Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case concerns a land exchange between the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the J.R. Simplot Company, involving land that was formerly part of the Fort Hall Reservation in Idaho. The Shoshone-Bannock Tribes had ceded this land to the United States under an 1898 agreement, which Congress ratified in 1900. The 1900 Act specified that the ceded lands could only be disposed of under certain federal laws: homestead, townsite, stone and timber, and mining laws. In 2020, BLM approved an exchange of some of these lands with Simplot, who sought to expand a waste facility adjacent to the reservation. The Tribes objected, arguing that the exchange violated the restrictions set by the 1900 Act.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho reviewed the Tribes’ challenge and granted summary judgment in their favor. The court found that the BLM’s approval of the exchange violated the Administrative Procedure Act because it did not comply with the 1900 Act’s restrictions. The court also held, in the alternative, that the exchange failed to meet requirements under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA) and the National Environmental Policy Act. The district court certified the case for interlocutory appeal to resolve the legal question regarding the interplay between the 1900 Act and FLPMA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the 1900 Act’s list of permissible land disposal methods is exclusive and that the BLM’s exchange under FLPMA was not authorized because FLPMA is not among the listed laws. The court further held that FLPMA does not repeal or supersede the 1900 Act’s restrictions, and any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the Tribes under established Indian law canons. The court concluded that BLM’s authorization of the exchange was not in accordance with law. View "SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES OF THE FORT HALL RESERVATI V. USDOI" on Justia Law

Two University of Washington professors, who serve as moderators for a faculty email listserv, were investigated by the Washington State Executive Ethics Board after forwarding emails that allegedly contained political discussion and requests for fundraising. The Board reviewed several months of their emails during its investigations. One professor was ultimately fined $750 for improper use of state resources, while the other was not disciplined. The professors, on behalf of themselves and a proposed class of listserv subscribers, filed suit challenging the Board’s investigatory policies and practices, alleging that these chill their First Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington dismissed the professors’ complaint as unripe under Article III, finding that they had not sufficiently alleged that the Board’s policies chilled their speech. The district court also concluded that the professors’ emails, as public employees, were public records and thus not protected by a First Amendment privacy interest. Additionally, the court found the claims prudentially unripe because the Board’s investigations were ongoing.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the professors’ claims are ripe under both constitutional and prudential ripeness doctrines. The court found that the professors had sufficiently alleged a credible threat of future enforcement and chilling of speech, given their ongoing roles and the Board’s history of enforcement. The court also determined that the issues presented are fit for judicial decision and that withholding review would impose substantial hardship on the professors. The panel remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the professors’ First Amendment claims against the Board’s investigatory policies and practices are ripe for adjudication. View "FLAXMAN V. FERGUSON" on Justia Law

A group of researchers at the University of California received multi-year federal research grants from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the National Science Foundation (NSF), and the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH). In April 2025, the EPA and NEH sent form letters to these researchers, terminating their grants. The letters cited changes in agency priorities and referenced the implementation of several Executive Orders issued in early 2025, which directed agencies to eliminate funding for projects related to diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI), environmental justice, and similar initiatives. The researchers alleged that these terminations were not based on individualized assessments but were instead the result of broad policy changes.The researchers filed a class action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, challenging the mass termination of grants on constitutional and statutory grounds, including violations of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the First and Fifth Amendments, and separation of powers. The district court provisionally certified two classes: one for those who received form termination letters without specific explanations, and another for those whose grants were terminated due to the DEI-related Executive Orders. The district court granted a preliminary injunction, ordering the agencies to reinstate the terminated grants, finding that the terminations were likely arbitrary and capricious and, for the DEI class, likely violated the First Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the government’s motion for a partial stay of the injunction. The court denied the motion, holding that the government had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits regarding jurisdiction, standing, or the substantive claims. The court found that the agencies’ actions were likely arbitrary and capricious under the APA and likely constituted viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment. The court also concluded that the balance of harms and public interest did not favor a stay. View "THAKUR V. TRUMP" on Justia Law

