Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. 136a(a), prohibits the use or sale of pesticides that lack approval and registration by the EPA. Petitioners, commercial bee keepers and bee keeping organizations, filed suit challenging the EPA’s approval of insecticides containing sulfoxaflor, which initial studies showed were highly toxic to honey bees. The court concluded that the EPA's unconditional approval was not supported by substantial evidence because the EPA's decision to unconditionally register sulfoxaflor was based on flawed and limited data. Accordingly, the court vacated the EPA's registration and remanded. View "Polinators Stewardship Council v. USEPA" on Justia Law

ONRC, an environmental group based in Oregon, field a citizen suit under section 505(a) of the Clean Water Act, (CWA), 33 U.S.C.1365(a), contending that the Bureau and other defendants violated the CWA by discharging pollutants from the Klamath Straits Drain (KSD) into the Klamath River without a permit. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. After the district court entered its decision in this case, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, which held that the flow of water out of a concrete channel within a river does not rank as a discharge of pollutant under the CWA. A water transfer counts as a discharge of pollutants under the CWA only if the two separate bodies of water are “meaningfully distinct water bodies.” In this case, the court found that the record demonstrates that the waters of the KSD are not meaningfully distinct from those of the Klamath River. Therefore, a permit is not required under the CWA. The court affirmed the judgment. View "ONRC Action v. Bureau of Reclamation" on Justia Law

KS Wild filed suit against the Forest Services, alleging that the Forest Service had permitted suction dredge mining in the Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest, which provides designated critical habitat for coho salmon, without consulting with NMFS, in violation of Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1536(a)(2). The district concluded that KS Wild's notice of intent to sue under the ESA was deficient and, therefore, the district court dismissed the claim against the Forest Service for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that KS Wild's June notice letter was sufficient notice under the citizen suit notice provision of the ESA, and that there is subject matter jurisdiction in the district court over KS Wild’s suit to enforce the Forest Service’s obligations under Section 7. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands v. MacWhorter" on Justia Law

WildEarth filed suit to enjoin the government's participation in the killing of predatory animals in Nevada. The district court dismissed the suit based on lack of standing, holding that WildEarth had not shown that its alleged injuries were caused by the government’s reliance on the programmatic environmental impact statement (PEIS), and that, in any event, Nevada could choose to implement an independent predator damage management program if the federal government ceased its activities, so WildEarth’s injuries were not redressable. Claims One and Two challenged APHIS’s failure to supplement the 1994/1997 PEIS for its predator damage programs nationwide. The court concluded that WildEarth has standing for Claims One and Two because WildEarth member Don Molde would have standing to bring Claims One and Two on his own, and WildEarth also satisfies the other associational standing requirements. Claims Three and Four alleged that APHIS violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321-4347, by preparing an inadequate environmental assessment for Nevada and consequently failing to prepare a Nevada-specific EIS. The court concluded that WildEarth meets the injury-in-fact and causation requirements for standing to challenge APHIS’s predator damage management activities in Nevada based on Molde’s injuries, as well as the other requirements for associational standing, and that Molde's injury is redressable. Finally, the court concluded that the mere existence of multiple causes of an injury does not defeat redressability, particularly for a procedural injury. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "WildEarth Guardians v. USDA" on Justia Law

Pit River appealed the district court's order granting judgment on the pleadings of its action challenging BLM's continuation of geothermal leases. The court concluded that the district court incorrectly treated Pit River’s claims as arising under only section 1005(a) of the Geothermal Steam Act, 30 U.S.C. 1005(a). In this case, BLM’s 1998 decision to continue the 26 unproven leases in the Glass Mountain unit under section 1005(a) was issued simultaneously with its decision to reverse and vacate its earlier decision to extend those leases on a lease-by-lease basis under section 1005(g). Thus, Pit River’s challenge to the decisions implicates both section 1005(a) and section 1005(g). The court further concluded that Pit River's claims fall within the zone of interests under section 1005(g) and Pit River has stated a claim under section 1005(g) where BLM must conduct environmental, historical and cultural review under relevant federal law before granting lease extensions under section 1005(g). The district court did not consider the merits of Pit River’s Geothermal Steam Act claims, and determining whether BLM violated provisions of the Geothermal Steam Act will require careful analysis. Therefore, the court declined to rule on the merits of this issue and remanded for further proceedings. The court reversed the district court’s order granting judgment on the pleadings. View "Pit River Tribe v. BLM" on Justia Law

