Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case involves several dialysis providers, a nonprofit organization, and individual patients challenging a California law (AB 290) aimed at regulating relationships between dialysis providers and nonprofits that assist patients with health insurance premiums. The law was enacted due to concerns that providers were donating to nonprofits to help keep patients on private insurance, which led to higher reimbursements for providers compared to public insurance. Key provisions of the law included capping provider reimbursements if they had a financial relationship with a nonprofit offering patient assistance, requiring disclosure of patients receiving such assistance, restricting nonprofits from conditioning assistance on patient treatment choices, mandating disclosure to patients of all insurance options, and a safe harbor for seeking federal advisory opinions.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted in part and denied in part motions for summary judgment. It upheld the constitutionality of the reimbursement cap, coverage disclosure requirement, and safe harbor provision, but found the anti-steering, patient disclosure, and financial assistance restriction provisions unconstitutional. The district court also ruled that the unconstitutional parts were severable from the remainder of the statute and rejected claims that federal law preempted the state law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the reimbursement cap, patient disclosure requirement, and financial assistance restriction violated the First Amendment because they burdened the rights of expressive association and were not narrowly tailored to serve the state’s interests. The court found the coverage disclosure requirement constitutional under the standard for compelled commercial speech, as it required only factual, uncontroversial information reasonably related to a state interest. However, it concluded that the unconstitutional provisions were not severable from the coverage disclosure requirement. The court also held challenges to the safe harbor provision moot. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and each party was ordered to bear its own costs. View "DOE V. BONTA" on Justia Law

A former mortgage underwriter sued her employer under the False Claims Act, alleging that the company submitted false certifications in a federal mortgage insurance program. The government declined to intervene and unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the case. After years of litigation, the parties reached a settlement: the employer agreed to pay $38.5 million, with a portion going to the plaintiff and the remainder to the United States Treasury. The settlement specifically excluded the plaintiff’s claims for attorneys’ fees, expenses, and costs, leaving them unresolved.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California approved the settlement in January 2023, dismissing the substantive claims but expressly keeping the attorneys’ fees issue pending. Months of disputes ensued over the amount of attorneys’ fees. In May 2024, the district court awarded the plaintiff over $8.5 million in attorneys’ fees and approximately $89,000 in expenses. The plaintiff argued that postjudgment interest on these amounts should accrue from the date of the settlement approval, since her entitlement to fees was established then. The district court disagreed, holding that interest should only begin to accrue from the date the fees were actually awarded.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that postjudgment interest under 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) accrues only from the entry of a “money judgment,” which requires both identification of the parties and a definite, ascertainable amount owed. Because the district court’s earlier order approving the settlement did not specify the amount of attorneys’ fees, it was not a “money judgment.” Therefore, interest begins accruing only from the order that set the fee amount. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. View "THROWER V. ACADEMY MORTGAGE CORPORATION" on Justia Law

A former employee filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act against her former employer, alleging that the company falsely certified compliance with federal mortgage program requirements. The Department of Housing and Urban Development would be responsible for defaulted loans under this program. The relator’s attorneys conducted an extensive investigation, including interviewing former employees, after the government declined to intervene and later sought to dismiss the action. Despite these challenges, the relator’s attorneys successfully opposed the motions to dismiss, and the case proceeded. The litigation ultimately resulted in a settlement exceeding $38 million, with the relator and her attorneys receiving a portion of the recovery.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California calculated attorneys’ fees using the lodestar method, finding the hourly rates and hours reasonable, and arrived at a lodestar amount of approximately $4.37 million for the relator’s main counsel. The district court then awarded a 1.75 multiplier, increasing the fee award to over $8.5 million. The court justified the enhancement by citing the “exceptional result” achieved—surviving dismissal against both the government and the employer—and the attorneys’ investigative efforts, but did not provide a detailed rationale for choosing the 1.75 figure.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court abused its discretion by awarding a multiplier above the lodestar because the factors cited for the enhancement—exceptional results and investigative work—were already reflected in the lodestar calculation. The Ninth Circuit further found that the district court failed to provide a sufficiently reasoned explanation for selecting a 1.75 multiplier. The court reversed the enhanced fee award and remanded for further proceedings. View "THROWER V. ACADEMY MORTGAGE CORPORATION" on Justia Law

