Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellants formerly maintained railroad tracks on a parcel of land in Stockton, California, that was contaminated by petroleum. The petroleum was spilled at a nearby industrial site and migrated onto the property via an underground french drain that appellants had installed in order to remove water from the roadbed. At issue was whether appellants were liable for the contamination of the property under the law of nuisance or under California's Polanco Redevelopment Act (Act), Cal. Health & Safety Code 33459 et seq. The court held that there was no evidence that appellants actively or knowingly caused or permitted the contamination as required for nuisance liability and liability under the Act's Water Code provision, Cal. Health & Safety Code 33459(h). The court also held that appellants were not "owners" of the property under the Act's Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9607(a), provision when the contamination occurred. The court further held that, because the record established no genuine issue of material fact as to appellants' liability, appellants were entitled to summary judgment. Therefore, the court need not reach any of the damages issues on appeal or cross-appeal.

Plaintiffs, 25 members of the Achuar indigenous group dependent for their existence upon the rainforest lands and waterways along the Rio Corrientes in Peru, and Amazon Watch, a California corporation, sued Occidental Peruana ("OxyPeru") in Los Angeles County Superior Court for environmental contamination and release of hazardous waste. OxyPeru's headquarters were located in Los Angeles County but OxyPeru removed the suit to federal district court where it successfully moved for dismissal on the ground that Peru was a more convenient forum. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed the suit on the basis of forum non conveniens. The court reversed the dismissal and held that the district court failed to consider all relevant private and public interest factors, entirely overlooking enforceability of judgments factor, which weighed heavily against dismissal. The court also held that the district court correctly assumed that Amazon Watch was a proper domestic plaintiff, but erroneously afforded reduced deference to its chosen forum and ignored the group entirely in the analysis of numerous factors. Therefore, these errors led the district court to misconstrue factors that were neutral or weighed against dismissal, and to strike an unreasonable balance between the factors and deference due a domestic plaintiff's chosen forum. The court further held that the district court abused its discretion by failing to impose conditions on its dismissal that were warranted by facts in the record showing justifiable reasons to doubt OxyPeru's full cooperation in the foreign forum.

Plaintiffs sued defendant to enforce the Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA") unilateral administrative order that commanded defendant to conduct a remedial investigation and feasibility study to assess the site conditions in the Columbia River and to implement a cleanup. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs' claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CLERCA"), 42 U.S.C. 9613(h). The court held that the district court correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate plaintiffs' claims for penalties for the 892 days of noncompliance with the unilateral administrative order and properly dismissed plaintiffs' claims where subsection (h)(2) did not apply to citizens suits.

Jensen Family Farms, Inc. ("Jensen") sued the Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution Control District ("District"), alleging that the District's Rules 220, 310, and 1010 were preempted by the federal Clean Air Act ("CAA"), 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.; Rules 220 and 310 violated certain provisions of California law; and the Rules violated Jensen's due process rights. Jensen moved for summary judgment and while it's motion was pending, the district court granted the California Air Resources Board's ("CARB"), California's air pollution control agency, motion to intervene. CARB and the District (collectively, "defendants") subsequently filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Jensen appealed the district court's judgment. The principal question in this case, among other questions, was whether the District's rules were preempted by the CAA. The court held that Rules 220 and 310 were not standards or other requirements related to the control of emissions and therefore, not preempted by CAA 209(e). The court also held that Rule 1010 did not apply to any "nonroad engines," as that term was used in the CAA and therefore, was not preempted under section 209(e). The court further held that there was no basis for Jensen's claim under Cal. Code Regs. tit. 17, 93116 or Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, 2450 et. seq.; that the Rules did not violate Jenson's due process rights where it admitted that the Rules served the legitimate government interest in minimizing air pollution from diesel engines; and the Rules did not violate California Constitution, Article 13A because Jensen waived this argument in its complaint. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment on the pleadings in favor of defendants.