The case concerns the Estate of Jack Halverson, which sought to compel the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), to partition a parcel of land on the Crow Reservation in Montana. Jack Halverson had owned a significant fractional interest in Allotment 1809 and, in 2015, applied for a partition under federal law. After Halverson’s death, his estate and the BIA entered into a settlement agreement that purported to resolve the partition. The BIA executed deeds to effectuate the partition, but the Estate contended that the BIA failed to assign the ownership interests as required by the agreement, resulting in the Estate receiving a smaller share of land than anticipated.After the BIA recorded the deeds, the Estate moved before an Administrative Law Judge to compel the BIA to comply with the settlement agreement, but the motion was denied. The Estate then filed a mandamus action in the United States District Court for the District of Montana, seeking to compel the BIA to partition the land as agreed. The district court granted summary judgment for the BIA, finding that the agency had fully performed its obligations under the settlement agreement. The Estate appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the action was barred by sovereign immunity. The court held that a mandamus suit seeking to enforce contract rights against a federal official is, in effect, a suit against the United States, and such suits are barred unless there is a clear waiver of sovereign immunity. The court found no statute waiving immunity for this type of claim. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "HALVERSON v. BURGUM" on Justia Law

A private company operating a federal immigration detention facility in Washington State challenged the enforcement of several provisions of a state law that imposed health, safety, and inspection requirements on private detention centers. The law required the state Department of Health to adopt rules ensuring sanitary and safe conditions, authorized unannounced inspections, provided for civil penalties for violations, and created a private right of action for detainees. The company argued that these provisions violated the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity and were preempted by federal law, claiming they improperly targeted federal contractors and conflicted with federal standards.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted a preliminary injunction, finding that the challenged sections of the law violated intergovernmental immunity by discriminating against the federal government and its contractor. The court compared the requirements imposed on the federal facility to those imposed on state prisons and concluded that the law treated the federal contractor less favorably. The state appealed, and while the appeal was pending, the Washington legislature amended the law, but the changes did not materially alter the issues on appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s preliminary injunction and remanded for further proceedings. The Ninth Circuit held that the appropriate comparison for determining discrimination under intergovernmental immunity is between the federal immigration facility and other civil detention facilities in the state, not state prisons. The court directed the district court to make this comparison in the first instance. The Ninth Circuit also held that the challenged provisions were not preempted by federal law and that the district court erred in enjoining the private right of action, as the state officials named as defendants had no enforcement authority under that provision. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "THE GEO GROUP, INC. V. INSLEE" on Justia Law

A nonprofit Christian ministry that provides youth programs in Oregon applied for state grant funding from the Oregon Department of Education’s Youth Development Division. The Division had recently added a rule requiring all grant applicants to certify that they do not discriminate based on religion in employment, vendor selection, subcontracting, or service delivery. The ministry, whose mission is to share Christian teachings, requires all employees and volunteers to affirm a Christian Statement of Faith and be involved in a local church. After initially awarding the ministry a conditional grant, the Division withdrew the award upon discovering the ministry’s religious hiring requirements.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon denied the ministry’s request for a preliminary injunction to reinstate the grant and enjoin enforcement of the rule, finding the ministry unlikely to succeed on the merits of its First Amendment claims. The court also dismissed all claims, including those for damages, based on qualified immunity, even though the defendants had only moved to dismiss the damages claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Ninth Circuit held that the rule, as applied to grant-funded initiatives, is likely neutral and generally applicable, thus not violating the Free Exercise Clause, and is a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral condition for participation in the grant program. The court also found that the ministry’s religious autonomy claims were unlikely to succeed, as the relevant doctrines are affirmative defenses, not standalone claims. However, the court held that applying the rule to the ministry’s non-grant-funded initiatives likely imposes an unconstitutional condition on expressive association. The Ninth Circuit directed the district court to enjoin enforcement of the rule as to non-grant-funded initiatives, affirmed the dismissal of damages claims due to qualified immunity, and reversed the dismissal of claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. View "YOUTH 71FIVE MINISTRIES V. WILLIAMS" on Justia Law

