Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Government & Administrative Law
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Google owns YouTube, an online video-sharing platform that is popular among children. Google’s targeted advertising is aided by technology that delivers curated, customized advertising based on information about specific users. Google’s technology depends partly on what Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) regulations call “persistent identifiers,” information “that can be used to recognize a user over time and across different Web sites or online services.” In 2013, the FTC adopted regulations under COPPA that barred the collection of children’s “persistent identifiers” without parental consent. The plaintiff class alleged that Google used persistent identifiers to collect data and track their online behavior surreptitiously and without their consent. They pleaded only state law causes of action but also alleged that Google’s activities violated COPPA. The district court held that the “core allegations” in the third amended complaint were preempted by COPPA.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the third amended complaint on preemption grounds. The court remanded so that the district court can consider, in the first instance, the alternative arguments for dismissal to the extent those arguments were properly preserved. The panel held that state laws that supplement, or require the same thing as federal law, do not stand as an obstacle to Congress’s objectives, and are not “inconsistent.” The panel was not persuaded that the insertion of “treatment” in the preemption clause evinced clear congressional intent to create an exclusive remedial scheme for enforcement of COPPA requirements. The panel concluded that COPPA’s preemption clause does not bar state-law causes of action that are parallel to or proscribe the same conduct forbidden by COPPA. View "CARA JONES, ET AL V. GOOGLE LLC, ET AL" on Justia Law

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The FDA issued marketing denial orders for Petitioners’ flavored products, finding that Petitioners’ applications lacked sufficient evidence showing that their flavored products would provide a benefit to adult use.   The Ninth Circuit denied petitions for review challenging the denial of Petitioners’ premarket tobacco product applications seeking FDA authorization to sell nicotine-containing e-liquids in the United States. The panel held that the text of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (the “Tobacco Control) Act”) plainly authorizes the FDA to require that manufacturers submit comparative health risk data, which necessarily includes comparisons of flavored e-liquids to tobacco-flavored e-liquids. The panel also held that the FDA did not arbitrarily or capriciously deny Petitioners’ applications and that any error the agency committed by failing to consider Petitioners’ marketing plans was harmless.   The panel held that the FDA did not introduce a new evidentiary standard; rather, it consistently required evidence that evaluated the impacts of flavored versus non-flavored products on initiation and cessation. Further,the panel concluded that, even if the agency erred by failing to consider Petitioners’ marketing plans, any error was harmless, and it would not remand on this basis. Finally, the panel addressed Petitioners’ post-argument motions to supplement the administrative record and file supplemental briefing, seeking judicial notice of a premarket tobacco product application deficiency letter, FDA internal memoranda, and FDA press releases. View "NUDE NICOTINE INC. V. FDA" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington a pro se action to challenge the denial of his claim for disability benefits by the Social Security Administration. A magistrate judge of that court, acting with the full civil authority of that court, reversed and remanded the matter to the agency for rehearing after the government conceded that there was an error in the agency’s adjudication. Plaintiff appealed that decision.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel considered whether the magistrate judge had authority to exercise the full civil jurisdiction of the district court over Plaintiff’s claim. There is no doubt that the district court had jurisdiction over the case, but Plaintiff challenged whether he had given the consent that was required for a magistrate judge to exercise that jurisdiction. The panel held that it had jurisdiction to review the antecedent question of whether the magistrate judge validly entered judgment on behalf of the district court. The panel rejected Plaintiff’s contention that, as a pro se litigant, he believed he was consenting to the magistrate judge’s issuance of a report and recommendation, not a final judgment. The panel held that Plaintiff was fully informed of the district court’s conclusion that he had knowingly and voluntarily consented to the assignment to the magistrate judge. Further, the court wrote that Plaintiff was unable to show good cause or extraordinary circumstances to withdraw consent. The panel affirmed the district court’s conclusion that Plaintiff consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction. View "VICTOR WASHINGTON V. KILOLO KIJAKAZI" on Justia Law

