Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

WildEarth challenged the Forest Service's decision to designate over two million acres of public land in the Beaverhead-Deerlodge National Forest for use by winter motorized vehicles, principally snowmobiles. The court affirmed the district court’s ruling that the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) sufficiently analyzed the conflicts between snowmobiles and other recreational uses in the Revised Forest Plan; the court agreed that WildEarth’s challenge to the Subpart C exemption in the Travel Management Rule (TMR) is not ripe for review; the court reversed the district court’s National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., ruling, in part, because the Forest Service did not properly disclose the information underlying its analysis of snowmobile impacts on big game wildlife in the EIS; the court reversed the district court’s ruling that the Forest Service adequately applied the minimization criteria in the TMR; and the court remanded for further proceedings. View "WildEarth Guardians v. USFS" on Justia Law

The Forest Service initiated consultation with FWS under Section 7 of the ESA, 16 U.S.C. 1536(a)(2), and the FWS determined that the Forest Service’s standards and guidelines did not jeopardize the Canada lynx. FWS subsequently discovered that its decisions relating to the designation of critical habitat for the Canada lynx were flawed. After re-evaluating the data, FWS designated extensive National Forest land as critical habitat. Cottonwood filed suit alleging that the Forest Service violated the ESA by failing to reinitiate consultation after the FWS revised its critical habitat designation to include National Forest land. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that Cottonwood's claim is justiciable. The court also concluded that the Forest Service violated the ESA because, pursuant to the ESA’s implementing regulations, the Forest Service was required to reinitiate consultation when the FWS designated critical habitat in National Forests. Finally, the district court erred in denying injunctive relief to Cottonwood. The court concluded that there is no presumption of irreparable injury where there has been a procedural violation in ESA cases. A plaintiff must show irreparable injury to justify injunctive relief. The court acknowledged that Thomas v. Peterson's ruling on injunctive relief is no longer good law. Cottonwood should not be faulted for relying on Thomas and its progeny as a basis for injunctive relief. Although the court affirmed the district court's ruling, the court remanded for further proceedings to allow Cottonwood an opportunity to make the necessary showing in support of injunctive relief. View "Cottonwood Environmental Law Center v. U.S. Forest Service" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (“BSEE”) acted unlawfully in approving two of Shell’s oil spill response plans (“OSRPs”). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the federal defendants and intervenor-defendant Shell. The court concluded that plaintiffs’ claim that BSEE’s approval of the OSRPs was arbitrary and capricious on the ground that Shell assumed an impossibly high recovery rate fails because the record simply does not support plaintiffs’ claim that Shell assumed an impossibly high recovery rate of almost 100 percent. According deference to the agency's interpretation of its own statute and regulations, the court held that BSEE's approval of the OSRPs was a nondiscretionary act that did not trigger a requirement for inter-agency consultation pursuant to the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1536(a)(4). Finally, the court concluded that BSEE is not required to prepare an environmental impact statement prior to approving the OSRPs pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4332(C). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Alaska Wilderness League v. Jewell" on Justia Law

Petitioners filed suit challenging the EPA's regional haze regulations for the State of Montana. Petitioner PPL Montana operates and partially owns the Colstrip Steam Electric Generating Station and the J.E. Corette Steam Electric Station. Petitioner NPCA are nonprofit conservation organizations. The court concluded, inter alia, that EPA’s best available retrofit technology (BART) determination for nitrogen oxide emissions at Colstrip Units 1 and 2 is arbitrary and capricious; EPA’s responses to petitioners’ more minor challenges to its cost-effectiveness analysis make clear that it is capable of the required rational explanation; because the rule offers no reasoned explanation to support its requirement of a fourth scrubber at Colstrip Units 1 and 2, the court concluded that such requirement is arbitrary and capricious; the inconsistency in EPA’s BART determinations at Colstrip Units 1 and 2 and Corette is, absent explanation, arbitrary and capricious; by requiring PPL Montana to install selective non-catalytic reduction (SNCR) at Colstrip Units 1 and 2 without sufficient assurance of any improvement at all, EPA has offered no reasoned explanation; and EPA’s determination that installation of additional technology to control emissions from Corette was not cost-effective suffers the same failure of explanation as its BART determinations at Colstrip. Finally, the court rejected NPCA's contention that EPA’s decision not to require any additional emission-reducing technology, let alone installation of selective catalytic reduction (SCR), at Colstrip Units 3 and 4 was arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, the petitions for review are granted in part, denied in part, and vacated and remanded. View "Nat'l Parks Conservation Ass'n v. EPA" on Justia Law

