Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Government & Administrative Law
JOHN HENDRIX, ET AL V. J-M MANUFACTURING CO., INC., ET AL
Relator John Hendrix and five public-agency exemplar plaintiffs claim that J-M Manufacturing Co. (“J-M”) violated the federal and various state False Claims Acts (“FCAs”) by representing that its polyvinyl chloride (“PVC”) pipes were compliant with industry standards. In Phase One of a bifurcated trial, a jury found that J-M knowingly made false claims that were material to the public agencies’ decisions to purchase J-M pipe. After the jury was unable to reach a verdict in Phase Two, the district court granted J-M judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”) on actual damages and awarded one statutory penalty for each project involved in plaintiffs’ claims.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that sufficient evidence of falsity, materiality, and scienter supported the Phase One verdict. A reasonable jury could conclude that plaintiffs received some pipe not meeting industry standards. Further, the jury reasonably found that plaintiffs would not have purchased or installed J-M pipe had they been told the truth that J-M knew it had stopped producing pipes through processes materially similar to those used at the time of compliance testing and also knew that a significant amount of the pipe later produced did not meet industry standards. Plaintiffs’ failure to prove that any individual stick of pipe that they received was non-compliant did not mean that they failed to establish scienter. The panel held that the district court properly awarded JM judgment as a matter of law on actual damages under the federal False Claims Act. Plaintiffs did not establish actual damages by showing that they would not have bought the pipe had they known the truth. View "JOHN HENDRIX, ET AL V. J-M MANUFACTURING CO., INC., ET AL" on Justia Law
JAMES HUNTSMAN V. CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDENT, ET AL
Plaintiff brought suit in federal district court against the Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, alleging fraud under California law. Plaintiff is a former member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. (The Corporation is the legal entity behind the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. We refer to both the Corporation and the Church as “the Church.”) Plaintiff alleged that, from 1993 until 2015, he contributed substantial amounts of cash and corporate shares to the Church as tithes. He alleged that during at least some of that time, he relied on false and misleading statements by the Church about its use of tithing money. The district court granted the Church’s motion for summary judgment. It held that no reasonable juror could find that the Church had fraudulently misrepresented how tithing funds were used.
The Ninth Circuit reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. The court held that there is evidence in the record from which a reasonable juror could conclude that the Church knowingly misrepresented that no tithing funds were being or would be used to finance the development of the shopping mall and that Huntsman reasonably relied on the Church’s misrepresentations. The panel rejected the Church’s argument that Plaintiff’s fraud claims are barred by the First Amendment. The panel held that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine did not apply because the questions regarding the fraud claims were secular and did not implicate religious beliefs about tithing itself. Nor was the panel required to examine Plaintiff’s religious beliefs about the appropriate use of church money. View "JAMES HUNTSMAN V. CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDENT, ET AL" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law
ANDREW TETER, ET AL V. ANNE E. LOPEZ, ET AL
In Hawaii, it is a misdemeanor knowingly to manufacture, sell, transfer, transport, or possess a butterfly knife—no exceptions. Plaintiffs sued Hawaii’s Attorney General and Sheriff Division Administrator (“Hawaii”). Plaintiffs sought declaratory relief to establish that section 134-53(a) violates the Second Amendment and injunctive relief against its enforcement. Plaintiffs alleged that, “but for Hawaii law,” they would purchase butterfly knives. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court concluded that section 134-53(a) does not violate the Second Amendment, granted Hawaii’s motion, and entered judgment in its favor.
The Ninth Circuit reversed district court’s summary judgment in favor of Hawaii officials. The court held that because the possession of butterfly knives is conduct protected by the plain text of the Second Amendment, and because Hawaii has not demonstrated that its ban on butterfly knives is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of regulating arms, the court concluded that section 134-53(a) violates Plaintiffs’ Second Amendment rights. The panel determined that Plaintiffs had standing to challenge Section 134-53(a) because they alleged that the Second Amendment provides them with a legally protected interest to purchase butterfly knives, and for section 134-53(a), they would do so within Hawaii. Plaintiffs further articulated a concrete plan to violate the law, and Hawaii’s history of prosecution under its butterfly ban was good evidence of a credible threat of enforcement. The panel held that possession of butterfly knives is conduct covered by the plain text of the Second Amendment. The panel held that Hawaii failed to prove that section 134-53(a) was consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of regulating weapons. View "ANDREW TETER, ET AL V. ANNE E. LOPEZ, ET AL" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law
PERSIAN BROADCAST SERVICE GLOB V. MARTIN WALSH, ET AL
In an effort to employ an Australian citizen and E-3 visa-holder, Persian Broadcast filed and received approval for a Labor Condition Application (LCA) through the U.S. Department of Labor (“Department”), first in 2011 and again in 2013. An LCA binds an employer to pay the required wages for the period of authorized employment, and only two exemptions can eliminate an employer’s legal obligations: when an employee is nonproductive for personal reasons or there has been a bona fide termination of the employment relationship. In February 2015, the employee filed an administrative complaint with the Department, arguing that Persian Broadcast failed to pay him the full amount of his wages as specified in the two LCAs.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment upholding an Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) order awarding backpay plus pre-and post-judgment interest to the employee. First, the panel held that the employee’s February 2015 complaint was not time-barred. The ARB reasonably relied on the LCAs rather than the employee’s visa to determine the period of authorized employment and Persian Broadcast’s wage obligations. By failing to pay the employee the reported wage under the second LCA period, Persian Broadcast continued to violate the wage requirement until the LCA period ended on September 12, 2015.