A group of individuals and organizations challenged a longstanding policy of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), codified as Rule 202.5(e), which requires defendants in civil enforcement actions to agree not to publicly deny the allegations against them as a condition of settlement. This “no-deny” provision has been in place since 1972 and is incorporated into settlement agreements, with the SEC’s remedy for a breach being the ability to ask the court to reopen the case. The petitioners argued that this rule violates the First Amendment and was improperly adopted under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).Previously, the New Civil Liberties Alliance (NCLA) petitioned the SEC to amend Rule 202.5(e) to remove the no-deny requirement, citing constitutional concerns. The SEC denied the petition, explaining that defendants can voluntarily waive constitutional rights in settlements and that the rule preserves the agency’s ability to litigate if a defendant later denies the allegations. After the denial, the petitioners sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, asserting both First Amendment and APA violations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the SEC’s denial. Applying the Supreme Court’s framework from Town of Newton v. Rumery, the court held that voluntary waivers of constitutional rights, including First Amendment rights, are generally permissible if knowing and voluntary. The court concluded that Rule 202.5(e) is not facially invalid under the First Amendment, as it is a limited restriction tied to the settlement context and does not preclude all speech. The court also found that the SEC had statutory authority for the rule, was not required to use notice-and-comment rulemaking, and provided a rational explanation for its decision. The petition for review was denied, but the court left open the possibility of future as-applied challenges. View "POWELL V. UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION" on Justia Law

The case involves an executive order issued by President Trump, which excluded over 40 federal agencies and subdivisions from collective bargaining requirements, citing national security concerns. The plaintiffs, six unions representing federal employees, argued that the executive order constituted First Amendment retaliation, was ultra vires, violated Fifth Amendment procedural due process, abrogated contractual property rights, and violated the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment.The Northern District of California granted a preliminary injunction against the executive order, focusing on the First Amendment retaliation claim. The district court found that the plaintiffs had raised serious questions about whether the order was retaliatory, citing statements from a White House Fact Sheet that criticized federal unions. The court concluded that the balance of hardships and public interest favored the plaintiffs, as the order threatened union operations and collective bargaining rights.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the government's request for an emergency stay of the district court's preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit granted the stay, finding that the government was likely to succeed on the merits of the retaliation claim. The court concluded that the executive order and the accompanying Fact Sheet demonstrated a focus on national security, and that the President would have issued the order regardless of the plaintiffs' protected conduct. The court also found that the government would suffer irreparable harm without a stay, as the injunction impeded the government's ability to manage national security-related functions. The court determined that the public interest favored granting the stay to preserve the President's authority in national security matters. View "American Federation of Government Employees v. Trump" on Justia Law

The Center for Investigative Reporting and Will Evans requested several years of workforce composition reports from the U.S. Department of Labor under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). These reports, filed by federal contractors, detail the job categories and demographics of their employees. The Center intended to use this information to report on the diversity of these contractors' workforces. The Department of Labor withheld many of the requested reports, citing FOIA’s Exemption 4, which protects confidential commercial information.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California reviewed the case and ordered the Department to disclose the reports. The court found that the information in the reports did not qualify as "commercial" under Exemption 4 because it did not reveal commercially significant insights about the contractors' operations. The Department of Labor appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. The Ninth Circuit held that the workforce-composition information in the reports did not constitute "commercial" information under Exemption 4. The court reasoned that the data on the number of employees in various job categories and their demographics did not directly describe the exchange of goods or services or the making of a profit. The court concluded that the Department of Labor failed to demonstrate that the information in the reports was commercial in nature, and therefore, the reports must be disclosed. The court did not address other elements of Exemption 4 or the FOIA Improvement Act, as the determination on the commercial nature of the information was sufficient to resolve the case. View "CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING V. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR" on Justia Law

Charley Johnson, trustee of the Charley E. Johnson Revocable Living Trust, purchased approximately 21 acres of land bordering the Tonto National Forest in Gila County, Arizona. Johnson later discovered that many of the improvements on the land, including a house, barn, well, and corrals, were actually on National Forest Service (NFS) land due to an erroneous survey. To resolve this, Johnson filed an application under the Small Tracts Act (STA) to purchase the encroached land. The U.S. Forest Service eventually sold Johnson a 0.59-acre parcel that included the house, barn, and well but excluded the corrals, claiming they were authorized range improvements owned by the United States.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona granted summary judgment in favor of the United States, holding that the Forest Service's decision to exclude the corrals was not subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because it was committed to agency discretion by law. The court also found that the Forest Service's reliance on an appraisal valuing the 0.59-acre parcel at $27,000 was not arbitrary or capricious.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the APA's narrow exception for actions committed to agency discretion did not apply to discretionary conveyances under the STA. The court found that the STA and its regulations provide meaningful standards for evaluating the Forest Service's decisions, making them subject to judicial review. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the Forest Service's decision to exclude the corrals from the STA sale was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. View "JOHNSON V. USA" on Justia Law