Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In August 2021, a city implemented a COVID-19 vaccination policy for its employees, requiring them to either receive the vaccine or request a medical or religious exemption. Employees granted an exemption were required to undergo weekly COVID-19 testing and wear masks in shared spaces. One employee, a forensic specialist, requested and received a religious exemption but objected to the testing and masking requirements, claiming they revealed his unvaccinated status and created a hostile work environment. He was placed on unpaid leave for refusing to comply but eventually agreed to the requirements and returned to work. He continued to challenge the policy until it was rescinded in March 2022.The employee filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, asserting federal and state claims against the city and several employees related to the testing and masking requirements. The district court found that the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act applied but initially did not grant immunity to all individual defendants for each claim. Ultimately, the court dismissed the complaints, denied the employee’s motion for reconsideration, and entered judgment for the defendants.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that both the city and individual defendants were “covered persons” under the PREP Act, and that COVID-19 tests and masks constituted “covered countermeasures” authorized for emergency use. The court clarified that the causation requirement for PREP Act immunity is satisfied if the injury alleged arises from the administration or use of a covered countermeasure, regardless of the legal theory. Because the employee’s alleged harms were directly linked to the city’s COVID-19 safety policy, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal and denial of reconsideration, holding that PREP Act immunity barred all claims. View "SCHMIDT V. CITY OF PASADENA" on Justia Law

Several plaintiffs, who own downstream water rights on the Baker-Lehman Creeks in Nevada, alleged that activities by Great Basin National Park—including water diversion and vegetation planting—reduced water flow and threatened their ability to use water as determined by a 1934 Nevada state court decree. This decree (the Baker-Lehman Decree) set out the rights of all claimants to water from these creeks, which now originate and flow through federally managed land. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the United States from activities that interfered with their water rights.The case began in Nevada state court, where plaintiffs filed to enforce their rights under the 1934 decree. The United States removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Nevada and asserted sovereign immunity from suit. The district court found that sovereign immunity was not waived, reasoning that the McCarran Amendment did not apply because the United States did not participate in the original adjudication and thus the decree was not “comprehensive.” It dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The appellate court held that the McCarran Amendment retroactively waives the United States’ sovereign immunity for suits seeking administration of water rights determined in a comprehensive state adjudication. The court found that the Baker-Lehman Adjudication was comprehensive under Nevada’s statutory system, regardless of the United States’ prior participation. The plaintiffs’ suit to enforce their adjudicated water rights constitutes administration under the McCarran Amendment. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case, holding that the United States’ sovereign immunity was waived for this suit. View "BAKER RANCHES, INC. V. BURGUM" on Justia Law

Crown Resources Corporation and its parent company operated the Buckhorn Mountain Mine in Okanogan County, Washington, under a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit issued by the Washington State Department of Ecology. Alleging violations of the Clean Water Act related to the mine’s discharges, both the Okanogan Highlands Alliance (OHA), a private environmental group, and the State of Washington filed separate citizen suits against Crown in 2020. The cases were consolidated and jointly litigated for several years. After mediation failed, OHA and Crown negotiated a settlement without Washington’s involvement. OHA and Crown submitted a proposed consent decree to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, which resolved OHA’s claims only. The district court entered the consent decree.Following the entry of the consent decree, Crown moved for judgment on the pleadings in Washington’s suit, arguing that the claims were barred by claim preclusion due to the prior resolution of OHA’s suit. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington agreed, finding that Washington was in privity with OHA and thus barred from pursuing its claims. Washington’s motion for relief from judgment was denied, leading to this appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Ninth Circuit held that Washington, not being a party to the consent decree and not in privity with OHA, was not barred from bringing its suit. The court found that the exceptions to nonparty preclusion identified in Taylor v. Sturgell did not apply here. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "WASHINGTON V. CROWN RESOURCES CORP." on Justia Law

The City of Los Angeles received millions in federal housing grants over a period of years, certifying compliance with federal housing accessibility laws as a condition of those funds. Mei Ling and the Fair Housing Council of the San Fernando Valley (FHC) brought a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA), alleging that the City had falsely represented its compliance with accessibility requirements. The United States later intervened in the case. Separately, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) investigated the City for noncompliance and, after its own findings, entered into a Voluntary Compliance Agreement (VCA) with the City. Under the VCA, the City agreed to spend at least $200 million over ten years to remediate or build accessible housing, but the VCA explicitly excluded the FCA claims at issue in the litigation.The United States District Court for the Central District of California presided over years of discovery and litigation. Eventually, the United States, FHC, and the City agreed to settle the FCA claims for $38,266,989. The district court approved the settlement as fair, adequate, and reasonable, and dismissed all claims against the City, with relators entitled to a statutory share of the settlement proceeds. Mei Ling appealed, arguing that the VCA constituted an “alternate remedy” under the FCA, which would entitle her to a share of the VCA’s value.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the VCA was not an alternate remedy within the meaning of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(5) because it did not take the place of the FCA suit or settlement. The VCA addressed the City’s civil rights violations, not the alleged fraud underlying the FCA action, and expressly carved out the FCA claims. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s approval of the FCA settlement. View "LING V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES" on Justia Law

