Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Alliance filed suit challenging the decision of the federal defendants, as well as MDOL, to permit recurring, low-altitude helicopter flights to haze bison in the Yellowstone Grizzly Bear Recovery Zone. Alliance alleged that the federal defendants and MDOL have violated the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq., the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., and the National Forest Management Act (NFMA), 16 U.S.C. 1600 et seq., because they have failed to undertake the proper procedures for reevaluating the effect of helicopter hazing on Yellowstone grizzly bears and have not issued an incidental take permit for the alleged harassment of Yellowstone grizzly bears. The court reversed the district court's holding that Alliance lacked standing to bring its ESA and NEPA claims; reversed the district court's ruling that Alliance failed to comply with the ESA citizen suit 60-day notice provision; affirmed the dismissal of all of Alliance's ESA claims against Inspection Service and FWS as they were not included in the 60-day notice on which Alliance relies; affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the federal defendants and granted dismissal to MDOL on Alliance's ESA Section 7 claim as it is moot; affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the federal defendants and granted dismissal to MDOL on Alliance's Section 9 claim where no genuine issues of material fact exist in the record concerning whether a take of a Yellowstone grizzly bear has occurred or is likely to occur; and affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the federal defendants on the NEPA and NFMA claims. View "Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. USDA" on Justia Law

Shell sought and obtained approval from the Bureau of two oil spill response plans, relating to the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas, required by the Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. 1321(j). After obtaining approval, Shell filed suit under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. 2201(a), against environmental organizations seeking a declaration that the Bureau's approval did not violate the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 501 et seq. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction because Shell lacked Article III standing where Shell does not have legal interests adverse to the Bureau under the APA and it may not file suit solely to determine who would prevail in a hypothetical suit between the environmental groups and the Bureau. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's order denying the environmental groups' motion to dismiss. View "Shell Gulf of Mex. v. Ctr. for Biological Diversity" on Justia Law

NRDC appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants, arguing that defendants violated the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7401, and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., by failing to properly evaluate and disclose the potential environmental impact of a planned expressway connecting the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach. The court concluded that the governing regulations do not decisively answer whether the CAA required qualitative hot-spot analysis within the immediate vicinity of the project area during the time period at issue; the EPA and DOT's Conformity Guidance implicitly, but authoritatively, fills the void by interpreting these ambiguous regulations to permit the type of analysis defendants performed here; and having concluded that the agencies' interpretation of the appropriate hot-spot analysis governs, it is clear that defendants' Conformity Determination was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Because the court was satisfied that defendants took a "hard look" at the Project's likely consequences and probable alternatives, the court agreed with the district court that the environmental impact statement comported with NEPA requirements. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants. View "NRDC V. USDOT" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit challenging the NPS's enforcement of a regulation banning the operation of hovercrafts on the Nation River. Alaska intervened, challenging the NPS's authority to require its researchers to obtain a permit before engaging in studies on the Alagnak River. Plaintiff and Alaska argued that section 103(c) of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act precludes NPS from regulating activities on state-owned lands and navigable waters that fall within the boundaries of National Park System units in Alaska. The district court granted summary judgment to appellees. The court concluded that plaintiff had Article III standing, but that his interpretation of section 103(c) is foreclosed by the plain text of the statute. NPS's hovercraft ban applies to federally owned lands and waters administered by NPS nationwide, as well as navigable waters within national parks. The court rejected plaintiff's two additional arguments, that the Secretary exceeded her statutory authority in promulgating the regulation at issue and that her action raises serious constitutional concerns. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to plaintiff. The court held that Alaska lacked standing to bring its challenge and vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss.View "Sturgeon v. Masica" on Justia Law

These consolidated appeals concern challenges to two logging projects in Montana's Flathead National Project: (1) the Weber case challenged the Forest Service's decision to authorize the Spotted Bear River Project, and (2) the Christiansen case challenged the Soldier Addition II Project. Wild Swan appealed the district court's denial of preliminary injunctions in both cases. The court affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction because Wild Swan has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of its National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., claim where Wild Swan failed to demonstrate that the Forest Service acted arbitrarily in delineating the geographic boundaries of its cumulative effects analysis with respect to the lynx and grizzly bear; the Forest Service sufficiently addressed the effects of each project on the fisheries, but even if the Forest Service should have considered the cumulative impact of both worst-case sediment scenarios on the main channel of the South Fork, there is no immediate risk of irreparable injury justifying preliminary injunction; the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Wild Swan has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of its National Forest Management Act (NFMA), 16 U.S.C. 1604, claims, nor has plaintiff raised serious questions on the merits of this claim; and the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining Wild Swan has not demonstrated a likelihood of success or serious questions on the merits of its Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531, claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Friends of the Wild Swan v. Weber" on Justia Law

