Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A nonprofit organization called California River Watch claimed that the City of Vacaville, California was violating the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”). River Watch claimed the City’s water wells were contaminated by a carcinogen called hexavalent chromium. That carcinogen, River Watch says, was in turn transported to the City’s residents through its water-distribution system. River Watch’s argument on appeal was that because the hexavalent chromium originated from the Wickes site, it was “discarded material” under RCRA, and thus the City was liable for its transportation through its water-distribution system. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the City’s motion and denied River Watch’s motion because, as it explained, River Watch hadn’t demonstrated how the City’s water-processing activities could qualify as discarding “solid waste” under RCRA. Thus, the district court explained, RCRA’s “fundamental requirement that the contaminant be ‘discarded’” was not satisfied. River Watch appealed. The Ninth Circuit was satisfied that hexavalent chromium met RCRA's definition of "solid waste." However, the Court found RCRA’s context makes clear that mere conveyance of hazardous waste cannot constitute “transportation” under the endangerment provision. Under the facts presented, the Court found the City did not move hexavalent chromium in direct connection with its waste disposal process. Under River Watch’s theory of liability, hexavalent chromium seeped through groundwater into the City’s wells and the City incidentally carried the waste through its pipes when it pumps water to its residents. The Court concluded City did not have the necessary connection to the waste disposal process to be held liable for “transportation” under § 6972(a)(1)(B) of the Act. Because the City could not be held liable under RCRA, the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the City was affirmed. View "California River Watch v. City of Vacaville" on Justia Law

The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”) require the U.S Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) to regulate pesticides, which are defined to include herbicides. EPA issued an Interim Registration Review Decision for glyphosate (“Interim Decision”), which: (1) announced that its earlier draft human-health and ecological risk assessments were final; (2) contained a brief cost-benefit analysis concluding that the benefits outweighed the potential ecological risks when glyphosate is used according to label directions; and (3) laid out various mitigation measures, in the form of label changes for glyphosate products, to reduce the potential ecological risks. EPA still planned, among other things, to complete an assessment of glyphosate’s effect on endangered and threatened species, pursuant to the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”).   Petitioners filed for review of the Interim Decision: one led by Rural Coalition and the other by Natural Resources Defense Council (“NRDC”). The Ninth Circuit (1) granted in part and denied in part a petition for review challenging the EPA’s decision determining that glyphosate, the active ingredient in the weedkiller Roundup, does not pose “any unreasonable risk to man or the environment”; and (2) remanded to the agency for further consideration.   The court held that EPA’s conclusion was in tension with parts of the agency’s own analysis and with the Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment (“Cancer Guidelines”), which EPA purported to follow. Further, that EPA’s registration review decision under FIFRA was an “action” that triggered the ESA’s consultation requirement; EPA actively exercised its regulatory power, completing an assessment of glyphosate’s risks under FIFRA and delineating what constituted acceptable glyphosate use under the statute’s safety standard. View "NRDC V. USEPA" on Justia Law

Environmental groups learned through FOIA requests that agencies within the U.S. Department of the Interior had authorized permits for offshore well stimulation treatments without first conducting the normally-required environmental review. Pursuant to settlements between the environmental groups and the federal agencies – the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) and the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), the agencies issued an Environmental Assessment (“EA”) evaluating the use of offshore well simulation treatments and did not prepare a full Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”). The agencies concluded that the use of these treatments would not pose a significant environmental impact and issued a Finding of No Significant Impact (“FONSI”). Petroleum industry Defendants intervened.                                                                    The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiffs’ National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) claims, and affirmed the grant of summary judgment to plaintiffs on the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) and Coastal Zone Management Act (“CZMA”) claims.   After reviewing the agencies’ EA and FONSI, the court held that the agencies failed to take the hard look required by NEPA in issuing their EA and that they should have prepared an EIS for their proposed action. The court reversed the summary judgment to Defendants on the NEPA claims and granted summary judgment to Plaintiffs on those claims; affirmed the district court’s summary judgment to Plaintiffs on the ESA and CZMA claims; and held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning injunctive relief. The court held that the agencies acted arbitrarily and capriciously by not preparing an EIS. The court vacated the inadequate EA. View "EDC V. BOEM" on Justia Law

