Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Two environmental organizations challenged a July 2020 Final Environmental Assessment (EA) and Decision and Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) issued by Wildlife Services, an agency within the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The EA and FONSI authorized a predator damage and conflict management program in Wilderness Areas and Wilderness Study Areas in Nevada. The plaintiffs argued that the program violated the Wilderness Act and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).The United States District Court for the District of Nevada granted summary judgment in favor of Wildlife Services. The court concluded that predator control in Wilderness Areas to support pre-existing grazing operations was permissible under the Wilderness Act. The court also found that the agency's statewide analysis of the environmental impacts was reasonable and that the agency had adequately considered the potential impacts on public health, Wilderness Areas, and the scientific uncertainty regarding lethal predator damage management (PDM).The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment on the Wilderness Act claim, holding that lethal PDM is permissible in Wilderness Areas when conducted in support of pre-existing grazing operations. However, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's summary judgment on the NEPA claim. The court found that the EA failed to take the required "hard look" at the environmental impacts, particularly regarding the geographic scope of the PDM program, the potential impacts on public health, the unique characteristics of Wilderness Areas, and the scientific uncertainty surrounding lethal PDM. The court remanded the case to the district court to direct the agency to reconsider whether an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is required and to produce either a revised EA or an EIS. View "WILDEARTH GUARDIANS V. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION WILDLIFE SERVICES" on Justia Law

Johnnie Fuson, a registered member of the Navajo Tribe, was forced to relocate from his family’s home following the partition of the Joint Use Area (JUA) under the Navajo-Hopi Settlement Act. Fuson applied for relocation assistance benefits, but his application was denied by the Office of Navajo and Hopi Indian Relocation (ONHIR). On appeal, the Independent Hearing Officer (IHO) also deemed Fuson ineligible for benefits, citing adverse credibility findings and determining that Fuson was not a resident of the Hopi Partitioned Lands (HPL) on the relevant date.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona upheld the IHO’s decision, granting summary judgment in favor of ONHIR and denying Fuson’s motion for summary judgment. The district court found that substantial evidence supported the IHO’s adverse credibility findings and that the IHO’s decision was not arbitrary and capricious.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the IHO’s adverse credibility findings were not supported by substantial evidence. The IHO had found every witness not credible due to inconsistencies with other witnesses, creating a circular reasoning that guaranteed adverse credibility findings for all witnesses. The Ninth Circuit also found that the IHO’s finding that Fuson was not a resident of the HPL homesite was arbitrary and capricious. The IHO relied almost exclusively on the Bureau of Indian Affairs enumeration roster without adequately considering contrary testimony about the roster’s reliability.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "FUSON V. OFFICE OF NAVAJO AND HOPI INDIAN RELOCATION" on Justia Law

A mother, Aurora Regino, filed a complaint against the Chico Unified School District after the district began using her child's new preferred name and pronouns without informing her. Regino claimed that the district's policy, which allows students to be addressed by their preferred names and pronouns without parental notification, violated her substantive and procedural due process rights. She argued that the policy deprived her of her fundamental rights as a parent to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of her children.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California dismissed Regino's complaint, reasoning that she failed to allege the existence of a fundamental right that was clearly established in existing precedent. The court applied a standard similar to that used in qualified immunity cases, requiring that the right be clearly established in existing law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal, holding that the district court applied erroneous legal standards to the substantive and procedural due process claims. The Ninth Circuit clarified that a plaintiff asserting a substantive due process claim does not need to show that existing precedent clearly establishes the asserted fundamental right. Instead, the critical inquiry is whether the asserted fundamental right is deeply rooted in the nation's history and tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to conduct the proper analysis, including a careful formulation of the asserted fundamental right and an examination of whether it is deeply rooted in history and tradition.The Ninth Circuit also held that the district court erred in its analysis of Regino's procedural due process claim by requiring her to identify a fundamental right. Procedural due process protects all liberty interests derived from state law or the Due Process Clause itself. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Ninth Circuit's opinion. View "REGINO V. STALEY" on Justia Law

