Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (the “Service”) approved the original Grizzly Bear Recovery Plan in 1982 and revised it in 1993. Since 1993, the Service has issued several Plan Supplements that provide habitat-based recovery criteria for identified recovery zones. The district court entered summary judgment against the Center for Biological Diversity (the “Center”) because it found that the Plan was not a “rule” subject to a petition for amendment under 5 U.S.C Section 553(e). It also found that it lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of the petition under the citizen-suit provision of the ESA, 16 U.S.C. Section 1540(g)(1)(C), because the Center did not allege that the Service failed to perform any nondiscretionary duty.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed, on different grounds, the district court’s summary judgment against the Center. The panel affirmed on the ground that Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) review was not available because, even assuming the Plan was a “rule,” the denial of the Center’s petition was not “final agency action.” Because the Center did not claim that the Service’s denial of its petition was otherwise reviewable by statute, the sole issue is whether the denial of the petition is “final agency action.” Because the term “rule” under the APA is defined broadly, the panel assumed that a recovery plan fit under this broad umbrella. The panel concluded that a decision not to modify a plan was not a final agency action. Because the Center’s suit did not challenge a final agency action, the district court was not authorized to review the denial of the petition under Section 704 of the APA. View "CENTER FOR BIO. DIVERSITY V. DEB HAALAND, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Washington State Health Care Authority (“HCA”) and the Swinomish Indian Tribal Community petition for review of a Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) decision denying Washington’s request to amend Apple Health, the Washington State Medicaid plan (the “State Plan”). HCA petitioned CMS to amend the State Plan to include dental health aide therapists (“DHATs”) on the list of licensed providers who can be reimbursed through Medicaid. CMS rejected the Amended State Plan on the basis that it violates the Medicaid free choice of providers statute and regulation guaranteeing all Medicaid beneficiaries equal access to qualified healthcare professionals willing to treat them. Petitioners challenged this denial.   The Ninth Circuit granted the petition of review. The panel rejected CMS’s reasoning on the ground that the underlying Washington statute—Wash. Rev. Code Section 70.350.020—did not violate Section 1396(a)(23) because it merely authorized where and how DHATs can practice and did not in any way restrict Medicaid recipients’ ability to obtain service from DHATs relative to non-Medicaid recipients. CMS’s rejection of the Amended State Plan was “not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. Section 706(2)(A). Accordingly, the panel granted the petition for review and remanded to the agency with instructions to approve the Amended State Plan. View "WASHINGTON STATE HEALTH CARE A, ET AL V. CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAI, ET AL" on Justia Law

The City of Costa Mesa (“City”) began amending its zoning code to reduce the number and concentration of sober living homes in its residential neighborhoods. Two of its new ordinances—Ordinances 14-13 and 15-11 (“Ordinances”)—made it unlawful to operate sober living homes without a permit. Appellants SoCal Recovery, LLC (“SoCal”) and RAW Recovery, LLC (“RAW”) (together, “Appellants”) operate sober living homes in Costa Mesa, California, for persons recovering from drug and alcohol addiction. Appellants alleged that two new City ordinances and the City’s enforcement practices discriminated against them on the basis of disability under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). Granting the City’s motions for summary judgment, the district court found that Appellants did not establish that residents in their sober living homes were actually disabled, or that the City regarded their residents as disabled.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment. The panel held that Appellants and other sober living home operators can satisfy the “actual disability” prong of the ADA, FHA, or FEHA on a collective basis by demonstrating that they serve or intend to serve individuals with actual disabilities; they need not provide individualized evidence of the actual disability of their residents. Rather, they can meet their burden by proffering admissible evidence that they have policies and procedures to ensure that they serve or will serve those with actual disabilities and that they adhere or will adhere to such policies and procedures. prong of the disability definition. View "SOCAL RECOVERY, LLC, ET AL V. CITY OF COSTA MESA, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA) prohibits providers of “financial advisory services” from engaging in deceptive conduct. 12 U.S.C. Sections 5481(15)(A)(viii), 5536(a)(1)(B). Defendant mailed millions of solicitations to current and prospective college students, advertising a targeted program for assisting those students in applying for scholarships. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) filed an enforcement action in the district court alleging the solicitations were deceptive. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment to the CFPB.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment ruling. The panel rejected Defendant’s argument that he did not provide financial scholarships are not financial in nature merely because they do not have to be repaid. Second, the record establishes that Defendant’s advice extended beyond the topic of scholarships, covering the entire field of student financial aid. Third, Defendant did, in fact, hold himself out as an expert in finance. The panel held that Defendant provided “financial advisory services,” and the district court did not err in concluding that Defendant was a “covered person” under the CFPA.   The panel held that Defendant was incorrect that the district court failed to consider the net impression of the entirety of his solicitation materials. In addition, the district court did not err by concluding that no issue of material fact existed as to the deceptive nature of Defendant’s conduct based upon the net impression created by his entire solicitation packet. Finally, the panel held that Defendant forfeited his challenge to the district court’s calculation of the restitution and civil penalties. View "CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION V. ARMOND ARIA, ET AL" on Justia Law

