Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff alleged that a Transportation Security Officer (“TSO”) sexually assaulted her during an airport security screening. At issue is whether Plaintiff may bring claims for battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”).   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the United States. The panel held that TSOs fall under the FTCA’s “law enforcement proviso,” which waives sovereign immunity for torts such as assault and battery committed by “investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States Government.” 28 U.S.C. Section 2680(h). The panel joined the Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits in holding that the FTCA’s limited waiver of sovereign immunity applies to certain intentional torts committed by TSOs. The district court, therefore, had subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s FTCA claims.   The panel considered whether, as officers of the United States, TSOs are “empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. Section 2680(h). The government argued that TSOs do not “execute searches” by conducting screenings. The panel held that the screenings fit the ordinary, contemporary, and common meanings of searches. View "MICHELE LEUTHAUSER V. USA, ET AL" on Justia Law

Claimant appealed the district court’s judgment upholding the denial of social security benefits by an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). Reviewing de novo the district court’s decision, Farlow v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 485, 487 (9th Cir. 2022), the Ninth Circuit reversed The ALJ materially mischaracterized Claimant’s functional capacity when posing a question to a vocational expert, so the vocational expert’s testimony lacked evidentiary value with respect to jobs that Claimant could perform. Here, Claimant argued that the ALJ’s question posed to the vocational expert inaccurately described her actual limitations. First, the hypothetical posed to the expert did not provide that claimant was limited to jobs with “little or no judgment.” The panel concluded that the error was harmless because the vocational expert identified only jobs with that limitation. Second, the hypothetical did not provide that Claimant could “follow short, simple instructions” only. Third, in the question posed to the vocational expert, the ALJ described a hypothetical person who “can work in an environment with occasional changes to the work setting.” The panel concluded that the ALJ materially mischaracterized Claimant’s functional capacity when posing a question to a vocational expert, so the vocational expert’s testimony lacked evidentiary value with respect to jobs that Claimant could perform. View "CAROLINE LEACH V. KILOLO KIJAKAZI" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of Federal contractor employees and Federal employees working for the Department of Energy, challenged two Executive Orders, Executive Orders 14,042 and 14,043 (EOs), issued in September 2021. 1 Those EOs mandated COVID-19 vaccination for Federal contractor employees and Federal employees, respectively. They also provided for legally required medical or religious exemptions. Plaintiffs challenged the EOs as ultra vires exercises of presidential power in violation of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act (Procurement Act), the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (Procurement Policy Act), the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act (RFRA), the major questions doctrine, and general constitutional federalism constraints. Plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief to address their allegedly “imminent and wrongful terminations” for failure to comply with the vaccination requirements. The district court held that Plaintiffs who had submitted religious and medical exemptions but who had not yet completed the exemption request process did not have claims ripe for adjudication. The district court then dismissed the operative Second Amended Complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim and without leave to amend.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and dismissed as moot in part. The panel concluded that the case was moot as to all non-RFRA claims. The vaccine mandate exemption processes that the Plaintiffs challenged were premised on the revoked EOs. The panel held that it could not provide relief from EOs and exemption processes that no longer exist. Accordingly, no live controversy remained between the parties. The panel further concluded that Plaintiffs’ claims for damages under RFRA were precluded by sovereign immunity. View "DAVID DONOVAN, ET AL V. BRIAN VANCE" on Justia Law

The United States (“the Government”) initiated a civil forfeiture suit in federal district court against a $380 million arbitration award fund, the majority of which is held in the United Kingdom. The fund belongs to PetroSaudi Oil Services (Venezuela) Ltd. (“PetroSaudi”), a private oil company incorporated in Barbados. PetroSaudi won the award in an arbitration proceeding against Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (“PDVSA”), a Venezuelan state energy company. The portion of the fund held in the United Kingdom (“the fund”) is held in an account controlled by the High Court of England and Wales (“the High Court”). The Government seeks forfeiture of the fund on the ground that it derives from proceeds of an illegal scheme to steal one billion dollars from the Malaysian sovereign wealth fund 1Malaysia Development Berhad (“1MDB”). PetroSaudi challenged two orders entered by the district court.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s interlocutory orders. The panel held that PetroSaudi’s appeal from the district court’s protective order under 18 U.S.C. Section 983 fell within this exception. Accordingly, the court had jurisdiction to consider the appeals of the two orders. The panel concluded that the sovereign immunity of the United Kingdom, as codified in the FSIA, did not protect the arbitration award fund from the two orders issued by the district court. The panel held that because the district court had in rem jurisdiction over the fund, it did not need in personam jurisdiction over PetroSaudi to issue an order preserving the fund. View "USA V. PETROSAUDI OIL SERV. (VENEZUELA) LTD., ET AL" on Justia Law