This case arose from California's decision to extend its control to cleanup of radioactive pollutants (Senate Bill 990). Boeing filed suit challenging the validity of SB 990, which controlled cleanup of the Santa Susanna Laboratory grounds. The district court agreed with Boeing that the federal government had preempted the field of regulation of nuclear safety, and alternatively that clean up of radioactive materials at the Santa Susanna site is a federal activity. California appealed. The court concluded that Boeing had standing where it could clearly demonstrate an injury in fact; SB 990 violates intergovernmental immunity and is invalid under the Supremacy Clause because the activities of the federal government are free from regulation by any state and state laws are invalid if they regulate the United States directly or discriminate against the federal government or those with whom it deals; the court agreed with the district court that the terms of SB 990 are unseverable; and the court declined to construe SB 990 as limited to non-radioactive cleanup. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "The Boeing Co. v. Raphael" on Justia Law

CDA entered into a settlement with the government under provisions of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601-75, for payment of the costs of hazardous waste clean-up efforts at a mine site in Idaho. The district court approved the settlement over the objections of intervenor FRC. The court rejected FRC's contention that the district court was required to analyze the comparative fault of the parties in order to determine whether its consent decree was substantively fair where, because the decree was based on CDA's ability to pay, it is unclear what effect, if any, a comparative fault analysis would have had on the district court's determination. The court also rejected FRC's contention that the district court erred by failing to consider the substantial evidence submitted by FRC indicating the existence of liability insurance where the court saw no reason to reject the district court's determination that the record shows that the Government appropriately considered the financial health of the CDA and concluded that the proposed settlement represented the maximum amount of money it could contribute to the cleanup costs. The district court's conclusion was well supported. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "United States v. FRC" on Justia Law

MEIC filed suit against the Director of the Montana Department of Environmental Quality, claiming that the Director will violate duties imposed by the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA), 30 U.S.C. 1201-1328. The district court granted the Director's motion for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) and Intervenors' motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). MEIC alleged a pattern or practice of the Director granting mining permit applications without doing proper cumulative hydrologic impact assessments (chias). The court concluded that, assuming arguendo, those allegations established that the Director will not do a proper CHIA for the application at issue, MEIC did not establish a substantial risk that the Director will grant the application at all. Even if the court assumed that MEIC could bring suit on behalf of its members, the members do not have standing because they did not suffer an actual or imminent injury in fact. Under a constitutional ripeness standard, MEIC also failed to allege a substantial controversy of sufficient immediacy and reality because MEIC failed to demonstrate a substantial risk that the Director will grant the application. In regards to MEIC's argument under the firm prediction rule, the court concluded that the rule's standards were not met where the court could not make a firm prediction about whether or not the Director will grant the application. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "MEIC v. Stone-Manning" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants. The district court concluded that defendants were shielded from liability under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251, where defendants' non-stormwater discharges of coal into Resurrection Bay, Alaska, complied with the Multi-Sector General Permit for Stormwater Discharges Associated with Industrial Activity - a general permit under EPA's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System. The court concluded that the district court erred in concluding that the General Permit shielded defendants from liability for their non-stormwater coal discharges where the express terms of the General Permit prohibited defendants from such acts. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.View "Alaska Cmty. Action v. Aurora" on Justia Law

ASARCO, LLC ("Asarco") appealed the district court's dismissal of its contribution action brought under section 113(f) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"). Asarco sought to recover from Union Pacific Railroad Co. and Union Pacific Corp. a share of $482 million in cleanup costs Asarco paid for environmental harm at the Coeur d'Alene Superfund Site in Northern Idaho. The district court dismissed the action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), concluding that although Asarco's claim was timely, it was barred by a 2008 settlement agreement between the parties that settled Union Pacific's claims against Asarco at the same site. Upon review, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Asarco's claim was timely, but that the parties' 2008 settlement agreement did not unambiguously release Asarco's claim in this case. Therefore reversed the district court's judgment dismissing the case under Rule 12(b)(6). View "ASARCO LLC v. UPRC, et al" on Justia Law