Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Hawaii Longline Association appealed the approval of a consent decree entered into by plaintiff environmental groups and defendant federal agencies affecting the regulation and management of the Hawaii shallow-set, swordfish longline fishery. Appellant challenged the district court's vacatur of a regulation increasing the limit on incidental interactions between longline fishing boats and loggerhead turtles and replacing the increased limit with a lower limit that was previously in effect. Appellant argued that the district court abused its discretion in approving a consent decree that violated federal law by allowing the National Marine Fisheries Service to change duly promulgated rules without following the procedural rulemaking requirements of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, 16 U.S.C. 1851-1856, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq. Because the consent decree was injunctive in nature, the court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1). The consent decree did not purport to make substantive changes to the Fishery regulations so the rulemaking provisions of the Magnuson Act and the APA did not apply. The district court did not clearly err in finding that a return to lower incidental take limits was more protective of loggerhead turtles. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

This appeal arose from a long-running conflict which has devolved to the present remaining dispute as to the classification of approximately 9,000 acre feet (AF) of water released between June 17 through 24 of 2004 from the Nimbus and New Melones reservoirs within California's Central Valley Project (CVP) by defendant, the U.S. Department of the Interior, acting through the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (collectively, federal defendants). Plaintiffs, water agencies, contended that the Department of the Interior abused its discretion in failing to apply the latter June 2004 releases against the 800,000 AF of CVP yield especially designated for fish, wildlife, and habitat restoration under section 3406(b)(2) of the CVP Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 102-575, 106 Stat. 4600. Because the court found that the water agencies have standing and the accounting which the Department of Interior conducted for the latter June 2004 releases did not constitute an abuse of discretion, the court affirmed the district court's orders granting summary judgment in favor of the federal defendants and against the water agencies.

TIRN appealed from the district court's dismissal of its claim on res judicata grounds. TIRN alleged that the State Department failed to satisfy its consultation and environmental assessment obligations under the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., and the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq., in conducting annual certifications of countries exempted from the general ban on shrimp imports. At issue was whether TIRN's current lawsuit for NEPA and ESA violations was precluded by its earlier lawsuits challenging the State Department's regulations implementing the Section 609(b)(2) of Public Law 101-162 certification process. The court held that because TIRN's current challenge arose from the same transactional nucleus of facts as earlier litigation, res judicata barred its claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court.

Plaintiff, a photojournalist, contended that viewing restrictions at a Bureau of Land Management (BLM) horse roundup violated her First Amendment right to observe government activities. The district court denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding that most of the relief sought was moot because the roundup ended in October 2010. Alternatively, the district court concluded that plaintiff was unlikely to succeed on the merits because the restrictions did not violate the First Amendment. The court held that, because the preliminary injunction motion sought unrestricted access to future horse roundups, and not just the one that took place in 2010, the case was was not moot. With regards to plaintiff's First Amendment claim, the district court erred by failing to apply the well-established qualified right of access balancing test set forth in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court. Accordingly, the court remanded the case to the district court to consider in the first instance whether the public had a First Amendment right of access to horse gathers, and if so, whether the viewing restrictions were narrowly tailored to serve the government's overriding interests.

Just when Defendants-Appellees United States Forest Service and Joseph P. Stringer (USFS), and Intervenor-Defendant Arizona Snowbowl Resort Limited Partnership (ASRLP) had successfully defended an agency decision to allow snowmaking at a ski resort on federal land all the way to the United States Supreme Court, "new" plaintiffs appeared. Represented by the same attorney as the losing parties in the first lawsuit, the "new" plaintiffs—who had closely monitored the first litigation—brought certain environmental claims that were virtually identical to some that the attorney had improperly attempted to raise in the earlier lawsuit, for no apparent reason other than to ensure further delay and forestall development. "Although it is apparent to [the Ninth Circuit] that the 'new' plaintiffs and their counsel have grossly abused the judicial process by strategically holding back claims that could have, and should have, been asserted in the first lawsuit… [the Court was] compelled to hold that laches [did] not apply here" because the USFS and ASRLP could not demonstrate that they suffered prejudice, as defined by the applicable case law. The Court held that the Save the Peaks Plaintiffs' claims failed under NEPA and the APA. Accordingly, the Court held that the district court properly granted summary judgment to the USFS and ASRLP.

This case arose out of plaintiffs' second challenge to the sufficiency of the DOE's Environmental Assessment (EA) of a prospective "biosafety level-3" (BSL-3) facility at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). On appeal, plaintiffs petitioned the court to require the DOE to prepare an Environment Impact Statement (EIS), or in the alternative, to revise its EA, in light of the allegations set forth in its original complaint, to determine whether an EIS was required. The court held that the DOE took the requisite "hard look" at the environmental impact of an intentional terrorist attack in the manner required by the National Environment Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321, et seq., and San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The court further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs' motion to supplement the record. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Plaintiff brought suit in federal district court challenging the 2004 Framework, the Forest Services' recommendations to the Sierra Nevada Forest Plan, as inconsistent with the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., and the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., claiming that the 2004 EIS did not sufficiently analyze the environmental consequences of the 2004 Framework for fish and amphibians. The court held that the Forest Service failed to take a hard look at environmental consequences on fish in the 2004 EIS, in violation of NEPA. There was a lack of analysis of the likely impact on individual species of fish in the 2004 EIS and the lack of any explanation in the 2004 EIS as to why it was not "reasonably possible" to perform some level of analysis of such impact. The court held, however, that the Forest Service did take a hard look at environmental consequences on amphibians in the 2004 EIS, in compliance with NEPA. Therefore, the court reversed in part and affirmed in part.

Petitioners petitioned for review of the EPA's approval of the 2004 State Implementation Plan (2004 SIP) for the San Joaquin Valley's nonattainment area for the one-hour ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standard. The court held that the EPA's 2010 approval of the 2004 SIP, which was based on data current only as of 2004, was arbitrary and capricious. The court did not reach petitioners' remaining arguments and granted the petition for review, remanding the matter to the EPA for further proceedings.

In these consolidated appeals, the court addressed the propriety of various actions taken by the EPA under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401, with respect to Montana air quality from 1993 to 2008. In No. 02-71657, Montana Sulphur sought review of the EPA's final rule which partially disapproved a proposed revision to Montana's State Implementation Plan (SIP) governing sulfur dioxide (SO2). In No. 08-72642, Montana Sulphur sought review of the EPA's April 2008 final rule promulgating a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP) for the State of Montana's SO2 emissions. Because the court concluded that the agency did not act arbitrarily or capriciously with respect to either the SIP or FIP, the court denied both petitions for review.

This case arose out of three applications by the TRRC to build a a railroad line in Southeastern Montana to haul coal. The Board, or its predecessor, approved each of the three applications (TRRC I, II, and III). Petitioners challenged TRRC II and III on a number of environmental and public convenience and necessity grounds. The court held that the Board failed to take the requisite "hard look" at certain material environmental impacts inherent in TRRC II and III in the manner required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., prior to approving those applications. The court further held that the Board did not err in its public convenience and necessity analyses, except with respect to its reliance on the viability of TRRC II during the approval of TRRC III.