Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs sued the Agencies, challenging changes to the Survey and Manage Standard (Standard) of the Northwest Forest Plan. Plaintiffs and the Agencies negotiated a settlement which the district court approved and entered in the form of a consent decree. D.R. Johnson appealed, contending that the district court's approval of the consent decree was an abuse of discretion. At issue was whether a district court could approve resolution of litigation involving a federal agency through a consent decree, which substantially and permanently amended regulations that the agency could only otherwise amend by complying with statutory rulemaking procedures. Because the consent decree allowed for substantial permanent amendments to the Standard, it impermissibly conflicted with laws governing the process for such amendments. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion in approving it in its current form. Finally, D.R. Johnson waived its C & O Act, 28 U.S.C. 1291, argument. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Conservation Northwest v. Sherman" on Justia Law

Defendants, PG&E and Pacific Bell, own and maintain utility poles throughout the San Francisco Bay Area. Plaintiff filed this action against both companies, alleging that the poles discharged wood preservative into the environment in violation of the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1251-1387, and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6901-6992k. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action under Rule 12(b)(6) where plaintiff failed to state a claim under the CWA because discharges of stormwater from the utility poles were neither a "point source discharge" nor "associated with industrial activity" and where plaintiff failed to state a claim under the RCRA because wood preservation that escaped from the utility poles was not a "solid waste." The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff leave to amend. View "Ecological Rights Foundation v. PG&E" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a subrogation suit against defendants for recovery of insurance payments to its insured, Taube-Koret, for environmental response costs Taube-Koret incurred in cleaning up pollutants released on its property. The court concluded that plaintiff had no standing to bring suit under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601-9675, section 107(a) because it did not incur any "costs of response" related to the removal or remediation of a polluted site, and because the common law principle of subrogation did not apply to section 107(a); plaintiff could not bring a subrogation claim under section 112(c) because it did not allege that Taube-Koret was a "claimant"; and plaintiff's state law claims were time-barred. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's third amended complaint with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6). View "Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Space Systems/ Loral, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

This case arose out of the long and contentious process to repair a flood-damaged road in a sensitive area of the Humboldt-Toiyabe National Forest. Great Old Broads appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Forest Service on Great Old Broads' claims related to the Forest Service's record of decision (ROD) determining the method of restoring the South Canyon Road as part of the Jarbridge Canyon Project. The court held that Great Old Broads exhausted its claims before the Forest Service but that the ROD conformed to the National Forest Management Act (NFMA), 16 U.S.C. 1600-1687, Executive Order 11988, and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321-4370f. The court reversed the district court on its analysis of exhaustion, but affirmed the district court on its alternative decision on the merits as to each of the claims presented. View "Great Old Broads For Wilderness, et al v. Kimbell, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs contended that the BLM violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. 1701 et seq., and its own regulations, 43 C.F.R. 3809 et seq., by permitting Denison to restart mining operations at the Arizona 1 Mine in 2009, after a 17-year hiatus, under a plan of operations that BLM approved in 1988. The court concluded that the prior panel did not intend that its brief affirmation of a preliminary injunction denial become law of the case; BLM's decision to allow Denison to resume mining under the 1988 plan of operations was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; because the 1988 plan had been approved, BLM's obligation under NEPA had been fulfilled and therefore, BLM did not unlawfully withhold required agency action; BLM's update of the reclamation bond should not be set aside as not in accordance with law or without observance of procedure required by law as plaintiffs contended; BLM's invocation of the categorical exclusion was not arbitrary and capricious or otherwise not in accordance with law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Center for Biological Diversity, et al v. Salazar, et al" on Justia Law

This case arose out of a dispute between the government and the county concerning the clean up of an abandoned landfill. The government entered into a consent decree with the county and the county then moved to modify the decree. The district court suspended the decree pending further findings and the government appealed. The county later moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that the order was not appealable because it was nonfinal. Because the government failed to satisfy the Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc. factors, the court held that it did not have jurisdiction at this time and dismissed the appeal. View "United States v. El Dorado County, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged the Forest Service's decision adopting the modified Idaho Roadless Rule. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants and adopted the district court's comprehensive judgment in Appeal No. 11-35269. The district court found that the Forest Service did not violate the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq., in preparing the Biological Opinion and that the Forest Service did not violate the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., in relying on the Biological Opinion or in preparing the Final Environmental Impact Statement and Record of Decision approving the Rule. Consequently, cross appeals were dismissed as moot. View "Jayne, et al v. Sherman, et al" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was the EPA's Environmental Appeals Board (EAB) properly upheld two air permits authorizing exploratory drilling operations in the Arctic Ocean by a drillship and its associated fleet of support vessels. The petition for review challenged two aspects of the permits: (1) the determination that supported vessels, unlike the drillship itself, did not require the best available control technology (BACT) to control emissions; and (2) the exemption of the area within a 500-meter radius of the drillship from ambient air quality standards. The court denied the petition, holding that the EPA's interpretation of 42 U.S.C. 7627 was reasonable and that the EPA's grant of a 500 meter ambient air exemption was not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the agency's regulations. View "REDOIL, et al v. EPA" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged the FWS's Biological Opinion regarding the Ruby Pipeline Project, which involved the construction, operation, and maintenance of a 42-inch-diameter natural gas pipeline extending from Wyoming to Oregon. The court set aside the Opinion as arbitrary and capricious and set aside the Record of Decisions because it relied on the invalid Opinion. The court remanded for the agency to formulate a revised Opinion that: (1) addresses the impacts, if any, of Ruby's groundwater withdrawal on listed fish species and critical habitat; and (2) categorizes and treats the Conservation Action Plan measures as "interrelated actions" or excludes any reliance on their beneficial effects in making a revised jeopardy and adverse modification. View "Center for Biological Diversity. v. BLM, et al" on Justia Law

These consolidated petitions for review challenged a contract between the BPA and one of its long-time customers, Alcoa. BPA's preference customers and others filed this petition for review, requesting that the court hold that the contract was unlawful because it was inconsistent with the agency's statutory mandate to act in accordance with sound business principles. Petitioners claimed, among other things, that instead of entering into a contract to sell power to Alcoa at the statutorily required Industrial Firm power (IP) rate, BPA should sell to other buyers at the market rate. The court denied the petitions for review insofar as they pertained to the Initial Period. Because the potential for BPA and Alcoa to enter into the Second Period of the contract was no longer before the court, the court dismissed those portions of the petitions. Finally, the court held that because BPA relied on a categorical exclusion to the National Environmental Policy Act's (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321-4347, requirements, declining to complete an Environmental Impact Statement was not arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, the court denied petitioner's NEPA claim. View "Alcoa Inc. v. BPA, et al" on Justia Law