Alison Mayfield, who is deaf and communicates primarily through American Sign Language (ASL), was pulled over by officers from the City of Mesa’s Police Department (MPD) for suspected reckless driving. During the traffic stop and subsequent DUI processing, Mayfield requested an ASL interpreter but was not provided one. Instead, officers used a combination of written notes, lip-reading, and gestures to communicate with her. Mayfield was ultimately charged with DUI but pleaded guilty to reckless driving.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona dismissed Mayfield’s claims under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act (RA), holding that her claims were barred by Heck v. Humphrey and that she failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted. Mayfield appealed the dismissal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that Mayfield’s ADA and RA claims were not barred by Heck v. Humphrey because a ruling in her favor would not necessarily imply the invalidity of her reckless driving conviction. The court found that the district court erred in considering the original DUI charges rather than the ultimate conviction for reckless driving and that the City of Mesa had not met its burden to establish the applicability of the Heck bar.On the merits, the Ninth Circuit held that the relevant question was whether the means of communication used by the officers were sufficient to allow Mayfield to effectively exchange information during the stop and arrest. The court concluded that Mayfield failed to plead sufficient facts to establish that MPD discriminated against her by not providing a reasonable accommodation. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Mayfield’s complaint without leave to amend, as amendment would be futile. View "MAYFIELD V. CITY OF MESA" on Justia Law

Ryan Bussey, a former Army soldier, received a Bad Conduct Discharge (BCD) after being found guilty of wrongful sexual contact. He sought to upgrade his discharge to Honorable, arguing that his combat-induced Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) contributed to his conduct. The Army Board for Correction of Military Records acknowledged Bussey's PTSD but concluded it was not a mitigating factor for his crime of conviction.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary of the Army, upholding the Board's decision. Bussey appealed this decision, seeking review under the Administrative Procedure Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the Board erred in its decision. The court held that the Board failed to consider all the circumstances resulting in Bussey's discharge, focusing too narrowly on whether PTSD caused the legal elements of the crime. The court emphasized that the Board should have analyzed whether PTSD potentially contributed to the facts, events, and conditions leading to Bussey's wrongful sexual contact.Additionally, the court found that the Board did not give liberal consideration to Bussey's PTSD-based claim, as required by 10 U.S.C. § 1552(h)(2)(B). The court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case to the Board to reconsider Bussey's upgrade request under the appropriate standard, instructing the Board to resolve doubts and inferences in favor of Bussey. If the Board finds that PTSD contributed to the circumstances resulting in Bussey's discharge, it may grant the requested relief. View "Bussey v. Driscoll" on Justia Law

Peyman Roshan, a lawyer and real estate broker, had his law license suspended by the California Supreme Court in 2021 for misconduct. Following this, the California Department of Real Estate (DRE) initiated a reciprocal disciplinary proceeding against his real estate license. Roshan filed a federal lawsuit against the DRE, alleging constitutional violations and seeking to enjoin the DRE's disciplinary action.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed Roshan's lawsuit, citing the Younger abstention doctrine, which prevents federal courts from interfering with certain ongoing state proceedings. The district court held that the DRE's disciplinary proceeding was quasi-criminal in nature and that Roshan could raise his federal claims during the judicial review of the DRE action.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court correctly applied the Younger abstention doctrine. The court noted that the state proceedings were ongoing, involved important state interests, and allowed Roshan to raise his federal claims. The court also determined that the DRE proceeding was quasi-criminal because it was initiated by a state agency following an investigation, involved formal charges, and aimed to determine whether Roshan should be sanctioned by suspending or revoking his real estate license.The Ninth Circuit concluded that all the requirements for Younger abstention were met and that Roshan had not demonstrated any bad faith, harassment, or extraordinary circumstances that would make abstention inappropriate. Therefore, the district court's decision to abstain from hearing the case was proper, and the dismissal of Roshan's lawsuit was affirmed. View "ROSHAN V. MCCAULEY" on Justia Law

