Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

AmeriPride Services Inc. brought this contribution action against Texas Eastern Overseas, Inc. (TEO) under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) stemming from the contamination of the soil and groundwater in an industrial area of Sacramento, California. After a bench trial, the district court entered a final order and judgment against TEO. A panel of the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings, holding (1) in allocating liability to a nonsettling defendant in a CERCLA contribution action, the district court is not required to apply either of the two leading methods for allocating liability to a nonsettling defendant after other responsible parties have entered into a settlement agreement to resolve their responsibility for an injury but, rather, has discretion to determine the most equitable method of accounting for settlements between private parties; and (2) because the district court did not explain its methodology for complying with CERCLA 9613(f) and furthering the goals of CERCLA, the panel could not determine whether the district court abused its discretion in allocating response costs. View "Ameripride Servs., Inc. v. Tex. Eastern Overseas Inc." on Justia Law

The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) approved of the South Coast Air Quality Management District’s Rule 317 as a revision to California’s State Implementation Plan for the Clean Air Act (CAA). The EPA approved the Rule pursuant to section 172(e) of the CAA - the so-called “anti-backsliding” provision - which allows for not less stringent alternative controls, finding that the pollution controls the Rule imposed were not less stringent than section 185 of the CAA. In its analysis, the EPA interpreted the statute to mean that the CAA’s anti-backsliding provisions apply when air quality standards have been strengthened as well as when they have been relaxed. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the EPA reasonably found that section 172(e) contained an ambiguous gap; (2) the EPA’s interpretation of the ambiguity was reasonable; and (3) EPA’s approval of Rule 317 as an alternative program was proper. View "Natural Res. Defense Counsel v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency" on Justia Law

The California Dump Truck Owners Association (Truck Association) initiated a federal preemption challenge to a California environmental regulation. The district court dismissed the suit, finding that the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) approval of the regulation as part of California’s state implementation plan (SIP) divested the court of jurisdiction under the Clean Air Act (CAA). The Truck Association appealed, contending that it was challenging only the regulation and not the SIP, and therefore, the CAA did not apply. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the Truck Association’s suit, as a practical matter, challenged the the EPA’s approval of a provision of California’s SIP; and (2) because the court of appeals has exclusive jurisdiction over such challenges, the district court lacked jurisdiction. View "Cal. Dump Truck Owners Ass’n v. Nichols" on Justia Law

Black Mesa sought costs and expenses from the OSM after Black Mesa participated in a successful challenge to OSM's grant of a coal mining permit revision. The ALJ denied the fee request, the IBLA affirmed, and the district court affirmed. The court held that, on the standard of review applicable here, the review of the agency's "eligibility" determination is de novo and its "entitlement" determination is reviewed for substantial evidence; on de novo review, Black Mesa is "eligible" for fees because it showed some degree of success on the merits; in light of the court's decision on "eligibility," the court declined to reach whether, on this record, Black Mesa was "entitled" to fees; and the court remanded for the agency to consider the issue. In addition, the court rejected Black Mesa's argument that the Secretary waived a challenge to the reasonableness of any award amount that the agency might grant on remand for costs and expenses reasonably incurred for Black Mesa's participation in the proceedings at the agency level. Accordingly, the court reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Black Mesa Water Coalition v. Jewell" on Justia Law

The Department of Interior's Bureau of Reclamation asked the NMFS in 2006 to evaluate the impact of continuing water extraction in the Central Valley on certain threatened and endangered Salmonid species that live there. NMFS developed a Biological Opinion (BiOp) in which it determined that Reclamation's proposed project would jeopardize some of the Delta's endangered Salmonids. NMFS required Reclamation to change the way it pumps water out of the Valley's rivers and groups that depend on Central Valley's water sued to stop this change. The district court found that NMFS violated the Administrative Procedure Act's (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A), arbitrary or capricious standard when developing much of the BiOp and defendants appealed. The court held that the district court did not give NMFS the substantial deference it is due under the APA; the court found that the components of the BiOp invalidated by the district court are reasonable and supported by the record; and the court upheld the BiOp in its entirety. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants. View "San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Authority v. Locke" on Justia Law