Rosemont Copper Company sought to dig a large open-pit copper mine in the Santa Rita Mountains just south of Tucson, Arizona. The United States Forest Service (“the Service”) approved Rosemont’s mining plan of operations (“MPO”) on two separate grounds. The district court held that neither ground supported the Service’s approval of Rosemont’s MPO.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment that the Service acted arbitrarily and capriciously in approving the entirety of Rosemont Copper Company’s MPO. The court agreed with the district court’s holding that Section 612 of the Multiple Use Act granted no rights beyond those granted by the Mining Law. The court also agreed with the district court’s holding that the Service had no basis for assuming that Rosemont’s mining claims were valid under the Mining Law. The court remanded to the Service for further proceedings as it deems important, informed by the Government’s concession that Section 612 grants no rights beyond those granted by the Mining Law, and by the court’s holding that Rosemont’s mining claims on the 2,447 acres were invalid under the Mining Law. The court further noted that it did not know whether the Service would have decided that Part 228A regulations were applicable to Rosemont’s proposal to occupy invalid claims with its waste rock, and, if applicable, whether the Service would have construed those regulations to allow such occupancy. View "CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. USFWS" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a non-profit group composed of small business owners who fish in the Bay Area, sued various government agencies seeking to prevent the enforcement of a commercial fishing prohibition that applies generally in national parks. Plaintiff claims that the Golden Gate National Recreation Area (GGNRA) does not confer with National Park Service with the ability to regulate offshore waters. The district court granted summary judgment to the government entities.The Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that the text and structure of the GGNRA Act confirm that Congress has given the Park Service administrative jurisdiction over the waters in question. Nothing in the GGNRA Act supports the Plaintiff's position, that the Park Service must first establish a property interest in the waters from the State of California. View "SAN FRANCISCO HERRING ASSOC. V. USDOI" on Justia Law

Pesticides sold in the United States generally must be registered by the EPA. Private parties can petition the EPA to cancel the registration of a pesticide, and the EPA is required to resolve those petitions “within a reasonable time.” The Natural Resources Defense Council (“NRDC”)’ petitioned the EPA to cancel the registration of tetrachlorvinphos (“TCVP”), for use in household pet products. After delays, the EPA eventually denied NRDC’s petition.The court held that the EPA’s denial of NRDC’s petition was not supported by substantial evidence. The EPA failed to provide a reasoned explanation for its denial of NRDC’s petition and made several arbitrary calculations. The EPA’s errors primarily impacted two calculations central to its denial of NRDC’s petition: (1) the amount of TCVP dust released by the pet collars, and (2) the assumption that pet owners will trim the collars by at least 20%.The court found that it could only uphold agency action based on the reasons the agency gave for its decision. The panel held further that the EPA’s assumption that only 14.6% of the dust released from the collars was TCVP was troubling on the merits. The court held that it would not defer to the EPA’s highly inaccurate calculation that pet owners will trim pet collars by 20% when fitting the collar onto a pet’s neck. The court concluded that it was apparent that the EPA’s denial of NRDC’s petition was simply not supported by substantial evidence when considered on the record as a whole. View "NRDC V. USEPA" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that the energy companies’ extraction of fossil fuels and other activities were a substantial factor in causing global warming and a rise in the sea level, bringing causes of action for public and private nuisance, strict liability, strict liability, negligence, negligent failure to warn, and trespass.The court held that the district court lacked federal question jurisdiction under Sec. 1331 because, at the time of removal, the complaints asserted only state-law tort claims against the energy companies. The court held that Plaintiffs’ global-warming claims did not fall within the Grable exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule. In addition, Plaintiffs’ state law claims did not fall under the “artful-pleading” doctrine, another exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule, because they were not completely preempted by the Clean Air Act.Further, the court found Plaintiffs’ claims were not removable under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. The court also held that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction under the federal-officer removal statute, Sec. 1442(a)(1), because the energy companies were not “acting under” a federal officer’s directions. The court then rejected the energy companies’ argument that the district court had removal jurisdiction over the complaints under Sec. 1452(a) because they were related to bankruptcy cases involving Peabody Energy Corp., Arch Coal, and Texaco, Inc. Finally, the court held that the district court did not have admiralty jurisdiction because maritime claims brought in state court are not removable to federal court absent an independent jurisdictional basis. View "COUNTY OF SAN MATEO V. CHEVRON CORP." on Justia Law

The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (the “Service”) published the Kenai Rule, codifying its ban on baiting Kenai Refuge brown bears and its closing of the Skilak Wildlife Recreation Area (“Skilak WRA”) to certain animals.The court held that the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (“ANILCA”) preserved the federal government’s plenary power over public lands in Alaska. The court rejected Plaintiffs’ arguments that the Service exceeded its statutory authority in enacting the Kenai Rule. The court held that while the Alaska Statehood Act transferred the administration of wildlife from Congress to the State, the transfer did not include lands withdrawn or set apart as refuges or reservations for the protection of wildlife, like the Kenai Refuge. Next, the court held that Plaintiff’s assertion that the Service could preempt the State’s hunting regulations on federal lands in Alaska was unsupported by the law.Further, the court rejected Safari Club’s contention that the Skilak WRA aspect of the Kenai Rule violated the National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act of 1997 (“Improvement Act”). The court held that The Improvement Act did not require the Service to allow all State-sanctioned hunting throughout the Kenai Refuge. Moreover, the court rejected Plaintiffs’ arguments that the Service violated the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) by acting arbitrarily and capriciously in issuing the Kenai Rule. Finally, the court rejected Plaintiffs’ two-part National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) argument. The panel concluded that there was no basis for reversal. View "SAFARI CLUB INTERNATIONAL V. DEBRA HAALAND" on Justia Law

The California State Water Resources Control Board signed a Management Agency Agreement (“MAA”) with the U.S. Forest Service to formally recognize it as the management agency on Forest Service lands to implement water management plans. The U.S. Forest Service issued grazing permits in three allotments-- the Bell Meadow, Eagle Meadow, and Herring Creek Allotments (the “BEH Allotments”). Plaintiffs alleged that the Forest Service’s allowance of livestock grazing in the BEH Allotments led to fecal matter runoff. The only claim at issue here alleged that the government violated Section 313 of the Clean Water Act by failing to comply with requirements of California’s Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act.The panel held that the plaintiffs had Article III standing under the associational standing doctrine because at least one member of each plaintiff organization averred that they regularly hike in all three Allotments. rest Service would instead implement the agreed-upon Best Management Practices (“BMP”s) and the provisions of the MAA. Second, plaintiffs asserted that the MAA was superseded by the State Board’s adoption of the 2004 “Policy for Implementation and Enforcement of the Nonpoint Source Pollution Control Program” (“2004 NPS Policy”). The panel held that this argument was refuted by the text of that document. The panel concluded that plaintiffs failed to show that government violated the reporting and permitting requirements of the relevant Cal. Water Code. The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judgment to defendants with respect to plaintiffs’ claims based on asserted violations of the basis plan’s water quality objectives. View "CENT. SIERRA ENVTL. RES. CTR. V. STANISLAUS NAT'L FOREST" on Justia Law

Appellee, Signal Peak Energy, sought to expand its mining operations, resulting in the expected emission of 190 million tons of greenhouse gases (“GHGs”). The Department of the Interior (“Interior”) published an environmental assessment (“EA”) which explained that the amount of GHGs emitted would amount to .44 percent of the total GHGs emitted each year globally. A group of environmental groups challenged the Interior's approval of the proposed expansion.The Ninth Circuit first noted that the parties’ dispute was not moot. The panel further held that Interior violated the National Environmental Policy Act by failing to provide a convincing statement for why the project’s impacts were insignificant. Moreover, the panel was unpersuaded that Interior was required to use the social cost of carbon metric to quantify the harm. Further, the panel found that it was less clear whether the agency had any other available metric to evaluate the project's impact. The panel remanded to the district court to decide whether an environmental impact statement was required. View "350 MONTANA V. DEBRA HAALAND" on Justia Law