A family rented military housing located within the Naval Amphibious Base Coronado in California, managed by San Diego Family Housing (SDFH) and Lincoln Military Property Management. During their tenancy, the family experienced repeated water intrusion and mold contamination, which allegedly caused health issues and property damage. After reporting these problems, remediation was attempted, but the family was dissatisfied with the response and subsequent actions. They ultimately vacated the property and brought claims in California state court for negligence and other state law issues against SDFH, Lincoln, and InDepth, a mold remediation company.SDFH and Lincoln removed the action to the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, asserting federal enclave, federal agency, and federal officer jurisdiction. The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss based on derivative sovereign immunity and later, after supplemental briefing and a Statement of Interest from the United States, rejected all grounds for federal jurisdiction. The district court found no evidence that the federal government had exclusive jurisdiction over the property, no sufficient nexus for federal officer removal, and insufficient grounds for federal agency status. The court remanded the case to state court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s remand order after the Supreme Court remanded for consideration in light of Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that no basis for federal jurisdiction existed: (1) federal enclave jurisdiction was not established due to lack of evidence of federal government assent to exclusive jurisdiction; (2) federal officer removal requirements were not satisfied, as defendants were not “acting under” a federal officer; and (3) SDFH did not qualify as a federal agency. The district court’s remand to state court was affirmed. View "CHILDS V. SAN DIEGO FAMILY HOUSING, LLC" on Justia Law

The case centers on an incident during a Delta Air Lines domestic flight, where a passenger’s behavior prompted concerns among fellow travelers and flight attendants. After an off-duty pilot and other passengers reported the passenger’s conduct as suspicious, the lead flight attendant, following consultation with the captain, approached the passenger and attempted to ask him to remain seated. This interaction escalated into a physical confrontation, leading the flight attendant to request assistance from a federal law enforcement agent onboard. The agent, with the flight attendant’s help, restrained the passenger until the plane landed. The passenger later alleged that he suffered physical and emotional injuries as a result of the restraint.At trial in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, a jury found in favor of the passenger, awarding him substantial damages for bodily and emotional injuries. However, the district court vacated the verdict, citing excessive damages and the interdependence of liability and damages. The court subsequently granted summary judgment for Delta Air Lines, concluding that the airline was immune from liability under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) for any injuries sustained after the flight attendants reported the passenger’s behavior to law enforcement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment, holding that ATSA immunity applies not only to the initial disclosure of suspicious activity to law enforcement but also to subsequent conduct stemming from law enforcement’s decisions following such disclosure. The court found no genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether the passenger’s conduct was objectively suspicious or whether Delta was solely responsible for the injuries. As Delta was immune for all physical injuries, the passenger could not recover for any alleged emotional injuries under the Montreal Convention. View "BANDARY V. DELTA AIR LINES, INC." on Justia Law

Federal agents lawfully searched the home of an individual under investigation for drug trafficking and seized $585,000 in cash from a safe. Before the cash could be processed, an FBI agent stole $218,200 from the seizure. The agent was later prosecuted, pleaded guilty, and was ordered to pay a forfeiture money judgment that included funds traceable to the stolen cash. The individual from whom the money was seized later pleaded guilty to drug-trafficking charges and agreed to forfeit only $366,800—the amount remaining after the theft. The government did not seek forfeiture of the additional $218,200, and the final forfeiture order reflected only the lower amount.The individual then moved under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, seeking the return of the $218,200 that was stolen and never forfeited. The district court, treating the Rule 41(g) motion as a civil complaint, granted summary judgment to the government, finding that the individual had agreed to forfeit all cash seized and that his evidence of lawful ownership was insufficient. The court further found that no reasonable jury could conclude that any portion of the seized money was lawfully obtained while the remainder was subject to forfeiture.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that sovereign immunity did not bar the individual's Rule 41(g) claim for the return of cash that was seized, lost, but then recovered by the government in forfeiture proceedings. The court clarified that when the government possesses money traceable to previously seized funds, the claimant may seek its return, and the government bears the burden to justify retention. Finding that the government failed to meet this burden, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "CANNON V. USA" on Justia Law

