Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq., and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706 et seq., challenging FWS's designation of an area of Alaska’s coast and waters as critical habitat for the polar bear. The district court granted summary judgment to plaintiffs on two grounds: the district court faulted FWS for failing to identify specifically where and how existing polar bears utilize the relatively small portion of critical habitat designated as Units 2 and 3; and the district court faulted FWS for failing to provide Alaska with adequate justification for adopting a final rule not fully consistent with the State’s submitted comments. The district court vacated the entire designation. In this case, the standard FWS followed, looking to areas that contained the constituent elements required for sustained preservation of polar bears, was in accordance with statutory purpose and hence could not have been arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. The court concluded that FWS’s designation of Unit 2 as critical denning habitat was not arbitrary and capricious. Unit 2 contains areas requiring protection for both birthing and acclimation of cubs, and FWS adequately explained its treatment of the relatively few areas of known human habitation. The court also concluded that, with respect to Units 2 and 3, FWS's definition of the denning habitat was in accord with the statutory purposes and it was not arbitrary and capricious for FWS to include areas necessary for such related denning needs. The court further concluded that FWS provided adequate justification to Alaska pursuant to section 4(i) of the ESA. Finally, the court concluded that the district court court correctly upheld the no-disturbance zone as a part of Unit 3 because it provides refuge from human disturbance; FWS’s assessment of the potential economic impacts was not arbitrary and capricious; and the district court was correct in denying Alaska’s claim, although the court did not agree with the district court to the extent that it held that Section 7 of the ESA creates any independent duty to consult apart from the requirements of Section 4. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Alaska Oil and Gas Ass'n v. Jewel" on Justia Law

Petitioners seek review of the EPA's Final Rule partially disapproving Arizona's regional haze State Implementation Plan (SIP) submission and promulgating a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP) in place of the disapproved SIP elements. The court concluded that EPA reasonably concluded that Arizona’s cost and visibility impact analyses for Coronado suffered from significant analytical defects and that the SIP did not provide a reasoned explanation of the bases for the ultimate best available retrofit technology (BART) determination for Coronado; although Section 169A of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7491(a)(1), affords the states substantial authority to determine BART controls, the combination of these defects provided EPA reasonable grounds upon which to disapprove Arizona’s BART determinations as to nitrogen oxides emissions limits at Coronado; and its partial disapproval of the SIP in this respect was not arbitrary or capricious. The court further concluded that EPA’s visibility improvement assessment was consistent with the statute and regulatory requirements, and supported by the record. Finally, EPA properly promulgated its FIP in the same rule as its partial disapproval of the SIP. Accordingly, the court denied the petition. View "Arizona ex rel. Darwin v. EPA" on Justia Law

Cascadia appealed from the district court's denial of their motion seeking to enjoin the Douglas Fire Complex Recovery Project in the southern Oregon Klamath Mountains. Cascadia conceded that the Service identified the relevant scientific data but argues that compliance with the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1536(a)(3), requires more than merely restating the scientific data. In view of the deference owed to the agency’s determination, and the record evidence of reliable data, the court concluded that the district court’s rejection of Cascadia’s challenge was not an abuse of discretion, legally erroneous, or factually erroneous. The record reflects that the Service indeed relied upon the data of several surveys from an array of surveyors regarding the effect that barred owls have on the spotted owl. Further, the record does not support a finding that the Service failed to use the best available scientific information regarding the effect the wildfire had on the spotted owl’s habitat use, or a finding that the Service’s conclusions were arbitrary. Finally, the court rejected Cascadia's contention that the Service failed to adequately utilize the best scientific information necessary to ensure spotted owl recovery when evaluating the Project and rendering its jeopardy determination. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Cascadia Wildlands v. Thrailkill" on Justia Law

FWS conducted a formal consultation under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq., and determined in a Biological Opinion (Biop) that FWS’s execution of a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) would not jeopardize the Moapa dace. After CBD filed suit challenging the Biop, the district court granted summary judgment to FWS and Intervenors SNWA and CSI. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that CBD has standing; no evidence in the record demonstrates that FWS relied on improper factors, failed to consider important aspects of the problem, offered explanations for its decision that were counter to the evidence before it, or offered implausible explanations for its decision; and FWS’s determination that its participation in the MOA would not cause jeopardy to the Moapa dace was not arbitrary, capricious, or in violation of the ESA. View "Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. USFWS" on Justia Law

Cascadia challenged the BIA's approval of the Kokwel Project, a plan by the Coquille Indian Tribe to harvest 268 acres of timber in the Coquille Forest in southwest Oregon. The district court granted summary judgment to the BIA and Tribe. The court concluded that the BIA and the Tribe did not violate the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., by aggregating the Alder/Rasler Project, which had been approved, but not yet completed, as part of the environmental baseline against which the incremental impact of the Kokwel Project was considered. Further, the court concluded that the Coquille Restoration Act (CRA), 25 U.S.C. 715 et seq., does not require compliance with the Recovery Plan for the northern spotted owl. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Cascadia Wildlands v. Bureau of Indian Affairs" on Justia Law

