Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves a challenge by local governments and municipal organizations to the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) 2020 Ruling, which interprets and clarifies existing legislative rules from the 2014 Order. These rules implement section 6409(a) of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, requiring state and local governments to approve certain wireless network modifications that do not substantially change existing facilities.The petitioners challenged several provisions of the FCC’s 2020 Ruling: the Shot Clock Rule, the Separation Clause, the Equipment Cabinet Provision Clarification, the Concealment and Siting Approval Conditions Provisions, and the Express Evidence Requirement. They argued that these clarifications were either arbitrary and capricious or improperly issued without following the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) notice-and-comment procedures.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the 2020 Ruling’s clarifications of the Shot Clock Rule, the Separation Clause, and the Equipment Cabinet Provision were consistent with the 2014 Order, were interpretive rules, and were not arbitrary or capricious. Therefore, the court denied the petition for review regarding these provisions.However, the court found that the 2020 Ruling’s clarifications of the Concealment and Siting Approval Conditions Provisions were inconsistent with the 2014 Order, making them legislative rules. The FCC’s failure to follow the APA’s procedural requirements in issuing these legislative rules was not harmless. Consequently, the court granted the petition for review concerning these provisions.Finally, the court denied the petition for review regarding the Express Evidence Requirement, concluding that its application would not have a retroactive effect. The court’s decision was to grant the petition in part and deny it in part, affirming some of the FCC’s clarifications while invalidating others. View "League of California Cities v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

Jonathan Corbett, an attorney specializing in civil litigation against the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), submitted two Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to TSA. The first request, made on June 13, 2021, sought incident reports and video footage related to a pat-down search of Kelly Joyner. TSA responded by asking Corbett to complete a "Certification of Identity" form, which he did not do, leading TSA to close the request. The second request, submitted on March 6, 2022, sought records regarding an alleged search of an unnamed client. TSA again asked for the form, which Corbett did not provide, and the request was closed.Corbett filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California after TSA missed its twenty-day deadline to respond to his FOIA requests. TSA issued final responses after the lawsuit was filed, stating that they could neither confirm nor deny the existence of the requested records without the third-party subject’s consent. TSA moved for summary judgment, arguing that Corbett’s claims were moot and that he had failed to exhaust administrative remedies by not appealing within the agency. The district court granted TSA’s motion, construing it as a motion to dismiss, and held that Corbett should have pursued administrative appeals.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that once a FOIA suit is properly initiated based on constructive exhaustion, an agency’s post-lawsuit response does not require dismissal for failure to exhaust. The court emphasized that exhaustion under FOIA is a prudential consideration rather than a jurisdictional one, and district courts have limited discretion to require exhaustion only if an agency shows exceptional circumstances. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "CORBETT V. TSA" on Justia Law

Raizel Blumberger filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Ian Tilley, alleging that he failed to provide proper medical care during childbirth, resulting in her injuries. Dr. Tilley was an employee of Eisner Pediatric and Family Medical Services, a federally funded health center deemed a Public Health Service (PHS) employee for 2018. The Attorney General appeared in state court, stating that Dr. Tilley's status was under consideration. A year later, the Attorney General advised that Dr. Tilley was not a deemed employee, leading Dr. Tilley to remove the case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442 and 42 U.S.C. § 233(l)(1).The United States District Court for the Central District of California remanded the case, finding Dr. Tilley's removal untimely under § 1442 and concluding that the Attorney General satisfied its advice obligations under § 233(l)(1). Dr. Tilley appealed, arguing that the Attorney General failed to properly advise the state court of his deemed status, thus making removal appropriate.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court analyzed the timeliness of Dr. Tilley's § 1442 removal under the wrong legal standard and remanded on that basis. The court determined it had jurisdiction to review the district court’s § 233 analysis, despite potential untimeliness. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Attorney General was obligated under § 233(l)(1) to advise the state court that Dr. Tilley had been a deemed employee during the relevant period. The court reversed the district court’s conclusion that the Attorney General’s notice satisfied § 233(l)(1) and held that the government was obligated to remove the case to federal court. The case was vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "BLUMBERGER V. TILLEY" on Justia Law