During the summer of 2025, protests erupted in Southern California in response to federal immigration raids. Protesters, legal observers, and journalists alleged that officers of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), including agents from Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Federal Protective Services, and Customs and Border Protection, used crowd control weapons indiscriminately against them. Multiple individuals, including members of the press and protesters, suffered significant physical injuries during these events, even when they were complying with police orders or were not near disruptive protest activity.Several individual journalists, legal observers, protesters, and two press organizations filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. They alleged violations of their First Amendment rights, specifically the right to be free from retaliation for engaging in protected activities and the right of public access to protests. The district court issued a preliminary injunction to protect the rights of protesters, journalists, and legal observers, finding that the defendants’ conduct chilled First Amendment activity. The government appealed, arguing that the injunction was overly broad and legally unsound.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their First Amendment retaliation claims, that both individual and organizational plaintiffs had standing, and that the other requirements for a preliminary injunction were met. However, the court found that the scope of the injunction was overbroad because it extended relief to non-parties and included provisions not narrowly tailored to the specific harms alleged. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to issue a preliminary injunction but vacated and remanded the case for the district court to craft a narrower injunction consistent with its opinion. View "LOS ANGELES PRESS CLUB V. NOEM" on Justia Law

The case concerns the National Marine Fisheries Service’s (NMFS) designation of critical habitat in 2022 for two species of Arctic seals, following their listing as threatened under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) in 2012. The designated areas covered waters off Alaska’s north coast and were based on findings that those areas contained physical and biological features essential to the conservation of the seal species. Alaska opposed these designations, contending that they were too broad and provided minimal benefit, and requested that certain coastal areas be excluded due to economic impacts. NMFS excluded an area used by the Navy for training but declined to exclude others requested by Alaska and the North Slope Borough, finding no significant economic impact.The United States District Court for the District of Alaska largely agreed with Alaska, holding that the critical habitat designations were unlawful. The court vacated the rules and remanded the matter to NMFS, concluding that NMFS had not adequately explained why the entire designated area was necessary for the seals’ conservation, had failed to consider foreign conservation efforts and foreign habitat, and had abused its discretion by not considering certain exclusions. The Center for Biological Diversity intervened as a defendant and appealed the district court’s decision. The district court did, however, reject Alaska’s argument that NMFS had failed to comply with the ESA’s “prudency” requirement.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that it had jurisdiction, reversed the district court’s rulings that the designations were unlawful, and affirmed the court’s ruling on the ESA’s prudency requirement. The Ninth Circuit held that NMFS’s designations complied with the ESA, that the agency was not required to consider foreign conservation efforts or habitat, and that the decision not to exclude certain coastal areas was within its discretion. The critical habitat designations were reinstated, and the case was remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the Center and NMFS. View "STATE OF ALASKA V. NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE" on Justia Law

A healthcare provider operating as a covered entity under the federal Section 340B Drug Pricing Program purchased pharmaceuticals from several drug manufacturers. The provider alleged that these manufacturers engaged in a fraudulent scheme by knowingly charging prices for drugs that exceeded the statutory ceiling, resulting in inflated reimbursement claims submitted to Medicaid, Medicare, and other government-funded programs. The provider did not seek compensation for its own overcharges, but instead brought a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA), seeking to recover losses on behalf of the federal and state governments.The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed the complaint with prejudice. It reasoned that, under the Supreme Court’s holding in Astra USA, Inc. v. Santa Clara County, Section 340B does not confer a private right of action for covered entities to sue drug manufacturers over pricing disputes; such claims must instead be pursued through the Section 340B Administrative Dispute Resolution process. The district court concluded that the provider’s FCA claims were essentially attempts to enforce Section 340B and should therefore be barred.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that the provider’s FCA claims were not barred by the absence of a private right of action under Section 340B or by the Astra decision, because the action was brought to remediate fraud against the government and not to recover personal losses or enforce Section 340B directly. The court further found that the provider had plausibly pleaded falsity under the FCA. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings. View "ADVENTIST HEALTH SYSTEM OF WEST V. ABBVIE INC." on Justia Law

A federal land exchange was mandated by the Southeast Arizona Land Exchange and Conservation Act, requiring the United States Forest Service to transfer approximately 2,500 acres of National Forest land, including Oak Flat—a site of religious significance to the Apache—to Resolution Copper Mining, LLC, in exchange for over 5,000 acres of private land. The legislation included requirements for tribal consultation, land appraisal, and the preparation of an environmental impact statement (EIS). Following the issuance of a revised Final EIS in 2025, several environmental and tribal groups, as well as individual Apache plaintiffs, challenged the exchange. Their claims spanned the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and the Free Exercise Clause, alleging procedural and substantive deficiencies.Previously, the United States District Court for the District of Arizona denied the plaintiffs’ motions for a preliminary injunction, finding that they had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on any claims relating to the appraisal process, NEPA, consultation, or the National Forest Management Act. A separate group of Apache plaintiffs brought similar claims, including religious liberty challenges, which were also denied—particularly in light of circuit precedent established in Apache Stronghold v. United States. All plaintiff groups appealed and sought further injunctive relief pending appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial for abuse of discretion and affirmed. The court held that plaintiffs had standing and their claims were justiciable, but that none of their arguments were likely to succeed on the merits or raised serious questions. The court specifically found the appraisals and environmental review sufficient, the agency’s tribal consultation adequate, and the religious liberty claims foreclosed by circuit precedent. The denial of a preliminary injunction was affirmed, and all related motions for injunctive relief were denied as moot. View "ARIZONA MINING REFORM COALITION V. UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE" on Justia Law