John Hudnall, a former financial advisor, applied for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, claiming he had been unable to work since May 1, 2015, due to major depressive disorder, anxiety, and insomnia. His application included a function report from his wife, Miyuki Sato, detailing his limitations in daily activities and self-care. Despite this, the Social Security Administration denied his application and request for reconsideration. Hudnall then sought a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who also denied his claim, finding him not disabled based on medical evidence and Hudnall's self-reported activities, without explicitly addressing Sato's lay evidence.Hudnall appealed to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, which granted summary judgment in favor of the Social Security Administration. Hudnall then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.The Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that under the Social Security Administration's new regulations, effective March 27, 2017, ALJs are no longer required to provide germane reasons for discounting lay witness testimony. The court found that these regulations, which state that ALJs are not required to articulate how they considered evidence from nonmedical sources, are within the Commissioner of Social Security's broad authority and are not arbitrary and capricious. Consequently, the ALJ did not err in discounting Sato's evidence without explanation. The court resolved all other issues in a concurrently filed memorandum disposition. View "HUDNALL V. DUDEK" on Justia Law

A medical institute and its co-director sought to provide patients with psilocybin, a schedule I controlled substance, for therapeutic use. They requested the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to exempt the co-director from registration under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) or to waive the registration requirement. The DEA declined both requests, leading the petitioners to seek judicial review.Previously, the petitioners had asked the DEA for guidance on accommodating the Right to Try Act (RTT Act) for psilocybin use. The DEA responded that the RTT Act did not waive CSA requirements, and the petitioners' initial judicial review was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The petitioners then made a concrete request to the DEA for exemption or waiver, which the DEA again denied, prompting the current appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that it had jurisdiction under 21 U.S.C. § 877 to review the DEA's final decision. The court found that the DEA's denial was not arbitrary and capricious. The DEA provided a reasonable explanation, stating that the RTT Act did not exempt the CSA's requirements and that the proposed use of psilocybin was inconsistent with public health and safety. The DEA also noted that the petitioners did not provide sufficient details for the proposed regulation. The court denied the petition for review, affirming the DEA's decision. View "ADVANCED INTEGRATIVE MEDICAL SCIENCE INSTITUTE, PLLC V. UNITED STATES DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization, Prutehi Litekyan: Save Ritidian, challenged the U.S. Air Force's decision to engage in hazardous waste disposal at Tarague Beach, Guam, without conducting a National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) review. The Air Force planned to dispose of unexploded ordnance through Open Burning/Open Detonation (OB/OD) operations. The nonprofit argued that the Air Force failed to take a "hard look" at the environmental impacts and did not engage the public as required by NEPA.The District Court of Guam dismissed the case, holding that Prutehi Litekyan lacked standing because its injury was not fairly traceable to the Air Force's actions. The court also found that there was no final agency action, making the case unripe for judicial review. Additionally, the court ruled that the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) permitting process made NEPA review redundant, thus Prutehi Litekyan failed to state a claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court held that Prutehi Litekyan had standing because the Air Force's failure to conduct NEPA review could have influenced its decision on waste disposal methods, making the injury fairly traceable to the Air Force's actions. The court also determined that the Air Force's decision to apply for a RCRA permit and its detailed plans for OB/OD operations constituted final agency action, making the case ripe for judicial review.Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit held that NEPA applied to the Air Force's decision to conduct OB/OD operations at Tarague Beach. The court found that RCRA's permitting process did not displace NEPA's requirements, as the two statutes serve different purposes and are not redundant. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "LITEKYAN V. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE" on Justia Law

Vietnamese refugees and residents of San Diego County, Anh Thai and Don Doan, alleged that two law enforcement officers, Dulce Sanchez and William Villasenor, violated their constitutional rights by forcibly entering their homes and interrogating them about their disability benefits. Sanchez and Villasenor were Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office investigators assigned full-time to a joint federal-state task force, the Cooperative Disability Investigations (CDI) Unit, which investigates fraud in Social Security disability benefits applications. The plaintiffs claimed that the officers displayed guns and state badges, did not seek consent for the search, and failed to have an interpreter present during the investigations.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California granted summary judgment in favor of Sanchez and Villasenor, concluding that the officers were acting under color of federal law, not state law, and therefore could not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court found that the CDI Unit was implemented under federal authority, and the officers’ day-to-day work was supervised by a federal officer, Special Agent Glenn Roberts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that because the CDI Unit was created under federal authority and supervised by a federal officer, Sanchez and Villasenor were acting under color of federal law. The court noted that the officers’ paychecks were reimbursed by the Social Security Administration, and their investigations took place outside of Los Angeles County, further indicating their federal role. Consequently, the officers were not subject to suit under § 1983, which applies to actions under color of state law. The court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Thai v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law