Disputes over the allocation of water within the Klamath Basin in southern Oregon and northern California, particularly during the recent period of severe and prolonged drought, have prompted many lawsuits in this and other courts. In this episode, Klamath Irrigation District (“KID”) petitions for a writ of mandamus to compel the district court to remand KID’s motion for preliminary injunction to the Klamath County Circuit Court in Oregon. The motion had originally been filed by KID in that Oregon court but was removed to federal district court by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (“Reclamation”), a federal agency within the U.S. Department of Interior. Reclamation was identified by KID as the respondent for KID’s motion.   The Ninth Circuit denied KID’s petition for writ of mandamus. The panel considered the five factors in Bauman v. U.S. District Court, 557 F.3d 813, 817 (9th Cir. 2004), in determining whether mandamus was warranted. The panel began with the third factor—clear error as a matter of law— because it was a necessary condition for granting the writ of mandamus. The panel rejected KID’s attempt to circumvent KID II, the Tribes’ rights, and the effect of the ESA by characterizing the relief it sought as an application of the ACFFOD. The panel expressed no views on the merits of KID’s underlying motion for preliminary injunction and concluded only that the district court did not err in declining to remand the motion for preliminary injunction to the state court. The panel held that it need not consider the remaining Bauman factors because the third factor was dispositive. View "IN RE: KLAMATH IRRIGATION DISTRICT V. USDC-ORM" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was cited for misuse of a vehicle horn under Section 27001 after she honked in support of protestors gathered outside a government official’s office. Although the citation was dismissed, Plaintiff filed suit to block future enforcement of 27001 against any expressive horn use―including honks not only to “support candidates or causes” but also to “greet friends or neighbors, summon children or co-workers, or celebrate weddings or victories.” She asserted that Section 27001 violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments as a content-based regulation that is not narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest. Alternatively, she argued that even if the law is not content-based, it burdens substantially more speech than necessary to protect legitimate government interests.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the State of California. The first held that Plaintiff had standing to challenge the law because, ever since she received a citation for impermissible horn use, she has refrained from honking in support of political protests to avoid being cited again. The panel determined that, at least in some circumstances, a honk can carry a message that is intended to be communicative and that, in context, would reasonably be understood by the listener to be communicative. The panel noted that Plaintiff had not alleged that the State has a policy or practice of improper selective enforcement of Section 27001, so the panel had no occasion to address that possibility here. View "SUSAN PORTER V. KELLY MARTINEZ, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act (“FSHCAA”) provides that health centers receiving funding under Section 330 of the Public Health Service Act (“PHSA”) may be deemed Public Health Service (“PHS”) employees. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants violated their duty to report a court-ordered Lane County Mental Health patient’s refusal to comply with the terms of his probation. Plaintiffs alleged they were injured as a result of Defendants’ failure to report a patient’s repeated failures to comply with his mental health treatment plan. Defendants contended that they were entitled to Section 233 immunity. The district court held that Section 233 immunity did not apply to Defendants and remanded to state court.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order remanding to state court Plaintiffs’ action alleging negligence and wrongful death claims against federally funded community health centers and their employees (“Defendants”), and remanded to the district court to enter an order substituting the United States as the defendant and deeming the action as one brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The panel first addressed whether there was jurisdiction to review the district court’s remand order. Ordinarily, a remand order is not reviewable on appeal, except for cases removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1442. The panel agreed with Defendants that Section 233 immunity did not turn on who brings the claim, but rather on whether the conduct giving rose to the claim arose out of the Defendants’ performance of “medical, surgical, dental or related functions.” View "SAM FRIEDENBERG, ET AL V. LANE COUNTY, ET AL" on Justia Law