The President issued an executive order in January 2025 suspending the entry of all refugees into the United States under the United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP), citing concerns about national capacity and security. The Department of State, in response, suspended and later terminated funding for both overseas and domestic refugee resettlement services, including cooperative agreements with resettlement organizations. Plaintiffs, consisting of affected refugees and resettlement agencies, challenged these actions, arguing that the suspension exceeded the President’s statutory authority and that the funding terminations violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Refugee Act.Upon review, the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted two preliminary injunctions. The first prohibited enforcement of the executive order suspending refugee admissions and related funding, and the second required the reinstatement of terminated cooperative agreements with resettlement agencies. The Government immediately appealed and sought stays of these injunctions. The district court also certified three plaintiff classes and further clarified the scope of its injunctions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the President acted within his statutory authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) in suspending refugee admissions and in pausing decisions on refugee applications, and it reversed the district court’s injunctions to the extent they blocked these actions. The court also concluded that suspending overseas refugee processing and related funding did not violate the Refugee Act or the APA. However, the court affirmed the injunction as to the termination of domestic resettlement services, holding that the Government was likely acting contrary to law and arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to provide statutorily mandated resettlement services to admitted refugees. The scope of the injunction was upheld as compliant with recent Supreme Court precedent. View "PACITO V. TRUMP" on Justia Law

Two companies that operate app-based delivery platforms challenged a Seattle ordinance enacted in 2023, which aims to protect gig economy workers from unwarranted account deactivations. The law requires “network companies” to provide workers with written deactivation policies and mandates that these policies be “reasonably related” to the companies’ safe and efficient operations. The ordinance also delineates examples of impermissible deactivation grounds, such as those based solely on customer ratings or certain background checks. The companies did not contest the general bar on unwarranted deactivations but argued that the notice and deactivation policy requirements violate the First Amendment and that the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague.In the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, the companies sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the ordinance from taking effect. The district court denied their motion. It found that the ordinance regulates conduct (the act of deactivating accounts) rather than speech, and that any impact on expression is incidental. The court also concluded that the use of “reasonable” in the ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague, pointing to statutory context and specific examples for guidance.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of injunctive relief. The court held that the ordinance regulates nonexpressive conduct, not speech, and thus does not trigger First Amendment scrutiny. Alternatively, if the ordinance were seen as regulating speech, that speech would be commercial in nature, and the law would satisfy the lower level of scrutiny applicable to compelled factual commercial disclosures. The court further held that the ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague, as it provides adequate notice of what is prohibited. The disposition by the Ninth Circuit was to affirm the district court’s denial of injunctive relief. View "MAPLEBEAR INC. V. CITY OF SEATTLE" on Justia Law

The case concerns a challenge brought by an environmental non-profit against the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) relating to the agency’s 2016 national recommendations for allowable cadmium levels in water. The EPA, as required by the Clean Water Act (CWA), periodically issues nonbinding criteria for water pollutants, which states typically adopt as standards for their own waters. In 2016, the EPA updated its cadmium recommendations but did so without consulting the Fish and Wildlife Service or the National Marine Fisheries Service, as mandated under Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) for actions that may affect protected species.Previously, the United States District Court for the District of Arizona found that the Center for Biological Diversity (CBD) had standing to challenge the EPA’s failure to consult. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of CBD, holding that the EPA’s issuance of the cadmium recommendations constituted “agency action” under the ESA that “may affect” listed species, thus triggering the consultation requirement. The court vacated the less stringent chronic freshwater cadmium recommendation and remanded all four 2016 cadmium recommendations to the EPA for proper consultation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that CBD had Article III standing, finding a concrete injury to its members’ interests in protected species, that the injury was fairly traceable to EPA’s recommendations due to predictable state adoption, and that the injury could be redressed by stricter recommendations resulting from consultation. On the merits, the court concluded that EPA’s publication of nationwide recommendations was “agency action” under the ESA and that such action “may affect” listed species, thus requiring prior consultation with the Services. The district court’s vacatur and remand were affirmed. View "CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY" on Justia Law