Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The district court granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting the State of Washington from enforcing its limitation on contributions to political committees supporting the recall of a state or county official. The court concluded that plaintiffs satisfied their burden under Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., to demonstrate that the contribution limit was likely an unconstitutional and harmful burden on plaintiffs' rights of free speech under the First Amendment. Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting the injunction and the court affirmed the judgment.

This case concerned the Washington State Grange's proposed People's Choice Initiative of 2004, or Initiative 872. I-872 created a "top two" primary in which the primary served as a means of winnowing the candidates to two rather than selecting party nominees. At issue was whether the State of Washington had designed its election ballots in a manner that eliminated the risk of widespread voter confusion, a question left unresolved in Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party. The court held that the state had done so. The ballots, and related informational material, informed voters that, although each candidate for partisan office could specify a political party that he or she preferred, a candidate's preference did not imply that the candidate was nominated or endorsed by the party, or that the party approved of or associated with that candidate. Given the design of the ballot, and in the absence of evidence of actual voter confusion, the court held that Washington's top primary system, as implemented by the state, did not violate the First Amendment associational rights of the state's political parties. The court also affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' ballot access and trademark claims. The court reversed the district court's order granting the state's request for reimbursement of attorney's fees paid in accordance with a 2006 stipulation.

Oregon's Measure 37 required state and local governments to compensate private property owners for the reduction in the fair market value of their real property that resulted from any land use regulations of those governmental entities that restricted the use of the subject properties. In this consolidated appeal, at issue was whether Oregon committed a constitutional taking, violated plaintiffs' due process rights, or violated plaintiffs' equal protection rights when Oregon voters enacted Measure 49 to replace and modify remedies available under the previous Measure 37. The court concluded that Oregon did not commit a constitutional taking when it modified Measure 37, because any potential property interest that plaintiffs had for compensation or a specific type of land use under Measure 37 had not vested. Measure 49 also did not contravene substantive due process because it did not implicate fundamental rights. For this reason, and also because the regulatory classification under Measure 49 was not based on a suspect class, Measure 49 survived rational basis scrutiny and had not violated plaintiffs' equal protection rights. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court.

This case arose out of three applications by the TRRC to build a a railroad line in Southeastern Montana to haul coal. The Board, or its predecessor, approved each of the three applications (TRRC I, II, and III). Petitioners challenged TRRC II and III on a number of environmental and public convenience and necessity grounds. The court held that the Board failed to take the requisite "hard look" at certain material environmental impacts inherent in TRRC II and III in the manner required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., prior to approving those applications. The court further held that the Board did not err in its public convenience and necessity analyses, except with respect to its reliance on the viability of TRRC II during the approval of TRRC III.

This case arose from claims that the federal government, with the assistance of major telecommunications companies, engaged in widespread warrantless eavesdropping in the United States following the September 11, 2001 attacks. At issue was whether plaintiffs have standing to bring their statutory and constitutional claims against the government for what they described as a communications dragnet of ordinary American citizens. The court concluded that plaintiffs' claims were not abstract, generalized grievances and instead met the constitutional standing requirement of concrete injury; nor do prudential considerations bar the action; the claims did not raise a political question nor are they inappropriate for judicial resolution; and the court did not impose a heightened standing requirement simply because the case involved government officials in the national security context. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's dismissal on standing grounds and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs appealed from the district court's dismissal of their complaint against government officials and a group of telecommunications companies. Plaintiffs challenged section 802 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. 1885a, as an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment. Section 802 allowed the U.S. Attorney General to certify that a telecommunications company provided assistance at the behest of the government in connection with investigation of terrorism, thereby triggering immunity on the theory that application of section 802 required dismissal of plaintiffs' case and negated the cause of action under various federal statutes. The court held that the district court correctly dismissed plaintiffs' complaint for lack of jurisdiction where plaintiffs demanded no monetary damages. Consequently, the court need not reach the merits of the Takings Clause claim.

These consolidated appeals arose from claims that major telecommunications carriers assisted the government with intelligence gathering following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Plaintiffs challenged the legality of the telecommunications companies' participation in the surveillance program. At issue was the constitutionality of section 802 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. 1885a, which allowed for immunity for the telecommunications companies. The court concluded that the statute was constitutional and did not violate Articles I and III of the Constitution or the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Accordingly, the district court's grant of the government's motion to dismiss was affirmed as to the challenged section 802 claims.

Plaintiffs contended that Barack Obama was constitutionally ineligible to be President of the United States. In addition to plaintiffs' constitutional claims, as well as their claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their quo warranto claims for improper venue; their Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552 et seq., claims for failure to state a claim; and their Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq., claims against defendants First Lady Michelle Obama, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Vice President Joe Biden, and former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, for failure to state a claim. The court adopted the district court's classification of the parties and held that each plaintiff lacked standing; the proper venue for plaintiffs' quo warranto claims was in the District of Columbia, pursuant to D.C. Code 16-3503; FOIA did not apply to any of defendants because they were all individuals, not agencies; and plaintiffs had six months between the original complaint and the amended complaint to attempt to set forth civil RICO allegations and their failure to do so was inexcusable. Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs' constitutional claims for lack of Article III standing and the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs' quo warranto, FOIA, or RICO claims. The dismissal of the district court was affirmed and the emergency petition for writ of mandamus was denied.

Plaintiffs, Washington Medicaid beneficiaries with severe mental and physical disabilities, appealed the district court's denial of their motion for a preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the operation of a regulation promulgated by Washington's DSHS that reduced the amount of in-home "personal care services" available under the state's Medicaid plan. The court concluded that plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable injury because they have shown that reduced access to personal care services would place them at serious risk of institutionalization. The court further concluded that plaintiffs have raised serious questions going to the merits of their Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132, and Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794(a), claims, that the balance of hardships tipped sharply in their favor, and that a preliminary injunction would serve the public interest. Accordingly, the court remanded for entry of a preliminary injunction.

Plaintiffs challenged the 2006 Gallatin National Forest Management Plan prepared by the United States Forest Service, arguing that the travel plan violated the Montana Wilderness Study Act of 1977, 16 U.S.C. 1131. The court held that the Study Act required the Service to ensure that current users of a wilderness study area were able to enjoy the wilderness character of the area as it existed in 1977, pending a congressional decision on whether to designate the area as wilderness. In this case, the Service had not adequately explained how the 1977 wilderness character of the relevant study area had been maintained despite an increase in the volume of motorized and mechanized recreation in the area. Therefore, the court concluded that the Service's adoption of the travel plan was arbitrary and capricious and affirmed the district court's decision finding that the Service's actions violated the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq.