Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was removed from the Costa Mesa City Council meeting for an alleged violation of Costa Mesa Municipal Code 2-61, which made it a misdemeanor for members of the public who speak at City Council meetings to engage in "disorderly, insolent, or disruptive behavior." On appeal, plaintiff challenged, among other things, the district court's dismissal of his First Amendment facial challenge to the ordinance. Because section 2-61 failed to limit proscribed activity to only actual disturbances, the court reversed the district court's constitutionality ruling and found the statute facially invalid. However, the word "insolent" was easily removed from the ordinance without detriment to the purpose of section 2-61 and it need not be wholly invalidated since it was properly applied to plaintiff's disruptive behavior. The court affirmed the remainder of the district court's determinations. View "Acosta v. City of Costa Mesa, et al." on Justia Law

William Jefferson & Co., Inc. (William Jefferson) lost a state administrative appeal in which William Jefferson challenged the Orange County Tax Assessor's valuation of a parcel of real property. William Jefferson then filed a suit in federal district court, alleging that its procedural due process rights were violated in the course of the administrative appeal hearing. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that the state administrative appeal did not deny William Jefferson procedural due process. In a separate memorandum disposition filed concurrently with this opinion, the court affirmed the lower court's grant of the agency's motion for a protective order and its denial of class certification. View "William Jefferson & Co., Inc. v. Board of Assessment and Appeal, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioners, a group of municipal and federal government entities, which sold electricity in the affected markets at issue but who were outside of FERC's refund jurisdiction, appealed FERC's order of refunds for electricity rates that were above what FERC determined to be the just and reasonable rate. The court did not agree with FERC's assertion that it had broad authority under section 206 of the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 U.S.C. 824e, to retroactively reset rates that were charged in the California electricity markets during the time in question. Nonetheless, the court concluded that the specific FERC Orders that were challenged in the current petitions for review did not exceed the limits on FERC's authority. Consequently, the court denied the petitions. View "Modesto Irrigation District, et al. v. FERC" on Justia Law

CTTA filed this action seeking to invalidate two ordinances where the City and County of San Francisco required tow truck drivers to obtain permits to operate in San Francisco and towing firms to obtain permits to conduct business within San Francisco. CTTA primarily argued that the entire "permit scheme" (as it called both ordinances) was preempted by federal law. The district court upheld the permit scheme for "non-consensual" towing, but enjoined enforcement against those doing exclusively "consensual" towing and against tow truck drivers simply "passing through" San Francisco. Both parties cross-appealed. The CTTA's challenge to the entire permit scheme necessarily encompassed all of the permit scheme's components - each of which could be preempted. The district court analyzed the permit scheme in a way the parties presented the scheme, as a whole, but without specifically addressing its individual provisions. In doing so, however, the district court ran afoul of American Trucking Associations v. City of Los Angeles, which required "examining the specific provisions" of the permit scheme. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "California Tow Truck Assoc. v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

This case involved the Service's regulations under Section 101(a)(5)(A) of the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), 16 U.S.C. 1371(a), that authorized incidental take of polar bears and Pacific walruses resulting from oil and gas exploration activities in the Chukchi Sea and on the adjacent coast of Alaska. Plaintiffs brought suit challenging the regulations and accompanying environmental review documents under various environmental acts. The court held that the Service permissibly determined that only "relatively small numbers" of polar bears and Pacific walruses would be taken in relation to the size of their larger populations, because the agency separately determined that the anticipated take would have only a "negligible impact" on the mammals' annual rates of recruitment or survival. The "small numbers" determination was consistent with the statute and was not arbitrary and capricious. The court also held that the Service's accompanying Biological Opinion and Environmental Assessment (EA) complied with the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq., and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. View "Center for Biological Diversity, et al. v. Salazar, et al." on Justia Law

The IRS issued a Notice of Deficiency (NOD) to Alex and Liset Meruelo a few days before the three-year statute of limitations expired. Alex was a partner in a partnership. The Meruelos petitioned the tax court challenging the deficiency contained in the NOD and subsequently moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the IRS issued the NOD prematurely, making it invalid. The tax court held that the NOD was valid and not premature and that the items were affected items. The parties later reached an agreement as to all issues, except the validity of the NOD. The tax court then entered a final decision holding that the Meruelos were liable for $1,387,006 in additional income tax and $277,401 in penalties. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that (1) a NOD issued when no partnership-level proceeding or final partnership administrative adjustment have been issued is valid; (2) a NOD issued when the normal three-year statute of limitations has not expired is valid; and (3) therefore, the tax court had jurisdiction. View "Meruelo v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Grand Canyon Trust appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the United States Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) rejecting the Trust's claims alleging that Reclamation and FWS violated the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and the Administrative Procedure Act in the operation of the Glen Canyon Dam. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed as moot in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) several of the Trust's claims were moot; (2) Reclamation did not violate the ESA by not consulting with FWS before issuing each annual operating plan (AOP) for the Dam; and (3) Reclamation did not violate NEPA by not preparing an environmental assessment or environmental impact statement for each AOP. View "Grand Canyon Trust v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation" on Justia Law

Appellant appealed a district court judgment affirming the Social Security Administration's (SSA) decision finding him disabled from September 26, 1997 through December 3, 1998, and concluding that the disability ended on December 4, 1998 due to medical improvement. Appellant contended that the ALJ's medical improvement finding was not supported by substantial evidence because she erred in relying on a single proposed rating decision from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) (the 2001 decision). Appellant also claimed that the ALJ erred by failing to mention the opinion of his treating physician. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the ALJ erred in relying solely on the 2001 decision, as (1) the 2001 only proposed changes while ignoring two other decisions that rejected the proposed changes recommended in the 2001 decision; and (2) the ALJ's misunderstanding led her to inaccurately conclude that her finding that Appellant's disability terminated on December 4, 1998 was consistent with the VA's ratings. View "Hiler v. Astrue" on Justia Law

Petitioners, the Native Village of Kilalina IRA Council and other Alaskan groups, appealed the EPA Environmental Appeals Board's (EAB) order denying review of their challenges to a permit authorizing Intervenor Teck Alaska, Inc. to discharge wastewater caused by the operation of Red Dog Mine. The EAB concluded that Kivalina had not satisfied the procedural requirements to obtain review under 40 C.F.R. 124.19(a) because it did not demonstrate why the EPA's responses to comments were clearly erroneous or otherwise warranted review. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioners' petition for review, holding that Petitioners did not meet the requirements of section 124.19. View "Native Village of Kivalina IRA Council v. EPA" on Justia Law

The United States petitioned the district court for an order enforcing a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) subpoena served on Golden Valley Electric Association (Golden Valley) for power consumption records concerning three customer residences. The court granted the petition and ordered compliance. Golden Valley complied with the subpoena but appealed the order. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Golden Valley's compliance with the district court's enforcement order did not moot the appeal; (2) the DEA's subpoena sought information relevant to a drug investigation, was procedurally proper, and was not overly broad; and (3) the subpoena complied with the Fourth Amendment. View "United States v. Golden Valley Elec. Ass'n" on Justia Law