Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case involved two provisions in Arizona's Senate Bill 1070, which makes it unlawful for a motor vehicle occupant to hire or attempt to hire a person for work at another location from a stopped care that impedes traffic, or for a person to be hired in such a manner. At issue was whether these provisions violated the First Amendment by restricting and penalizing commercial speech for day laborers and for those who hire them. The court held that the district court correctly determined that, though Arizona had a significant government interest in promoting traffic safety, the day labor provisions failed Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York's requirement that restrictions on commercial speech be no more extensive than necessary to serve that interest. The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits and that the other requirements for a preliminary injunction were satisfied. Therefore, the court affirmed the preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the day labor provisions. View "Valle del Sol, et al v. State of Arizona, et al" on Justia Law

This case arose out of the long and contentious process to repair a flood-damaged road in a sensitive area of the Humboldt-Toiyabe National Forest. Great Old Broads appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Forest Service on Great Old Broads' claims related to the Forest Service's record of decision (ROD) determining the method of restoring the South Canyon Road as part of the Jarbridge Canyon Project. The court held that Great Old Broads exhausted its claims before the Forest Service but that the ROD conformed to the National Forest Management Act (NFMA), 16 U.S.C. 1600-1687, Executive Order 11988, and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321-4370f. The court reversed the district court on its analysis of exhaustion, but affirmed the district court on its alternative decision on the merits as to each of the claims presented. View "Great Old Broads For Wilderness, et al v. Kimbell, et al" on Justia Law

Farmers that irrigate their land using water from the San Luis Unit of the Central Valley Project claimed that the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 501 et seq., compelled the Bureau to provide their irrigation districts with more water than it was currently providing. Farmers argued that several federal statutes required the Bureau to provide irrigators with sufficient irrigation water to satisfy Farmers' needs before delivering water to any other party for any other purpose. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Bureau on several grounds. Pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA), the court held that the Bureau was not legally required to take a discrete action to deliver Farmers' preferred amount of San Luis Unit water for irrigation before it provided water for others. The Bureau retained the discretion to allocate San Luis water among various parties to satisfy its various obligations. There was no final agency action, nor was there any action that the Bureau had unlawfully withheld. Farmers' claims amounted to a broad programmatic attack on the way the Bureau generally operated the Central Valley Project and therefore Farmers have not established subject matter jurisdiction under the APA. View "San Luis Unit Food Producers, et al v. United States, et al" on Justia Law

Defendants pled guilty to one count of receipt of stolen mail and one count of mail theft. During the 2010 holiday season, defendants drove through neighborhoods on "Christmas shopping" trips in search of packages on porches, doorways, or in community mailboxes to steal. On appeal, defendants argued that the district court erred by including certain expenses the USPS incurred to avert future mail thefts as loss, for purposes of both sentencing and restitution. The court held that the district court was not clearly erroneous in concluding that the expense the USPS incurred was a reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm resulting from defendants' actions. The USPS theft prevention measures were directed at defendants' ongoing crime spree that concluded after the USPS changed its delivery procedures. The court held, however, that the district court plainly erred in ordering restitution for the USPS's expenses where mail theft - not unlawful possession - caused the USPS to change its procedure. Accordingly, the court affirmed defendants' sentences but vacated that portion of the restitution order awarding restitution for the USPS's expenses. View "United States v. May" on Justia Law

Good News appealed from the district court's determination on remand from the Ninth Circuit that the Town's ordinance restricting the size, duration, and location of temporary directional signs did not discriminate between different forms of noncommercial speech in an unconstitutional manner. In Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the court held that the ordinance was not a content-based regulation and was a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction. Accepting the court's opinion in Reed as law of the case, the court concluded that the Sign Code was constitutional because the different treatment of types of noncommercial temporary signs were not content-based as that term was defined in Reed, and the restrictions were tailored to serve significant government interests. Good News' other challenges did not merit relief. Further, the court determined that the amendments to the Sign Code made by the Town during the pendency of the appeal did not moot this case and that Good News could file a new action in the district court should it wish to challenge the new provisions of the Sign Code. View "Reed, et al v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona, et al" on Justia Law

Multistar, a for-hire motor carrier engaged in the business of transporting hazardous materials, petitioned for review of FMCSA's order to cease operations, and, in a separate petition for review, challenged the agency's denial of Multistar's petition for administrative review. The court dismissed the petitions insofar as they challenged the "unsatisfactory" rating and the order to cease operations because the court could not reach the merits of Multistar's substantive claims where there was no final agency decision. The court held that Multistar received all of the process it was due with regard to the contested violations, and the agency's denial of Multistar's petition for review was not arbitrary or capricious. Accordingly, the court dismissed in part and denied in part. View "Multistar Industries, Inc. v. USDOT, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs contended that the BLM violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. 1701 et seq., and its own regulations, 43 C.F.R. 3809 et seq., by permitting Denison to restart mining operations at the Arizona 1 Mine in 2009, after a 17-year hiatus, under a plan of operations that BLM approved in 1988. The court concluded that the prior panel did not intend that its brief affirmation of a preliminary injunction denial become law of the case; BLM's decision to allow Denison to resume mining under the 1988 plan of operations was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; because the 1988 plan had been approved, BLM's obligation under NEPA had been fulfilled and therefore, BLM did not unlawfully withhold required agency action; BLM's update of the reclamation bond should not be set aside as not in accordance with law or without observance of procedure required by law as plaintiffs contended; BLM's invocation of the categorical exclusion was not arbitrary and capricious or otherwise not in accordance with law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Center for Biological Diversity, et al v. Salazar, et al" on Justia Law

This case arose out of a dispute between the government and the county concerning the clean up of an abandoned landfill. The government entered into a consent decree with the county and the county then moved to modify the decree. The district court suspended the decree pending further findings and the government appealed. The county later moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that the order was not appealable because it was nonfinal. Because the government failed to satisfy the Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc. factors, the court held that it did not have jurisdiction at this time and dismissed the appeal. View "United States v. El Dorado County, et al" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was the EPA's Environmental Appeals Board (EAB) properly upheld two air permits authorizing exploratory drilling operations in the Arctic Ocean by a drillship and its associated fleet of support vessels. The petition for review challenged two aspects of the permits: (1) the determination that supported vessels, unlike the drillship itself, did not require the best available control technology (BACT) to control emissions; and (2) the exemption of the area within a 500-meter radius of the drillship from ambient air quality standards. The court denied the petition, holding that the EPA's interpretation of 42 U.S.C. 7627 was reasonable and that the EPA's grant of a 500 meter ambient air exemption was not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the agency's regulations. View "REDOIL, et al v. EPA" on Justia Law

In the four cases giving rise to these eleven consolidated appeals, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Director of the California Department of Health Care Services (DHCS), appealed the district court's grant of preliminary injunctions to plaintiffs, various providers and beneficiaries of California's Medicaid program (Medi-Cal). At issue was the implementation of Medi-Cal reimbursement rate reductions. The court held that Orthopaedic Hospital v. Belshe did not control the outcome in these cases because it did not consider the key issue here - the Secretary's interpretation of 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(30)(A); the Secretary's approval of California's requested reimbursement rates were entitled to Chevron deference; and the Secretary's approval complied with the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq. The court further held that plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits on their Supremacy Clause claims against the Director because the Secretary had reasonably determined that the State's reimbursement rates complied with section 30(A). The court finally held that none of the plaintiffs had a viable takings claim because Medicaid, as a voluntary program, did not create property rights. View "Managed Pharmacy Care, et al v. Sebelius, et al" on Justia Law