After the Snake River Basin Adjudication (SRBA) confirmed thousands of federal stockwater rights on federal land, Idaho enacted a series of statutes known as the “stockwater amendments.” These amendments altered water rights rules, including procedures for forfeiture and appurtenance, and imposed new requirements specifically affecting federal stockwater rights. The United States challenged several provisions, arguing that they were intended to divest it of SRBA-decreed stockwater rights and unlawfully discriminated against the federal government. Two groups—the Idaho Legislature and ranching interests—intervened as defendants.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho rejected jurisdictional challenges based on Rooker-Feldman, prior exclusive jurisdiction, Burford abstention, and claim preclusion, holding it could hear the case. On the merits, the district court found Idaho Code § 42-224 constitutional as applied to the United States, but held Idaho Code §§ 42-113(2)(b), 42-502, and 42-504 were facially unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause. The United States appealed the ruling on § 42-224, while the State Defendants and Ranchers cross-appealed the jurisdictional holdings and the ruling on § 42-113(2)(b).The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s jurisdictional holdings, concluding that neither the doctrine of prior exclusive jurisdiction nor Burford abstention applied. The panel reversed the district court’s finding that § 42-224 was constitutional as applied, holding that it is part of a statutory scheme that unlawfully discriminates against the United States and jeopardizes its SRBA-decreed rights. The panel affirmed the district court’s holding that § 42-113(2)(b) is facially unconstitutional because it singles out the United States for unfavorable treatment by changing appurtenance rules only for rights associated with federal land. Thus, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, awarding costs to the United States. View "USA V. STATE OF IDAHO" on Justia Law

A group of more than 150 U-visa petitioners in the United States challenged the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) over delays and denials related to their pending U-visa petitions. Due to a statutory cap on U visas, these petitioners faced long waits. Some were placed on a waiting list (“WLD Plaintiffs”), while others received only a “bona fide determination” (“BFD Plaintiffs”). All had deferred action and work authorization but lacked advance parole, which would allow them to travel abroad and return. The plaintiffs argued that USCIS unlawfully withheld or delayed waiting list decisions (Claim 1), unlawfully withheld or delayed consideration for advance parole (Claim 2), and arbitrarily and capriciously denied advance parole to those on the waiting list (Claim 3).The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed Claims 2 and 3 for all plaintiffs, finding that the APA does not permit courts to compel discretionary agency actions and that the plaintiffs did not plead or prove that they requested and were denied parole. The court allowed only Claim 1, brought by BFD Plaintiffs, to proceed, but later granted summary judgment to USCIS, holding that the BFD Plaintiffs lacked standing because being waitlisted would not independently entitle them to parole.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that granting parole to waitlisted U-visa petitioners is discretionary under 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(d)(2), not mandatory. The panel affirmed dismissal of the WLD Plaintiffs’ claims for lack of statutory jurisdiction, as the APA does not permit courts to compel discretionary action and there was no final agency action on parole denials. The panel also affirmed the district court’s rejection of the BFD Plaintiffs’ parole-related injury theory for standing, but reversed and remanded for consideration of their alternative injury theories and, if necessary, the merits of Claim 1. View "U VISA APPELLANTS V. DIRECTOR, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES" on Justia Law

The case concerns a long-term resident of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) who applied to United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) for NM-1 immigration status, a special status created by the Northern Mariana Islands Long-Term Legal Residents Relief Act. This status was designed to regularize the position of certain residents after federal immigration law was applied to the CNMI, which had previously operated under its own immigration system. The applicant’s request for NM-1 status was denied by USCIS on the grounds that he did not meet the required period of continuous, lawful residence. His request for administrative reconsideration was also denied.The applicant then filed suit in the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands, seeking a declaration that his application satisfied the statutory criteria and an injunction ordering USCIS to approve his application. The government moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the Relief Act’s jurisdiction-stripping provision—specifically, 48 U.S.C. § 1806(e)(6)(D)—barred judicial review of the denial. The district court agreed with the government and dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed whether the jurisdictional bar in the Relief Act precluded review of decisions made by USCIS as the Secretary of Homeland Security’s delegate. The court held that the statute’s bar on judicial review of any “decision of the Secretary of Homeland Security” covers decisions made by USCIS pursuant to delegated authority. The court reasoned that delegation is a routine administrative practice and that Congress legislated against the backdrop of such delegation. The court further noted that precedent interpreting similar jurisdiction-stripping provisions supported this conclusion. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "BARMAN V. USA" on Justia Law