Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Government & Administrative Law
NEVIN V. COLVIN
The plaintiff filed two successive applications for disability benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. Her first application, alleging disability beginning June 24, 2017, was denied by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on September 18, 2018. While appealing this denial to the district court, she filed a second application for benefits for a later period. Washington State Disability Determination Services (DDS) reviewed the second application and awarded benefits, determining she was disabled starting September 19, 2018, the day after the ALJ denied her first application.The district court partially ruled in her favor on the first application and remanded it for further proceedings. The Appeals Council remanded the case to the ALJ with instructions. On June 23, 2021, the ALJ reopened the second application and denied the benefits previously granted by DDS. The ALJ concluded that the plaintiff was disabled beginning July 14, 2020, on her first application. The district court held it lacked jurisdiction to review the ALJ’s reopening and denial of benefits on the second application.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, holding that the district court had jurisdiction to review the ALJ’s reopening of the second application. The Appeals Council did not reopen the second application, and the ALJ’s reopening occurred more than two years after the award, which is only permissible in cases of fraud or similar fault. Finding no evidence of fraud or similar fault, the Ninth Circuit held that the ALJ erred in reopening and reversing the award of benefits on the second application. The court remanded for the district court to direct the agency to award benefits according to DDS’s decision. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision on the first application, concluding that the ALJ’s finding that the plaintiff was not disabled between June 24, 2017, and September 19, 2018, was supported by substantial evidence. View "NEVIN V. COLVIN" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Government & Administrative Law, Public Benefits
MACY’S INC. V. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The case involves a dispute between the International Union of Operating Engineers, Stationary Engineers, Local 39 (the Union), Macy’s Inc., and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). During negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement, Union members rejected Macy’s final offer and went on strike. After three months, the Union ended the strike and offered to return to work unconditionally. Macy’s responded by locking out the Union members, which led the Union to file a charge with the NLRB, alleging that the lockout was an unfair labor practice.An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled in favor of the Union, finding that Macy’s violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by locking out employees without providing a clear and complete offer outlining the conditions necessary to avoid the lockout. The NLRB adopted the ALJ’s findings and ordered Macy’s to reinstate the employees and compensate them for any losses incurred due to the lockout. Macy’s and the Union both petitioned for review of the NLRB’s decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that it had jurisdiction because the Union was a “person aggrieved” by the NLRB’s decision. The court found that substantial evidence supported the NLRB’s conclusion that Macy’s lockout was unlawful because the Union was not clearly and fully informed of the conditions necessary for reinstatement. The court also upheld the NLRB’s remedial order, including the make-whole relief for direct or foreseeable pecuniary harms, finding no clear abuse of discretion.The Ninth Circuit denied both the Union’s and Macy’s petitions for review and granted the NLRB’s cross-application for enforcement of its final order. The court concluded that the NLRB’s actions were within its broad discretion to effectuate the policies of the NLRA. View "MACY'S INC. V. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD" on Justia Law
MONTANA WILDLIFE FEDERATION V. HAALAND
Several environmental protection organizations challenged the policies governing oil and gas lease sales conducted by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) on protected sage-grouse habitat. In 2015, BLM amended its land use management plans to prioritize oil and gas leasing outside of sage-grouse habitat. In 2018, BLM revised its guidance documents, limiting the prioritization requirement to situations with a backlog of expressions of interest and shortening public comment periods.The District Court for the District of Montana found that the 2018 Instruction Memorandum (IM) violated the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) and vacated the June 2018 Wyoming lease sale. The District Court for the District of Idaho found that the lease sales violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and FLPMA due to inadequate public participation and vacated the lease sales.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the cases. It held that the Montana district court's vacatur of the 2018 IM was not injunctive and thus not appealable, but the vacatur of the lease sales was injunctive and appealable. The court affirmed that the 2018 IM was inconsistent with the 2015 Plan and that the June 2018 Wyoming lease sale violated FLPMA. The court also affirmed that the Idaho lease sales violated NEPA and FLPMA due to insufficient public participation.The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Montana district court did not abuse its discretion in vacating the lease sales. However, it found that the Idaho district court abused its discretion in vacating the lease sales and remanded the case, directing the BLM to reconsider the leasing decisions with proper public participation while enjoining surface-disturbing activities in the interim. The court also held that neither district court violated the due process rights of intervenors by vacating the leases. View "MONTANA WILDLIFE FEDERATION V. HAALAND" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law
BARTON V. OFFICE OF NAVAJO AND HOPI INDIAN RELOCATION