Sierra Club appealed the district court's upholding of the BLM's decision to grant a right-of-way over federal land (Road Project) for a wind energy project (Wind Project) developed on private land by North Sky. The court affirmed the decision of the district court where the Wind Project does not trigger the duty to consult under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531, because the Wind Project did not constitute agency action. The Wind Project and the Road Project were separate and independent ventures, one public (Road Project) and one private (Wind Project). The Wind Project is not an indirect effect of the Road Project. The two projects are not interrelated or interdependent. Further, the Wind Project does not trigger the duty to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., where the projects have independent utility and are not connected actions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Sierra Club v. BLM" on Justia Law

Petitioner challenged California's plans to improve air quality in the San Joaquin Valley. At issue was whether the EPA erred in approving California's State Implementation Plans (SIPs) to comply with National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) enacted under the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7409, concerning ozone and fine particulate matter in the San Joaquin Valley. The court held that by approving California’s plans even though the plans did not include the state-adopted mobile emissions standards on which those plans rely to achieve their emissions reductions goals, EPA violated the CAA; EPA did not violate the CAA by not requiring inclusion of other state mechanisms in its plans, and that other control measures approved by EPA are enforceable commitments as the CAA requires; and, therefore, the court granted the petition in part and denied in part, remanding for further proceedings. View "Comm. for a Better Arvin v. EPA" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged the EPA's 2012 approval of revisions and additions to California's Pesticide Element relating to the reduction of volatile organic compounds (VOCs) in the San Joaquin and Ventura air basins. The court held that the EPA was not arbitrary and capricious in its interpretation of the Pesticide Element's commitment to reduce emissions by certain levels where EPA's interpretation was reasonable in light of the ambiguity in the Pesticide Element's plain language; the EPA's determination that the revisions fulfilled the commitment in the original Pesticide Element to adopt enforceable regulations for reducing emissions was reasonable because the EPA's explanation demonstrates that it considered the relevant data and factors regarding emissions levels and the action did not conflict with the court's decision in El Comité para el Bienestar de Earlimart v.Warmerdam; the EPA's determination that California's assurances of compliance with federal and state law were adequate was not unreasonable because it provided a reasoned explanation for its actions. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "El Comite Para El Bienestar de Earlimart v. EPA" on Justia Law

In 2013, Plaintiffs filed an action against the Boeing Company and Landau Associates (Landau) in a Washington state court alleging that from the 1960s to the present years Boeing released toxins into the groundwater around its facility in Auburn, Washington and that for over a decade Landau, Boeing’s environmental-remediation contractor, had been negligent in its investigation and remediation of the pollution. Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs asserted state law claims of negligence, nuisance, and trespass. Boeing removed the action to a federal district court based on diversity jurisdiction and the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). The district court remanded the case to state court, concluding (1) contrary to Boeing’s allegations, Landau was not fraudulently joined, and thus there was not complete diversity; and (2) Plaintiffs’ action came within the local single event exception to CAFA federal jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded, holding (1) the district court correctly determined that Boeing failed to show that Landau was fraudulently joined; but (2) Plaintiffs’ action does not come within the local single event exception to CAFA, and therefore, the district court has federal jurisdiction under CAFA. Remanded. View "Allen v. Boeing Co." on Justia Law

AmeriPride Services Inc. brought this contribution action against Texas Eastern Overseas, Inc. (TEO) under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) stemming from the contamination of the soil and groundwater in an industrial area of Sacramento, California. After a bench trial, the district court entered a final order and judgment against TEO. A panel of the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings, holding (1) in allocating liability to a nonsettling defendant in a CERCLA contribution action, the district court is not required to apply either of the two leading methods for allocating liability to a nonsettling defendant after other responsible parties have entered into a settlement agreement to resolve their responsibility for an injury but, rather, has discretion to determine the most equitable method of accounting for settlements between private parties; and (2) because the district court did not explain its methodology for complying with CERCLA 9613(f) and furthering the goals of CERCLA, the panel could not determine whether the district court abused its discretion in allocating response costs. View "Ameripride Servs., Inc. v. Tex. Eastern Overseas Inc." on Justia Law

The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) approved of the South Coast Air Quality Management District’s Rule 317 as a revision to California’s State Implementation Plan for the Clean Air Act (CAA). The EPA approved the Rule pursuant to section 172(e) of the CAA - the so-called “anti-backsliding” provision - which allows for not less stringent alternative controls, finding that the pollution controls the Rule imposed were not less stringent than section 185 of the CAA. In its analysis, the EPA interpreted the statute to mean that the CAA’s anti-backsliding provisions apply when air quality standards have been strengthened as well as when they have been relaxed. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the EPA reasonably found that section 172(e) contained an ambiguous gap; (2) the EPA’s interpretation of the ambiguity was reasonable; and (3) EPA’s approval of Rule 317 as an alternative program was proper. View "Natural Res. Defense Counsel v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency" on Justia Law