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The Forest Service developed the Project to replace trees infested with laminated root rot and bark beetles with disease-resistant ones. In May 2016, the Service contracted with T2, a private company, for logging to implement the decision. The Service issued a revised Environmental Assessment (“EA”) in July 2020 and a revised decision notice in December 2020. BMBP filed this action challenging the 2020 decision notice. The Service filed an administrative record (“AR”) in 2021.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the U.S. Forest Service. The panel first addressed BMBP’s argument that the AR was incomplete. First, BMBP argued that deliberative materials were part of the “whole record” and that a privilege log was required if they were not included in the AR. The panel held that deliberative materials are generally not part of the AR absent impropriety or bad faith by the agency. Because deliberative materials are not part of the administrative record, to begin with, they are not required to be placed on a privilege log. The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to order the production of a privilege log. Second, BMBP argued that all documents in the 2016 AR should be in the AR for this case. BMBP contended that the documents in the 2016 AR were necessary before the agency in the 2020 process because the Project was a continuation of the withdrawn one. The panel held that BMBP’s arguments failed to overcome the presumption of regularity. View "BMBP V. SHANE JEFFRIES, ET AL" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff alleged that a Transportation Security Officer (“TSO”) sexually assaulted her during an airport security screening. At issue is whether Plaintiff may bring claims for battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”).   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the United States. The panel held that TSOs fall under the FTCA’s “law enforcement proviso,” which waives sovereign immunity for torts such as assault and battery committed by “investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States Government.” 28 U.S.C. Section 2680(h). The panel joined the Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits in holding that the FTCA’s limited waiver of sovereign immunity applies to certain intentional torts committed by TSOs. The district court, therefore, had subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s FTCA claims.   The panel considered whether, as officers of the United States, TSOs are “empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. Section 2680(h). The government argued that TSOs do not “execute searches” by conducting screenings. The panel held that the screenings fit the ordinary, contemporary, and common meanings of searches. View "MICHELE LEUTHAUSER V. USA, ET AL" on Justia Law

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Claimant appealed the district court’s judgment upholding the denial of social security benefits by an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). Reviewing de novo the district court’s decision, Farlow v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 485, 487 (9th Cir. 2022), the Ninth Circuit reversed The ALJ materially mischaracterized Claimant’s functional capacity when posing a question to a vocational expert, so the vocational expert’s testimony lacked evidentiary value with respect to jobs that Claimant could perform. Here, Claimant argued that the ALJ’s question posed to the vocational expert inaccurately described her actual limitations. First, the hypothetical posed to the expert did not provide that claimant was limited to jobs with “little or no judgment.” The panel concluded that the error was harmless because the vocational expert identified only jobs with that limitation. Second, the hypothetical did not provide that Claimant could “follow short, simple instructions” only. Third, in the question posed to the vocational expert, the ALJ described a hypothetical person who “can work in an environment with occasional changes to the work setting.” The panel concluded that the ALJ materially mischaracterized Claimant’s functional capacity when posing a question to a vocational expert, so the vocational expert’s testimony lacked evidentiary value with respect to jobs that Claimant could perform. View "CAROLINE LEACH V. KILOLO KIJAKAZI" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, a group of Federal contractor employees and Federal employees working for the Department of Energy, challenged two Executive Orders, Executive Orders 14,042 and 14,043 (EOs), issued in September 2021. 1 Those EOs mandated COVID-19 vaccination for Federal contractor employees and Federal employees, respectively. They also provided for legally required medical or religious exemptions. Plaintiffs challenged the EOs as ultra vires exercises of presidential power in violation of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act (Procurement Act), the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (Procurement Policy Act), the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act (RFRA), the major questions doctrine, and general constitutional federalism constraints. Plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief to address their allegedly “imminent and wrongful terminations” for failure to comply with the vaccination requirements. The district court held that Plaintiffs who had submitted religious and medical exemptions but who had not yet completed the exemption request process did not have claims ripe for adjudication. The district court then dismissed the operative Second Amended Complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim and without leave to amend.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and dismissed as moot in part. The panel concluded that the case was moot as to all non-RFRA claims. The vaccine mandate exemption processes that the Plaintiffs challenged were premised on the revoked EOs. The panel held that it could not provide relief from EOs and exemption processes that no longer exist. Accordingly, no live controversy remained between the parties. The panel further concluded that Plaintiffs’ claims for damages under RFRA were precluded by sovereign immunity. View "DAVID DONOVAN, ET AL V. BRIAN VANCE" on Justia Law