ASARCO appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment for CNA in ASARCO's suit for contribution under section 113(f)(3)(B) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9613(f)(3)(B). The district court dismissed the complaint. The court held that a judicially approved settlement agreement between private parties to a CERCLA cost-recovery suit starts the clock on the three-year statute of limitations in section 113(g)(3)(B), and that a later bankruptcy settlement that fixes the costs of such a cost recovery settlement agreement does not revive a contribution claim that has otherwise expired. The court's holding that a later bankruptcy settlement with the government cannot revive an otherwise expired contribution claim ensures that a party does not receive a benefit that it had not paid for in the bankruptcy settlement. In this case, the court concluded that ASARCO's time to file contribution claims pursuant to the Wickland Agreement has expired, and that the Wickland Agreement covered all response costs at the Selby Site and the 2008 bankruptcy settlement merely fixed costs. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "ASARCO v. Celanese Chem. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's conclusion that the agencies' procedures leading to the designation of critical habitat for a threatened species - the southern distinct population segment of green sturgeon - complied with the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1533, and the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706. The district court granted defendants' motions for summary judgment and dismissed the case. The court concluded that, when considering the economic impact of its designation, NMFS complied with section 4(b)(2) of the ESA and was not required to follow the specific balancing-of-the-benefits methodology argued for by plaintiffs; section 4(b)(2) establishes a discretionary process by which the agency may exclude areas from designation, but does not set standards for when areas must be excluded from designation; accordingly, an agency’s discretionary decision not to exclude an area from designation is not subject to judicial review; and plaintiffs' National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4332(C), claim fails because NEPA does not apply to critical habitat designations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Building Indus. Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce" on Justia Law

AEWC petitioned for review of the Beaufort Permit issued by the EPA under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) provisions of the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1342, 1343, which authorizes the discharge by oil and gas exploration facilities of 13 waste streams into the Beaufort Sea. The court remanded, in light of EPA's acknowledged error, to the EPA for a determination regarding whether the discharge of non-contact cooling water (alone or in combination with other authorized discharges) into the Beaufort Sea will cause unreasonable degradation of the marine environment because of the effect of such discharge on bowhead whales, including deflection from their migratory paths. The court denied the petition in all other respects because the EPA’s issuance of the Permit is otherwise supported by the record evidence, does not reflect a failure to consider an important aspect of the problem, and is not otherwise arbitrary or capricious. . View "Alaska Eskimo Whaling Comm'n v. EPA" on Justia Law

In 2004, the FWS promulgated a Final Rule designating particular areas as critical habitat for the Santa Ana sucker, a small freshwater fish. In a subsequent 2005 Final Rule and in a 2009 Proposed Rule, the FWS excluded certain areas covered by local conservation plans from critical habitat designation. But in a 2010 Final Rule, the FWS changed course and designated as critical habitat several thousand acres of land that had previously been excluded. Plaintiffs, several municipalities and water districts, filed suit against the FWS and others, challenging the FWS's rulemaking. The district court granted defendants summary judgment on all claims. The court agreed with the district court that the FWS satisfied its statutory obligation to cooperate with state agencies; that the critical habitat designation was not arbitrary or capricious; and that any claims under the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., were barred by this Court’s decision in Douglas County v. Babbitt. The court concluded that section 2(c)(2) of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531, does not create an independent cause of action; the critical habitat designation of land was proper; the FWS's designation of critical habitat in unoccupied areas was proper; and plaintiff's NEPA claim fails as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Bear Valley Mut. Water Co. v. Jewell" on Justia Law

AIR petitioned for review of the EPA's promulgation of 40 C.F.R. 52.245, a regulation that revised the scope of a previous EPA decision. The EPA promulgated the regulation under section 110(k)(6) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7410(k)(6), an error-correcting provision, after the Agency determined that it had mistakenly approved certain New Source Review rules in 2004 as part of California’s State Implementation Plan (SIP). The court concluded that the EPA was not arbitrary, nor did it abuse its discretion in correcting its prior approval of the New Source Review rules after it learned that California law, specifically Senate Bill 700, did not authorize the San Joaquin Air Control District to require new source permits or emissions offsets for minor agricultural sources; because those rules conflicted with state law, they should not have been incorporated into the SIP in 2004; and therefore, the EPA did not act improperly in correcting its prior approval. The court held, as a matter of first impression, that the EPA reasonably interpreted section 110(k)(6)’s requirement that the EPA “revise such [erroneous] action as appropriate” to encompass a retroactive limitation of its previous approval. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Ass'n of Irritated Residents v. EPA" on Justia Law