The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. 136a(a), prohibits the use or sale of pesticides that lack approval and registration by the EPA. Petitioners, commercial bee keepers and bee keeping organizations, filed suit challenging the EPA’s approval of insecticides containing sulfoxaflor, which initial studies showed were highly toxic to honey bees. The court concluded that the EPA's unconditional approval was not supported by substantial evidence because the EPA's decision to unconditionally register sulfoxaflor was based on flawed and limited data. Accordingly, the court vacated the EPA's registration and remanded. View "Polinators Stewardship Council v. USEPA" on Justia Law

ONRC, an environmental group based in Oregon, field a citizen suit under section 505(a) of the Clean Water Act, (CWA), 33 U.S.C.1365(a), contending that the Bureau and other defendants violated the CWA by discharging pollutants from the Klamath Straits Drain (KSD) into the Klamath River without a permit. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. After the district court entered its decision in this case, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, which held that the flow of water out of a concrete channel within a river does not rank as a discharge of pollutant under the CWA. A water transfer counts as a discharge of pollutants under the CWA only if the two separate bodies of water are “meaningfully distinct water bodies.” In this case, the court found that the record demonstrates that the waters of the KSD are not meaningfully distinct from those of the Klamath River. Therefore, a permit is not required under the CWA. The court affirmed the judgment. View "ONRC Action v. Bureau of Reclamation" on Justia Law

KS Wild filed suit against the Forest Services, alleging that the Forest Service had permitted suction dredge mining in the Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest, which provides designated critical habitat for coho salmon, without consulting with NMFS, in violation of Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1536(a)(2). The district concluded that KS Wild's notice of intent to sue under the ESA was deficient and, therefore, the district court dismissed the claim against the Forest Service for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that KS Wild's June notice letter was sufficient notice under the citizen suit notice provision of the ESA, and that there is subject matter jurisdiction in the district court over KS Wild’s suit to enforce the Forest Service’s obligations under Section 7. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands v. MacWhorter" on Justia Law

WildEarth filed suit to enjoin the government's participation in the killing of predatory animals in Nevada. The district court dismissed the suit based on lack of standing, holding that WildEarth had not shown that its alleged injuries were caused by the government’s reliance on the programmatic environmental impact statement (PEIS), and that, in any event, Nevada could choose to implement an independent predator damage management program if the federal government ceased its activities, so WildEarth’s injuries were not redressable. Claims One and Two challenged APHIS’s failure to supplement the 1994/1997 PEIS for its predator damage programs nationwide. The court concluded that WildEarth has standing for Claims One and Two because WildEarth member Don Molde would have standing to bring Claims One and Two on his own, and WildEarth also satisfies the other associational standing requirements. Claims Three and Four alleged that APHIS violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321-4347, by preparing an inadequate environmental assessment for Nevada and consequently failing to prepare a Nevada-specific EIS. The court concluded that WildEarth meets the injury-in-fact and causation requirements for standing to challenge APHIS’s predator damage management activities in Nevada based on Molde’s injuries, as well as the other requirements for associational standing, and that Molde's injury is redressable. Finally, the court concluded that the mere existence of multiple causes of an injury does not defeat redressability, particularly for a procedural injury. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "WildEarth Guardians v. USDA" on Justia Law

Pit River appealed the district court's order granting judgment on the pleadings of its action challenging BLM's continuation of geothermal leases. The court concluded that the district court incorrectly treated Pit River’s claims as arising under only section 1005(a) of the Geothermal Steam Act, 30 U.S.C. 1005(a). In this case, BLM’s 1998 decision to continue the 26 unproven leases in the Glass Mountain unit under section 1005(a) was issued simultaneously with its decision to reverse and vacate its earlier decision to extend those leases on a lease-by-lease basis under section 1005(g). Thus, Pit River’s challenge to the decisions implicates both section 1005(a) and section 1005(g). The court further concluded that Pit River's claims fall within the zone of interests under section 1005(g) and Pit River has stated a claim under section 1005(g) where BLM must conduct environmental, historical and cultural review under relevant federal law before granting lease extensions under section 1005(g). The district court did not consider the merits of Pit River’s Geothermal Steam Act claims, and determining whether BLM violated provisions of the Geothermal Steam Act will require careful analysis. Therefore, the court declined to rule on the merits of this issue and remanded for further proceedings. The court reversed the district court’s order granting judgment on the pleadings. View "Pit River Tribe v. BLM" on Justia Law