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The United States (“the Government”) initiated a civil forfeiture suit in federal district court against a $380 million arbitration award fund, the majority of which is held in the United Kingdom. The fund belongs to PetroSaudi Oil Services (Venezuela) Ltd. (“PetroSaudi”), a private oil company incorporated in Barbados. PetroSaudi won the award in an arbitration proceeding against Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (“PDVSA”), a Venezuelan state energy company. The portion of the fund held in the United Kingdom (“the fund”) is held in an account controlled by the High Court of England and Wales (“the High Court”). The Government seeks forfeiture of the fund on the ground that it derives from proceeds of an illegal scheme to steal one billion dollars from the Malaysian sovereign wealth fund 1Malaysia Development Berhad (“1MDB”). PetroSaudi challenged two orders entered by the district court.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s interlocutory orders. The panel held that PetroSaudi’s appeal from the district court’s protective order under 18 U.S.C. Section 983 fell within this exception. Accordingly, the court had jurisdiction to consider the appeals of the two orders. The panel concluded that the sovereign immunity of the United Kingdom, as codified in the FSIA, did not protect the arbitration award fund from the two orders issued by the district court. The panel held that because the district court had in rem jurisdiction over the fund, it did not need in personam jurisdiction over PetroSaudi to issue an order preserving the fund. View "USA V. PETROSAUDI OIL SERV. (VENEZUELA) LTD., ET AL" on Justia Law

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Disputes over the allocation of water within the Klamath Basin in southern Oregon and northern California, particularly during the recent period of severe and prolonged drought, have prompted many lawsuits in this and other courts. In this episode, Klamath Irrigation District (“KID”) petitions for a writ of mandamus to compel the district court to remand KID’s motion for preliminary injunction to the Klamath County Circuit Court in Oregon. The motion had originally been filed by KID in that Oregon court but was removed to federal district court by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (“Reclamation”), a federal agency within the U.S. Department of Interior. Reclamation was identified by KID as the respondent for KID’s motion.   The Ninth Circuit denied KID’s petition for writ of mandamus. The panel considered the five factors in Bauman v. U.S. District Court, 557 F.3d 813, 817 (9th Cir. 2004), in determining whether mandamus was warranted. The panel began with the third factor—clear error as a matter of law— because it was a necessary condition for granting the writ of mandamus. The panel rejected KID’s attempt to circumvent KID II, the Tribes’ rights, and the effect of the ESA by characterizing the relief it sought as an application of the ACFFOD. The panel expressed no views on the merits of KID’s underlying motion for preliminary injunction and concluded only that the district court did not err in declining to remand the motion for preliminary injunction to the state court. The panel held that it need not consider the remaining Bauman factors because the third factor was dispositive. View "IN RE: KLAMATH IRRIGATION DISTRICT V. USDC-ORM" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff was cited for misuse of a vehicle horn under Section 27001 after she honked in support of protestors gathered outside a government official’s office. Although the citation was dismissed, Plaintiff filed suit to block future enforcement of 27001 against any expressive horn use―including honks not only to “support candidates or causes” but also to “greet friends or neighbors, summon children or co-workers, or celebrate weddings or victories.” She asserted that Section 27001 violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments as a content-based regulation that is not narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest. Alternatively, she argued that even if the law is not content-based, it burdens substantially more speech than necessary to protect legitimate government interests.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the State of California. The first held that Plaintiff had standing to challenge the law because, ever since she received a citation for impermissible horn use, she has refrained from honking in support of political protests to avoid being cited again. The panel determined that, at least in some circumstances, a honk can carry a message that is intended to be communicative and that, in context, would reasonably be understood by the listener to be communicative. The panel noted that Plaintiff had not alleged that the State has a policy or practice of improper selective enforcement of Section 27001, so the panel had no occasion to address that possibility here. View "SUSAN PORTER V. KELLY MARTINEZ, ET AL" on Justia Law