Sierra Forest Legacy and other organizations (collectively, "Sierra Forest") appealed a largely unfavorable summary judgment against them and a favorable but limited remedial order in their National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., and National Forest Management Act ("NFMA"), 16 U.S.C. 1600 et seq., suit challenging the 2004 Sierra Nevada Forest Plan Amendment ("2004 Framework") and the Basin Project, a timber harvesting project approved under the 2004 Framework. The State of California ("California") also appealed a summary judgment against it and a limited remedial order in a related NEPA action. At issue was whether the process of establishing management guidelines governing 11.5 acres of federal land in the Sierra Nevada region complied with both the procedural requirements of NEPA and the substantive restrictions of NFMA. The court affirmed the district court's decision on the merits of Sierra Forest and California's NEPA claim and held that Sierra Forest and California had standing to assert a facial NEPA claim against the 2004 Framework but that the 2004 Framework supplemental environmental impact statement ("SEIS") adequately addressed short-term impacts to old forest wildlife and disclosed and rebutted public opposition. The court also held that the Forest Service did not violate NEPA when approving the Basin Project because the U.S. Forest Service and related federal defendants (collectively, "Federal Service") adequately addressed cumulative impacts of the proposed management act. The court further held that the Forest Service violated NEPA by failing to update the alternatives from the 2001 Framework SEIS to reflect new modeling techniques used in the 2004 Framework SEIS. However, the court vacated the district court's orders granting a limited remedy and remanded for reconsideration of the equities of a "substantive" injunction without giving undue deference to government experts. The court remanded also because it reversed the district court's decision on Sierra Forests' NFMA claims.

Plaintiffs filed a citizen enforcement suit alleging that defendant was discharging toxic pollutants from the Seward Small Boat Harbor and a boat repair yard. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion in denying an award of attorney fees to plaintiffs pursuant to section 505(d) of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), 33 U.S.C. 1365(d). The court held that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that special circumstances supported its denial of an award of attorney fees. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions to award plaintiffs' fees and costs that were reasonably incurred in furtherance of the CWA's purpose.

Plaintiff, an Oregon non-profit organization, sued defendants under the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), 33 U.S.C. 1365(a), alleging that defendants violated the CWA and its implementing regulations by not obtaining permits from the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") for stormwater, largely rainwater, runoff that flowed from logging roads into systems of ditches, culverts, and channels and was then discharged into forest streams and rivers. At issue was whether plaintiff's complaint was properly dismissed with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The court reversed the district court's dismissal and held that stormwater runoff from logging roads that was collected by and then discharged from a system of ditches, culverts, and channels was a point source discharge for which a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit was required.

Plaintiffs, manufactures of a bear-resistant container called the Ursack S29 model and three individual users of the Ursack, sued the Sierra Interagency Black Bear Group ("SIBBG"), as well as national and forest park services (collectively, "defendants"), where defendants withdrew conditional approval of the S29 model and refused to permit backpackers to use the S29 in the container-only areas of defendants' national parks and forests. At issue was whether SIBBG's decision to revoke conditional approval of the S29 model was arbitrary and capricious. The court held that SIBBG's decision to revoke conditional approval of the S29 model was not arbitrary or capricious where the court could not conclude that the SIBBG, although it did not mention overflow food problems in the course of its debate, ignored this aspect of the problem; where the distinctions the SIBBG made between the BearVault and the Ursack were rational; and where SIBBG's tree-damage rationale, prohibiting users from tying the S29 model to trees, was not arbitrary or capricious.

Intervenor State of Alaska appealed the district court's judgment in favor of Southeast Alaska Conservatory Council and five other groups (collectively, "SEACC") in their suit against the Federal Highway Administration ("FHWA") and other defendants arising from the initiation of the Juneau Access Improvements Project ("Project") to improve surface access between Juneau and the communities of Haines and Skagway in the Lynn Canal corridor of Southeast Alaska. At issue was whether the district court properly ordered the State to consider improving existing ferry service between Juneau and the communities of Haines and Skagway before proceeding with expensive construction of a new ferry terminal and highway through a national forest. The court held that the district court properly concluded that it was arbitrary for the FHWA to refuse to consider reassigning vessels as a project alternative on the basis that it would increase costs and reduce services elswhere when the chosen project alternative could have been rejected for the same reason. By failing to examine a viable and reasonable alternative to the proposed project, and by not providing an adequate justification for its omission, the Environmental Impact Statement issued by the FHWA violated the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), 40 C.F.R. 1502.14(a).

Plaintiffs brought suit for declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act seeking to compel defendant to prohibit off-road vehicle use of Oregon's Little Canyon Mountain area. At issue was whether defendant's failure to close Little Canyon Mountain to off-road vehicle use violated the Federal Land and Policy Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. 1701-1785, and 43 C.F.R. 8340-8342. The court held that defendant did not, and was not required to, make a finding that the off-road vehicle use of which plaintiff complained had caused "considerable adverse effects" on the resources enumerated in 43 C.F.R. 8341.2(a) and therefore, the court could not compel defendant to close Little Canyon Mountain to off-road vehicle use. The court also held that defendant's denial of plaintiff's petition to close Little Canyon Mountain to off-road vehicle use was not arbitrary and capricious.