A group of LGBTQ+ students sued the U.S. Department of Education, alleging that they experienced discrimination at religious colleges and universities that receive federal funding. They challenged the religious exemption to Title IX, which allows religious institutions to discriminate based on gender if it conflicts with their religious tenets. The plaintiffs claimed this exemption violated the First Amendment's Establishment Clause and the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantee. They also argued that the Department's 2020 amendment to Title IX regulations, which clarified that institutions do not need to submit a written statement to claim the exemption, was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The United States District Court for the District of Oregon dismissed the plaintiffs' claims. It ruled that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim that the religious exemption violated the First and Fifth Amendments. The court also found that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the 2020 amendment under the APA. The court denied the plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint, concluding that any amendment would be futile.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the Title IX religious exemption does not violate the Establishment Clause under the historical practices and understanding test set forth in Kennedy v. Bremerton School District. The court found that the exemption is consistent with a long history of religious accommodations in U.S. law. The court also held that the exemption does not violate the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantee, as it is substantially related to the important governmental objective of accommodating religious exercise. Finally, the court agreed that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the 2020 amendment, as they did not show that the rule caused them harm. The court also upheld the denial of leave to amend the complaint. View "HUNTER V. USEDU" on Justia Law

Mendocino Railway, a California corporation, owns and operates a railroad line known as the "Skunk Train" between Fort Bragg and Willits, California. The City of Fort Bragg and the California Coastal Commission sought to regulate the use and maintenance of the Railway's properties within the City, which the Railway resisted, claiming federal preemption under the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA). The City filed a state court action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to compel the Railway to comply with local regulations. The Railway argued that federal law preempted these local regulations. Subsequently, the Railway filed a federal lawsuit seeking a declaration that the City's and Commission's regulatory actions were preempted by federal law and an injunction to prevent interference with its operations.The Mendocino County Superior Court overruled the Railway's demurrer, which argued that federal law preempted all local regulations. The Railway's subsequent petitions to the California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court were unsuccessful. The Railway then filed an answer in the state court, asserting federal preemption as an affirmative defense. Meanwhile, the Commission intervened in the state court action, seeking a declaration that the Coastal Act and local coastal program applied to the Railway's activities and were not preempted by federal law. The Railway also attempted to remove the state action to federal court, but the district court remanded it back to state court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court's dismissal of the Railway's federal lawsuit under the Colorado River doctrine, which allows federal courts to abstain from exercising jurisdiction in favor of parallel state court proceedings. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal, finding that the state court proceedings were sufficiently parallel to the federal action and that considerations of avoiding piecemeal litigation, forum shopping, and the order in which the forums obtained jurisdiction supported the dismissal. The court held that the state court could adequately protect the Railway's rights and that the federal preemption issue could be resolved in the state court proceedings. View "MENDOCINO RAILWAY V. AINSWORTH" on Justia Law

An attorney, Daniel Crowe, challenged the requirement to join the Oregon State Bar (OSB), arguing it infringed on his First Amendment right to freedom of association. Crowe objected to statements published by OSB in its magazine, which he felt misrepresented his views. OSB refunded Crowe a portion of his dues used for the publication but did not satisfy his concerns, leading him to file a lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon initially dismissed Crowe's claims, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals partially reversed this decision, allowing the freedom of association claim to proceed. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for OSB, holding that the bar's activities were germane to its regulatory purpose and did not violate Crowe's rights. Crowe appealed again.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that OSB is an arm of the state entitled to sovereign immunity, dismissing claims against OSB and for retrospective relief against its officers. However, the court found that Crowe demonstrated an infringement on his freedom of association because OSB's statements in its magazine could reasonably be imputed to its members, including Crowe, and were not related to the bar's regulatory purpose. The court concluded that this infringement did not survive exacting scrutiny.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment regarding Crowe's freedom of association claim for prospective equitable relief against individual OSB officers and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "CROWE V. OREGON STATE BAR" on Justia Law

A resident of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) filed a lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that the Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United States precludes the application of a federal cockfighting prohibition. The plaintiff also sought an injunction to prevent the enforcement of this prohibition. The federal cockfighting prohibition, codified in 7 U.S.C. § 2156 and amended in 2018, made cockfighting illegal in all U.S. jurisdictions, including the CNMI.The U.S. District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands dismissed the complaint with prejudice, finding that the federal cockfighting prohibition applied to the CNMI under the Covenant. The district court determined that 7 U.S.C. § 2156 was applicable to Guam and the several states as required by Covenant § 502, and thus also applicable to the CNMI. The court also found that Covenant § 105, which governs laws enacted after January 9, 1978, did not apply to amendments of laws that existed on that date.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that Covenant § 502 governs the applicability of 7 U.S.C. § 2156 and its 2018 Amendment to the CNMI. The court found that § 2156 was applicable to Guam and the several states as of January 9, 1978, and thus applicable to the CNMI. The court also held that even if Covenant § 105 were to govern, the federal cockfighting prohibition would still apply to the CNMI because it is applicable to the several states and does not impermissibly intrude upon the internal affairs of the CNMI. The court concluded that the federal interests in regulating interstate commerce, ensuring the humane treatment of animals, and preventing the spread of avian flu outweighed any intrusion into the CNMI’s internal affairs. The judgment was affirmed. View "SALAS V. USA" on Justia Law