Second, the panel held that the employee’s circumstances did not meet either of the statutory exemptions to the LCA wage requirement because, by continuing his reporting work, the employee remained in productive status, and there was never a bona fide termination. View "PERSIAN BROADCAST SERVICE GLOB V. MARTIN WALSH, ET AL" on Justia Law
CITY & COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO V. USEPA
The City and County of San Francisco (“San Francisco”) petitions for review of a final order of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) denying review of San Francisco’s federal National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) permit for its Oceanside combined sewer system and wastewater treatment facility (“wastewater system”). This NPDES permit, issued pursuant to the Clean Water Act of 1972 (“CWA”), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387, allows San Francisco to discharge from its wastewater system into the Pacific Ocean. San Francisco contends that EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously.
The Ninth Circuit denied San Francisco’s petition. The panel held that the EPA had authority under the CWA to include the two general narrative prohibitions. Noting that Supreme Court precedent, this Circuit’s prior cases, and prior Environmental Appeals Board decisions support the legality and confirm the enforceability of general narrative prohibitions in permits issued under the CWA, the panel held that the two narrative provisions were consistent with the CWA and its implementing regulations. The panel further held that the EPA was not required to follow the procedures set forth in 40 C.F.R. Section 122.44(d)(1)(i)-(vii) for deriving pollutant-specific effluent limitations in imposing the general narrative provisions and that the EPA’s decision to impose the general narrative provisions was rationally connected to evidence in the record indicating that a “backstop” to the more specific provisions would be useful in protecting beneficial uses. The panel next held that the EPA had authority under its Combined Sewer Overflow Control Policy to require San Francisco to update its long-term control plan for its combined sewer overflows. View "CITY & COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO V. USEPA" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law
STEVEN CROWE V. CHRISTINE WORMUTH, ET AL
Plaintiff worked as a police officer at the Tripler Army Medical Center (TAMC) in Honolulu, Hawaii. Prior to his termination, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) office alleging sexual and race discrimination, retaliation, and a proposed and later a formal termination. After he was terminated, Plaintiff attempted to file a mixed case appeal with the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), seeking to appeal the Army’s termination decision based on the affirmative defense of sexual orientation discrimination. The MSPB upheld Plaintiff’s termination and he filed suit in district court. He alleged that he had been subjected to discrimination based on his sexual orientation (bisexual) and race (Caucasian), retaliated against for protected conduct, and ultimately terminated from his employment.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part and remanded. The panel held that the MSPB lacked jurisdiction to consider the pre-termination claims. Neither the text nor the structure of the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) supports the theory that the MSPB has pendent jurisdiction to decide factually related claims of discrimination associated with personnel actions outside the list of “particularly serious” actions set forth in 5 U.S.C. 7512. The panel affirmed the district court’s (1) determination that Plaintiff failed to exhaust before the MSPB any other theories of discrimination for his termination besides sexual orientation; (2) grant of summary judgment to the Army on Plaintiff’s Title VII claim; and (3) grant of summary judgment to the Army on Plaintiff’s CSRA claim, finding that substantial evidence supported the MSPB’s finding that Plaintiff regularly had sex at TAMC during work hours. View "STEVEN CROWE V. CHRISTINE WORMUTH, ET AL" on Justia Law
PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRATS, ET AL V. ROB BONTA
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment for the State of California in an action alleging that California Government Code Section 3205 violates the First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause by prohibiting local government employees from soliciting political contributions from their coworkers while state employees are not similarly barred. Plaintiffs Progressive Democrats for Social Justice, a political organization, and Krista Henneman and Carlie Ware, two officers of that organization (collectively “PDSJ”), sued to challenge the constitutionality of Section 3205. Henneman and Ware were deputy public defenders for Santa Clara County who supported Sajid Khan, a fellow county deputy public defender, in his campaign to become district attorney. Henneman and Ware determined that individually soliciting donations from their coworkers would violate Section 3205. They, therefore, did not engage in the solicitations and instead filed this lawsuit challenging Section 3205 as unconstitutional. The complaint alleged that California’s law violated the First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause by banning political solicitations among local employees but not among state employees. After filing suit, PDSJ moved for a temporary restraining order enjoining the enforcement of Section 3205, which the district court denied.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment for the State of California. The panel held that the speculative benefits that Section 3205 may provide the Government were not sufficient to justify the burden on Plaintiffs’ expression. None of the materials before the State at the time of Section 3205’s enactment supported the statute’s distinction between local and state workers. Further, the court explained that Section 3205 did not account for agency size, which undercut the State’s argument that the statute was properly tailored to address the government’s interest, and Section 3205 was underinclusive as a means of limiting the actuality and appearance of partisan behavior by public employees. View "PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRATS, ET AL V. ROB BONTA" on Justia Law