In 2018, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) decided to preempt California’s MRB rules with respect to truck drivers subject to federal regulations. Swift Transportation (Plaintiffs) argued that the presumption against retroactive application of laws operates here to allow their lawsuit to proceed despite the FMSCA’s preemption of California’s meal and rest break (MRB) rules.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Swift Transportation Co. of Arizona, LLC in a class action brought by former hourly truck drivers for (“Plaintiffs”) alleging violations of California’s MRB rules and derivative state-law claims. The panel applied the retroactivity test set forth in Landgraf v. USI FilmProducts, 511 U.S. 244, 263-64, 280 (1994). Under step one of the twostep test, the panel held that because Congress clearly intended for the FMSCA to have the power to halt enforcement of state laws, and because the FMSCA intended for this particular preemption determination to apply to pending lawsuits, the FMSCA’s decision prohibits present enforcement of California’s MRB rules regardless of when the underlying conduct occurred. The panel held that it need not reach the second step of the Landgraf analysis. View "JOHEL VALIENTE, ET AL V. SWIFT TRANSP. CO. OF ARIZ." on Justia Law

Claimant an Arizona woman in her forties filed an application for Social Security disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. The agency repeatedly denied the claimant’s claims. The district court affirmed the ALJ’s decision, concluding that the ALJ reached a reasonable determination based on substantial evidence in the record. On appeal, the claimant argues that the ALJ erred by insufficiently supporting his analysis, failing to account for the claimant’s symptoms and limitations in the residual functional capacity (RFC) assessment, improperly discounting the opinion of one medical provider while giving undue weight to the opinion of another, and failing to satisfy the “clear and convincing” standard for rejecting subjective symptom testimony.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the ALJ did not err in discounting the opinion of the claimant’s treating physician because the “extreme limitations” described by the physician were incompatible with the rest of the objective medical evidence. Likewise, the ALJ did not err in giving significant weight to the opinion of the consultative examiner because the examiner’s determination that the claimant could perform light-exertion work was consistent with the objective medical evidence. Finally, the ALJ provided “clear and convincing” reasons for discounting Claimant’s subjective pain testimony. The claimant’s self-reported limitations were inconsistent with (1) the objective medical evidence, (2) her self-reported daily activities, and (3) her generally conservative treatment plan. View "MISTY SMARTT V. KILOLO KIJAKAZI" on Justia Law

Claimant argued that the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) erred by rejecting the uncontested opinion of a non-examining physician, that supported her claim. Under the pre-2017 regulations that apply to the claim, ALJs are required to give greater weight to certain medical opinions. To reject the uncontested opinion of an examining or treating doctor, an ALJ must provide “clear and convincing” reasons supported by substantial evidence.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision affirming the denial of claimant’s application for disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. The panel held that the “clear and convincing” standard did not apply to the physician’s opinion because he never treated or examined claimant. Rather his opinion was based solely on a review of claimant’s medical records. The panel held that nothing in the relevant regulations required an ALJ to defer to an opinion from a non-treating, non-examining medical source. In rejecting the physician’s opinion, the ALJ cited specific contradictive medical evidence in the record. In making these findings, the ALJ cited the record at length. The panel concluded that this satisfied the requirements of Sousa v. Callahan, 143 F.3d 1240, 1244 (9th Cir. 1998), the relevant regulations, and the substantial evidence standard. Further, the panel concluded that the district court properly concluded that the ALJ’s denial of benefits was supported by substantial evidence View "RUTH FARLOW V. KILOLO KIJAKAZI" on Justia Law

Plaintiff claimed that Defendant used excessive force while attempting an arrest on June 10, 2018, in Berdoo Canyon, which is considered BLM land. Plaintiff and her husband failed to yield to a park ranger, at which point Defendant was called to assist. As Defendant was trying to stop Plaintiff's vehicle, he fired several shots, hitting her in the hand and grazing her head.Plaintiff filed a Sec. 1983 claim against Defendant. The district court denied Defendant's motion for summary judgment related to Plaintiff's excessive force claim and Defendant appealed.On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed, declining to extend Bivens. The existence of alternative remedial structures is reason enough to not infer a new Bivens cause of action. Similarly, uncertainty about the potential systemwide consequences of implying a new Bivens cause of action is by itself a special factor that forecloses relief. The panel held that there was no Bivens cause of action for Plaintiff’s claim, which presented a new context. View "DENISE MEJIA V. WESLEY MILLER, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former cargo customer service agent for Delta Airlines, claimed that the Transportation Security Agency (“TSA”) revoked his security badge without explanation and sued for violations of the Administrative Procedure Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981, and due process.The Ninth Circuit held that Sec. 1981 prohibited discrimination by state officials but not federal or nongovernmental actors. The court also held that the district court did not have jurisdiction to consider Plaintiff's challenge to the TSA’s Redress Process because it fell within this court’s exclusive jurisdiction under 49 U.S.C. Sec. 46110, and that Plaintiff failed to establish a liberty interest to support his due process claims. View "LASSANA MAGASSA V. ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, ET AL" on Justia Law

Pursuant to Rule 8.548(b)(2) of the California Rules of Court, the Ninth Circuit requested that the Supreme Court of California decide the certified question presented below: Do non-convicted incarcerated individuals performing services in county jails for a for-profit company to supply meals within the county jails and related custody facilities have a claim for minimum wages and overtime under Section 1194 of the California Labor Code in the absence of any local ordinance prescribing or prohibiting the payment of wages for these individuals? View "ARMIDA RUELAS, ET AL V. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, ET AL" on Justia Law