Rosemont Copper Company (Rosemont) challenged the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s (FWS) designation of certain areas in southern Arizona as critical habitat for jaguar under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Rosemont sought to develop a copper mine and related processing facilities in the area. The Center for Biological Diversity (Center) sued after the FWS concluded that Rosemont’s proposed mine project would not destroy or adversely modify the designated critical habitat. Rosemont intervened and filed crossclaims against the FWS. The district court concluded that the FWS erred in designating occupied critical habitat because the record did not establish that jaguar occupied this area when this species was listed as endangered. But it upheld the FWS’s designation of this same area and an adjacent area as unoccupied critical habitat. The district court also granted summary judgment in favor of the Center.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the FWS, vacated the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Center, remanded with instructions for the district court to vacate the FWS’s critical-habitat designations, and remanded to the agency for further proceedings. The panel held that because the FSW did not comply with Section 424.12(e) its designation of Unit 3 and Subunit 4b as unoccupied critical habitat was arbitrary and capricious. The panel concluded that the FWS did not provide a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made, or articulate a satisfactory explanation to justify its designations of Unit 3 and Subunit 4b as unoccupied critical habitat. View "CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. USFWS, ET AL" on Justia Law

The United States Forest Service designated several thousand acres of national forest for various treatments, including commercial logging, to reduce the risk of wildfires and disease. The Forest Service invoked a categorical exclusion from National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) review for projects in the wildland-urban interface. In Hanna Flats I, the district court granted summary judgment for Alliance for the Wild Rockies based on the reasoning that the record did not show that the Project fell within the statutory definition of the wildland-urban interface. Subsequently, the Forest Service issued a Supplement to the Decision Memo, further justifying the categorical exclusion. In Hanna Flats II, the district court issued a preliminary injunction based on the reasoning that the Forest Service could not invoke the categorical exclusion.   The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment in Hanna Flats I, and vacated the district court’s preliminary injunction in Hanna Flats II. The panel held that in Hanna Flats I, the district court erred in finding that Alliance’s public comments adequately put the Forest Service on notice of its eventual claim. The panel concluded that it had appellate jurisdiction. The panel held that the Forest Service sufficiently preserved its notice argument, even though it framed notice as an exhaustion requirement below and as a waiver issue on appeal. Second, the panel held that Alliance’s comments did not put the Forest Service on notice of the wildland-urban interface issue. The panel held that there was no reason to conclude that it should exercise its equitable discretion to leave an injunction in place that was wrongly granted. View "ALLIANCE FOR THE WILD ROCKIES V. CARL PETRICK, ET AL" on Justia Law

President Obama issued a Proclamation under the Antiquities Act expanding the Cascade-Siskiyou National Monument (“Monument”) in southwestern Oregon. Proclamation 9564 (“Proclamation”). Murphy Timber Company and Murphy Timber Investments, LLC (collectively, “Murphy”) are Oregon timber businesses. Murphy owns woodlands and purchases timber harvested in western Oregon to supply its wood products manufacturing facilities. Concerned that the Proclamation imposed a new limitation on its timber supply and deleterious effects on its woodlands adjacent to the expanded Monument, Murphy sued the President, the Secretary of the Interior (“Secretary”), and the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the United States and intervenor environmental organizations. First, the Court has recognized constitutional challenges to presidential acts as reviewable. Second, the Court has held that actions by subordinate Executive Branch officials that extend beyond delegated statutory authority— i.e., ultra vires actions—are reviewable. The panel concluded that Murphy’s particularized allegations that the O&C Act restricts the President’s designation powers under the Antiquities Act satisfied the applicable jurisdictional standard. The panel held that the Proclamation’s exercise of Antiquities Act power was consistent with the text, history, and purpose of the O&C Act. Third, the panel held that the dissent’s concerns that the Proclamation and the O&C Act are in conflict are unsubstantiated. View "MURPHY COMPANY, ET AL V. JOSEPH BIDEN, ET AL" on Justia Law