Manley Barton, a registered member of the Navajo tribe, applied for relocation benefits from the Office of Navajo and Hopi Indian Relocation (ONHIR) based on his residence at his grandparents' homesite on the Hopi Partitioned Lands (HPL). The Navajo-Hopi Settlement Act required individuals residing on land partitioned to the tribe of which they were not a member to relocate. To be eligible for benefits, applicants had to show they were residents of the land partitioned to the other tribe on December 22, 1974, and were heads of household when they moved away. Manley claimed he lived at the HPL homesite until 1986, despite being away for education and employment.ONHIR denied Manley's application, and the Independent Hearing Officer (IHO) upheld the denial, concluding that Manley's residence at the HPL homesite ended in 1984 when his grandparents relocated. The IHO did not consider other evidence of Manley's intent to reside at the HPL homesite, such as his testimony and that of his family members about his continued use of the homesite for ceremonies and chores. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of ONHIR, finding the IHO's decision was supported by substantial evidence and not arbitrary or capricious.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's summary judgment. The court held that the IHO improperly applied the "temporarily away" exception, which allows applicants who are away for education or employment to establish residency through intent and manifestations of intent. The IHO's reliance solely on the grandparents' relocation to determine Manley's legal residence was arbitrary and capricious. The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "BARTON V. OFFICE OF NAVAJO AND HOPI INDIAN RELOCATION" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Government & Administrative Law, Native American Law
CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPERA V. FCC
A California corporation, China Unicom (Americas) Operations Limited (CUA), was authorized to provide domestic and international telecommunications services under certificates issued by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) pursuant to § 214 of the Communications Act of 1934. In 2020, the FCC ordered CUA to show cause why its certificates should not be revoked due to national security concerns related to its Chinese government ownership. CUA responded, but the FCC found the responses inadequate and initiated revocation proceedings.The FCC's International, Wireline Competition, and Enforcement Bureaus issued an order to show cause, citing national security concerns and CUA's lack of candor. CUA argued against the revocation, claiming the FCC lacked authority and that it was entitled to a formal hearing. The FCC, however, found CUA's responses insufficient and proceeded with revocation based on national security risks and CUA's lack of trustworthiness.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the FCC has the authority to revoke § 214 certificates based on national security concerns and that the FCC's decision was supported by substantial evidence. The court found that CUA's ultimate Chinese government ownership and the overlap of its board members with the Chinese Communist Party posed significant national security risks. Additionally, the court upheld the FCC's finding that CUA demonstrated a lack of candor and trustworthiness in its dealings with the FCC.The court also rejected CUA's procedural arguments, concluding that the FCC followed appropriate procedures and that a formal evidentiary hearing was not required. The Ninth Circuit denied CUA's petition for review, affirming the FCC's revocation of CUA's § 214 certificates. View "CHINA UNICOM (AMERICAS) OPERA V. FCC" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Communications Law, Government & Administrative Law
Kaweah Delta Health Care District v. Becerra
A group of 53 California hospitals challenged the Secretary of Health and Human Services' (HHS) 2020 low-wage-index policy, which adjusted Medicare payment rates by inflating the rates for the lowest quartile of hospitals and reducing payments to all hospitals by a small percentage. The hospitals argued that the policy violated statutory provisions, was arbitrary and capricious, resulted from a faulty administrative procedure, and was unsupported by evidence.The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied HHS's motion for summary judgment, granted the hospitals' motion for summary judgment, and remanded the matter to the Secretary without vacating the policy. The court held that HHS lacked authority to implement the low-wage-index policy under either the Wage Index Provision or the Exceptions and Adjustments Provision and found procedural defects in the policy's implementation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that the Secretary exceeded his statutory authority in establishing the 2020 wage index. The court held that the low-wage-index policy did not "reflect" area differences in hospital wage levels as required by the statute and that the Exceptions and Adjustments Provision could not independently authorize the policy. The court also vacated the district court's decision to remand the case without vacating the policy, stating that when an agency cannot issue the challenged policy in another way, the only appropriate remedy is vacatur. Judge Nguyen dissented, arguing that the low-wage-index policy was consistent with the statutory text and that the majority's decision would have negative repercussions for vulnerable communities. View "Kaweah Delta Health Care District v. Becerra" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Government & Administrative Law, Health Law
Napouk v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department
Lloyd Gerald Napouk was fatally shot by two Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department officers after they responded to reports of a man behaving suspiciously in a residential neighborhood with what appeared to be a long, bladed weapon. The officers attempted to engage Napouk, who refused to follow their commands and advanced towards them multiple times. When Napouk came within nine feet of one of the officers, both officers fired their weapons, killing him. The weapon turned out to be a plastic toy fashioned to look like a blade.Napouk’s parents and estate sued the officers and the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, deprivation of familial relations in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, municipal liability based on Monell v. Department of Social Services, and Nevada state law claims. The United States District Court for the District of Nevada granted summary judgment for the defendants, determining that the officers’ use of force was reasonable as a matter of law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment. The court held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity from the Fourth Amendment excessive force claim because Napouk posed an immediate threat to the officers, and no rational jury could find the officers’ mistake of fact regarding the weapon unreasonable. The court also held that the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claim failed because there was no evidence that the officers acted with anything other than legitimate law enforcement objectives. Additionally, the plaintiffs’ Monell claims failed due to the absence of a constitutional violation, and the state law claims failed because the officers were entitled to discretionary-function immunity under Nevada law. View "Napouk v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department" on Justia Law
THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA
Ohio House, LLC operates a sober-living facility in Costa Mesa, California, within a multiple-family residential (MFR) zone. The City of Costa Mesa notified Ohio House that it was subject to Ordinance 15-11, which mandates that group homes with over six residents in MFR zones obtain a conditional-use permit and meet a separation requirement. Ohio House's application for a permit was denied due to non-compliance with the separation requirement, and its request for a reasonable accommodation was also denied.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted partial summary judgment to the City on Ohio House's disparate-impact claim and denied Ohio House's post-verdict motions. The jury found in favor of the City on Ohio House's remaining claims, including disparate treatment, discriminatory statements, interference with fair housing rights, and reasonable accommodation. The district court also ruled that Ohio House's claim under California Government Code § 65008 was time-barred.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings. The court held that Ohio House failed to establish facial disparate treatment as a matter of law because the City's group-living regulations facially benefit disabled individuals. The court also affirmed the summary judgment for the City on the disparate-impact claim, agreeing that Ohio House did not prove a significant, adverse, and disproportionate effect on a protected group. The court upheld the jury's verdict on the discriminatory statements claim, finding no unlawful discriminatory statements by the City. The court also affirmed the denial of judgment as a matter of law on the interference claim, concluding that Ohio House failed to prove a causal link between its protected activity and the City's actions. Finally, the court affirmed the denial of judgment as a matter of law on the reasonable accommodation claim, agreeing that the requested accommodation was unreasonable as it would fundamentally alter the City's zoning scheme. The court also upheld the district court's ruling that Ohio House's § 65008 claim was time-barred. View "THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA" on Justia Law
USA V. KING COUNTY
King County, Washington, issued Executive Order PFC-7-1-EO, which directed county officials to ensure that future leases at Boeing Field prohibit fixed base operators (FBOs) from servicing U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) charter flights. This order was based on the county's disagreement with federal immigration policies. Following the issuance of the order, all three FBOs at Boeing Field ceased servicing ICE flights, forcing ICE to relocate its operations to Yakima Air Terminal, which increased operational costs and security concerns.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted summary judgment for the United States, finding that the Executive Order violated both the Supremacy Clause’s intergovernmental immunity doctrine and a World War II-era contract reconveying Boeing Field to King County. The district court concluded that the Executive Order discriminated against the federal government and its contractors and breached the Instrument of Transfer, which required King County to allow the United States nonexclusive use of the landing area at Boeing Field.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the United States had Article III standing to bring the suit, as it had suffered concrete and particularized injuries due to the increased operational costs and imminent risk of future injury from the Executive Order. The court also found that the United States’ claims were ripe for adjudication.The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Executive Order violated the Instrument of Transfer by preventing ICE from using Boeing Field, thus breaching the contractual right of the United States to use the airport. Additionally, the court held that the Executive Order violated the intergovernmental immunity doctrine by improperly regulating federal operations and discriminating against the federal government and its contractors. The court rejected King County’s defenses, including the anti-commandeering and market participant doctrines. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "USA V. KING COUNTY" on Justia Law
RABADI V. USDEA
Dr. Fares Jeries Rabadi, a licensed physician in California, had his certificate of registration to dispense controlled substances revoked by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). The DEA initiated an investigation into Rabadi in April 2018 due to his high-risk prescribing practices. In March 2020, the DEA issued an Order to Show Cause and Immediate Suspension of Registration, alleging that Rabadi issued numerous prescriptions for controlled substances outside the usual course of professional practice and not for a legitimate medical purpose to seven individuals. Rabadi requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ), which took place in September 2020. The ALJ found Rabadi's testimony not credible and recommended revoking his registration. The DEA Administrator adopted the ALJ's recommendations with minor modifications and revoked Rabadi's registration.Rabadi petitioned for review, arguing that the DEA's revocation was invalid because DEA ALJs are unconstitutionally insulated from removal by two layers of "for-cause" protections. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Rabadi's argument failed under Decker Coal Co. v. Pehringer, which found similar ALJ removal protections constitutional. The court noted that DEA ALJs perform purely adjudicatory functions, Congress does not mandate the use of ALJs for DEA hearings, and DEA ALJ decisions are reviewed de novo by the DEA Administrator, who is removable at will by the President.Rabadi also argued that the DEA Administrator's order was arbitrary and capricious. The court rejected this argument, finding that the Administrator properly ignored Rabadi's unsupported defense regarding high dosages of prescribed drugs and appropriately analyzed the public interest factors, including Rabadi's lack of a conviction record. The Ninth Circuit denied Rabadi's petition for review, upholding the DEA Administrator's order. View "RABADI V. USDEA" on Justia Law