Conservation Congress filed suit contending that the federal government violated national environmental laws in failing to consult adequately as to the Beaverslide Project's potential effects on the Northern Spotted Owl. The Project is a lumber thinning and fuel reduction project in northern California. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the government. The court concluded that the district court properly held that Conservation Congress provided sufficient notice of intent to sue to confer jurisdiction on the district court to entertain the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq., claims; the ESA claims are not moot; the district court properly granted summary judgment to the government on the merits of Conservation Congress's claims under the ESA where the Forest Service did not violate the consultation requirements of 50 C.F.R. 402.16; the district court properly concluded that the agencies did not fail to use "the best scientific and commercial data available," as required by the ESA; and the district court properly granted summary judgment on Conservation Congress's National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., claims under the "hard look" standard. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Conservation Congress v. Finley" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the EPA's Administrator under the Clean Air Act's (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7604, citizen-suit provision, seeking an order that would force the Administrator to issue revised regulations governing ozone pollution. Plaintiffs claimed that the Administrator has a nondiscretionary duty to issue revised ozone regulations under section 166(a) of the CCA. The court held that, when a plaintiff sues the Administrator for failure to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator, the nondiscretionary nature of the duty must be clear-cut - that is, readily ascertainable from the statute allegedly giving rise to the duty. Given section 166(a)'s ambiguity, the court could not say that the existence of a nondiscretionary duty to promulgate revised Prevention of Significant Deterioration regulations for ozone is clear-cut or readily ascertainable from the statute. This is enough to preclude plaintiffs' reliance on section 7604(a)(2) as the jurisdictional basis for their suit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims. View "WildEarth Guardians v. McCarthy" on Justia Law

Alliance filed suit challenging the decision of the federal defendants, as well as MDOL, to permit recurring, low-altitude helicopter flights to haze bison in the Yellowstone Grizzly Bear Recovery Zone. Alliance alleged that the federal defendants and MDOL have violated the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq., the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., and the National Forest Management Act (NFMA), 16 U.S.C. 1600 et seq., because they have failed to undertake the proper procedures for reevaluating the effect of helicopter hazing on Yellowstone grizzly bears and have not issued an incidental take permit for the alleged harassment of Yellowstone grizzly bears. The court reversed the district court's holding that Alliance lacked standing to bring its ESA and NEPA claims; reversed the district court's ruling that Alliance failed to comply with the ESA citizen suit 60-day notice provision; affirmed the dismissal of all of Alliance's ESA claims against Inspection Service and FWS as they were not included in the 60-day notice on which Alliance relies; affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the federal defendants and granted dismissal to MDOL on Alliance's ESA Section 7 claim as it is moot; affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the federal defendants and granted dismissal to MDOL on Alliance's Section 9 claim where no genuine issues of material fact exist in the record concerning whether a take of a Yellowstone grizzly bear has occurred or is likely to occur; and affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the federal defendants on the NEPA and NFMA claims. View "Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. USDA" on Justia Law

Shell sought and obtained approval from the Bureau of two oil spill response plans, relating to the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas, required by the Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. 1321(j). After obtaining approval, Shell filed suit under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. 2201(a), against environmental organizations seeking a declaration that the Bureau's approval did not violate the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 501 et seq. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction because Shell lacked Article III standing where Shell does not have legal interests adverse to the Bureau under the APA and it may not file suit solely to determine who would prevail in a hypothetical suit between the environmental groups and the Bureau. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's order denying the environmental groups' motion to dismiss. View "Shell Gulf of Mex. v. Ctr. for Biological Diversity" on Justia Law

NRDC appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants, arguing that defendants violated the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7401, and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., by failing to properly evaluate and disclose the potential environmental impact of a planned expressway connecting the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach. The court concluded that the governing regulations do not decisively answer whether the CAA required qualitative hot-spot analysis within the immediate vicinity of the project area during the time period at issue; the EPA and DOT's Conformity Guidance implicitly, but authoritatively, fills the void by interpreting these ambiguous regulations to permit the type of analysis defendants performed here; and having concluded that the agencies' interpretation of the appropriate hot-spot analysis governs, it is clear that defendants' Conformity Determination was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Because the court was satisfied that defendants took a "hard look" at the Project's likely consequences and probable alternatives, the court agreed with the district court that the environmental impact statement comported with NEPA requirements. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants. View "NRDC V. USDOT" on Justia Law