CARA JONES, ET AL V. GOOGLE LLC, ET AL
Google owns YouTube, an online video-sharing platform that is popular among children. Google’s targeted advertising is aided by technology that delivers curated, customized advertising based on information about specific users. Google’s technology depends partly on what Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) regulations call “persistent identifiers,” information “that can be used to recognize a user over time and across different Web sites or online services.” In 2013, the FTC adopted regulations under COPPA that barred the collection of children’s “persistent identifiers” without parental consent. The plaintiff class alleged that Google used persistent identifiers to collect data and track their online behavior surreptitiously and without their consent. They pleaded only state law causes of action but also alleged that Google’s activities violated COPPA. The district court held that the “core allegations” in the third amended complaint were preempted by COPPA.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the third amended complaint on preemption grounds. The court remanded so that the district court can consider, in the first instance, the alternative arguments for dismissal to the extent those arguments were properly preserved. The panel held that state laws that supplement, or require the same thing as federal law, do not stand as an obstacle to Congress’s objectives, and are not “inconsistent.” The panel was not persuaded that the insertion of “treatment” in the preemption clause evinced clear congressional intent to create an exclusive remedial scheme for enforcement of COPPA requirements. The panel concluded that COPPA’s preemption clause does not bar state-law causes of action that are parallel to or proscribe the same conduct forbidden by COPPA. View "CARA JONES, ET AL V. GOOGLE LLC, ET AL" on Justia Law
NUDE NICOTINE INC. V. FDA
The FDA issued marketing denial orders for Petitioners’ flavored products, finding that Petitioners’ applications lacked sufficient evidence showing that their flavored products would provide a benefit to adult use.
The Ninth Circuit denied petitions for review challenging the denial of Petitioners’ premarket tobacco product applications seeking FDA authorization to sell nicotine-containing e-liquids in the United States. The panel held that the text of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (the “Tobacco Control) Act”) plainly authorizes the FDA to require that manufacturers submit comparative health risk data, which necessarily includes comparisons of flavored e-liquids to tobacco-flavored e-liquids. The panel also held that the FDA did not arbitrarily or capriciously deny Petitioners’ applications and that any error the agency committed by failing to consider Petitioners’ marketing plans was harmless.
The panel held that the FDA did not introduce a new evidentiary standard; rather, it consistently required evidence that evaluated the impacts of flavored versus non-flavored products on initiation and cessation. Further,the panel concluded that, even if the agency erred by failing to consider Petitioners’ marketing plans, any error was harmless, and it would not remand on this basis. Finally, the panel addressed Petitioners’ post-argument motions to supplement the administrative record and file supplemental briefing, seeking judicial notice of a premarket tobacco product application deficiency letter, FDA internal memoranda, and FDA press releases. View "NUDE NICOTINE INC. V. FDA" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Government & Administrative Law, Health Law
VICTOR WASHINGTON V. KILOLO KIJAKAZI
Plaintiff filed in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington a pro se action to challenge the denial of his claim for disability benefits by the Social Security Administration. A magistrate judge of that court, acting with the full civil authority of that court, reversed and remanded the matter to the agency for rehearing after the government conceded that there was an error in the agency’s adjudication. Plaintiff appealed that decision.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel considered whether the magistrate judge had authority to exercise the full civil jurisdiction of the district court over Plaintiff’s claim. There is no doubt that the district court had jurisdiction over the case, but Plaintiff challenged whether he had given the consent that was required for a magistrate judge to exercise that jurisdiction. The panel held that it had jurisdiction to review the antecedent question of whether the magistrate judge validly entered judgment on behalf of the district court. The panel rejected Plaintiff’s contention that, as a pro se litigant, he believed he was consenting to the magistrate judge’s issuance of a report and recommendation, not a final judgment. The panel held that Plaintiff was fully informed of the district court’s conclusion that he had knowingly and voluntarily consented to the assignment to the magistrate judge. Further, the court wrote that Plaintiff was unable to show good cause or extraordinary circumstances to withdraw consent. The panel affirmed the district court’s conclusion that Plaintiff consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction. View "VICTOR WASHINGTON V. KILOLO KIJAKAZI" on Justia Law