cast a ballot at the polls, Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-579(A)(the poll place provision). At issue on appeal was whether Proposition 200 violated section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), 42 U.S.C. 1973, was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment or Twenty-fourth Amendment to the Constitution, or was void as inconsistent with the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), 42 U.S.C. 1973gg et seq. The court upheld Proposition 200's requirement that voters show identification at the polling place, but concluded that the NVRA superseded Proposition 200's registration provision as that provision was applied to applicants using the National Mail Voter Registration Form to register to vote in federal elections.

Defendant was convicted of one count of obstruction of justice for failing to disclose the full extent of his knowledge regarding the mailing of a letter that could reasonably be believed to constitute an attempt at voter intimidation. Defendant, a Republican candidate for a seat in the U.S. House of Representatives at the time, contended that there was insufficient probable cause to support the issuance of the warrant and that, therefore, the evidence obtained pursuant to it should have been suppressed at his trial. The court held that there was sufficient probable cause to support the issuance of the warrant to search defendant's home and campaign headquarters. The court rejected defendant's First Amendment claim. Although defendant was never prosecuted for a violation of the election laws, in light of the contents of the letter and the facts surrounding its distribution, there was a fair probability that the campaign mailing constituted a tactic of intimidation intended to induce its recipients to refrain from voting. Accordingly, the order of the district court denying the motion to suppress was affirmed.

The Nevada Constitution authorized the citizens of Nevada to enact statutes and amend the Nevada Constitution through the initiative process. To place an initiative on the ballot, proponents must obtain signatures from a number of registered voters equal to 10 percent of the votes cast in the previous general election. This signature requirement was also subject to a geographic distribution requirement known as the All Districts Rule. Plaintiffs sought an order declaring the All Districts Rule unconstitutional and enjoining the state from enforcing it. The court held that plaintiffs have not demonstrated the existence of a genuine issue on their claims that the All Districts Rule violated either the Equal Protection Clause or the First Amendment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiff, the Chief of Police Services for the City of San Clemente, sued defendants under 42 U.S.C. 1983 after plaintiff was placed on administrative leave after he ran for, and lost, the election of Orange County Sheriff-Coroner. Plaintiff claimed that his placement on administrative leave and subsequent demotion were in unconstitutional retaliation for the exercise of his First Amendment rights. The district court concluded that plaintiff's campaign speech was not protected by the First Amendment because he fell into the narrow "policymaker" exception to the general rule against politically-motivated dismissals. Although the court determined that the district court erred in this conclusion, the court agreed that the district court's alternative holding that Michael Carona, the incumbent Orange County Sheriff who won the election at issue, was entitled to qualified immunity because a government official in his position "reasonably but mistakenly" could have believed that political loyalty was required by someone with plaintiff's job responsibilities at the time he ran against Carona. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

The district court granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting the State of Washington from enforcing its limitation on contributions to political committees supporting the recall of a state or county official. The court concluded that plaintiffs satisfied their burden under Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., to demonstrate that the contribution limit was likely an unconstitutional and harmful burden on plaintiffs' rights of free speech under the First Amendment. Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting the injunction and the court affirmed the judgment.

This case concerned the Washington State Grange's proposed People's Choice Initiative of 2004, or Initiative 872. I-872 created a "top two" primary in which the primary served as a means of winnowing the candidates to two rather than selecting party nominees. At issue was whether the State of Washington had designed its election ballots in a manner that eliminated the risk of widespread voter confusion, a question left unresolved in Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party. The court held that the state had done so. The ballots, and related informational material, informed voters that, although each candidate for partisan office could specify a political party that he or she preferred, a candidate's preference did not imply that the candidate was nominated or endorsed by the party, or that the party approved of or associated with that candidate. Given the design of the ballot, and in the absence of evidence of actual voter confusion, the court held that Washington's top primary system, as implemented by the state, did not violate the First Amendment associational rights of the state's political parties. The court also affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' ballot access and trademark claims. The court reversed the district court's order granting the state's request for reimbursement of attorney's fees paid in accordance with a 2006 stipulation.

Plaintiff, a continuing political committee, alleged that three provisions of Washington election law violated the First Amendment as applied to ballot measure committees. The court held that Washington's disclosure requirements, Washington Revised Code, 42.17.090, and Washington Administrative Code 390-16-034, which required these committees to disclose the name and address of contributors giving more than $25, and additionally to disclose the employer and occupation of contributors giving more than $100, survived exacting scrutiny because they were substantially related to the important governmental interest in informing the electorate. The court held that Washington Revised Code 42.17.105(8), which prohibited a political committee from accepting from any one person contributions exceeding $5,000 within 21 days of a general election, was not closely drawn to achieve the state's important interest in informing the electorate. Therefore, section 42.17.105(8) was therefore unconstitutional as applied to ballot measure committees. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.