The case involves current and former San Francisco Police Department (SFPD) employees who sued the United States, alleging that the Navy misled the City of San Francisco and the SFPD about the safety of a contaminated former Naval shipyard leased by the City for use as a facility for SFPD employees. The plaintiffs claimed that the Navy's misrepresentations about the safety of the site caused them to be exposed to hazardous substances, resulting in health problems.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, indicating that the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) misrepresentation exception likely barred their claims. The plaintiffs then filed a Second Amended Complaint, which the district court also dismissed, concluding that the misrepresentation exception applied because the plaintiffs' claims were fundamentally based on the Navy's alleged misrepresentations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the FTCA’s misrepresentation exception applied because the plaintiffs' claims arose out of the Navy’s alleged misrepresentations, even if the misrepresentations were made to the City and the SFPD rather than directly to the plaintiffs. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) implicitly limited or suspended the misrepresentation exception, finding no indication that Congress intended CERCLA to override the FTCA’s misrepresentation exception. The court concluded that the claims were barred by the FTCA’s misrepresentation exception and affirmed the dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "ABBEY V. USA" on Justia Law

J.B., a student with multiple disabilities, was enrolled in the Kyrene Elementary School District. Due to concerns about the school's handling of J.B.'s behavioral issues, J.B.'s parent, L.B., withdrew J.B. from the District and placed J.B. in a private school, Brightmont Academy. The District attempted to conduct evaluations to update J.B.'s Individualized Education Program (IEP), but L.B. refused to consent to these evaluations, proposing instead that the District use video recordings for assessments.The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that the District did not violate the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and ruled in favor of the District. L.B. appealed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona, which affirmed the ALJ's decision. The District Court found that L.B. refused to consent to the District's evaluations and made it clear that she did not intend to re-enroll J.B. in the District.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that the District did not deny a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) to J.B. because L.B.'s refusal to consent to evaluations relieved the District of further obligations under IDEA. Additionally, the court found that the District's procedural error in stating that no further IEP meetings would occur because J.B. was not enrolled in the District was harmless, as it did not result in a deprivation of educational opportunity for J.B. Consequently, L.B. was not entitled to reimbursement for private school tuition and related expenses. View "J.B. V. KYRENE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 28" on Justia Law

Timothy Blixseth, a debtor, faced an involuntary bankruptcy petition filed by the State of Montana Department of Revenue (State) along with other state tax agencies. The bankruptcy court dismissed the petition, finding the State's claim was subject to a bona fide dispute. Blixseth then filed an adversary proceeding under 11 U.S.C. § 303(i) seeking costs and damages from the State for the dismissed petition.The bankruptcy court denied the State's motion to dismiss the adversary proceeding, ruling that the State had waived its sovereign immunity by filing the involuntary petition and through statements made by its counsel. The State appealed to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP), which dismissed the appeal, stating that the collateral order doctrine did not apply.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the BAP's dismissal, holding that the collateral order doctrine did apply, allowing for immediate appeal. The Ninth Circuit also reversed the bankruptcy court's denial of sovereign immunity. The court held that the State did not waive its sovereign immunity by filing the involuntary petition or through its counsel's statements. Additionally, the court found that 11 U.S.C. § 106, which addresses sovereign immunity in bankruptcy proceedings, was unconstitutional.Applying the analysis from Central Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Blixseth's § 303(i) claim was not necessary to effectuate the bankruptcy court's in rem jurisdiction. The court determined that the adversary proceeding did not further the core functions of bankruptcy jurisdiction, such as the equitable distribution of the debtor's property or the debtor's fresh start. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit reversed the bankruptcy court's denial of sovereign immunity and remanded with instructions to dismiss Blixseth's § 303(i) claim against the State. View "Montana Department of Revenue v. Blixseth" on Justia Law